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Following the Bolshevik Revolution in November of 1917, the United States ended 
diplomatic relations with Russia, and refused to recognize the Soviet regime until 
1933 when President Franklin Roosevelt reversed this policy.  Given Russia’s vast 
size and importance on the world stage, Washington closely monitored the internal 
developments in that country during the non-recognition period.  This dissertation is 
study of the American diplomatic despatches about the political, economic and social 
conditions in the USSR in its formative years.  In addition to examining the 
despatches as a valuable record of the Soviet past, the dissertation also explores the 
ways in which the despatches shaped the early American attitudes toward the first 
Communist state and influenced the official policy.  The American diplomats, 
stationed in revolutionary Russia and later, in the territories of friendlier nations 
surrounding the Soviet state, prepared regular reports addressing various aspects of 
  
life in the USSR.  Following the evacuation of the American diplomatic personnel 
from Russia toward the end of the Civil War, the Western visitors to Russia, 
migrants, and Soviet publications became primary sources of knowledge about the 
Soviet internal affairs.  Under the guidance of the Eastern European Affairs Division 
at the U.S. State Department, the Americans managed to compile great volumes of 
information about the Soviet state and society.  In observing the chronological order, 
this dissertation focuses on issues of particular significance and intensity such as 
diplomatic observers’ treatment of political violence, repression and economic 
hardships that engulfed tumultuous periods of the Revolution, Civil War, New 
Economic Policy and Collectivization.  The dissertation also examines the American 
recognition of the Soviet state in the context of the diplomatic despatches about the 
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The United States of America broke off diplomatic relations with Russia immediately 
after the Bolsheviks seized power in November of 1917.  Having denounced the 
Soviet regime as illegitimate, Washington withheld recognition for sixteen years until 
1933, when the government of President Franklin Roosevelt reversed the policy 
course.  This dissertation explores the diplomatic despatches of the monitors who 
supplied policymakers in Washington with vital information about the Soviet internal 
conditions during the non-recognition period.  Issued from various diplomatic stations 
in and around Russia, the diplomatic despatches played an important role in 
determining the early attitudes among American officials toward the Soviet 
government and influenced the policy of non-recognition.  In the form of observer 
reports, interviews, analyses, memorandums, and translated Soviet publications, the 
American diplomats composed despatches that sought to depict the political, 
economic and social aspects of life in the Soviet Union.  As such, these despatches 
not only furnished policy makers with information on the conditions inside Russia 
under the new government, but they also comprise a valuable record of the Soviet 
past.  
Given the persistent ideological hostility between Washington and Moscow, 
what, in fact, constituted the “First Cold War”1 was the period during which the 
                                                 
1 The term “First Cold War” belongs to Donald E. Davis and Eugene P. Trani whose book The First 
Cold War: The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson in U.S.-Soviet Relations (Columbia, MI: University of 
Missouri, 2002) addresses the early hostility between the American and Bolshevik governments.  As 
for the historical narratives on the antagonism between the U.S. and Soviet Russia in the first sixteen 
years of the latter’s existence, the literature is vast.  To cite just a few, one could point out Georg 
Schild, Between Ideology and Realpolitik: Woodrow Wilson and the Russian Revolution , 1917-1921 




Americans managed to obtain a great deal of knowledge about the Soviet regime.  By 
1920’s, the East European Division of the U.S. State Department contained the 
largest repository of information on the Soviet Union.  The charismatic chief of this 
division, Robert F. Kelley, known as “Mr. Eastern Europe” among colleagues due to 
his superb knowledge of the Russian history, was keen on streamlining the 
information-gathering by diplomats and ensured that the despatches met the expected 
criteria for quality.  Such oversight had become especially necessary after the 
American diplomats departed Russia in 1919 and the number of reliable sources on 
the ground diminished.  In 1922, the United States upgraded the consulate in the 
Latvian capital Riga to the embassy status, and established a section within the 
embassy that focused on the Soviet Union.  Situated 100 miles to the south-west of 
Petrograd, Riga provided a unique advantage to the American diplomats to observe 
the political processes in Russia.  Staffed by the officers who had close experience 
with Soviet Russia, from 1922 until 1933, the Russian Section played a pivotal role in 
acquisition of information and its analysis.  Authors Natalie Grant, Claudia Breuer, 
and Loy Henderson have produced narratives that specifically address the functions 
of the legation in Riga which served as a primary listening post for the United States.2  
While a notable portion of the despatches utilized in this dissertation hail from the 
                                                                                                                                           
1920: A Study  of National Policy (Durham, NC: Duke University, 1956), John Richman, The United 
States and the Soviet Union: The Decision to Recognize (Raleigh, NC: Camberleigh and Hall, 1980).  
Two previous works that dealt with the topic of U.S.-Soviet tensions in the time frame of my focus 
were Melvin Goodman’s “The Diplomacy of Non-Recognition: Soviet American Relations, 1917-
1933” (PhD diss., Indiana University, 1972) and David Singer’s “The United States Confronts the 
Soviet Union: The Rise and Fall of the Policy of Non-Recognition” (PhD diss., Loyola University, 
1973).  
2 See Natalie Grant, “The Russian Section: A Window on the Soviet Union,” Diplomatic History 2 
(1978), Claudia Breuer, Die ‘Russische Section’ in Riga (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart, 
1995), George W. Baer ed., A Question of Trust: The Origins U.S. –Soviet Diplomatic Relations - The 




Latvian capital, the American consulates in other countries, particularly those in 
Sweden, Germany, Poland, Finland, China, and Turkey richly contributed to the 
knowledge about the conditions in the Soviet Union.  Yet much of these latter 
documents have rarely been incorporated into the small body of academic 
publications that utilized the U.S. diplomatic despatches.  In this dissertation I have 
sought to remedy that shortcoming.   
 Certainly, the diplomatic despatches were not the only source of information 
about the USSR.  But given their official status, these were the documents that 
reached the tables of the policy makers in Washington and influenced their attitudes.  
Such documents could include a memo from the U.S. ambassador in Russia when 
Americans were still there in the immediate post-revolution period, a report from a 
low-ranking consul at a provincial Chinese city, or even an article in an obscure 
Swedish newspaper.  It could be the minutiae of a conversation with a farmer or a 
simple technician who worked at a Soviet factory.  This dissertation is the story of 
those who shared their personal accounts of Russia.  It is about writers, doctors, 
engineers and unskilled workers who went to the USSR for various reasons and came 
back with their accounts about the Soviet realities.  It is also the story of high to low-
level diplomats who labored under sometimes intense circumstances to obtain 
information.  The American diplomats were trained and sent to the region to survey 
Russia and record its present.  During the revolution and the ensuing civil war, the 
Americans were on the ground and experienced the events as they unfolded before 
their eyes.  Later, they watched Soviet Russia from the immediate neighborhood 




views were affected by the prejudices that predated their arrival to Russia, and their 
narratives, regardless of any efforts to retain objectivity, were limited in scope.  The 
characters of this dissertation were the products of their time and circumstances.  
After all, there was only so much that one person could visualize or experience at a 
time.  But altogether these despatches comprise an informative collage of narratives 
with a specific historical value.  
As late as the middle of the twentieth century, for most Westerners, in the 
words of Winston Churchill, Russia remained “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside 
an enigma.”  However, the literature pertaining to the Western visitors’ perception of 
Russia had been rich for some time.  From early 1500s, when the English merchants 
first came into contact with Russians until early 20-th century, travelers’ accounts 
were crucial in providing some picture of the realities.  In that sense, one could view 
this dissertation as addressing series of mini-reports by the contemporaries of Richard 
Chancellor, Sir Jerome Horsey, Friedrich von Herbertstein – Western diplomats in the 
old Russian Empire whose accounts of that country not only made an indelible impact 
on the way Russia came to be perceived by Westerners, but also added to historical 
knowledge about Russia’s past.  Authors Anthony Cross and Marshall Poe, in 
particular, have produced valuable narratives which emphasize the historical 
significance of the, so to say, earliest diplomatic despatches.3  As Tsarist Russia 
entered the modern age, such visits by Western men became more numerous, among 
which the best known is the voyage by French nobleman Astolphe de Custine whose 
perceptions of the Russian society, some American diplomatic observers would 
                                                 
3 See Anthony Cross, Russia Under Western Eyes, 1517-1825 (London: Elek Books, 1971), and 
Marshall Poe, A People Born to Slavery: Russia in Early Modern European Ethnography, 1476-1748 




argue, were relevant to their own experiences.  “Like Custine, we Americans in 
Moscow felt ourselves in a profoundly different civilization.  His observations, as 
fresh as yesterday, despite their age of a century, served to bring the Soviet Union 
into perspective better than any of our previous readings, studies and observations,” 
remarked Walter Bedell Smith, who had an opportunity to serve as an American 
ambassador in Stalin’s USSR.4
Given its pariah status, the Soviet Union increasingly became recluse in 
contrast to the late Tsarist Russia, where, beginning from the reforms by Alexander II 
until the downfall of Nicholas I, there existed greater exchange of visitors and ideas 
with the West.  The Bolsheviks’ unconcealed hostility to the bourgeois West and their 
proclaimed desire to spread Communist revolution throughout the world was a strong 
repellent in the already fragile ties with the West.  Less than a year after the 
Bolshevik takeover, a great majority of Western diplomats had withdrawn from the 
Soviet territories.  Those who remained behind or resumed work were isolated and 
their actions constantly monitored by the Soviet security apparatus.  On the other 
hand, Russia’s revolutionary character fueled attraction of great many Western leftists 
who visualized the Soviet Union as the symbol of socialism’s impending victory over 
an unjust capitalist order.  As such, the Soviet Union, guided by a government agency 
whose specific purpose was to present a desired image of the Communist motherland 
for the rest of the world, drew visitors who were eager to see socialism in progress, 
and also those, who for different motives, chose to participate in the construction of a 
new society.  American historians Sylvia Margulies, David Caute and Paul Hollander 
                                                 
4 Walter B. Smith in Introduction to The Journals of the Marquis de Custine: Journey for Our Time 




have shed much light into the motives and visions of those who went to the Soviet 
Union in search of hope and returned with misleading accounts of the Soviet 
realities.5  In the years since the collapse of the USSR, various narratives addressing 
the early Soviet experiences of British diplomats, German travelers and French 
intellectuals have been produced which, similar to this dissertation, were more 
oriented to depict the existing socio-political conditions in the country than the 
ideological proclivities of the observers.  
While I frequently rely on traveler accounts -- the transcripts of which 
constituted the bulk of the American diplomatic despatches during the period of non-
recognition -- this research focuses on the body of the diplomatic despatches as a 
whole.  In addition to the accounts provided by American and other Western travelers 
to the USSR, the U.S. diplomats situated in the adjacent countries, particularly in 
Latvia, obtained newspapers, magazines, and other forms of printed literature which 
were diligently translated and forwarded to Washington alongside analytical reports.  
Renowned diplomats of the future such as George F. Kennan and Loy Henderson had 
responsibilities which involved far more than simply filtering through the raw 
information that came out of the USSR, but to discern the underlying political and 
economic trends and interpret the events in a way that would be of practical use to 
policy makers in Washington.  As the Americans found out early on, the Soviet 
publications could not be trusted for their veracity.  But they could be trusted to give 
indications of the policies pursued by the Soviet leadership.  
                                                 
5 See Sylvia Margulies, Pilgrimage to Russia, The Soviet Union and the Treatment of Foreigners, 
1924-1937 (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 1968), David Caute, The Fellow Travelers: 
Intellectual Friends of Communism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988, and Paul Hollander, 
Political Pilgrims: Western Intellectuals in Search of the Good Society (New Brunswick, NJ: 




The essential purpose of this research is to reconstruct the internal conditions 
in the Soviet Union through the accounts of those who had the ability to observe, 
compare and, of course, speak out about their impressions – mostly, the foreigners.  
Hundreds of diplomatic despatches examined in the course of this research describe 
Soviet conditions with remarkable insight.  In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse and 
the opening of the archives, a substantial body of evidence with regard to the events 
of the past has surfaced.  From the terrible experiences of the Civil War to the famine 
of collectivization, there is a greater degree of consensus on issues today that were 
previously the subjects of sometimes heated academic debate.  So, more often, 
information in these despatches confirm some of what is widely known about the 
Soviet past – persecution, chronic shortages, and famine.  An overwhelming number 
of the examined despatches contain negative verdicts on the Soviet practices and 
policies.  As despatch after despatch testifies, Communism in practice had disastrous 
economic consequences for the welfare of the population.  Liquidation of private 
property and accumulation of most means of production in the hands of the state 
almost immediately led to unprecedented famines and destruction of millions of lives.  
Although the Soviet government’s commitment to Communist principles were 
somewhat eased during the New Economic Policy, this dissertation finds that at no 
point did the Soviet leaders lose sight of the objectives of the Bolshevik revolution.  
Hence the worsening economic conditions throughout mid 1920’s which reached 
their climax during the deadly campaign of collectivization – ironically, the year in 




In using the term ‘First Cold War’, I have sought to highlight the political 
roots of the hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Many 
despatches reemphasize the primacy of Communist ideology in the behavior and 
policies of Soviet leaders whose allegiance to reengineering human society and 
undermining non-Communist governments abroad did not waver.  The documents 
examined in the course of this research demonstrate that the communist government 
such as the one which existed in the Soviet Union, barring extraordinary 
circumstances, such as the rise of expansionist Nazi Germany, could not have been 
friends with the United States, at least, not in the long-term.  The sixteen years of 
non-recognition was not accidental or due to stubborn ideological hostility of 
American leaders, but a deliberate response to the global threat that was the USSR.  
The American policy makers and recognition opponents in the State Department 
identified the internal policies of the Soviet government and its proclamations as 
precursors to the Kremlin’s actions in the international venue and took this position 
quite seriously.  The decision to recognize the Soviet Union by the FDR 
administration, in effect, disregarded this correlation between domestic actions and 
international policies, thus coming at the height of the government-initiated famine 
that killed millions in Ukraine and North Caucasus.  In doing so, the American 
government hoped to accentuate mutual interests over the ideological differences 
which ultimately proved too resilient.   
Above all, these despatches retell the tragic story of the Soviet peoples 
through a collage of American narratives.  For that reason, the dissertation is 




are reflected in the chapters that address the October Revolution, Civil War, New 
Economic Policy, Stalin’s rise to power, Collectivization, and Recognition.  In 
choosing to follow the chronological order, I have attempted to trace the quality of 
American observation from one point to another, and the change over time.  But this 
is not just a story of the Soviet Union as the Americans saw it, it is also the story of 
the Soviet Union that was.  It is difficult to overestimate the effect of the political 
upheaval which tore apart the centuries-old social fabric of the society and sought to 
build an entirely new one based on Marxist ideology.  Deeply opposed to Western 
liberal values, the Bolsheviks were creating a model for the rest of the world to 
follow.  Lenin’s proletarian dictatorship promised to build a society where persons 
would contribute according to their abilities and receive according to their needs.  
Instead, the inhabitants of the former Russian empire were subjected to calamities 
unparalleled even by the poor standards of the country’s tsarist past.  In revisiting the 
despatches about the Soviet internal affairs, this dissertation sheds light onto 





Chapter 1: The Rupture: Bolsheviks Seize Power 
On November 7, 1917, at five o’clock in the evening, a despatch went out from the 
U.S. embassy in Petrograd to Washington.  In that message, the American 
Ambassador David Francis informed his superiors at the State Department about the 
meeting between the  embassy secretary Sheldon Whitehouse and aide de camp of 
Alexander Kerensky, the head of the Provisional Government.  Kerensky’s advisor 
had just told Whitehouse that the prime minister was on his way to Luga in order to 
mobilize loyal forces to the government against the Bolsheviks.  He acknowledged 
that Bolsheviks had the virtual control of the city, but reassured his American 
counterpart that “the whole affair [was] to be liquidated within five days.”6  An hour 
later, the American embassy issued a second despatch.  In it, Francis definitively 
confirmed that the Bolsheviks controlled “everything” in Petrograd.  Expressing his 
concern about the fates of the Provisional Government’s ministers, the American 
ambassador noted that an incendiary speech had been made by Lenin who “spoke of 
peace, violently attacked the Bourgeoisie and advocated division of property.”  
According to him, “many newspapers, perhaps all, had been suppressed.”7  What was 
not mentioned in the despatches, however, was that on the same day, Prime Minister 
Kerensky had left Petrograd in an American diplomatic car, the automobile of the 
U.S. assistant military attaché, Captain E. Francis Riggs.  Although the whole 
incident had been accidental, owing to the chance that Kerensky’s adjutant Boris 
Knirsha happened to come across the American’s car first instead of that by Italian or 
                                                 
6 David R. Francis, U.S. Ambassador in Russia, to Robert Lansing, U.S. State Secretary, November 7, 
1917, RG 59, File  #861.00/632.  




British diplomats, the event was symbolical of the United States’ attachment to 
Russia’s first liberal government in history and Washington’s ensuing aversion 
toward the Bolshevik regime.    
By the nightfall of November 7, the only important government structure not 
yet controlled by the Bolshevik forces was the Winter Palace, the seat of the 
Provisional Government.  Early in that morning the Bolshevik forces had made an 
attempt to capture the building.  Having encountered fierce resistance from the junker 
guards defending the palace, they had retreated.  However, that did not prevent 
Vladimir Lenin, the leader of the Bolshevik Party, from making a declaration from 
his political headquarters in Smolny to the effect that the Provisional Government had 
been deposed.  At 9 o’clock in the evening, the gunmen under Lenin’s command 
stood poised to fulfill the declaration.  As the cruiser Aurora, sitting nearby in the 
Neva river, began bombarding the Winter Palace, the numerically superior 
Bolsheviks stormed the building.  After several hours of fighting, the defenders of the 
Provisional Government were told by the ministers to abandon the effort and lay 
down the arms.  The victorious Bolsheviks immediately arrested all the ministers and 
took them to the Peter and Paul fortress.   
On November 8, Washington received a frantic message from the U.S. 
embassy in Stockholm, Sweden.  According to Ambassador Ira Morris, all telegrams 
coming out of Petrograd were being issued by the Bolsheviks and nothing had been 
heard from the Americans in the city.  “In the view of the fact that Embassies there 
may not be in telegraphic communication with their governments,” Morris conveyed 




possible.”8  From this point on, most of the despatches regarding the situation 
immediately after the Bolshevik takeover were to come from the U.S. embassy in 
Sweden.  In purely geographical terms, as one of the closest location to the Russian 
capital, the Stockholm bureau assumed the duties to inform the American government 
about the rapid developments in revolutionary Russia. 
Angered and frustrated by the prospect of Bolshevik power, U.S. Ambassador 
David Francis kept trying to communicate with Washington.  However, his first full 
despatch to arrive in Washington was on November 17 -- ten days after the Bolshevik 
takeover.  Until then, the American envoy had to rely on couriers and haphazard 
telegraphic lines between Petrograd and Stockholm.  The disruption in telegraph 
communication and closure of nearly all non-Bolshevik newspapers significantly 
obstructed the view of unfolding events.  It is evident from the despatches that for 
about a month following the Bolshevik seizure of power, nobody had a clear idea 
about the political realities in Russia.  In the haze and confusion of the power vacuum 
following the collapse of the Provisional Government, much of the information was 
based on personal eyewitness stories which were inevitably limited in range and 
perspective. 
In the immediate days following November 7, diplomatic despatches made 
little reference to Bolshevik newspapers which were rightly assumed to be airing little 
other than propaganda.  While censorship had been prevalent in pre-revolutionary 
Russia, the Bolshevik seizure of power marked a decisive departure from the previous 
practices both in scope and intentions.  One of the first acts of the Provisional 
                                                 





Government had been to abolish the Central Administration for Press Affairs, which 
in effect abolished censorship.9  The only requirement from directors of the 
publication was to register their product with the government.  In contrast, on the very 
first night of their incumbency, the Bolsheviks moved to “close down eight bourgeois 
newspapers, and also adopted a special resolution about the press which called for 
temporary shutdown of all bourgeois newspapers.”10  Two days later, on November 
9, Sovnarkom (The Council of People’s Commissars) issued a decree on the press 
that read: “It is common knowledge that the bourgeois press is one of the most 
powerful weapons in the hands of the bourgeoisie… it is no less dangerous at this 
moment than bombs or machine guns…”11  First, applied mostly in regard to non-
Marxist publications, these restrictive measures soon extended to every print outlet 
that was deemed disloyal to the Bolshevik Party.   
While disappointed by the transpiring events around him, the deposition of the 
Provisional Government did not take the American ambassador by surprise.  Having 
monitored precarious state of the Provisional Government throughout its short tenure, 
Francis had gained some prior knowledge about radical adversaries faced by Prime 
Minister Kerensky.  As a representative of a government allied with Russia at war 
against Germany, Francis resented Lenin and his followers from the start.  The 
Bolshevik agitation for separate peace with the Germans seriously undermined the 
Allied efforts to win the Great War.  The fact that the Bolshevik leader had spent 
                                                 
9 Peter Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917-1929 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
10 Mikhail V. Zelenov, Apparat TsK RKP(b)-VKP(b), tsenzura i istoricheskaia nauka v 1920-e gody 
(Nizhni Novgorod: Nizhpoligraph, 2000), 62. 
11 Arlen V. Blium, Za kulisami “Ministerstva Pravdy”: Tainaia istoriia sovestskoi tsenzury, 1917-1929 




much of his exile in the territories controlled by Wilhelm Kaiser and had been 
facilitated by the German government to come to Russia strengthened Francis’ 
suspicions about Vladimir Lenin being a German agent.  At the same time, Francis 
was mindful that just as the Germans were using Lenin to achieve their ends, the 
Bolshevik leader saw Wilhelm Kaiser as a useful partner in his goal to advance his 
own radical ideas.  “While I have no doubt that Lenin was a German agent from the 
beginning,” the ambassador would later write in his memoir, “I believe and so wired 
the Department [of State] that his real purpose was promotion of worldwide social 
revolution.”12  Indeed, shortly after the November coup, Francis wrote to State 
Secretary Robert Lansing: “I don’t know if they are German agents or not…. I think 
Lenin and Trotsky are reckless adventurers and playing bluff game.”13  Clearly, it 
was the Bolshevik outlook of society and its universal ideas about the world that most 
revolted the ambassador and his superiors at the State Department.   
On the other end, in Washington, the U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 
having received his first cable from the Associated Press, jotted down in his diary: 
“The Bolsheviks have overthrown the government.”14  In the absence of relevant 
regional bureaux or divisions which streamlined the information between the 
embassies and the foreign policy chief (the Division of Russian Affairs was not 
established until August of 1919), Lansing had few options other than awaiting a 
cable from the envoys in Russia or a handful media outlets.15  With his conservative 
                                                 
12 David R. Francis, Russia from the American Embassy: April, 1916 - November, 1918 (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1921), 226.  
13 Francis to Lansing, December 9, 1917, RG 59, File  #861.00/786. 
14 G.H. Sevostianov, Moskva-Vashington: Na puti k priznaniu, 1918-1933 (Moscow: Nauka, 2004), 9. 
15 As late as 1920’s, only “about seven hundred people worked in Department’s divisions in 
Washington” -- a far cry from the complexities of the modern State Department with numerous 




political outlook, Lansing generally agreed with Francis’ assessment of the situation.  
Often described as the “leading warrior against Bolshevism,” Lansing relied on 
Francis’ counsel in reaching his conclusions about the Soviets.16  In his view, the 
Bolshevik’s proclaimed desire to spread revolution throughout the world and their 
plan to turn the nascent Soviet state into a launch pad represented grave danger to 
world peace.  The Bolsheviks’ increasing enthusiasm for resorting to violence fueled 
Lansing’s suspicions about the nature of the regime.  Most of all, having invested 
political capital in the success of the Provisional Government, the Secretary of State 
was severely disappointed at the Bolsheviks’ opportunism in overthrowing the first 
democratic government in Russian history.   
While President Woodrow Wilson shared Lansing’s apprehensions about 
Bolsheviks, there were two main problems with regard to communication between the 
commander in chief and his foreign policy apparatus.  First, Wilson was too busy 
focusing on the Western European front to pay sufficient attention to the matters 
unfolding in Petrograd.17  While Lansing made efforts to maintain communication 
with the American diplomats in Moscow, according William Allison, President 
“seldom asked for, and rarely read, embassy reports.”18  Secondly, instead of his 
diplomats, Wilson frequently deferred to personal envoys and friends when making 
                                                                                                                                           
Ferrell, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy (New York, Cooper Square Publishers 
Inc., 1963), Vol. XI, 26. 
16 Norman Saul, Friends or Foes?: The United States and Soviet Russia, 1921-1941 (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2006), 6.  
17 “He was much more concerned with the war on the Western front and with such matters as the 
Allied demand for 100 American division, the efforts of the Allies to amalgamate American soldiers 
into Allied units and the possibility of new Allied fronts in Italy and Macedonia,” observed Eugene 
Trani in  “Woodrow Wilson and the Decision to Intervene in Russia: A Reconsideration,” The Journal 
of Modern History (Sep., 1976), 442. 
18 William Allison, American Diplomats in Russia: Case Studies in Orphan Diplomacy, 1916-1919 




decisions in such matters.  His close relationship with individuals such as Colonel 
Edward House, John Spargo and George Creel had more influence on Wilson’s 
understanding of Soviet Russia than Robert Lansing or David Francis.19  In the case 
of American socialist leader John Spargo, his attitude toward Bolsheviks did not 
greatly differ from that of Robert Lansing.  Convinced that the path to socialism lay 
in gradual reforms rather than revolution, Spargo went as far as describing [Bolshevik 
Russia] as “the greatest problem now confronting the American people.”  According 
to Ronald Radosh, “Spargo urged Lansing to give vigorous support to anti-Bolshevik 
forces within Russia; the overthrow of Bolsheviks if necessary.”20  But such incidents 
of coalescence did not alleviate the structural problems in President Wilson’s 
handling of the Russian policy.   
Generally, Wilson’s own attitude toward Bolsheviks was not as hostile or 
palpable as that of his State Secretary.  According to historian Eugene Trani, who 
does not hide his displeasure with the “hard-liners” at the State Department, “Lansing 
greatly feared Bolshevism and was far more alarmed than Wilson about its possible 
implications.”21  This difference of attitudes was at times reflected in conflicts such 
as the one which arose between George Creel, head of the U.S. Committee on Public 
Information (created by Woodrow Wilson for propaganda purposes during the war) 
and Robert Lansing.  Having dispatched journalists Arthur Bullard and Edgar Sisson 
                                                 
19 Author Claude E. Fike blamed this reality on the ineffectiveness of David Francis: “Thus there 
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as the representatives of the committee in revolutionary Russia, Creel systematically 
interfered with the activities of Lansing’s subordinates in that country.  Creel’s 
instruction to his envoys “to have a free hand, using [their] own judgment” irritated 
the Secretary and hurt the latter’s confidence in the President.22  By relying on 
personal representatives and his own academic prowess, Wilson ignored the 
diplomats to the point that he “completely alienated himself from his State 
Department.”23  On the other hand, the president’s inability and unwillingness to 
consolidate the decision-making in one set of hands led to a bit of chaos in which 
very few felt authorized enough to determine the course of policy with regard to the 
Soviet government.  In Trani’s view, ultimately, Wilson “allowed the State 
Department to handle operations concerning Soviet Russia, proof by itself that 
Wilson assigned low priority to that country.”  The paradoxical effect of Wilson’s 
indifference to both State Department and Russia was that “Lansing and the State 
Department emerged as decisive American forces” in shaping the actual policy 
toward the Bolshevik government.24  Subsequently, Lansing’s confidant on Russian 
matters, David Francis, enjoyed greater degree of freedom in his actions, and perhaps 
influenced the policies in a way he could not have otherwise.   
A native son of the American Midwest, Francis first established his career by 
opening a grain company together with his brother in St. Louis, Missouri.  With his 
business booming and married to the daughter of a wealthy railroad magnate, shortly 
afterwards, Francis began to work his way through more prestigious layers of the 
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society.  By 1883, Francis became the president of St. Louis Merchants Exchange.  
Soon, Francis was to be elected mayor of St. Louis, and consequently, the governor of 
the state of Missouri.  Francis’ political as we all as monetary capital allowed him to 
mingle with leading politicians at a national level.  In fact, Francis owed his 
diplomatic career to such connections when in 1916 president Woodrow Wilson 
turned to his benefactor from Missouri to fill the vacant post of ambassador in Russia.  
As some historians have pointed out -- George F. Kennan being the more prominent 
among such voices -- Ambassador Francis may have lacked the qualifications to 
assess the situation in this extremely distinct land where he found himself, but as his 
record shows, the ambassador was sufficiently equipped with background in business 
and politics to appreciate what did and did not serve the interests of his country.  In 
the words of historian James Libbey, “of all the political misfits which the United 
States willed upon the Russian people as American ambassador, Francis stood higher 
than most as a man eminently qualified for the post in 1916.”25  For the rest of the 
duration of his stay in the beleaguered country, Francis did his utmost to salvage what 
he considered to be in the best interests of both America and Russia.  In his 
recognition of the Bolshevik capacity to overthrow the Provisional Government, a 
day before Lenin’s followers seized power, Francis even had gone as far as requesting 
American troop deployment to serve as a stabilizing force.   
As many of the despatches coming from Petrograd suggest, Francis was 
convinced that with their destructive ideology and practices, the Bolsheviks were 
doomed to failure.  In his view, it was only a matter of time before this group of 
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zealots so alien to the Russian social order were stripped from power.  With barely 
two percent of the population comprised of workers, the idea of a proletarian 
revolution seemed absurd.  One did not have to be a Russian expert to ascertain the 
disastrous prospects of a Marxist experiment in a society that had arguably missed the 
industrial revolution.  Indeed, the Bolsheviks’ attempt to put a secular-utopian 
Western ideology into practice in a deeply religious and patently backward country 
struck Ambassador Francis as illogical.  This line of thought was not only 
characteristic of Francis, but most Western diplomats who lived in and observed 
Russia.   
According to Michael Hughes, who studied the experience of British 
diplomats in Russia during the times of great change, “the Bolshevik leadership was 
still a surprisingly unknown quantity to the British officials at the time of the 
November Revolution.”  While the British Ambassador in Petrograd George 
Buchanan did not maintain close contacts with his American counterpart, his 
understanding and interpretation of the events were similar to those of Francis in 
many regards.  “The Bolshevik regime was viewed as a threat both to Britain’s 
national interests and to the values of civil society.”26  Unlike Francis, Sir George 
Buchanan was a career diplomat who meticulously observed diplomatic etiquettes 
and had a deeper academic background in Russian history and politics.  In terms of 
belief and character, Buchanan was said to represent “all that the best of England 
stood for – honor, frankness, a deeply understanding sympathy,”27 and above all, a 
soul committed to liberal political order.  Ambassador Buchanan was disappointed by 
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the gains of radical leftists whose dictatorial agenda and behavior threatened hopes 
for liberal Russia.  But like Francis, in the immediate days following the Bolshevik 
coup, “his concern about the political situation was ameliorated by his belief that 
insurgents would not be able to hold on to power for any significant length of time….  
A few hours before the Bolshevik seizure of power began, Buchanan had told the 
[British] Foreign Office that even if it were successful, the new government could 
‘not be of long duration and would before long provoke counter-revolution,’ a view 
that was shared by most foreign diplomats in Russia.”28   
There was no doubt in the minds of American diplomats residing in Russia 
that the Bolshevik phenomenon was wholly ephemeral owing its existence to the 
anarchy, hunger and social upheavals associated with the war and fall of the 
centuries-old dynasty.  That a regime founded upon such radical and quixotic ideals 
could not survive too long raised little doubt.  The signs of this impression was 
evident in a despatch after despatch being sent to Washington from American envoys 
throughout Russia and neighboring countries which self-assuredly spoke of the 
Bolsheviks’ imminent demise.  In his despatches, the American ambassador to 
Sweden, Ira Morris reported of the advances being made by the Kerensky forces 
against Bolsheviks.29  While admitting that most of these reports had not been 
confirmed, it is noteworthy that nearly all such despatches exuded positive tone in 
regard to the developments in and around Petrograd.  Peppered with triumphant 
statements such as “Bolsheviks defeated in Gatchina,” “the new government nearly 
ended,” “Bolsheviks badly beaten near Tsarskoe Selo,” the despatches seemed to 
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reinforce the predetermined view that the Reds were going to lose.  American consul 
in Batum, F. Willoughby Smith, unwilling to call Bolsheviks by their proper title, 
announced that “Caucasus population and army refuse to unite with Maximalist 
movement” yet at the same time expressing his doubt about the former’s ability to 
hold out “much more than five days without financial aid.”30  Similar anti-Bolshevik 
sentiments were being expressed by the American Consul in Kiev who reported about 
the armed preparations to oppose the Bolsheviks.   
More often, though, observers confused their own wishes with the realities on 
the ground.  The actual outlook, while not quite as rosy for the Bolsheviks, was more 
bleak for the opposition, particularly the forces led by Alexander Kerensky.  Trying 
to regain momentum, Kerensky regrouped in Gatchina, planning for an attack on 
Bolshevik-controlled Tsarskoe Selo.  But having lost power, Kerensky’s lack of 
credibility spawned distrust and open insubordination among the generals who had 
initially professed loyalty to the Provisional Government.  In his memoir, Kerensky 
attributed many of the failures at Gatchina and in previous instances, to chance and 
betrayal.  Yet his own account of the events makes it clear that the Bolshevik tide was 
simply too strong for the Provisional Government to overcome.  The popular support 
upon which Kerensky had relied in the initial stages of his power had almost 
completely evaporated, in his mind, giving way to the “misleading activities of 
agents-provocateurs and traitors.”31  By November 13, Kerensky was far from the 
position of vying for power.  Instead he was desperate trying to save his own life 
from those whom Kerensky correctly suspected were prepared to hand him over to 
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the Bolsheviks at any time.  Kerensky’s own description of the situation aptly 
summarizes the impending doom: “The rats are desperately deserting the sinking 
ship.  There is not a soul in my rooms, only yesterday filled to capacity.  There is only 
gravelike silence and calm.  We are alone.”32  Shortly after these feelings were 
recorded, Gatchina fell to the Bolsheviks.  Kerensky barely managed to escape.   
Given the Bolsheviks’ inability to take immediate and firm control of a 
country stretching eight times zone, it is natural that the diplomatic representatives 
doubted the ability of the Reds to subdue their opponents.  Having abolished the 
tsarist army, and relying upon a small force of Latvian regiments, sailors and 
untrained workers, in many foreign observers’ eyes, the Bolsheviks stood little 
chance against adversaries whose ranks contained well-known politicians, affluent 
social leaders and more importantly, experienced generals.  Yet with their 
declarations for peace and justice, the Bolshevik slogans seemed to resonate with 
various segments of a society too exhausted to carry on as before.  The war had 
inflicted severe miseries upon an already destitute populace.  In the despatches 
preceding the Bolshevik coup, it is evident that food shortages had given rise to a 
charged political atmosphere in which most opponents of the existing order could find 
fertile ground for agitation.33  These food shortages did not just affect the civilians; 
they were acutely felt in the military which was supposed to hold out against Russia’s 
external enemies.  Under such conditions it is understandable that ordinary Russians 
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felt little desire to stand up either for the Kerensky government which pledged to 
continue the disastrous war or against determined Bolsheviks who appeared quite 
willing to use all necessary means to retain power.   
While the junker resistance in Moscow and elsewhere encountered violent 
response, the Bolshevik takeover of Petrograd had proceeded with comparatively 
little violence and destruction.  It is clear from the despatches that the armed 
Bolsheviks took particular caution not to harm foreigners.  Throughout the dangerous 
period following the revolution, American representatives in Petrograd and Moscow 
constantly noted that they did not feel to be targeted by the Bolsheviks.  Nor did the 
Bolsheviks seek to needlessly antagonize the neutral populace.  Their immediate 
objective after the revolution was to consolidate their gains in the vortex of the 
Russian statehood and exclusively focus attention on those defined as immediate 
enemies.  To that end, the Bolsheviks were somewhat successful.  A despatch on 
November 19, reported that while there was fighting in Moscow, Petrograd was quiet, 
theaters were open and trains were running.34  Yet in the same despatch it was also 
noted that popular demonstrations were held in the city demanding freedom of press 
and denouncing the Bolshevik regime as more tyrannical than that of Tsar Nicholas 
II.   
Amid the chaos which ensued the fall of the Provisional Government, initial 
reports almost ubiquitously understated the Bolshevik strength.  Not until November 
18 did ambassador Morris for the first time admit that the Bolshevik power was 
strong and that Lenin’s followers were not being defeated in the engagements with 
                                                 




Cossacks or other anti-Bolshevik elements.35  There is little information in these 
despatches about the make-up of the forces loyal to Kerensky government, other than 
the junkers.  As for the regular army rank and file, in one despatch an American 
observer noted that during their battle against Bolsheviks, Kerensky’s men were 
surprised to see that he Reds were headed by veteran army officers.  The most ironic 
aspect of this phenomenon was the rationale of the army officers who felt that 
Kerensky government was departing from the time-honored traditions of the Russian 
armed forces.  “These officers stated that Kerensky’s destruction of all army 
discipline forced them to oppose him,” reported an observer.36  Many others could 
have been influenced by the genuine content of the Bolshevik message which 
promised an end to centuries old caste system and the grueling war in which most 
Russians felt being used as pawns by Britain, France, and possibly the United States.  
One delegation reported that the entire army was now on the side of the new regime 
“knowing that should Kerensky regain power, Bourgeoisie rule and continuation of 
war would ensue.”  It is clear that by 1917, the Russian society had exhausted its 
capacity to fight against external enemies.  In the months ahead, it would become 
apparent that along with the will to stand up to the German invaders, most Russians 
had forfeited their ability to oppose the Bolsheviks’ gradual usurpation of power.  
Beginning with December of 1917, a sense began to take hold that the 
Bolshevik power was there to stay and needed to be reckoned with.  Soon enough it 
became evident that the Bolshevik declarations about “peace, justice and bread” did 
not translate into immediate alleviation of the ongoing suffering.  Tired of war and 
                                                 





hunger, some may have taken a chance on the Bolsheviks.  But nearly a month after 
the Provisional Government had been deposed, life had not changed for the better.  In 
fact, as despatches from Petrograd and Moscow indicate “food was becoming scarcer 
daily, bread ration lowered to three quarters pound for two days.”37  The dire 
situation gave way to hunger demonstrations which were promptly suppressed by the 
Bolsheviks.  By all accounts, the food shortages had become more intolerable than at 
any time before the Bolshevik takeover.  To be fair, much of the hardship stemmed 
from the anarchy and lawlessness that reigned in the streets of Petrograd and 
Moscow.  Yet with their avowed antipathy to all political traditions including laws 
and regulations coupled with the inclination to rule by decree, the Bolsheviks only 
helped deepen the crisis – which in turn, alienated many.38  Increasingly, the 
Bolsheviks began to resort to terror methods and other forms of violence in dealing 
with those who dissented with the regime.  As the smoke of November 7 began to 
clear up, foreign observers, too, began to formulate exact ideas about the nature of the 
emerging regime.  “Having overthrown the Provisional Government by armed revolt, 
lacking a majority support,” wrote American Consul in Moscow Maddin Summers, 
“they can only hold the power by sheer terror:” 
“Their first act of power was to imprison the former ministers all of whom 
were sincere democrats.  The second was to confiscate all hostile 
newspapers, not only the few monarchical newspapers but also the 
constitutional democratic and even the moderate socialist newspapers.  
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This assault on the liberty of the press was especially serious at the time of 
general election.  They have complete control of posts and telegraphs and 
are using this power to falsify popular opinion.”39
 
Next to the ambassador in Petrograd, Consul General Maddin Summers played a 
pivotal role in formulating initial images about the Bolshevik regime in the American 
minds.  Summers’ political ideology was similar to that of Francis.  Given his 
conservative outlook on the limitations of human nature and classic liberal 
inclinations, Summers despised Bolsheviks.  Lenin’s scheme of social engineering 
was anathema to a person who found it difficult to digest even the February 
revolution.  “There are so many varied phases of the Russian character and race 
which one has to consider before we can say what will be the end… We must 
remember that those taking part now in this revolution are not by any means the mass 
of the Russian people,” Summers had written in reference to those who had toppled 
the Tsar.40   With the Provisional Government in shambles and radical leftists now at 
the helm of power, in the mind of Summers, Russia’s prospects seemed catastrophic.   
In addition to his solid background in diplomatic services, the Consul’s 
marriage to Natalia Gorainova, a daughter of a Russian aristocrat, enabled him to 
develop contacts deep within the high Russian society.  Through these contacts 
Summers gained a perspective to the events that was often unavailable to those for 
whom Russia always remained a foreign land of foreign peoples.  Furthermore, 
during the days of Bolshevik takeover the Moscow in which Maddin Summers stayed 
experienced lot more violence and bloodshed without the varnish of intellectual 
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appeal upon which Bolshevik leaders heavily relied in cosmopolitan Petrograd.  “In 
general,” George F. Kennan  writes, “The revolutionary pathos that characterized the 
November events in Petrograd – the fierce intellectual fervor, the sincere 
internationalism, the almost good-natured humanity – was absent, or much less 
evident in Moscow, where events bore more the nature of a brutal outburst of social 
bitterness and where Bolshevik element, reinforced by ordinary prisoners liberated 
from jails appeared rather as semi-criminal rabble rousers than as daring intellectual 
idealists.41  Against the evolving axis of Americans in Russia who soon began to 
advocate closer relations with the Bolshevik regime, Maddin Summers comprised an 
important column of opposition until his death in May of 1918.   
In the weeks following the Bolshevik seizure of power, U.S. Ambassador 
David Francis refrained from any action that could be interpreted as a sign of 
recognition.  Having turned down the Bolshevik detachment which was sent by the 
Soviet government to protect the embassy perimeters, Francis conveyed the official 
position of his government which held that the Provisional Government possessed 
sole authority over Russian territories.  Even though in a matter of months it became 
quite evident that the Provisional Government controlled next to nothing, this line of 
policy was officially maintained for nearly five years until 1922 when Russian 
Ambassador Boris A. Bakhmetev formally discharged himself of the duties conferred 
upon by the Kerensky administration.  The implications of the non-recognition policy 
also affected America’s relations vis-à-vis Finland and numerous other former 
Russian colonies that declared independence from the Russian Empire for some time.  
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America’s adherence to “One Russia under the Provisional Government” policy did 
not, however, prevent individual contacts between American personnel in Russia and 
the top Soviet officials.   
On December 1, 1917 chief of the American military mission in Russia, 
Brigadier General William J. Judson, became the first American official to meet with 
the Bolshevik leader Leon Trotsky, the Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar.  Most 
analysts believe, the American was motivated to initiate contact with the Bolsheviks 
out of fear that a total absence of ties would lead to Russia’s irreversible departure 
from the alliance at war.  With the Germans poised for offensive on the Eastern front, 
the Allied officials feared that the Bolsheviks would simply surrender.  Upon his 
meeting with Trotsky in which the two men cordially discussed various issues 
relating to Russia’s duties as an ally, Judson concluded: “My interview was very 
satisfactory but I recognize that there may be an aftermath of great personal 
embarrassment if Trotsky makes a speech and misquotes or misrepresents me.”42  
Later that day, Trotsky gave a fiery speech before a Bolshevik audience in which he 
mocked the capitalists who had come to convince him of “imperialist America’s 
platonic sympathy for the Russian nation.”43  The exact effect of this speech on 
further of U.S.-Bolshevik contacts is difficult to gauge.  It certainly could not have 
helped to dissuade the American government from its decision to shun those in Soviet 
government viewed as reckless adventurers leading Russia and possibly the world to 
the edge of precipice.  In fact, as soon as the Department of State found out about the 
meeting, General Judson was reprimanded and explicitly barred from further contact 
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with Soviet officials.  Secretary Lansing’s vision of Bolshevism as “the most hideous 
and monstrous thing conceived by human mind”44 apparently did not match with the 
realist outlook of General Judson and few other Americans who believed that 
effective coordination with the Bolshevik leadership could serve the Allied interests.    
There are indications that this important encounter may have been authorized 
by Ambassador Francis himself.  The feeling of isolation, uselessness and concern for 
safety, so evident in the despatches, could have prompted the ambassador to try 
opening up some channels of communication with the people in charge of Russia, or 
whatever was left of it by then.  However, mostly consistent in his disdain for the 
Bolsheviks, Ambassador Francis never became as excited about the prospects of 
U.S.- Bolshevik relations as General Judson did.   
General Judson’s activities in Russia were further complicated by the fact that 
as a chief of the military mission and the military attaché at the embassy, he reported 
to two different superiors.  In the latter position he was subordinate to Ambassador 
Francis, yet as a chief of independent military mission, he reported directly to the War 
Department.  Though never an insubordinate diplomat,  General Judson strongly 
differed in his views of the Russian situation from both of his supervisors.  As a 
military affairs expert, Judson’s primary interest was the state of the Russian army 
and the fate of the war in general.  To that end, Judson had a difficult time grappling 
with stern refusal of his government to engage with the Bolsheviks.  In his 
communication with the ambassador and the War Department he insisted that some 
form of contact should be maintained with the Bolsheviks – at least in order to 
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provide them with basic means to withstand the German onslaught.  In order to 
facilitate such a rapport between the American diplomatic representatives he stated 
that the latter should at least “observe all reasonable policy regulation which those 
make who are in control of the city [Petrograd].”45  In his determination to see 
Germany defeated, Judson’s concern was purely of military nature.  At the same time 
he was well aware that not everyone within the embassy, and certainly not within the 
State Department viewed matters from the same prism.  In his December 3, 1917 
memorandum to Ambassador Francis he “respectfully asked” that orders be given 
which would enable him  “to see important cables passing between Washington and 
the Embassy.”  “If I can conveniently see the Embassy cables to which I refer above,” 
he wrote, “I can certainly better advise the Department of our Government with 
which I correspond.”46  
General Judson was no novice when it came to the Russian or international 
affairs in general.  A graduate of the United States Military Academy at the West 
Point, Judson first began his career as an engineer at the Army Corps of Engineers.  
Following the Spanish-American War, the U.S. forces had taken control of Puerto-
Rico.  Placed in charge of numerous public works projects, Judson gained valuable 
experience in dealing with foreign cultures and learned to operate on different cultural 
milieus.  While his success created future opportunities for representation of his 
country in other, more important duties in Manchuria and St. Petersburg during the 
Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Judson had left his post in Puerto Rico with deep 
skepticism of expansionist and imperialist policies.  Yet, Judson always retained a 
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realist outlook “fully convinced of the necessity of every major state in the 
international arena to maintain its military and build and alliance network 
unmistakably capable of self-defense”47– an outlook which was further reinforced by 
his observations of combat operations taking place between the major powers at the 
time.  Compounded with this experience was his close interaction with the Russians 
and the foundation of a life-time interest in Russia’s political, economic and social 
realities.  To be sure, Judson admired Russia and rooted for its success.  But he had 
no illusion about the potential of a nation with such tortuous past to easily overcome 
the obstacles to creating a liberal society in the mirror image of his homeland.   On 
June 12, 1917, when Judson returned to the Russian capital as a member of the Root 
Mission – whose primary task was to express  strong support for the Provisional 
Government – he was equally excited about the possibilities for Russia’s 
rejuvenation.  But having stayed there as the American representative, he came to 
believe in the need to make the best of a very difficult situation.  “The great trouble 
with Russia today,” he wrote in September of 1917, “is the lack of discipline 
everywhere; on the railroads, in the factories and at the mines as well as in the 
Army.”48  Convinced that the fate of the Russian army would determine the fate of 
the war itself, Judson was not happy with the way in which the Provisional 
Government managed the military affairs.  When the Bolsheviks seized power, 
however, in Judson’s view, everything seemed perilously close to the end.   Unlike 
some of his colleagues who saw the Provisional Government as betrayed by German 
implanted diversionists, a thorough observer of the deteriorating state of the Russian 
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army took it as inevitability.  “The Bolshevik government will last 6 months before it 
falls under economic and transportation al burden,” he wrote.  Unless the Allies 
opened a discourse with the Lenin government, they might lose  the chance to serve 
their own national interests.  Furthermore, Judson portrayed the Bolsheviks as “the 
only element to be at all hostile to Central Powers, as [their] leader would not 
compromise. Very many Russians would welcome Germans to preserve their private 
interests,” he continued “and end socialistic regime.”49  The general’s distinct 
enthusiasm to deal with the Bolshevik government did not sit well with his superiors 
whose sentiments about the regime were uniformly negative.  Exactly a month after 
his meeting with Leon Trotsky, on a New Year’s day, Judson was recalled from his 
duties.   
In his eagerness to interact with the Soviets, Judson, however, was not alone.  
The American Red Cross chief in Petrograd, Raymond Robins, soon began to pick up 
where General Judson had left and opened contacts with the Bolshevik leaders.  Like 
Judson, Robins had not been a particular fan of the Bolsheviks prior to the revolution.  
In his starting capacity as the deputy chief of the Red Cross, shortly after his arrival to 
Petrograd in August, Raymond Robins prepared a report titled “Some Observations 
on the Present Conditions in Russia,” in which he praised the February Revolution 
that did away with the old autocratic order and assailed the Bolshevik Party for its 
destructive influence to the cause of the Allies and democratic prospects of Russia.  
In Robins’ eyes, however, the greatest danger to the revolution emanated not from the 
radicals who pledged to take the Revolution a step further, but the tsarist 
sympathizers who wished to take Russia back to the old days.  As he walked through 
                                                 




the former corridors of tsarist power, mingling with the officials of the Kerensky 
administration, Robins was jubilant to witness the rise of representative 
government.50  But he feared that amid hunger, chaos and destruction of the war, the 
Russian liberal order would not last.  In a way, he was right.   
Robins’ first reaction to the Bolshevik revolution conveys a sense that the Red 
Cross Representative was not saddened by the fall of the embattled government of 
Kerensky.  To the contrary, unlike most other American representatives in Russia 
who saw Bolsheviks as traitors to their own motherland and violent demagogues, 
Raymond Robins’ impressions written in his diary on the day of the Bolshevik coup 
exude excitement and inspiration:   
“The boys and the soldiers of the Red Guard. A great day in Russia 
and the world.  The All-Russian Soviet Meets.  I can hear shooting 
in the Nevsky [street] as I write at 10:26 pm.  War and civil war 
and the Commune. What an hour, o my father.  Amen.  Help 
America and Russia and the Free peoples of the earth.”51  
 
If Robins harbored any guesses, much less hopes, about the possibilities for 
Kerensky’s comeback, they all ended on November 8, during his visit to examine the 
tense standoff in the environs of Petrograd between the remaining forces loyal to the 
Kerensky government and the Reds.  At Gatchina, astounded Robins watched as 
5,000 Kerensky soldiers switched sides and went over to the Soviets.   
Three days later, Robins, along with his interpreter Alexander Gumberg 
whose brother was a prominent Bolshevik, entered the Bolshevik headquarters in 
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Smolny for a meeting with Leon Trotsky.  As soon as the guard recognized the Red 
Cross representative known for denunciatory speeches about Bolsheviks, he began to 
yell “counter-revolutionist, counter-revolutionist.”  But Robins was quick to reassure 
him about his true intentions: “I know a corpse when I see one,” Robins then went on, 
“the thing to do with a corpse is to bury it and not sit up with it.  Tell the 
Commissioner that I believe the Kerensky government is dead and I believe he has 
got all the power there is in Russia today.”  Raymond Robins’ actions during and in 
the months following the events of November 7 fit a certain pattern for which the Red 
Cross Mission came to be known.  Already under William Boyce Thompson whom 
Robins had come to replace, the American Red Cross had not been particularly 
helpful to the efforts of the U.S. embassy to isolate Bolsheviks.  In one of his 
despatches, Ambassador Francis acknowledged that Thompson had “closer relations 
with the Bolsheviks than with the Embassy.”52  However, that did not prevent the 
embassy staff from maintaining cordial, if not strong ties to the Mission, especially 
after the Bolshevik takeover restricted the American’s range of communication within 
Russia.  Perhaps aware of Robins’ colorful background as a political activist for 
social justice back in the United States, David Francis recognized the mercurial 
nature of the man and his behavior.   
Raymond Robins was a Christian of strong convictions and his religious 
beliefs shaped his views of the world in which he always felt the need to stand up for 
the weak and dispossessed.  He might have well become an influential figure within 
the U.S. government had he not invested his political capital with the Progressive 
Party – a breakaway Republican fraction under Theodore Roosevelt which failed to 
                                                 




dismantle the two-party system’s grip over American political landscape.  Then 
again, Robins showed little indication that he was in it exclusively for the personal 
gain.  Here was a man who was driven by an ideal to change the world around him, 
and whoever at the time appeared or promised to do so became Robins’ hero.  With 
“Land, Peace and Bread” as the prime Bolshevik slogan, it is not surprising that 
Lenin’s followers did not at all induce the sense of aversion in Robins as they did in 
others.  What was surprising is the fact that given Marxists’ ardent atheism and 
denunciation of religion as “the opium of the masses,” Robins still found a way to 
accommodate his outlook with theirs.   
Robins’ ever growing contacts within the Bolshevik administration gave him a 
substantial leverage and standing on the arena where the embassy increasingly found 
itself isolated and uninfluential.  Gone were the days when the American ambassador 
could walk into the prime minister’s office anytime he wished.  Now, for every little 
administrative matter, the embassy had to rely on a character who did not shy away 
from displaying sympathy for the Bolshevik government.  Even though, the 
ambassador was often informed about the minutiae of Robins’ contacts with 
Bolsheviks, given his inability to fully act in the capacity of a plenipotentiary envoy 
of his nation to Russia, Francis could not have been enamored with this state of 
affairs.  On December 24, Francis openly and for the first time expressed his disgust 
and despair with the whole situation.53  Having hoped for the swift demise of the 
Bolshevik power, Francis was frustrated by the ordinary Russians’ inability to effect 
such a change.  With reports about newspaper suppression, severe food shortages and 
workers on strike, it is not certain that by the end of December the Bolshevik prestige 
                                                 




remained at a previously high level.  However, in terms of sheer power and the ability 
to control the populace, there was no doubt that Bolsheviks were in an increasingly 
superior position at the location where it most mattered – the center.54   
The Bolsheviks’ seizure of main attributes of power in November did not 
mean that they immediately gained total power, much less, legitimacy.  Often 
overlooked in this regard are the elections to the Constituent Assembly held on 
November 12-14, five days after the fall of the Kerensky government, in which 
Bolsheviks managed to garner just 24 percent of the popular support while leaving 
agrarian-oriented Socialist Revolutionaries and other non-Marxist parties in majority.  
Even though the assembly failed to exercise power in any meaningful way, for 
Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin, the lack of support from three quarters of the 
population was an ominous sign that his revolution faced great danger.  With the 
living standards deteriorating in the months of November and December,55 it became 
more evident that in the case of new elections, the Bolsheviks would have trouble to 
even relying on the previous 24 percent of the general support.  From early on, Lenin 
recognized that he had to make a choice between observing the bourgeois etiquette of 
parliamentary politics and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat.  Knowing 
that he could afford to take his chances with the second yet more dangerous course of 
action, Lenin did not hesitate.  Anyone demanding that all powers be given to the 
Constituent Assembly was declared counter-revolutionist.  Taking things a step 
further, Lenin outlawed the Constitutional-Democratic Party and ordered the arrest of 
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its leaders as “the enemies of the people.”  However, the most decisive action was 
taken on January 5, on the opening day of the Constituent Assembly, when Lenin and 
his followers derailed the opposition’s final attempt to wrest some authority from the 
Bolsheviks.  Hoping that their majority in the assembly and the support of the public 
gathered outside the hall alone would be sufficient to pressure Lenin into some sort of 
concession, the Socialist-Revolutionaries refused the offer by some units of the 
Petrograd garrison to display armed might during the gathering.  This step proved to 
be an error in judgment.  The Bolsheviks, encouraged by the absence of armed 
opponent in the streets, opened fire upon the SR supporters who marched toward the 
Tauride Palace, killing seven or eight persons.56  The panicked crowed dispersed.  By 
the evening of that day, Bolsheviks filled the assembly hall and began intimidating 
and harassing non-Bolshevik members of the assembly.  For the SRs, the battle was 
lost.  A few days later, the Bolsheviks opened a counter-assembly, “The Third 
Congress of the Soviets” which assumed all the powers that had belonged to the 
Constituent Assembly.  Hence, the last representative election in the Russian history 
resulted in still-birth.57  Lenin’s own verdict best illustrated the reality of the matter 
when he asserted: “The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by the Soviet 
Government means a complete and frank liquidation of the idea of democracy by the 
idea of dictatorship.  It will serve as a good lesson.”58  
As historian Richard Pipes has noted, the Bolshevik dispersal of the 
Constitutional Assembly was a watershed, and it indeed taught the Bolsheviks several 
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important lessons to be ubiquitously applied in the future.  “They learned that in areas 
under their control they need fear of no organized armed resistance: their rivals, 
though supported by three-fourths of the population, were disunited, leaderless, and 
above all, unwilling to stand up and fight.  This experience accustomed Bolsheviks to 
resort to violence as a matter of course whenever they ran into defiance and to ‘solve’ 
problems by physically liquidating those who caused them.”59  According to historian 
James Libbey, by dispersing the Constitutional Assembly, “the Bolsheviks obstructed 
the one and only attempt to fashion a constitution by representatives of all sectors of 
Russia’s society…. Thereafter the Allied powers considered the Soviet government to 
be led by usurpers and this view seriously impeded the normalization of diplomatic 
channels between Russia and the rest of the world.”60  This assessment corresponds 
with the spirit of the despatches issued in the month of January and thereafter which 
particularly stand out for their content detailing the brutality and arbitrary violence 
dispensed by the Bolsheviks.   
On January 20, an embassy official, attending a funeral for a teenager girl 
killed in Petrograd streets, brought in, what Ambassador Francis reports to be an 
“astounding intelligence.”  According to the courier, the former Minister of 
Agriculture A.I. Shinigarev and the Comptroller of Provisional Government F.F. 
Kokoshkin, while “on release from prison for health reasons,” had been shot to death 
by the Red Guards in their beds at the Marie Hospital.61  In a later despatch, Francis 
narrated having sent another official to the hospital to verify the story.  The doctors 
confirmed that men dressed as Red Guards and sailors killed the former ministers 
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with Shinigarev shot twice in his sleep and Kokoshkin shot six times while awake.  In 
a Parisian publication Combat, the French investigator further elaborated his 
conversation with the doctor who remembered what Shinigarev had told him just as 
they were brought in from the Peter and Paul Fortress. “I have a presentiment that I 
will be killed tonight,” said Shinigarev, “While we were being transferred here we 
heard the Red Guards discussing among themselves the best way of getting rid of 
us.”62  Situated just four blocks from the embassy compound, the assassinations were 
deeply disturbing to the American personnel.  In the same despatch, reporting the 
story, Ambassador Francis requested additional guards for protection.  The 
Americans no longer felt safe.   
The killings were not limited just to high profile opponents of the Bolshevik 
regime.  Two days later, Maddin Summers reported from Moscow about a “peaceful 
demonstration in favor of the Provisional Government.”  The Bolsheviks responded 
to the demonstration by killing nearly fifty protesters.  Conveying that the city was in 
terror and all newspapers remained suppressed, Summers reported that Bolsheviks 
were “openly resorting to oppression.”63  Meanwhile food conditions, according to 
despatches coming from Petrograd, remained grave – in fact so grave that the starving 
Red Guard soldiers raided hotel France and “took all the food.”64  With only a 
quarter pound of bread allotted daily to the inhabitants of the city, the embassy 
reported “factory workers, especially women organizing, passing resolutions against 
the Soviet, which [was] the natural result of food scarcity.”  By February 8, 1918, 
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nearly 400,000 workers walked out of their jobs in protest to the dire living 
conditions, and, by large measure, the Bolshevik policies.65 The government 
immediately threatened with the use of iron hand.  The Soviet government would 
brook no dissent that jeopardized its extremely fragile hold on power.  It is 
noteworthy that in the despatches sent by American diplomats, the prime opponents 
of the Bolshevik regime are often described as workers and city folks – the 
supposedly core base of the Bolshevik movement.   
In fact, as George Leggett has demonstrated in his substantial volume on the 
history of the Soviet secret police, Cheka, the original motive behind the formation of 
this notorious institution was the suppression of strikes – at the time the most 
common form of public protest against government actions.66   The term “sabotage” 
figured prominently in the charges against their opponents by the Bolshevik 
authorities who from early on labeled participants of such actions as “the enemies of 
the people.”  The very first clause of the decree on the formation of the predecessor to 
the infamous KGB, Cheka (the Russia abbreviation for Extraordinary Commission 
for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage), determined that the main function 
of the agency should be “to suppress and liquidate all attempts and acts of counter-
revolution and sabotage throughout Russia from whatever quarter.”67  Rather, Leggett 
insists that by “concentrating on Lenin’s call for ‘exceptional measures to combat 
counter-revolutionaries and saboteurs,” frequently overlooked is the “the fact that 
Lenin, in his note, was concerned solely with state employees’ strike.”68  Although, in 
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Leggett’s judgment “nothing could have been further from his intention, at that time 
(italics original), than the introduction of a political police system,” it is obvious that 
for a person who, as historian readily admits, “had no patience with opposition, 
whether written or spoken” the assault against strikers was a part of a larger pattern of 
oppression.  It is difficult to see how the author of the dictum “Who is not with us is 
against us” could have intended to build anything other than a police state. 
On January 23, 1918, to mark their victory over all bourgeois rivals, the Third 
All-Russia Soviet held its opening session at the Tauride Palace.  The symbolic value 
of the place and the occasion was not missed on Edgar Sisson, an American sent by 
President Woodrow Wilson to carry out the recommendations of the Root Mission 
who arrived in Russia on November 25, 1917: “Here the Constituent Assembly had 
died.  Here was proper seat for the display of new-risen dominion,”69 he wrote.  For 
Sisson, “the most disagreeable feature of the day” was the speeches by “two 
Americans and one foreigner of considerable residence in America” who brought 
greetings of the United States to the congress.  They were Albert Rhys Williams, John 
Reed and Boris Reinstein, the latter being a Russian immigrant who “had been in the 
United States long enough to learn the English language.”  In a speech published in 
Izvestia newspaper, Albert Williams pointed out to the handpicked representatives of 
the Soviet power stating, “this form of parliamentarism will also be adopted by us 
when the American proletariat will resolve upon a revolutionary fight and will wage 
war against its bourgeoisie.” Williams’ fellow Bolshevik sympathizer Jack Reed 
ended his speech exclaiming “Long Live the Soviets!”  As the coverage given to their 
presence in the Soviet congress indicates, the participation of the Americans was 
                                                 




much appreciated by the Bolshevik leadership so eager to show its own people that 
their revolution was indeed a good idea and that it was about to spread throughout the 
world.    
However, Ambassador Francis was not at all pleased with the Americans’ 
behavior at the Tauride Palace.  On the day of the speech a despatch went out to 
Washington detailing the content of the speeches by Albert Williams and Jack Reed.  
Incensed with Williams’ proclamation that the American workers were too 
conservative and that they should follow the Russian model, Francis advised that all 
these individuals be arrested upon their return to the United States.70  It is likely that 
having witnessed the impotence of the Provisional Government on the face of handful 
Bolshevik agitators, Francis was not willing to take any chances on the radicals.  
Increasingly intolerant of radicalist dissent against a republican form government, 
Francis was lamentful that in time Kerensky had not executed the likes of Lenin and 
Trotsky.  Nor was Francis alone in experiencing these sentiments.  As far back as July 
of 1917, when the first Bolshevik attempt at gaining power was defeated, British 
ambassador had “contacted the Foreign Minister to ask that the government should 
take advantage of the situation to crush Bolsheviks once and for all.”71  When that did 
not happen, the British became furious to the point of nearly severing ties with the 
Kerensky government.  Long afterwards another British diplomat in Russia, Alfred 
Knox, would write a memoir in which he lamented that the Russian prime minister 
“had all the theatrical qualities of Napoleon but none of his ruthlessness.”72  Now, 
seeing the deadly measures employed by the Bolsheviks against their own opponents 
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to effective ends, like his British counterparts, Francis, too, was convinced that a 
certain measure of decisiveness was required in confronting the agents of 
demagoguery and disorder.  A year long experience in Russia extinguished even the 
many eyewitness liberals’ innocence about the dangers of freedom and impunity.  A 
man hailing from the tranquil and prosperous bosom of the American Midwest was 
among the first.   
That the American diplomats had little sympathy for the Bolsheviks was never 
in doubt.  However, the continuation of the war and its mutation in several directions 
were sowing confusion all across the political spectrum.  Irrationalism and paradox of 
Russia’s realities did not bypass those observing the county from within.  Initially, 
when Lenin and his armed followers overthrew the Provisional Government, not 
without reason many believed that the Bolshevik leader had been sent as a German 
spy.  Now that the Bolsheviks themselves constituted the Russian government, the 
matters had become more complicated.  Was Lenin willing to surrender everything to 
the Germans and protect his government?  Possibly.  But given the simmering rancor 
to the idea, giving up Russian lands to the Germans would not have proceeded 
without serious repercussions.  On the other hand, the Germans were proving to be an 
uncooperative partner, if they ever were one.  Since its first day in power the Soviet 
government had sued for peace – an honorable one to the minimum degree – which 
the Germans refused to accept.  Throughout the months of November, December and 
January, Bolshevik representative Trotsky conducted tireless negotiations with the 
Germans in an effort to reach a deal.  But the Germans seemingly aware that, the 




Instead they simply demanded as much land as they could control.  When the 
Bolsheviks, fearing that such significant concession would result in toppling of their 
government, refused, the German military command informed the Russians that the 
combat operations would resume on February 17, 1918. 
The German army’s proximity to Petrograd and Moscow gave rise to the 
rumors that these cities could fall any day.  Under such circumstances, the American 
embassy decided to leave the capital.  Their choice of location was a railroad town 
300 miles east of Petrograd, named Vologda.  The Americans calculated that if the 
Germans captured the Russian capital, the embassy personnel would have enough 
time to evacuate either to Vladivostok or Archangel.  When asked about the rationale 
behind the choice of location Ambassador Francis himself admitted that he knew 
nothing about the city “except that it is the junction of Trans-Siberian Railway and 
the Moscow – Archangel Railway and that it is 350 miles farther away from the 
Germans.”73  Still, by choosing to remain in Russia, at the same time, the Americans 
wanted to reassure the Russian public that they would not abandon them entirely.74  
On February 27, alongside his personal secretaries Earl M. Johnson and Philip 
Jordan, the American ambassador departed for Vologda.  By the time the American 
delegation reached their destination, the news came that Russia had capitulated to 
Germany.75    
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The terms of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty were harsh.  Overnight, the Russians 
lost more than a quarter of their empire.  For the first time in nearly two centuries, at 
least officially, the Russians no longer governed Poland, Finland, Ukraine, the Baltics 
and South Caucasus.  In addition to territorial losses, the German imposed 
humiliating conditions upon Russia which included demobilization of the army.  “No 
Russian government,” historian Pipes has observed, “ had ever surrendered so much 
land or granted a foreign power such privileges.”76  Western observers on the ground 
were astounded by the Bolsheviks’ complete detachment from the sense of 
motherland.  British Ambassador George Buchanan went as far as writing a letter to 
his superiors in which he deemed it impossible to “force an exhausted nation to fight 
against its will.”77  His other counterparts were even harsher in their assessments of 
Russians’ patriotism.  Many Westerners, as Michael Hughes conveys, saw the roots 
of Russian indifference in the nature of tsarist regime that “had acted as a focus for 
disparate ethnic and social groups whose members had almost nothing in common 
with one another other than the fact that they were subjects of a single ruler.”78  In his 
memoir, Alexander Kerensky echoed this reasoning by describing the mindset of 
Lenin and the Russian people in general:  
“Nowhere in Europe, except in Russia, is it possible to find such type of 
political leader, one so utterly devoid of any political feeling of country. 
Under Czarism the people were accustomed to regard the state itself as 
hostile.  The monopoly on all outer expressions of patriotism arrogated to 
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itself by absolutism perverted in the people the very feeling of 
patriotism.”79  
  
Having extensively studied the relationship between the state and people in Russia, 
Richard Pipes traces the origins of political attitudes among Russians to the absolutist 
nature of the tsarist regime “which brutally punished any attempts by its subjects to 
interfere with politics” often acting as a remote force which collected taxes and 
drafted soldiers without giving its citizens “virtually nothing in return.”  
Consequently, he argues, Russia evolved not so much as a society but as an 
“agglomeration of tens of thousands of separate rural settlements.”80  Unlike Western 
diplomats who at the time were appalled at the speed with which one political order 
was replaced by another, committed to ideals radically alien to the Russian people’s 
interests -- Pipes finds little surprise in the actions of the Bolshevik regime which in 
most other countries would be characterized as treason.   
The Soviet government’s actions predictably backfired.  The Bolsheviks 
became vilified both on the domestic and international venues.81  The inertia of the 
disappointment could have well ended the government.  As Ambassador Francis’ 
despatches in the weeks following the surrender indicate, an overriding sense 
emerged that the Bolshevik government was about to fall.  Since the early days of the 
revolution, for the second time, fortunes of the Bolshevik government seemed near 
peril.  But just as they had done so on November 7, in a way, the Germans once 
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against came to the Bolsheviks’ aid.  By refusing to halt their advance into the heart 
of Russia, the German armies continued occupying more land in Southern Russia.  
The German commanders claimed that the terms of Brest-Litovsk treaty did not apply 
to these territories since in reality they were not under the Bolshevik control.  This 
brazen act of aggression brought great alarm to the allies who decided to elevate their 
cooperation with the Bolshevik leadership in hopes of averting further German gains.  
So, here was a paradoxical situation:  On the one hand, the allies refused to recognize 
the Bolshevik government which they labeled as treasonous and detrimental to the 
allied cause; on the other, they felt they had no choice but engage with the only 
authority in Russia that could place checks on the German advance.  “The only power 
which can offer any resistance to the German advance is  the Soviet government,” 
wrote David Francis to Summers in Moscow, “When my house is on fire I don’t ask 
the quality of the water used to extinguish the flame.”82  
A pivotal figure in the reemerging frenzy of cooperation with the Bolsheviks 
was Raymond Robins.  Having taken upon himself the role of mediating between the 
Allied representatives in Russia and the Bolshevik leadership, Robins had long 
struggled to reach rapprochement between the estranged parties.  Like Judson before 
him, Robins was convinced that without the Bolshevik support, the Allied cause 
against Germany was doomed, and somehow an accord had to be reached.  The 
Americans’ unwillingness to recognize the Bolshevik regime upon some abstract 
moral and ideological grounds seemed nonsensical to him.  Robins believed that 
much of the rancor and resentment toward Bolsheviks emanated from the mutual 
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misunderstanding for which the greater blame rested with his own countrymen.  
Robins shared these views with the newly appointed British ambassador Bruce 
Lockhart who admittedly had little respect for David Francis’ intellectual capacities 
and shared the “dissident” conviction that a deal could be struck with the Bolsheviks.  
Having served in Russia for five years between 1912-1917, until he was briefly sent 
to London by Ambassador Buchanan, Lockhart was chosen by British leaders as a 
point man for opening new channels to the Russian government.  As Hughes 
recounts, “Lockhart certainly possessed many of the talents required for developing 
“unofficial relations’ with the Bolsheviks, not least of which was a boundless self-
confidence that on occasions proved rather tiresome to senior officials in London,”83 
and one could add, ultimately futile.  Between Lockhart and his pro-Soviet American 
friend Raymond Robins, “the two enjoyed unprecedented access to the Bolshevik 
leaders during March and April of 1918. They had no difficulty getting appointments 
with Trotsky and Lenin, and they literally could walk in to see Foreign Commissar 
Chicherin and his key staff members Karakhan and Radek.  They were even allowed 
to sit on certain meetings of the Bolshevik Central Executive Committee and other 
supposedly private Bolshevik discussions.”84  Inasmuch Francis was irked by such 
level of intimacy between Robins and the Bolsheviks, he was inclined to utilize the 
opportunity of having access to the ruling circles of Soviet Russia.  Furthermore, 
aware that his success depended on the confidence of the ambassador, Robins took 
great care to keep Francis informed of most of his activities and make him feel not 
only included, but in charge of the discussions.   
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Throughout March and April, Robins and Lockhart did their utmost to 
promote military and economic rapprochement between the Bolsheviks and the 
Allies.  In the aftermath of the German violation of the Brest-Litovsk agreement, at 
first this was an easier task.  But soon enough, Ambassador Francis realized that any 
military assistance given to the Bolsheviks was more likely to be used against 
emerging domestic opposition than the German armies.  Hateful of the Bolsheviks, 
Francis may have shared the grasp of facts on the ground with Robins, but he 
certainly did not share the latter’s convictions.  Francis had long ago begun to suspect 
that Lenin’s Russia posed equal, if not greater danger to the world peace and the 
security of his own nation than Kaiser’s Germany.  The last thing the American 
ambassador wanted to see was the potential use of Allied weapons against 
Bolsheviks’ domestic enemies.   
Particularly resentful of Robins’ pro-Soviet activities was Consul Maddin 
Summers. With the move of the Soviet government from Petrograd to Moscow, the 
lack of mutual decorum between the two men -- which had first originated from the 
ideological differences about the nature of the Bolshevik regime -- escalated into an 
open personal conflict.  Referring to Robins’ activities in Moscow, in March of 1918, 
Summers wrote to Francis, “I can assure you that any interference in any way here 
with my work will result in serious consequences.”85  Suspecting that Robins was in 
fact a Bolshevik agent, Summers was not willing to extend the similar level of 
discretion and authority to Robins as Ambassador Francis did.  Summers made it 
clear to his superiors in Washington that Robins had to put an end to his unofficial 
activities as the American representative in Moscow and leave Russia at once.  Even 
                                                 




President Wilson found it “very annoying to have this man Robins, in whom I have 
no confidence whatever acting as political adviser in Russia and sending his advice to 
private individuals.”  At the same time, Wilson wished to retain some channel of 
communication  with the Bolsheviks  at least “until things clear[ed] up a bit in that 
unhappy country.”86  Raymond Robin’s free-lancing, however, continued to deepen 
the frustration within the American diplomatic corps in the Soviet capital.  His almost 
open embrace of Bolsheviks and lack of regard for the local diplomats gave way to 
erroneous impressions as to who was really in charge of the American decision-
making process.  In the course of the heated exchange related to this matter in May, 
Maddin Summers suffered a heart attack and died.  Soon afterwards, like his protégé 
general Judson, Robins, too, was recalled.  
Raymond Robins’ departure from the scene sounded the death knell of 
whatever relationship was left between the American and Bolshevik authorities.  By 
removing Robins from Russia, the American government had made a definitive 
statement about its own views of the Bolshevik regime.  The leadership in 
Washington was not eager to waste time persuading Lenin of the advantages of 
staying in the Allied camp.  Even before Robins’ recall, Ambassador Francis had 
already decided that America’s capacity to convince Bolsheviks to fight against 
Germany had reached its limit.  Deeply skeptical of the Bolshevik motives, Francis 
was becoming more convinced that the Bolsheviks were not a part of the solution, but 
the problem itself.  In his mind, the optimal course of action would be to launch an 
intervention by the Allied forces which could accomplish two tasks simultaneously.  
First, they could help secure the military munitions and food storages from falling 
                                                 




into German hands; secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Francis saw the 
intervention as the swiftest way to topple Lenin’s government and help the 
establishment of a friendly and desirably, a democratic government similar to the 
Provisional Government in spirit, if not in character.  Unbeknownst to the ambassador 
himself, Washington, alongside the British, had already decided on landing limited 
number of marine regiments on the Russian soil.  On the horizon loomed foreign 





Chapter 2: Civil War and Foreign Intervention 
By mid-April of 1918, the Bolsheviks solidified their power in central Russia.  
Having captured and maintained the control of Petrograd and Moscow, they enjoyed 
unique political advantage over both domestic and foreign rivals.  In a country where 
for centuries the power was generously dispensed yet jealously guarded by the center, 
Vladimir Lenin understood the significance of the possession of the capital city.  
During the harrowing years of the civil war and foreign intervention, Bolsheviks 
managed to efficiently utilize all the physical and moral resources rendered to them 
by this possession.  With millions of people dead from violence, starvation and cold, 
at the end, the Reds overcame great challenges to stand victorious over their enemies.  
A number of the American observers, brave enough to stay at their posts, were there 
to record the Bolsheviks’ path to victory. 
Despite the arrival of spring, conditions in Bolshevik Russia continued to 
deteriorate.  The devastations resulting from the war, disruption in local infrastructure 
and socio-political order contributed a great deal to such state of affairs.  However, 
few measures were being taken by the new leaders to alleviate the existing hardship.  
Still in its fragile stages, retaining power was the top priority for the Bolsheviks who 
at any moment expected the rise of a counter-revolution.  “Besides official Soviet 
gazette only 3 papers remain: namely, Rannoe Utro, rather unreliable and without 
politics, Anarkhia, the organ of the radicals, and Pravda, the unofficial Soviet organ,” 
wrote the American consul, conveying the austere press conditions in Moscow.87  For 
descendents of Thomas Jefferson who famously expressed his preference for 
                                                 




newspapers without government over a government without newspapers, the 
Bolshevik rule appeared diametrically opposed to the American ideals of government.  
“At the head of the Russian people’s Government stands the council (soviet) of the 
people’s commissars elected by no one and controlled by no one, absolutely 
unlimited and who have nominally the whole power in the land,” visiting engineer 
Vladimir Petrovich Shubersky told the American minister in Norway.  “Every attempt 
to protest is crushed by force…The country is ruled by all sorts of district committees  
- committees not recognized or confirmed by anyone… These people are taken 
mostly from the dregs of society, from the worst remnants of public organization, 
from the lowest officials, youths and servants.”88  The Soviet method of rule revolted 
most Americans on the ground who, despite even great political differences among 
themselves, could agree on basic attributes of representative government.  The 
Bolshevik government displayed few such signs, if any. 
Nonetheless, the immediate American interest in Russia was not so much 
about seeing a democratic and prosperous Russia reflecting the mirror image of the 
United States in the old world, but a Russia that would stand up to the Germans and 
help the Allied effort.  To that end, the signals from the Bolsheviks leadership were 
not clear.  While the Bolsheviks had committed the treacherous act of signing the 
Brest-Litovsk treaty, they still remained the only factor that prevented the German 
armies from taking over entire Russia. “The most vital force which stands in the way 
of German domination of Russia today is the Soviet organization.  Anything done to 
weaken or destroy this organization will prove disastrous,” wrote Major Thomas D. 
                                                 





Thacher of the American Red Cross in Russia.89  In a letter advocating a more lenient 
attitude toward the Soviet government, a military analyst, Captain W.B. Webster, 
enumerated several reasons for his proposal among which were the statements that 
the Soviet government had unmasked true German intentions by signing the Brest-
Litovsk treaty later ignored by the Germans.  According to Webster, the Bolshevik 
authorities had actually dispatched radicals to Germany to foment revolution, and also 
deepened the socialist sentiment among the peasants so that to make it impossible for 
the Germans to eventually take over the country.90  Yet on the other hand, the 
worsening conditions under the Bolshevik rule made even their anti-German stance a 
liability.  “Bolsheviks are the only elements likely to be at all hostile to Central 
Powers,” wrote General Judson days before leaving Russia.  He then explained: 
“Very many Russians would welcome the Germans to preserve private interests and 
end socialistic regime.”91  The fact that the Bolsheviks were not German agents 
further complicated the situation, because it left open a possibility for an alliance 
between increasingly anti-Bolshevik forces and the Germans.  Nevertheless, Russian 
patriotism dictated that assistance in the struggle against Bolshevism should be 
sought first and foremost from the Allies who after all refused to recognize the 
Bolshevik government. 
Frustrated by their inability to overthrow the Bolsheviks, various political 
forces saw salvation in the foreign bayonets that could in all likelihood rid Russia of 
the red menace.  In frequent instances, the urging for the Allied intervention was 
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accompanied by the idea that failure to act could lead to geo-political catastrophe.  
The anti-Bolshevik groups did not hesitate to convey that the Allied credibility in 
Russia was at stake.  “Faith in the Allies has completely disappeared,” reported an 
American diplomat from Russia, “Cadets and intellectuals are angry because the 
allies did not interfere.”92  In his conversation with the U.S. ambassador in Sweden, a 
Russian observer named Herman Bernstein made it clear that “the times has arrived 
when the only hope of saving the Russian situation or the Allies is intervention by the 
Allies…If the Allied intervention is not undertaken, the Russians will be left without 
any recourse, since the Bolsheviks must, at any cost, be removed, but to accept and 
welcome the Germans.”93  Such development could not have affected the disposition 
of the Allies who viewed Russia as a pivotal factor in the war.   After his conversation 
with Count Frasso, a prominent member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, who 
recently arrived to Stockholm from Petrograd, Ambassador Morris wrote that 
Petrograd and the vicinity were entirely demoralized and anarchy reigned 
everywhere.  According to Frasso, very small percentage of the Russians sympathized 
with Bolsheviks, and that “only help for the present situation would be some strong 
factor such as the entry of foreign troops.”94  With conditions growing worse day by 
day, the Swedish press reported about the rise of pro-German sentiments among the 
segments of the population eager to get rid of the Bolsheviks.95  Ambassador Francis 
himself reported that patriotic Russians had begun switching to the German side in 
order to save Russia from Bolsheviks.  But some such as those in the Central Cadet 
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Committee held out hope for the Allied intervention, by issuing statements urging 
Russia to remain faithful to its allies.96  In a kaleidoscope of changing political 
realities of Russia, there was a good reason to believe that today’s friends could turn 
into one’s enemies as a result of inaction or delay.  Also strong was the factor of 
resentment for the Bolsheviks among the American personnel in Russia.  On May 2, 
1918, David Francis for the first time openly recommended that his government 
militarily intervene in Russia.97  In the ambassador’s view, given the abject 
conditions in the country and the Bolsheviks’ utter inability to put up serious 
resistance, such an intervention would be opportune.   
In the meanwhile, the Bolsheviks’ self-fulfilled prophecy of counter-
revolution was coming to fruition.  Toward the end of April, in the peripheries where 
the Bolshevik control had been most tenuous, forces alternative to the Bolshevik 
authority had begun to emerge.  The rise of a vehement opposition especially in the 
rural areas was aided by disillusionment of the peasants who from the very beginning 
associated themselves more the agrarian-oriented Social Revolutionaries than with 
the worker-oriented Bolsheviks.  The Bolshevik land policies which involved 
arbitrary requisitioning and refusal to place the land at the exclusive disposal of the 
peasant infuriated a great number of people.  Since the dispersal of the Constituent 
Assembly, it had become apparent that Russia’s liberals, with their deep-seated 
aversion toward violence, were no match for the Bolsheviks.  Hence, in the anti-
Bolshevik movement that started gaining ground in Eastern, Southern and Western 
areas of Russia, its was the military generals who took the front stage.  In denotation 
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of the white color which represented royal emblem of the Bourbons during the French 
Revolution, these anti-Bolshevik forces, despite significant variations among 
themselves, came to be labeled as ‘Whites’.   
Beginning in May of 1918, a series of despatches reporting about the political 
and military developments in the areas of Siberia, North Caucasus and Ukraine began 
to pour in.  Greater attention in these despatches was given to the developments in 
Siberia since this front constituted the most significant against the Bolsheviks.  On 
May 3, 1918, Charles Moser, the American consul in Harbin, reported an advance 
made by the forces of General Grigori Semyonov across the Onan river.  According 
to the consul, “supported by Japanese and British money,” Semyonov’s advance 
“aroused much enthusiasm” among the local populace.98  Within ten days, 
Semyonov’s forces advanced 100 miles into Siberia and cleared East Siberia.  
“Bolsheviks melt before organized resistance,” exclaimed Southard Warner from 
Harbin.99  In one of the first successful battles against the Bolshevik troops since the 
defeat of the Kerensky forces near Gatchina, the operation conducted by Semyonov 
was being keenly monitored by Western observers.  In his despatches, Warner 
expressed belief that Semyonov’s movement was in no respect monarchical and that 
in fact monarchists’ support hurt Semyonov’s popularity to the east of Baikal.  
Recounting the observations of Major Borrows who had just returned from Siberia, 
U.S. Ambassador in the Chinese capital, Paul S. Reinsch, excitedly reported about the 
successes of Semyonov.  According to Borrows “soldiers who were initially 
sympathetic to Bolsheviks had now been absorbed into more conservative and land-
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holding population of Siberia.”  He stressed to his superiors that conditions in Siberia 
were essentially different from European Russia in that farmers there held large tracts 
of land, the city population was well to do and subversive theories found unfavorable 
soil.  Perhaps caught up in the mood of the times in which an American-led 
intervention was increasingly seen as a cure to Bolshevism, the ambassador’s 
interlocutor Major Borrows even compared the Siberian landscape to America.  
“Farming conditions are similar,” he said, and “people are trusting America fully.”100   
The events on the ground corroborated the reports that Bolshevik popularity in 
the countryside was marginal.  In areas such as Irkutsk, commercial attaché 
Huntington reported that the Bolsheviks had very little power and had to rely upon 
Lettish and Hungarian troops in order to sustain themselves.  The government, he 
observed, was “now failing due to economic disaster and anarchism.”  Peasants 
refused to bring grain and meat to the market because it was requisitioned  by the 
Bolsheviks at inadequate prices.  “Every class in Siberia except small minority of 
Bolsheviks,” Huntington wrote, “desires friendly intervention and construction aid  of 
an outside power.”  According to him, the local population was negatively 
predisposed toward the Japanese, but was willing to accept them if no one else came 
forward. “Universal request,” however he added, “is for the Allied intervention with 
American participation which they feel [to] guarantee the motives.”101   
On June 4, 1918, for the first time since having moved to Vologda in 
February, Ambassador Francis returned to Petrograd. The purpose of the visit was to 
gauge the Bolshevik attitude toward possible Allied intervention, but mostly, to 
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examine the situation in a city which had once been his residence.  His first act as an 
ambassador was to replace the Norwegian colors flying atop the building with the 
American flag.  What Francis found in Petrograd was heart-breaking.  “Petrograd is 
dead.., famine stricken babies dying hundred a week,” he observed.102  Struck by the 
malnourished looks of the people in the streets, Francis noted that food had become 
exorbitantly expensive and daily ratios were extremely low.  He spoke with a hospital 
manager who reported  about hundred bodies brought in with their faces mutilated to 
destroy the identity.  In Francis’ estimate, “everyone, including the uneducated hated 
the tyranny of Lenin.”  All patriotic people says they will supplant present 
Government by one dominated by Germany if the Allies do not immediately, 
intervene, noted the ambassador.  Upon returning to Vologda, Francis wrote: “I am 
convinced more thoroughly that the Soviet government is only a shell…. The city 
[Petrograd] has no police, no visible disturbance and no robberies because valuable 
have all been removed or sold…. I spoke with so many people representing all classes 
and did not find one favoring present Government and regret to say that every one 
favored monarchy.”  Among such people, according to Francis, there were former 
Bolshevik sympathizers  who now saw Lenin’s forces as having  “irreparably injured 
democracy in Russia for a generation or until masses are educated and caused 
pendulum to swing violently in opposite direction.”103   
The Soviet leadership could not have been unaware about the sentiments of its 
starving citizens.  In a despatch from Moscow on June 8, Dewitt Clinton Poole, who 
had just replaced deceased Maddin Summers as the American Consul, reported about 
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Lenin asking his supporters to hold out for two more months.  In the third session of 
the central executive committee, the Bolshevik leader gave a speech saying that there 
was plenty of food in the country, but its was being hoarded by the rich villagers.  
Adding his own insight to this information, Poole wrote:   
“This is an exaggeration for political purposes. The rich villager hardly 
exists in reality. A great many peasants have some grain, a few have 
none at all. The attempt to distinguish rich and poor, identifying the 
former with the small bourgeoisie is intended to conceal fact which the 
food crisis is making daily more apparent.”104   
 
Amid the desperate circumstances in Bolshevik Russia, most observers retained their 
belief that Bolshevism was a spent force.  “Approaching collapse [should be] 
attributed more to inherent weakness of Soviet government and to general 
dissatisfaction than to strength of any organized opposition  thereto,” observed the 
American diplomat.105   In the next despatch, Poole reported the food situation 
becoming more acute.  “The weather is favorable and it offsets a bit the effect of low-
acreage planting,” he elaborated “but once Siberian grain stores run out, situation will 
worsen.”106   
 For the next year or so, Poole’s actions as an American representative in 
Russia would matter a great deal in defining the relations with the Bolshevik regime. 
Having arrived in Russia barely two months before the Bolshevik Revolution, Poole 
had met the challenges of the task with ardor.  Despite his rudimentary Russian, it had 
not taken long before Poole digested the Russian realities and made use of his 
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knowledge in the service of his country. On a mission to South Russia ordered by 
Consul Maddin Summers, under difficult circumstances, Poole observed the situation 
on the ground for several weeks and returned with an elaborate report containing 
policy recommendations.  During his tenure as a diplomat, Poole’s social skills won 
him the friendship of American expatriates from various segments of the political 
spectrum.  With his easygoing character and sense of respect for those around him, 
Poole almost immediately won the confidence of ambassador Francis.  Unlike his 
predecessor, Poole also established a degree of decorum with Bolshevik authorities, 
at least until the days when the Bolshevik actions no longer made such relationship 
possible.   
 As the shock of the Bolshevik revolution began to fade, the public discontent 
with the Bolshevik rule was evident in the ease with which the territories controlled 
by Reds fell to their adversaries.  The summer of 1918 comprised the formative 
period for the anti-Bolshevik governments in Omsk, Kuban and Rostov, not to 
mention the non-Russian parts of the former empire.  Shortly after the October 
Revolution, Russia lost Finland, Poland and Baltic provinces.  In Ukraine, nationalist 
leader Simon Petliura had made significant gains against Bolshevik armies.  By May 
of 1918, three independent republics -- Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia -- emerged 
in South Caucasus. The region of Central Asia had been abandoned to the local emirs 
with powerful influence over the devout Muslim population.  The Bolshevik 
leadership at the time recognized its inability to actively try bringing them under 
control.  In these difficult times, the Bolshevik Russians were aided by the American 




emerging from the ashes of the tsarist empire.  Strictly adhering to “one Russia” 
policy, for a notable period, the Americans rejected the idea of splintering Russia.  
For the most part, the Americans were concerned raising suspicions among nationalist 
Russians toward their motives.  Yet at the same time, the despatches reveal the dearth 
of knowledge that prevailed in the diplomatic minds regarding the imperial nature of 
the Russian state.  With the exception of the Finns and Poles, it appears that many 
American observers had difficulty grasping the underlying cause of anti-Bolshevik 
movements in the peripheral provinces.  Notwithstanding some notes about 
Armenians and “Moslem Tartars” disputing over some territories, most American 
diplomats in Russia had little knowledge about the non-Russians of this vast land.  
Upheavals in Russia brought with them a number of phenomena that was difficult to 
digest for observers from the United States.   
 One unique element remains the intervention and activities of the Czecho-
Slovak regiment which became an important player in the Russian civil war.  Nearly 
forty five thousand Czecho-Slovak soldiers of the Austrian army who had previously 
defected to the Russian side in order fight against the Austrians for the independence 
of their homeland, became stranded in Ukraine in the aftermath of the treaty at Brest-
Litovsk.  In obeisance of the orders received from the Czech National Council, the 
regiment began circumnavigating across Russia, Pacific and Atlantic oceans back to 
Europe.  On the way to the Pacific, the Czechs were embroiled in a conflict with 
Bolshevik forces which, given the weak state of the involved parties’ militaries, 
turned them into a major player in the battle for Russia.107  After several engagements 
                                                 
107 Frederick Lewis Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917 (New York: International 




with the Red guards, the Bolshevik leadership concluded that the Czechs were 
unwelcome in their country.  “The Soviet government despises the Czechs,” the 
Americans reported from Moscow with schadenfreude, adding “all observers agree 
that the Czechs are splendid.”108  In the eyes of those who wish to see an end to 
Bolshevism, indeed splendid they were.  “Throughout central Siberia,” reported 
Ernest L. Harris, the American consul general at Irkutsk, to David Francis in 
Vologda, “counter Bolshevik movement is intensifying.”  In his view, “the Czechs’ 
presence had been very encouraging.”109  Despite their stated neutrality in the war, 
the Czechs’ evident predisposition against the Bolsheviks had made it possible for the 
Whites to gain control of Russian cities of Tomsk, Taiga, NovoNikolaievsk, Kiansk, 
Kansk, Nizhnyudinsk and Omsk.  While Bolsheviks managed to prevail against 
General Semyonov on the Chinese border, across eastern Russia, the situation was 
beginning to look dire.  Having intimidated Bolsheviks into retreat from several 
important strongholds, including the Trans-Siberian railroad, the Czechs gave a much 
needed momentum to the anti-Bolshevik movement in the region. 
 By the summer of 1918, there was an increasing pressure on the Allies from 
all sides to  intervene in Russia.  America’s European allies, Ambassador Francis, and 
even the Russian diaspora living in the United States strongly advocated an American 
action Russia.  There were a great number of influential people such as Colonel 
Henry W. Anderson of the American Red Cross in Romania who believed 
intervention in Russia was “desirable and urgently necessary.”110  Even the British 
diplomats did not hesitate to tell their American allies that desperate conditions have 
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made it such that “the Russian people [were] demanding intervention of whatever 
kind it may be.” It was not just about the Russians.  “If we leave the Czechs to their 
fate and fail to intervene”, the British went on, “we shall suffer a blow to our image in 
Russia from which it will take years for us to recover,” concluded the British 
ambassador. 111  Of course, not everyone argued for the American intervention.  
Among those who opposed the idea of intervention, aside from radicals and socialists, 
there were some observers who did not see merit in military action.  U.S. military 
attaché Major Drysdale believed that the United States could assist anti-Bolshevik 
forces by economic and other peaceful means without necessarily resorting to arms.  
He believed that “forces of democratic development could not be permanently 
obstructed.”112  With greater elaboration spoke Vice Consul Felix Cole at Archangel.  
In late May, he sent a lengthy letter to the U.S. State Department conveying his 
misgiving about the idea of intervention.  Citing improper preparations, unrealistic 
expectations and ill-defined objectives, Felix Cole predicted that a small 
expeditionary mission could ultimately snowball into a bitter long war requiring ever 
larger number of troops.  “Intervention in the north Russia will mean that we must 
feed the entire north of Russia containing from 500,000 to 1,500,000 population,” he 
added.113  Cole understood that the Wilson administration had neither the will nor 
capacity for such an undertaking.  For the administration officials who were focused 
on prosecuting a war on the European front, Russia seemed like a secondary matter 
which nevertheless vied for their scarce time and resources.  “We have been literally 
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beset,” War Secretary Howard Baker complained in early July, “with the Russian 
questions in its various forms… Each one’s solution is dictated by the occurrences 
which he saw in the little corner of Russia in which he happened to be stationed.”114  
 After much vacillation and haggling with its allies in Europe and Japan, with 
great reluctance, in early August of 1918, President Wilson did eventually order a 
small number of American troops into Archangel and Siberia.  Historical evidence 
suggests that Wilson appreciated the gravity of the first American soldier setting foot 
on the Russian soil.  According to Betty Unterberger, at least initially, “Wilson could 
see nothing ‘wise or practicable’ in the scheme.”115  But as the war intensified, 
“Wilson was overwhelmed with appeals for intervention from his Allies, from the 
Supreme War Council  and from Ferdinand Foch, Generalissimo of the Allied 
Armies.”116  There is little indication that the despatches from Russia itself or concern 
for the spread of Bolshevism played a significant role in the president’s decision.  
Rather, Wilson appeared sensitive to a potential conflict with America’s European 
allies who insisted that the Russian ports which contained valuable military hardware 
-- given by the Allies to the Russian government prior to the Bolshevik seizure of 
power -- be secured.  Also, a part of the mission involved assisting the supposedly 
stranded Czecho-Slovak regiments in leaving the Russian territory.   
 Hence, in mid-August when 27-th and 31-st Infantry regiments landed in 
Vladivostok, the objectives of the mission were anything but clear.  Upon his arrival 
to the shore on September 1, the Commander of American Expeditionary forces in 
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Siberia General William S. Graves was surprised to find that no customs official or 
port authority was there to greet him to handle the arrangements.117  But it could have 
been worse.  In fact, by the time the Americans arrived in Vladivostok, the Japanese 
and British troops had cleared the area from the Bolsheviks, and in the ensuing 
period, they were to destroy the remaining Bolshevik detachments in Amur Valley 
which stretched from Khabarovsk to Blagovestchensk.  Three days after General 
Graves’ arrival to Vladivostok, 339-th American Infantry of about 4,700 men landed 
in Archangel.  The instructions of the commander of these forces, colonel Stewart, 
were simple: follow the orders of the British commander of Allied forces Major-
General F.C. Poole.  Ambassador Francis who had ardently advocated the American 
intervention for the past several months should have been elated.  However, greeting 
the arriving American soldiers at the Archangel port, the ambassador’s mood was 
dampened by certain concerns.  First, the regiments were nowhere large enough to 
overthrow the Bolsheviks.  Secondly, overthrowing the Bolsheviks did not seem to be 
the main target of the deployment.  For the next several months, Francis would do his 
utmost to try steer the rudderless American regiment in the direction which he 
thought would have been the most optimum outcome both for the Russians and his 
own countrymen.  
 As stated earlier, the Americans’ arrival in Russia was accompanied by a near 
total chaos in that country.  Despite the desperate circumstances which this 
intervention entailed, however, the landing resembled more a triumphant march 
through Paris in 1944, than the D-Day at Normandy.  Reporting from Vladivostok, 
U.S. Consul John K. Caldwell recalled the event: “The American troops paraded 
                                                 




yesterday and were well-received by the crowd as had been the French.”  Then 
reflecting on the complexities that surrounded the relationship between various Allied 
powers with the Russians, he added: “But the British and the Japanese were received 
in silence.  British were at disadvantage,” Caldwell explained, “because they were the 
first ones to show up, so nobody realized the significance, but silence for Japanese 
followed cheers for the French.”  Caldwell further elaborated, “It is evident that 
Russians still feel much hostility toward Japanese which latter are sure to increase by 
many small but irritating actions such as sentries preventing people from walking on 
pavement before the Japanese staff headquarters.”118  Even though the Allies acted in 
the capacity of liberators from Bolshevik tyranny, the friction between the locals and 
the true powers who were alien in culture, language and attitudes was unavoidable.  
While the comparatively positive attitude toward the representatives of the New 
World lingered until the latter’s departure, similar courtesy was not extended to the 
British, the French and certainly, the Japanese.  “They resent foreign domination,” 
wrote Ambassador Francis conveying his observations of ordinary Russians’ 
disposition to soldiers milling about in foreign uniforms.  However, neither the 
inhabitants of the Bolshevik-free territories, nor the American envoy lost sight of the 
fact that “if Allied troops were not here [in Archangel], Bolsheviks would drive into 
the Arctic Ocean all new Government officials and supporters not caught and 
shot.”119   
 With the multiplying successes of the White forces on the eastern and 
southern fronts followed by the foreign intervention, toward the end of August, the 
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Bolshevik morale began to sink.  Almost completely surrounded by hostile forces, 
few but the most determined within the Bolshevik leadership felt that obstacles to 
retaining power could be overcome.  Such state of affairs gave way to various kinds 
of rumors.  The managing director of the Nobel Oil Company of Swedish nationality, 
returning from Russia on August 13, 1918, reported that all Bolshevik leaders had left 
Petrograd and Moscow.  Three days prior, the property of the Nobel company in 
Petrograd was to be nationalized, but no one showed up from the government, leading 
the manager to speculate that the Bolshevik system had virtually collapsed.120  
Someone had even suggested that Lenin was living in Kronstadt on a battleship, 
whereas Leon Trotsky stayed in the Emperor’s yacht.   The Bolsheviks’ increasing 
sense of alarm became further reflected in the arrests of numerous British and French 
citizens on charges of spying.  Consul Poole reported about his meeting with Foreign 
Commissar Georgi Chicherin and his deputy Leo Karahan in which the American 
representative made it clear that he was not going to be intimidated by such actions.  
“If something happens, you will be held personally responsible for your actions,” 
Poole warned the Bolshevik ministers.  Nor was Poole assured by the Bolsheviks 
leader who told him that the consul had nothing to fear.  In a handwritten note at the 
end of the typed message Poole felt it necessary to add that the Bolsheviks were 
becoming “more and more desperate and that no reliance was to be placed on their 
assurances.”121
On August 30, 1918, as Vladimir Lenin made an exit from the Mickelson 
Factory where he had given a speech condemning imperialist interference with 
                                                 
120 Morris to Lansing, August 24, 1918, RG 59, File  #861.00/2557.    




Russia’s revolution, a Social Revolutionary activist named Fannie Kaplan shot him 
thrice.  The assassination attempt, which Lenin evidently survived, came on the heels 
of several high-profile killings of Bolshevik leaders, including Moisei S. Uritsky, the 
head of the Petrograd Cheka.  The Socialist Revolutionaries could not forgive Lenin 
for dispersing the Constituent Assembly, signing the Brest-Litovsk treaty and above 
all, the repression. 
The Bolshevik response that ensued was overwhelming.  On September 2, 
1918, Cheka issued an order which, judging by its contents, defied basic principles of 
judicial reciprocity.  It indiscriminately commanded “immediate execution” of former 
tsarist security officials and anyone with a gun in his possession, including those 
already in prison on such charges.  Without any judicial procedure, the order 
instructed imprisonment of “all well-known mensheviks, right SRs” as well as 
“representatives of the bourgeoisie, landlords, factory owners, traders, and all 
counter-revolutionary officers” and to place them in concentration camps under heavy 
work regimentation.  Perhaps more surprising aspect of the order was the provision 
ordering Cheka to detain the members of the bourgeoisie as hostages, thereby turning 
the Soviet government into a hostage-taker of the citizens, by its own admission.  “In 
case of any attempt to organize, stage uprising, attack the guards – immediately to be 
shot,” stated the second article of the eight-item order.122   
In addition to its opponents, whether real or perceived, on the domestic venue, 
among those targeted by the Soviet government were also several allied diplomats 
including the British envoy Bruce Lockhart who was suspected of aiding anti-
                                                 





Bolshevik elements.  With the remaining Allied officials huddled up in the building 
of the American embassy out of fear for their own lives, Consul Poole wrote a letter 
to the White House in which he stated that the situation in Moscow had become 
desperate.  “A veritable slaughter is going on,” Poole went on, “I think neutral and 
Allied Powers alike should take action in the name of humanity not so much on 
account of the Allied citizens who are in danger here as to shield the untold number 
of Russian innocents  who are being sacrificed by the Bolshevik barbarity.  Since 
Uritsky’s death 7000 people have been arrested in Petrograd alone, and on the 
Bolsheviks’ own statement, 500 of these have already been shot.  One of the bloodiest 
pages in history is being written.”123  Coming from a person who had observed the 
Russian affairs for the past several years, this level of alarm was noteworthy.  After 
all, the execution of the Tsar Nicholas along with his wife and children nearly a 
month ago in Yekaterinburg, had barely registered in the communication between the 
diplomats.  “Apparently, Czar and his family [have been] executed,” was the text of a 
short message in which Consul John Van A. MacMurray briefly confirmed the 
findings of the Czech and White forces after the liberation of the city from 
Bolsheviks.124  Fearing that freed Tsar might rally and lead the increasing monarchist 
factions, Lenin had Nicholas II and his dynastic line terminated.  Nearly half a year 
after the Bolsheviks had taken power, the culture of death had become so widespread 
in Russia, that the violent demise of a man who for over 20 years ruled Russia with 
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near-absolute authority did not draw much curiosity among those monitoring the 
events in that country.125  
In displaying merciless attitude toward their rivals, many Bolsheviks believed 
to be following in the footsteps of the French revolutionaries, whom Karl Marx had 
once praised for the courage “to meet the cowardly rage of the counter-revolution 
with revolutionary passion, the terreur blanche with the terreur rouge.”126  Often 
referred as the Red Terror by historians, this bloody period in the Russian history thus 
cannot be properly understood without appreciating the sense with which Bolsheviks 
looked at historical precedents for guidance.  According to George Leggett, “in 
applying terror, the Bolsheviks were very conscious of the traditions of the French 
revolutionary history.”127 Red Terror was not a mere reaction to the violence by their 
opponents; it stemmed from deeply-rooted attitudes which prevailed among 
Bolsheviks with regard to the notion of violence.  For the Bolsheviks, violence was 
not even a necessity, a last resort to salvage one’s objectives, but a method which 
drew them closer to their revered idols in France who over a century ago had visited 
terrible atrocities upon the representatives of the ancien regime.  Only several weeks 
after taking power, Trotsky had warned: “In not more than a month’s time terror will 
assume very violent forms, after the example of the Great French Revolution, the 
guillotine, and not merely the gaol, will be ready for our enemies.”128  As early as 
1905, Lenin described Bolsheviks as the Jacobins of the Social Democratic 
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movement, and likewise, advocated “similar use of terror to settle accounts with the 
aristocracy.”  However, unlike the Jacobins, the Bolsehviks’ more frequent targets 
were the fellow dissidents against the old establishment and the disenfranchised 
populace at large.  It is noteworthy that those who assassinated Uritsky or tried to kill 
Lenin were not monarchists, but social revolutionaries.  As such, the Bolshevik 
atrocities were more than simply an account-settling with the enemies; it constituted 
an attempt to establish total control over the society by all means available.  In that 
sense, the vast scope and brutality of the persecution defies even the historical 
standards of the country which suffered for centuries under tsarist despotism and its 
secret police agencies. According to Ronald Hingley, the historian of Russian secret 
police, “The Red Terror sets the Cheka apart from all preceding Russian political 
forces since it was responsible for far more political arrests and executions in some 
five years of activity than had occurred during the entire sway of Okhrana, the Third 
Section and all their predecessors put together.”129  One of the most significant 
authorities on the history of the Cheka, George Leggett estimated that the total 
number of the victims of Cheka, “over the four year period December 1917 – 
February 1922,  may have been in the region of 280,000, of whom perhaps half 
perished through execution and half in the suppression of insurrection.”130  These 
numbers demonstrate the terrifying extent to which Lenin would go in order to 
compensate “for the paucity of popular support on which to base a dictatorship 
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professedly operated by the proletariat, but progressively involving the regimentation 
of an entire people.”131  
On September 10, 1918, the Norwegian Minister at Helsingfors informed his 
superiors in Christiania that he had reliable information that Petrograd was “burning 
in twelve different places, and that people were being shot indiscriminately in the 
streets.”132  U.S. Consul General in Christiania Marion Letcher wrote from Moscow 
stating that massacre of Russian citizens by the Bolshevik government continued.  
According to him, “shootings in Moscow numbered 150 daily, and that more than one 
thousand people had been shot in retaliation for attempt on Lenin.”  Numerous Allied 
diplomats in Moscow had also been jailed.  Deprived of his staff and isolated, Poole 
suddenly found himself alone faced with the palpable danger of arrest or worse.  
Infuriated at the Bolsheviks’ total disregard for humanitarian values and basic 
diplomatic etiquettes, consul Poole issued a protest to Chicherin in which he pointed 
out that “the Bolshevik cause now tottered on the verge of complete moral 
bankruptcy.”133  While the city itself remained quiet, Letcher reported on September 
14, the revolution supported a veritable reign of terror with many and baseless 
shootings every day.”134  In Poole’s view, “among the Bolsheviks, saner elements 
were giving way to the violent and completely irresponsible.”  On September 14, 
facing mortal threat, with the assistance of two Norwegian diplomats, the American 
consul left Petrograd for the Finnish border.  After an emotionally draining 
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experience at the border passage, the American envoy was relieved to find himself 
surrounded by the Finnish guards in the non-Bolshevik territory.  It was later told that 
ten minutes after he had crossed the border, orders had arrived from the Kremlin for 
Poole’s arrest.135  
The growing terror in Russia’s center is also reflective from the series of 
despatches coming from governments as far away as Peru.  In the despatches sent by 
the governments of numerous countries friendly to the United States, ranging from 
Cuba to Persia, “the destruction of life and liberty in Russia” was condemned in 
strongest terms.136  In one of these messages there was a suggestion to place “reward 
on Lenin’s and Trotsky’s heads as international murderers.”  The harshness of the 
terror prompted Netherlands’ Minister in Russia to call for opening a second major 
front in the Great War, this one against the Bolsheviks. “The danger is now so great 
that I feel it my duty to call the attention of the British and all other Governments to 
the fact that if an end is not put to Bolshevism in Russia at once,” he wrote, “the 
civilization of the world will be threatened… I consider that the immediate 
suppression of Bolshevism is the greatest issue now before the world, not even 
excluding the war which is still raging, and unless as above stated Bolshevism is 
nipped in the bud immediately, it is bound to spread in one form or another over 
Europe and the whole world …”137   
In late September, the Swedish press reported that during the discussion at the 
Central  Committee, recovered Lenin expressed a desire to return to the revolution’s 
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good methods.  If that was the case, then it could be presumed that Lenin was 
responding to the barrage of foreign outcry and condemnation.  Yet an October 
missive sent by Poole’s agent in Petrograd tells a different story.  “Bolsheviks are 
convinced that their defiance of “imperialistic” powers are successful,” noted the 
unnamed agent, “Bourgeois are totally terrorized, cannot do anything. The British and 
French are harassed. Threats won’t do. We must bargain with Bolsheviks.  Food 
situation is going from bad to worse with no relief in sight.”138  Indeed, as 
Ambassador Francis had observed, the Bolshevik power seemed to multiply in ratio 
to the terror they exercised against their rivals and the discontent from starving 
populace at large.  Having wrecked the economy and the livelihoods of a great 
majority of the people, the Bolsheviks vested little hope in winning the hearts and 
minds of their subjects.   
The impressions of an American agricultural expert and a visiting professor 
Thomas Anderson are informative in this regard.  With no particular axe to grind 
against the Bolsheviks, Anderson coolly related how the first acts of nationalization 
by the Bolsheviks were received well by the population, since for the first time the 
land now belonged to them.  But a lack of operational procedure for common 
ownership, the Bolshevik attempts to set prices at minimum and requisitioning of 
grain quickly led to hostile reactions from the peasants.  As for the nationalization of 
industries, Anderson noted that “efficiency decreased 40 percent, and production cost 
went up 500 to 1000 percent.”  Consequently, most workers lost their jobs.  
According to Anderson, having lost their employment, the workers were mobilized 
into army for 600 roubles a month.  “This was the only way to assure one’s existence 
                                                 




during the upcoming winter,” the American explained the rationale behind many 
workers joining the Red Army.   In his view, most Russians did not take interest in 
politics, and were ignorant.  However, “no more than 10 percent of the population 
supports the Bolsheviks,” Anderson stated with unusual confidence, and that “most 
would welcome Allied intervention under the American lead” in order  “to stop the 
anarchy and slaughter that are now going on.”139   
Thomas Anderson’s account of the situation in Russia was corroborated by 
many Western and Russian persons who had just returned from that country.  In a 
despatch that contained interviews with Evgeni Savitch of the Second Russian 
Insurance Company,  a Frenchman named Valla, and two Americans representing the 
International Harvester Company, all interlocutors conveyed that Bolsheviks had little 
popular support.  The Bolshevik army, Savitch reported, had at first consisted of 
Lettish regiments “who were outcasts in their own society” only to be reinforced by 
Chinese laborers who had been brought into Russia in 1915-16.  “They are kept loyal 
to Bolsheviks,” Savitch contended, “by being paid huge sums of money.  They can 
loot and rob without ever facing a prospect of punishment.”  In a place where the 
wages were about 900 Roubles a month, a simple lunch of soup, chopped meat and 
potatoes cost 60 roubles.”  The only people who could afford even those amenities, 
according to Savitch, were sailors, and Red guards, since nobody else had money.  
“At the present time,” he continued, “many people are actually dying of starvation in 
Petrograd and Moscow.”  The two American observers repeated Savtich’s assertions 
about the extreme lack of food and fuel in Russia.  According to them, many people 
would die from cold alone during the upcoming winter.   “The men are convinced that 
                                                 




the next few months will see a still greater exodus of workmen and inhabitants of the 
cities to the country and it is quite possible that both Moscow and Petrograd will 
become dead cities,” wrote the author of the despatch interviewing the Americans.140  
In a letter sent from Petrograd to Stockholm, an inhabitant of the city stated that as 
high as the prices were it was still difficult to obtain anything.141  “All trade [is] 
gradually being nationalized and as soon as any business is nationalized the food 
stores and their articles are taken by Red Guards and sold at fantastic prices.  While 
people are starving the Red Guards and Bolshevik authorities are living in plenty,” 
the letter concluded.  In another despatch from Stockholm, the Russian manager of 
Northern Tourist Bureau named Mr. Wist was quoted saying that “Bolshevik were 
gaining numbers not because people liked them, because it was the only way to 
secure food.”  People, he told, were literally starved into submission.  “The one 
prayer of the soldiers, the sailors, and the civil population including the Bolshevik 
officials is that the Allies will immediately appear and commence operations against 
them,” wrote Mr. Wist.  “The minute this is done there would be an absolute 
wholesale desertion from the Bolsheviks.”142   
While the conditions in the parts of Russia controlled by non-Bolshevik forces 
were difficult, the despatches did not suggest similar levels of destitution and hunger.  
Describing the state of white soldiers, Ernest Harris, the U.S. Vice-Consul in Omsk 
wrote: “It is without money.  The soldiers are without sufficient clothes and are badly 
and irregularly paid.”143  Still, he noted that the Siberian government appeared to be 
                                                 
140 Morris to Lansing, October 19, 1918, RG 59, File  #861.00/3188. 
141 Morris to Lansing, December 3, 1918, RG 59, File  #861.00/3339. 
142 Morris to Lansing, December 10, 1918, RG 59, File  #861.00/3400. 




gradually improving its affairs.  In Stockholm, the American Charge d’Affaires 
Sheldon Whitehouse spoke with General Boris Badjanoff, the chief of the Ukrainian 
delegation in Scandinavia.  “There is a great abundance of grain in the Ukraine and at 
every place white bread, butter, sugar and real coffee can be obtained,” general 
Badjanoff told Whitehouse.  Even though most factories did not operate at full 
capacity, the Ukrainian general expressed his confidence that things were on the right 
track.  “A friend made 25, 000 roubles in 1917, but in 1918 his profit was 250,000,” 
he divulged.  Even though the prices for goods remained expensive, he assured 
Whitehouse that there was no starvation in nationalist-held Ukraine.144     
With the setting of winter, the warring parties in Russia’s civil war reached a 
stalemate.  For the Bolsheviks, success was defined by the mere fact that they still 
controlled large portions of the country, and following the intensification of Red 
Terror, they had little to fear in terms of internal dissent.  The same, however, could 
not be said about the Whites.  Unlike Bolsheviks who were united behind a singular 
objective and under one leadership, the Whites represented a rainbow of political 
factions and military leaders.  Consul Harris reported that outside Bolshevik Russia, 
there existed seven governments.  He noted wryly that the Russians of Archangel, 
Omsk, Yekaterinburg, Hobchangu, Ovsk, Vladivostok, Harbin, Samara differed 
between each other when not severely oppressed by the Tsar or Bolsheviks.145  
Following several unsuccessful attempts to organize civil government in Siberia, 
Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak was given the authority of a dictator in order to 
efficiently counter the Bolshevik moves.  However, General Semyonov refused to 
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recognize Kolchak’s authority as a dictator and declared himself one in the city of 
Chita.146  Even greater was the friction between White forces in North Caucasus and 
Kuban.  Reporting from the Don region, American consul in Batum, F. Willoughby 
Smith, recognized the importance of bringing about “such a union  between the 
parties as to enable them to work out a common program and prevent personal 
interests or ambitions from seriously interfering therewith.”  “This lack of union and 
individual intrigues and ambitions have led to the failure of every effort heretofore 
made to establish a Government in Russia unless the Bolshevik Soviet can be called 
one,” stated Smith.147   
In contrast to Bolsheviks, the Whites lacked a clear political platform, if any 
at all.  As historian of the Civil War Peter Kenez has observed, the latter “consisted of 
army officers, men who had felt basically at home in tsarist Russia, who disliked 
politics, and who envisaged only military solutions to problems. They had no vision 
of a future Russia, yet they deeply felt that Bolshevik rule would bring only evil to 
their country.”148  In response to the suggestion by one of his advisors that some 
political program should be instituted for their new government, Kolchak was 
reported to have replied: “No, leave this alone. Work only for the army. Don’t you 
understand that no matter what fine laws you write, if we lose, they will all the same 
shoot us?”149  According to Kenez, The Reds’ superb organizational skills were not 
just limited to raising a large army and effectively prosecuting the war against an 
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array of enemies, but they also carried out aggressive propaganda campaign which 
attracted large number of recruits willing to fight for a cause.  “The Bolshevik 
leadership believed in the possibility of remaking society and man and was 
committed to a puritanical outlook,” writes Kenez.  “The Whites, on the other hand, 
regarded the Civil War not as a heroic period in which the foundations of a better 
society was being laid, but as a nightmare which they had to survive as well as they 
could.”150    
This lack of political vision gave way to misunderstanding and suspicions 
among the populace about the motives of the White leaders.  “What is worse,” Ernest 
Harris complained from Siberia, “is that the [Kolchak] Government has not been able 
to combat social-revolutionists and Bolshevik propaganda which is undermining the 
discipline of the soldiers on the front.”151  Furthermore the ardent nationalism of 
certain White generals made it impossible for them to join forces with non-Russian 
entities who were equally eager to see the Bolsheviks gone.  Many of General Anton 
Denikin’s proclamations lamented the break-up of the mighty Russian Empire and the 
loss of natural resources in the territories inhabited by Poles, Ukrainians and 
Caucasian nations.  In fact, much of the time, Ukrainian nationalists spent their efforts 
trying to defend against invading forces of Denikin.152  Under such circumstances, 
former non-Russian subjects of the empire sometimes saw the Reds as the lesser of 
the two evils.   
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With the advent of Armistice on November 11, 1918, the entire prism through 
which the Americans regarded the Russian affairs changed.  The Great War which 
had been a catalyst for revolutionary turmoil in Russia was now over.  And with it, 
the raison d’etre of the Allied intervention – which was to secure military storage 
sites from falling in to German hands – had vanished.  However, shortly before the 
war ended, certain events had already transpired which perhaps bore omen for the 
relationship between the United States and the Soviet state in the near future.  Ever 
since the arrival of the American soldiers in Russia, Ambassador David Francis tried 
to assume some degree of control over the military force.  Even though formally the 
American military was placed under the British commander, as the senior political 
representative of the most powerful Allied state, the U.S. ambassador enjoyed great 
authority in terms of directing the army’s actions on the ground.  Almost helpless and 
stranded until recently in the center of Bololand (as the Americans came to refer to 
the areas controlled by Bolshevik forces), Francis now found himself a player in the 
game with some control over what seemed to be the only element that mattered in 
Russia – firepower.  Having moved to Archangel shortly before the arrival of the 
American forces in August, the ambassador was determined to make use of this 
valuable asset for the objective he had set forth.  Nearly a year past the Bolshevik 
takeover, Francis despised everything about the Bolsheviks and felt it to be critical to 
eliminate this movement once and for all.  “My conclusion is that the only way to end 
this disgrace to civilization,” Francis wrote, “is for the Allies immediately to take 
Petrograd and Moscow by sending sufficient troops therefore to Murmansk and 




he made a detailed suggestion with regard to the number of the troops that would be 
sufficient to handle the task. “Fifty thousand would serve, but hundred thousand 
would be ample.  [Consul] Poole says we could take Petrograd with ten thousand, but 
could not hold it.”153  The ambassador realized that the size of the expeditionary force 
was not sufficient for the task of removing Bolsheviks from power.  Francis believed 
that Bolsheviks gained strength by terrorizing, and the fact that Allies had so few 
troops on the ground, unwilling to take the fight to the Reds, threatened to render the 
mission utterly meaningless.  “The Russians correctly reason that if no additional 
Allied troops come,” he stated, “the Allies will be driven from northern Russia and all 
Russians will be exterminated by the Bolsheviks.”154  
Encouraged by the advances of the White forces centered in Omsk, Francis 
believed that the Allies should try to link up with the anti-Bolshevik forces in Siberia 
and perhaps form a united front against Bolsheviks.  Francis’ solution was simple: 
America should enter the war on the side of the Whites and with common effort, 
destroy the Bolshevik enemy.  The trouble was, Francis superiors at the State 
Department and the White House did not share neither his objectives, nor his 
solutions.155  Even though, the Americans in Archangel had already engaged in 
battles with Bolsheviks in several instances, U.S. State Secretary Robert Lansing 
made it clear that America did not consider itself in a state of war with Bolshevik 
Russia.  As such, no more American troops were to be sent to North Russia.   
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By this time, the ambassador faced yet another, personal health problem.  
Severe pain emanating for his enlarged prostate effectively incapacitated him.  While 
Francis wished to stay and continue the fight, he was forced to evacuate from the 
country where no medical care was available to treat this sort of problem.  On 
November 7, four days before the Great War ended, aboard the ship Olympia, he 
departed Archangel for England.  Even though Francis quickly recovered once in 
Britain, this would be the last time the ambassador who had served his country with 
honor and perseverance ever saw Russia again.   
With Ambassador Francis’ departure from the scene, the American -- and 
overall, the Allied – mission lost one of its key proponents in the fight against 
Bolshevism.  The remaining U.S. representatives on the ground, such as DC Poole 
who had now returned to Archangel to take Ambassador Francis’ place as a charge 
d’affaires, understood that such a withdrawal would only contribute to Bolshevik 
victory in the Civil War.  But staying in Russia had its costs.  Stranded in North 
Russia with no instructions to either advance or retreat, most American soldiers had 
difficulty understanding the point of their mission in this remote part of the world.  In 
his memoir, Fighting the Bolsheviks, Private First Class Donald E. Carey who served 
in the expedition to Archangel, captured the sentiments of a soldier caught up in these 
strange circumstances:  
“My first night on front line duty was weird and fanciful.  That I, a 
Michigan lad, reared amid the conveniences of an ordinary American 
home should be standing in the shadows of a cluster of pines beside a 




godforsaken country on such a hellish mission as war, far exceeded my 
wildest dreams.”156   
 
What emerges from the diaries of this young man is the unusual and perhaps even 
curious ambivalence toward the enemy who was to be confronted only depending on 
the circumstances.  Private Carey narrated the story of a Bolshevik propagandist who 
would occasionally show up at their camp and try to brainwash the bemused 
American soldiers about the ideals of his revolution.    
The fact that American government did not declare a war on Bolshevik 
Russia, however, did not mean there were no casualties resulting from frequent 
skirmishes that took place between opposing sides.  To be sure, the Americans fought 
against the Bolsheviks and numerous soldiers died on both sides as a result.  
According to a despatch issued by Poole, on January 3, with the goal of putting an 
end to the Bolshevik incursion which “inflicted desultory casualties” on the Allied 
troops, the Americans conducted a military operation.157  With only 7 Americans 
dead and 30 wounded, the operation was hailed as a partial success.  As the 
Bolsheviks kept up the pressure, however, the morale began tumbling both among 
soldiers and in Washington.  When the death toll from American soldiers in Russia 
reached 132, the politicians in the United States, such as Democratic Senator Robert 
LaFolette, began questioning the grounds for sacrificing American lives.158  Then 
there was the leftist anti-war camp which generally opposed American intervention 
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abroad, and especially, as one petition from Detroit characterized, to “overthrow a 
government established by the people with force of bayonets.”159  In Archangel itself, 
soldiers saw little point in defending a barren piece of tundra both for and against the 
people whom they simply did not understand.  “How I wished I was out of Russia so I 
could see my people, read, study and learn and amount to something.  I’m tired of 
rotten food, irregular life, vile companions and conditions, and of hearing Wilson and 
England damned,” wrote private Carey.160   
What made things particularly unworthwhile and frustrating was the soldiers’ 
knowledge of their government’s ultimate intentions to bring them home.  Shortly 
following the Armistice, there was a consensus within the Wilson administration that 
the American troops should be withdrawn.   The problem was that Russia’s arctic 
ports froze between the months of November and May.  Logistically, the seaborne 
evacuation of the regiments could not take place until late Spring.  Stranded in North 
Russia until the foreseeable future, strong friction developed between the American 
and British soldiers in the area.  “A volume might be written on “British-American 
Discord in Russia,’ wrote Carey – “The ‘limeys,’ as they were contemptuously called 
– when not designated by some foul names  -- were anathema to most of our troops.”  
Acting as allies for the first time in history, “the snobbish self-assurance and 
patronizing air of English soldiers, even in colonial times, never met favorably with 
Americans.”161  Many Americans believed that they had been put up to this fight by 
the British whose king, unlike President Wilson, openly pursued a policy designed to 
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remove Bolsheviks from power.  After all, British statesman Winston Churchill had 
been particularly adamant in this regard.  When it seemed that the Allies might 
abandon Russia to the mercy of Bolsheviks, he asserted: “It is a delusion to suppose 
that all this year we have been fighting the battles of the anti-Bolshevik  Russians.  
On the contrary, they have been fighting ours and this truth will become painfully 
apparent from the moment that they are exterminated and the Bolsheviks are supreme 
over the whole vast territories of the Russian Empire.”162  
According to historian Markku Ruotsila, conservatives such as Churchill 
recognized the inherent dangers in the victory of the Communist ideology insofar as it 
would have “certain definitive consequences [in the West] which could not be 
prevented once the fundamentals of economic and social interaction began to be 
tampered with.”  “For conservatives, it was necessary to destroy the temporary centre 
from which the false yet alluring ideas of pure democracy and collectivist state were 
being transmitted and it was necessary to destroy each of their several manifestation 
in Western societies.”  Whereas many Western liberals saw Bolshevism as a political 
reaction rooted in the economic social flaws of existing society” conservatives 
believed that “Bolshevism, and by extension, collectivism as a whole, fundamentally 
was not about temporal, material conditions at all.”  Instead, Ruotsila wrote, 
“conservatives understood that socialism and Bolshevism were offering a secular 
form of religion” which sought to supplant the fundamental beliefs upon which 
sustained liberal socio-political orders in Great Britain and the United States.  In 
contrasting attitudes among Churchill-type conservatives and liberals in the Anglo-
American world toward the Soviet regime, historian Markku Ruotsila concluded that 
                                                 




“conservatives correctly claimed that Bolshevism may well have been a social and 
economic phenomenon and a reaction to something pre-existent but that it was also 
an actual forces based movement in control of many of the significant resources of 
the Russian Empire.”  Thus, “given the supposed nature of Bolshevism, conservatives 
thought that to remain inactive would be to certainly lose the fight.”163   
The dangers posed by the Bolshevik triumph in Russia to the eventual security 
of the American republic were also well understood by the emissaries of the United 
States.  “Bolshevism is an actual menace to civilization; it must be met and crushed,” 
wrote American consul in Omsk Ernest Harris.  “Bolshevism is no longer a Russian 
problem but one which endangers all humanity.  First-hand personal experiences with 
Bolshevism in Russia and Siberia during almost two years leads me to make this 
statement.”164
In many ways, Harris’ views resonated with those of David Francis, Maddin 
Summers and D.C. Poole who had observed the rise of Bolshevism firsthand:  “I am 
inclined to think that the American people do not fully realize what Bolshevism 
signifies,” he reported with alarm.  “For fifteen months it has held European Russia in 
a state of terror… Bolshevism is a greater danger than the militarism, [which] at least 
stood for law and order while Bolshevism stands only for destruction of life and 
property.  Bolshevism constitutes a real world danger and should be literally stamped 
out.”  Reporting on the atrocities committed by Bolsheviks in the Baltic region, the 
American military attaché in Denmark, too, deemed necessary to comment  that 
Bolshevism was “nothing more or less than suppression of a large majority of the 
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people by a very small and exceedingly shameless minority, which is made up of a 
few foreign idealists and – for the greater part – of criminals.”  Thus, the attaché 
continued, “it is the complete opposite of Democracy and also of Aristocracy – for 
it’s the most extreme form of ochlocracy ever known to history.”165  The 
unwillingness of the American leadership to invest decisively in the destruction of 
Bolshevism, in Ernest Harris’ mind, only bolstered the Bolsheviks’ argument before 
the beleaguered Russian populace that the Allies were in Russia merely for the 
protection of their own geo-political interests – hence, they refused to advance an 
inch forward from the posts they had initially occupied inside Russia.  “The 
occupation of Murmansk and Archangel without further advance into the country has 
been unfortunate,” wrote Harris, because “it has lent color to the Bolshevik charge 
that intervention is selfishly inspired, seaports alone being taken and with a view of 
permanent occupation.  This argument, which is very Russian, is enabling the 
Bolsheviks,” he concluded.166   
The fog of the Civil War thickened during the winter months of 1919.  
Haphazard advances of the Whites aided by Britain and the United States and the 
impossibly harsh conditions kept a glimmer of hope that the tide against Bolshevism 
could be turned.  A motley of British, French and Italian visitors returning from 
Moscow informed that in terms of insecurity to life and freedom, the situation was 
extraordinarily harsh.  According to them, everyone in the city starved except the Red 
Guards and the Bolshevik leadership.  Even the amount of money was reduced, due to 
the shortage of paper.   The Western workers for the Society of Friends of War 
                                                 
165 Norman Hapgood, U.S. Minister in Denmark, to Lansing, June 18, 1919, RG 59, File  
#861.00/4813. 




Victims’ Relief Committee who escaped from Moscow reported the pricelist for food 
items which strikes one not as much for the exorbitance of the prices as for the 
content of the menu which, among other strange items, included dog meat.167  In their 
views, as the American diplomats in Stockholm who interviewed the visitors 
reported, “the Russian peasants wanted neither Bolshevik, nor the Bourgeoisie, but a 
conservative-socialist government.”  Perhaps this seemingly complex and in some 
ways, contradictory desire accounts for the failure of the Whites to gain support in the 
popular opinion. “The Russian leaders realize a fundamental antagonism between 
democracy and Bolshevism.  One favors one class rule over everyone else.., others 
believe in democracy… This difference cannot be adjusted by agreement; force is 
alone adequate, and the special circumstances of the Russian Revolution have been 
such that the champions of democracy must seek support abroad.”168   
The anti-Bolsheviks’ inability to garner sufficient support of the public as well 
as the latter’s boundless tolerance for the Bolshevik oppression was frustrating to 
many observers who sought various explanations for this phenomenon.  Reporting 
from Vladivostok, Consul John Caldwell blamed the lack of allegiance to anti-
Bolshevism on the failures of the Kolchak government.  He strongly criticized the 
actions and deeds of the reactionary classes ostensibly representing the White 
administration.  In Caldwell’s’ estimate, the latter’s interference in zemstvos, 
cooperatives and labor unions did much to sow seeds of suspicion among peasants 
who were weary of the return to bad old days.  Furthermore the drastic measures 
employed by Kolchak’s emissaries to mobilize inhabitants in the fight against 
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Bolsheviks alienated many people.  To remedy these shortcomings, Caldwell 
recommended the adoption of “liberal attitude to gain the confidence of lower classes 
and treat existing organizations with respect.”169   
While the despatches contain few references to the instances of White Terror, 
it is clear that many American representatives were not thrilled with the actions of 
their allies on the ground.  Even though retaliatory in form, wholesale executions of 
their opponents and accused Bolshevik sympathizers was a source of great discomfort 
to the Americans who essentially rooted for the White victory. In a conversation with 
the former consul in Norway, U.S. envoy to Denmark Norman Hapgood even 
suggested that “the only way to stop White Terror would be to attach many allied 
troops to Kolchak and Denikin.”170 As Peter Kenez observes, the Whites resented the 
Bolsheviks to such degree that they rarely considered or accepted the idea that 
individuals could join the Party for reasons other than their attachment to the 
ideology.  They ruthlessly treated all Bolsheviks alike.  In Kenez’ view, “the short 
sighted White policy of immediately executing Communist captives greatly benefited 
the Red side in the Civil War.”171
In the opinion of some American observers, the Whites’ inability to rally the 
Russian population also stemmed from the problems caused by the mentality of 
average Russians.  In an elaborate report detailing the political situation in war-time 
Russia, Edwin Cherrington, the Vice Consul in Omsk, considered various aspects of 
the Russian society.  Like many of his colleagues, he had no doubt that essentially, 
Bolshevism was about a struggle “between decent people and peasants and a handful 
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of gangsters seeking to impose their ideals on a society by sheer force.”  Labeling 
Bolshevism as a social disease or perversion and likening its followers to a child who 
destroys his own house our of sheer adventurism, nevertheless, Cherrington did not 
believe that such ideals could have ever found receptive audience in America.  
“Bolshevism could never happen in America.  Americans are much more 
individualistic,” he noted.  Citing the Russians’ long history under despotism and 
tyranny, he compared the Russian people at large to a great tiger kept in captivity 
since its birth.  “It desires freedom,” Cherrington acknowledged, “but knows not 
where it is going when the bars are let down nor the perils which beset the path of the 
inexperienced.”  In a country ruled by fear for so long, the vice-consul remarked, 
most Russians lacked a sense of civic obligation and a spirit of initiative taken for 
granted in America.  Long dominated by its almighty rulers, in the aftermath of the 
tsarist collapse, “with all its superstition the Church has been one of the few lights 
burning in this land of intellectual darkness,” wrote Cherrington.  “As much as we 
would like to do so, we cannot judge the Russian people by our own high standards.  
It is difficult to speculate on the future of a country where 75 percent or more of the 
people do not read nor write…”172   
Rejecting the widespread charges that Bolshevism was the doing of the Jews, 
therefore unreflective of Russian traits, Cherrington observed that the Jews were “as a 
class more energetic and more capable than Russians.”  “Having always been 
discriminated against, the Jews have been nursing their grievances for generations,” 
he added, but “the Russian Jews are not all Bolsheviks.  In fact, many of them have 
                                                 





suffered much under Lenin’s regime.”  Cherrington’s views in part resonate with the 
analysis of Oleg Budnitsky who refers to historical evidence to debunk the 
exaggerated and much abused equation of Bolsheviks with Jews.  While certain high-
profile figures of the Bolshevik Revolution, such as Trotsky (Bronstein), Kamenev 
(Rosenfeld) and Zinoviev (Aronov) were of Jewish origins, this factor in no way 
contributed to the welfare or advancement of the Russian Jews per se.  Speaking at  a 
Jewish rally, on June 9, 1917, scholar Semyon Dubnov referred to those characters 
Russian pseudonyms as reflective of the shame they felt of their Jewish identity.  
“They have no roots within our people,” he stated.173  Dubnov did not keep silent 
once the Bolsheviks seized power and watched with great consternation the early 
stages of the Red Terror: “They will talk about this loudly and in all stratas of the 
Russian society jewophobia will deepen.... They will not forgive…. The basis for 
anti-Semitism is ready.”174 The overthrow of the tsarist regime indeed resulted in the 
improvement in the political status of the Jews in terms of basic political rights.  “The 
Russian revolution,” writes Oleg Budnitsky, “brought the Jews the decree of March 
22 regarding the equalization of rights. It also gave birth to unforeseen explosion of 
anti-Semitism and innumerable calamities, mostly affecting those who had nothing to 
do with politics.”175  
In Edward Cherrington’s view, Russia’s discordant multi-national character 
was no less responsible for the plethora of ills that befell this land.  “The world has 
estimated Russia more by her vast domain than by her state of advancement.  We 
knew “the Russian Empire” and its gilt-edged veneer of Western civilization.  When 
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it fell we find a great conglomeration of peoples, twenty different races more Asiatic 
than European enveloped in ignorance and superstition, hundreds of years behind the 
Western world, groping in the night for something to cling to, an easy prey to 
demagogue and adventurer.”176   
With its distinct focus on the Russian national character, Cherrington’s report 
revealed some genuine sentiments among American observers of Russia who 
ordinarily refrained from expressing them in official settings.  But as David 
Engerman has demonstrated in Modernization from the Other Shore, “notions of 
national character so deeply rooted in the Foreign Service’s corps of Russia experts 
shaped the diplomats’ analysis of  political trends.”177  According to Engerman, at 
least in the initial stages of the Soviet state construction, “Slavic capacity for 
suffering” was a notion that affected the interpretations of nearly all diplomats who 
came to contact with Russia.  In its disregard for human life, liberty and dignity, 
many American diplomats recognized what they saw as the quintessential character 
of the Russian society where irrationalism, despotism and violence merged into a 
formidable triune.  In their eyes, as Engerman put it, “under the patina of Soviet 
modernity lay eternal Russianness.”178  Perhaps more than any other feature of the 
Soviet realities, the understanding of the Russian character therefore figured 
prominently into the methodology by which diplomatic observers assessed Russia.  
“Scratch a Soviet, and You’ll Find a Russian” had become an adage among those 
who searched for some measure of predictability in Soviet behavior.  According to 
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Engerman, even instructors at the Foreign Service School warned young American 
diplomats about the strong inertia of the traditions that emanated from psychology 
and “physiography of the habitat of the Russian people.”179
In denouncing what they saw as depraved nature of the Russian muzhik, 
perhaps unknowingly, these diplomats followed in the footsteps of early Western 
observers such as Astolphe de Custine who almost exclusively focused on the 
Russian national traits in an attempt to explain Russia to their countrymen.  A 
Frenchman who went Russia in 1839, to seek affirmation of his conservative views, 
Marquis de Custine returned with a conviction that Russians were an entirely 
different lot whose values radically differed from those present even in revolutionary 
France.  He was struck by the tyrant worship that the Russians seemed to have 
elevated to the status of a religion.  “Nothing can discredit authority with a people for 
whom obedience has become a condition of life, “he observed, “Some peoples have 
worshipped light; the Russians worship eclipse.”180  It was tragically ironic that the 
Russian leftists, including Vladimir Lenin, who despised Russia’s slavish past, by 
their actions appeared to have further intensified the bondage of their people.    
In The Slave Soul of Russia, psychologist Daniel Rancour-Lafferier refers to 
Custine’s assertion to explain the historical quandary of Russian despotism:  
“Tomorrow in an insurrection, in the midst of massacre, by the light of a 
conflagration, the cry of freedom may spread to the frontiers of Siberia; a blind and 
cruel people may murder their masters, may revolt against obscure tyrants, and dye 
the waters of Volga with blood; but they will not be any more free; barbarism is in 
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itself a yoke.”181  Rancour-Laferrier identifies “moral masochism” as the focus of the 
Russian culture, and sees its elements in various aspects of the Russian culture, 
particularly, its folklore and literature.  According to psychohistorian, this great 
capacity for suffering is closely intertwined with the masochistic desire to suffer – 
perhaps as a means to gain outside sympathy and meaning to one’s existence.  The 
much-talked-about Russian soul’s (russkaia dusha) reverence for the folklore hero 
Ivan the Fool, its submission to sud’ba (fate) and idolization of the collective are 
certain characteristics which the American psychohistorian points out as indicative of 
the childish self-destructiveness observed by Edward Cherrington.  Just as Daniel 
Rancour-Lefferrier does, the American diplomat would have heartily agreed with 
Russian publicist Nikolai Berdiayev: “There is a hunger for self-destruction in the 
Russian soul, there is a danger of intoxication with ruin.”182   
The idea that Bolshevism, despite its claim to universality, was a phenomenon 
isolated to the Russian people alone was comforting in some sense to certain 
observers.  Reporting on Bolshevik agitation in Western Europe, an American 
diplomat in the Copenhagen noted that Germans would not buy into Bolshevik 
slogans because “they are more intelligent.”183  Even within Russia itself, it occurred 
to the foreign observers that extreme atheism of the Bolsheviks precluded the support 
of millions of Muslim inhabitants of the Russian Empire.  An American 
representative in Siberia quoted Sadry Maksondoff, the President of Mohammedans 
Council stating that “Muslims consider Bolshevism a social plague and menace to the 
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whole world unless checked.  The Mohammedans of Russian Siberia have fought the 
Bolsheviks for months and organized an army to protect the provinces they 
inhabit.”184  The contrast between the fertile Russian soil for Bolshevism and the 
Estonians is even more evident in the report prepared by Charles Nagel of the Russian 
Bureau of the U.S. Legation in Tallinn.  Describing the ardent opposition of the 
Estonians to the Bolshevik invaders, Nagel observed that it was “no easy matter to 
introduce socialism in a country by force of arms, against the will of the people, such 
people as Estonians so unanimously standing ground for liberty against the invasion 
of the Bolsheviks.”  “The Estonian people are democratic by nature and great 
individualists,” he wrote, and the democratic form of the Estonian government clearly 
reflected such inclinations.  Recounting the success achieved by this tiny nation 
against numerically superior Bolsheviks, Nagel commented: “It is simply marvelous 
and to be admired.  What is the explanation of it? First, the great patriotism, 
enthusiasm, intrepidity, and courage of the Estonian army; second the Estonian 
population that gave everything to victory. When a detachment of 50 was sent against 
Bolsheviks, it increased to 500 arriving at the front…” 185   
The Bolsheviks’ inexplicable successes inside Russia, despite numerous 
allegations about atrocities committed by them, was exasperating for the opponents of 
Bolshevism.  If indeed “only five percent of the people” supported this movement as 
it was often alleged, then why for so long the Bolsheviks managed to hold on to 
power and in some cases expand it?  Vouched by many for his integrity, professor 
David Aronson who visited Bolshevik Russia in July of 1919, ascribed the Bolshevik 
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success to relentless political persecution.  “Political murders number one hundred a 
day,” he wrote.186  Not a single factory, except the few making ammunition, was 
functioning.  The Bolsheviks, according to Aronson, spread their ideas through the 
power of bayonet and desperation that was induced by abject destitution.  After all, in 
areas where the peasants were able to feed themselves, Bolshevism had very little 
appeal.  Yet there were others who, not unlike Edwin Cherrington, explained the dire 
state of Russia to the political ignorance of the peasant population.  “Peasants take 
very little interest in politics,” wrote S. Pinkney Tuck in his report from Kurgan and 
Petropavlovsk.187  The lack of interest in the political future of the country, combined 
with the absence of any sort of association except those formed under military 
warlords, much of the Russia’s atomized population had no capacity to resist an 
organized group of people determined to impose their vision upon Russia, be they 
Reds or Whites. 
Then there were the Western leftists who implicitly sympathized with the 
Bolshevik ideals, and tried to portray the Bolshevik power as the genuine 
manifestation of the will of the Russian people.  In its efforts to counter the barbarous 
image of the Bolsheviks in Europe, Swedish daily Politiken sometimes attempted to 
present its own account of realities in Russia.  In reference to the report by English 
parliamentarian and military officer Lieutenant Colonel Cecil L’Estrange Malone on 
his impressions in Russia, Politiken presented what it deemed to be the balanced 
picture of Russia.  “It must, of course be admitted that life in Soviet Russia is not a 
life of Paradise,” stated the author of the article.  According to Malone, food 
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conditions were bad and the war had contributed a great deal to break down the 
infrastructure.   According to him, 1100 had been put in prison on charges of 
speculation.  As for the political terror, Malone asserted that “there was a fierce 
political persecution against political opponents.”  He recalled that in the first part of 
the September alone 67 counter-revolutionists had been executed.  But Malone was 
quick to justify the execution by stating that these 67 individuals had belonged to a 
monarchist group which threw a bomb at a Soviet meeting whereby injuring 9 people.  
Malone went on to state that “the intellectual life on the contrary [was] rather lively.” 
According to him, cultural life flourished in Russia due to the opening of theaters and 
cheap tickets. “The collection of art nearly doubled” since the revolutionaries “took 
the property from former capitalists who hid them in their houses.”  As for the role of 
religion in Bolshevik society, Malone observed that “the Church [was] separated from 
the State and the churches [had] been handed over to the religious communions and 
no obstacles [were being] made for the exercise of religion.”188   
“The idea of Bolshevism cannot be rooted out,” exclaimed another editorial of 
Swedish daily Politiken.  “Allies have no consistent policy in regard to Russia,” wrote 
well known lawyer and author Karl Johanessen.  “They support Kolchak who is a 
dictator and a butcher,” he continued, “Kolchak can take power, but he cannot hold 
it.” “If the Bolsheviks,” observed the editors of Manchester Guardian “have not made 
Bolshevism possible, in any case, they have made any denial of it impossible.”  Some 
European leftists saw strong resemblance between the Bolshevik struggle against 
Whites and foreign interventionists and the French revolutionaries in late 18-th 
century who had supposedly fought to keep the flames of liberty unextinguished.  
                                                 




“During the French Revolution whole Europe turned in fight against the new ideas.  
They lost then.  The ideas are in the long run stronger than the bayonets, said even 
Napoleon,” Johanessen remarked.  As Marxists, to such people, the idea of 
parliamentary democracy was outmoded at best, or worse, served the capitalist 
interests.  “A policy which only counts with parliaments and abandons the idea of 
soviets, is at present time idiotic,” Johanessen blasted the Allied powers’ refusal to 
grant recognition to the Bolsheviks on the premise that the latter lacked popular 
legitimacy.189     
Unable to reach finality in the Civil War and weary of the Bolshevik 
resilience, by early 1919, the Anglo-American alliance sought to negotiate some sort 
of arrangement between the Bolsheviks and the Whites.  To head the secret mission 
to Bolshevik Russia, President Woodrow Wilson chose William C. Bullitt, an 
amateur diplomat involved in the affairs of the Great War.  There was also another, 
perhaps more important reason behind designation of Bullitt.  A liberal idealist, who 
despised the old world empires such as France and Britain no less than the Tsar, 
William Bullitt had strong connections with the Western communists who now 
enjoyed rare access to Lenin’s government.  From the early days of the Bolshevik 
takeover, Bullitt had been a vociferous advocate of Soviet recognition and a critic of 
the U.S. Ambassador in Russia David Francis whom Bullitt considered incompetent 
and unable to understand the true nature of the Bolshevik movement.  “It is obvious 
that no words could so effectively stamp the President’s address with 
uncompromising liberalism as would the act of recognizing the Bolsheviks,” he wrote 
                                                 




in a memorandum to the White House shortly after the President’s Fourteen Points 
speech.190   
On February 22, 1919, William Bullitt departed England aboard a commercial 
ship sailing to Norway.  In Christiania and Stockholm, the U.S. Ambassador Ira 
Morris helped to put Bullitt’s party in touch with Swedish communists in order to 
facilitate the American envoy’s trip to Russia.  On March 8, with much ebullience 
and great expectations Bullitt arrived in “cold, hungry and half-populated Petrograd” 
for his meetings with Lenin and other Soviet leaders.  From what later became clear, 
Bullitt had partially met his expectations by agreeing with Lenin on a certain set of 
proposals which included vague Soviet promises to observe ceasefire and maintain 
the frontlines of the Civil War as they then stood.  However, the Bolsheviks’ 
willingness to accede to such terms most stemmed from their weakness and the 
prospect of successful White counter-rally.  Consequently, the Whites rejected these 
terms and the whole mission ultimately proved futile.  As far as Bullitt was 
concerned, the Bolsheviks were merely trying to defend against the hostile world 
around them.  During his brief stay in catastrophe-stricken Petrograd, Bullitt had little 
to comment on his impressions, except that the treatment had received from the 
Bolsheviks was courteous.191  Upon his return to the United States, Bullitt told the 
Committee on Foreign Relations that “the reports of frightful conditions in Petrograd 
had been ridiculously exaggerated.192  Yet in a later report, Bullitt would confirm that 
“every man, woman and child in Moscow and Petrograd was suffering from slow 
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starvation,” and that “typhoid, typhus and small pox” had reached epidemic levels.  
Bullitt added that the Bolsheviks organized the entire remnants of the industry around 
the needs of the Red Army.   
The Bolsheviks’ appreciation for the role of military in the success of their 
revolution was reflective from the measures by which they built up that institution.  
According to the press report prepared by Lieutenant J.L. Davidson based on 
newspapers published in Russia (almost every one of which reflected the views of the 
governing Bolshevik Party), on the face of rising danger from the Whites, on 
February 23, 1919, -- the day that would later enter the Soviet calendar as an official 
holiday --  Leon Trotsky made certain proposals at the at the Fifth All-Russian 
Congress of Soviets which were accepted.  Among the measures to be taken were the 
introduction of “obligatory military service, strong centralized government, utilization 
of science and art of war as it worked out in world war, employment of military 
specialists and finally, iron discipline and unconditional submission to single will.” 
193  These were perilous times for the Soviet authority.  Nearly from all directions 
they had been surrounded by forces now poised to attack the Soviet seat of power.   
The spring of 1919 saw the beginning of successive White attacks that 
severely jeopardized the Bolshevik hold on power.  Admiral Kolchak’s forces, 
attacking from the East toward the Volga region made impressive gains.  The 
demoralized Bolshevik forces in the area, as earlier predicted by some Western 
observers, began to melt before the organized assault.  Unfortunately Kolchak’s army 
was neither sufficiently organized, nor did the Admiral coordinated his actions with 
the other White generals such as Denikin, Wrangel and Yudenitch, controlling 
                                                 




Southern, Crimean and North-Western fronts respectively.  The Bolshevik leadership, 
upon its discovery of this fact, quickly moved the bulk its forces against Kolchak, and 
soon, the armies of the Siberian government were on the run.  In Omsk, General 
Graves reported the evacuation of the Siberian government and the imminence of 
Kolchak’s fall.194  According to the American diplomat in Vladivostok David 
Macgowan, around the same time the White administration in Vladivostok declared 
that elections would be held by the end of the year to the assembly.195  General 
Semyonov’s representative, in his conversation with Graves, noted about the plans to 
form a representative government  “consisting of Buryats, Cossacks, and the 
Zemstvos.”196  However, it was too late for the elections.  The Siberian army was in 
total disarray.  In a domino effect, the White-held cities were falling one after 
another.  By winter of that year, isolated in Irkutsk and abandoned by his officers, 
Kolchak fell prisoner to the Bolsheviks.  Without much of a trial or interrogation, 
Bolsheviks unceremoniously executed him.   
Just as Kolchak fell back on the face of advancing Bolshevik forces, 
Denikin’s army came into motion.  Having failed to link up his forces with those of 
Kolchak, Denikin now single-handedly attempted to defeat the Bolsheviks.  To be 
sure, in conjunction with General Pyotr Wrangel, Denikin scored major victories 
which by July placed him in position to plan for the conquest of Moscow.  But here 
again, his unwillingness to heed the advice of the brilliant military ally Wrangel 
proved fatal.  Having listened to Wrangel’s military operation plan, Denikin 
suspected that the former wanted to take the glory from the battlefield for himself.  “I 
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see! You want to be the first to set foot in Moscow,” he at one point growled at 
Wrangel.197  Denikin, of course, never captured Moscow.  And only months later, the 
general’s army would meet the fate that befell Kolchak’s troops.   
The Whites’ shortcomings did not end with the lack of organization or good 
faith in each other’s actions. One of the essential factors which contributed to the 
Bolshevik victory was the latter’s unmatched ability to play one enemy against the 
other.  In the crucial months when the Bolsheviks’ fate hang on a thread, the Whites 
could have decisively benefited from winning the support of the non-Russian 
elements of the tsarist empire for their cause.  However, through their imperialist 
rhetoric and unwillingness to recognize a proper political space for non-Russian 
entities which comprised more than half of the former Russian Empire, the Whites 
alienated many.  The French military attaché, writing from Japan, had the following 
to say about the ineptitude of the Whites when it came to the nationality issues: “At 
bottom, especially on the matter of nationalities, the Admiral and the Omsk 
government have retained old-fashioned ideas.  It is to be feared that they have not 
learned much.  They sulk with the Poles.  They hate the Letts.  They almost accuse 
the Versailles Conference of dismembering Russia as well as Germany.”198  
Among these non-Russian forces, the Poles in particular constituted a pivotal 
player in the Civil War.  With a strong army at his disposal, Polish commander 
Joseph Pilsudsky was highly antagonistic toward the Reds.  Moreover, the Polish 
leadership was under pressure from British Foreign Office to join forces with 
Kolchak and other White generals in an effort to defeat the Red menace.  
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Nevertheless Pilsudsky, who had served jail time in Russia during his youth and had 
extensive knowledge of the Russian society and history, calculated that as destructive 
as the Bolshevik actions were, in crippling Russia, they had enabled the emergence of 
an independent Poland.  From this perspective, it made sense to support the fraction 
that would most weaken Poland’s arch nemesis.  Hence, in the summer of 1919, when 
Denikin seemed close to victory, the Poles delivered a decisive blow to the White 
fortunes by signing a truce with the Bolsheviks, and assuring them that no action 
would be taken so long as the Red Army was battling Denikin.199  Yet, in the 
meanwhile, Denikin appeared to be more concerned with defeating the Ukrainian 
nationalists than the Bolsheviks who had now reconsolidated their forces to crush 
both of them alike.200   
Upon defeating Denikin in the Don region, the Bolsheviks lost no time in 
moving toward South Caucasus.  The possession over the oil fields near the Western 
shores of the Caspian Sea was as essential to Lenin as they had been to the imperial 
rulers of Russia.201 In April of 1920, the national republics of Azerbaijan and 
Armenia which had now existed for two years quickly fell before the advancing 11-th 
Red Army.  Temporarily unable to defeat the Georgians, from there, the Soviet 
armies marched toward the newly opened Polish front to remedy the defeat of the 12-
th Army in the hands of Pilsudsky.  Though having failed to establish Red Poland, 
here, too, the Bolsheviks were successful.  Within a few months, the last holdouts in 
Crimea under General Wrangel and Georgia would succumb to the burgeoning Red 
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armies.  The anti-climactic defeat of the anti-Bolshevik forces in November of 1920 
was marked by General Wrangel being forced to fly French flags over his ships in the 
Black Sea, in order to protect from the Reds the evacuating masses of White 
supporters en route to Constantinople.202  The Bolsheviks were happy to oblige.    
Kolchak’s defeat also had a demoralizing impact on the Allied sponsors of the 
Whites, particularly the British who had invested more heavily in the war than the 
Americans.  Upon hearing about Bolshevik conquest of Chelyabinsk, British Foreign 
Secretary Lord Curzon noted: “A lost cause.”203  The cause was indeed lost, 
especially, with the Allies now proceeding through with their plan of evacuation from 
Russia.  With little fanfare, yet much to the relief of exhausted soldiers, in August of 
1919, the Allied military abandoned the front line being held against the Bolsheviks, 
and boarded the ships heading for Britain.  On September 14, 1919, as if a 
commander of a sinking ship, the last American representative in Archangel, Felix 
Cole closed down the consulate.  Before leaving Archangel, Cole had ensured that 
ships previously loaded with food supplies for American soldiers and the local 
populace turned around.  So intense was his hatred for the Bolsheviks, who he 
correctly presumed would be taking over the area.   
Since the times when America sent its first ambassador John Adams to 
Russia, the relationship between the two countries now stood at its lowest point.  
Having already removed their presence from Bolshevik areas of Russia, the defeat of 
the Whites left little choice for the Americans but to evacuate most of their personnel 
from that country.  With the exception of the consulate in Vladivostok, every single 
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American diplomatic mission inside Soviet Russia was shut down.  Following the 
diplomatic evacuation, in August of 1920, President Wilson’s newly appointed 
Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby issued an important note which was to govern 
the U.S.-Russian relations until 1933.  In it, Colby stated that it was “not possible for 
the Government of the United States to recognize the current rulers of Russia as a 
government with which the relations common to friendly governments can be 
maintained.”  Expressing his hopes that the Russian people would “soon find a way to 
set up a government representing their free will and purpose,” Colby made it clear 
that America would have nothing to do with the dictatorial Bolshevik regime.204  
Given the Americans’ absence from Russian territory, with this note, even the quasi-
official ties that existed between the two governments were now broken.  For the next 
thirteen years, the American statesmen and diplomats would go to great lengths to 
shun the Soviet regime and its representatives abroad.  As for the internal 
developments in this important part of the world, the American officials were forced 
to follow the events there from diplomatic posts in friendly nations bordering 
Bolshevik Russia.  Now, they would have to master the unfamiliar art of observing 
the rising Soviet power from outside. 
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Chapter 3: Consolidation of Power and the Beginning of 
New Economic Policy 
As the Civil War came to an end, the Bolshevik leadership faced the gloomy prospect 
of governing a nation in ruins.  The Reds’ triumphant performance in a difficult war 
had greatly boosted the morale of the leadership and solidified confidence in the 
infallibility of their cause.  However, the decisive test for the Bolsheviks resided in 
their ability to demonstrate the feasibility of Marxist-Leninist ideology in practice.  
To that end, Russia  under the Bolsheviks was so far an abject failure, or to be 
precise, a disaster zone.  Millions of Russians had died as a result of internal violence, 
starvation and cold.  Millions more had fled their homeland in search of a decent life 
abroad.205  Internationally, Soviet Russia was a pariah.  By 1920, the United States, 
alongside other Western nations, came to wash its hands off the entire Russian affair.  
In Friends or Foes, Norman E. Saul identifies the non-recognition of Soviet Russia 
by the United States as predicated upon “great American disappointment in regard to 
the failure to secure an American path for the Russian future.  Instead it found Russia 
moving in an opposite direction seemingly in direct conflict with the American 
conception of society and the world…”206 The country wrecked by ceaseless 
violence, persecution and famine was of less urgent interest to the policymakers in 
Washington who became resigned to the inescapable realities of Russia.  The 
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increasingly isolationist trend in the United States now governed by a Republican 
administration further assured ideological hostility against Bolshevik Russia for years 
to come.  “The most sensible course of action,” as Peter Filene described the overall 
sentiment among the Americans, “was simply patient attendance upon the 
Communists’ defeat at the hands of the Russian people or by their own 
incompetence.”207  But this course also meant that Bolsheviks no longer had to fear 
foreign intervention, and could thus focus their efforts on strengthening the new 
regime’s hold over the vast territories of the former Russian empire.   
The Bolshevik reconquest of much of the territories of the former Russian 
Empire had forced the Americans to withdraw their diplomatic personnel from the 
remaining consulates in that country.  With the exception of Vladivostok which 
remained under the Japanese control, there were no American diplomats in Russia to 
send official despatches about the situation there.  Instead, Washington came to 
increasingly rely on diplomatic stations located in the countries neighboring Soviet 
Russia.  At least logistically, this made sense.  The American legations in Stockholm, 
Helsingfors, Viborg, Riga, Warsaw, Constantinople and Harbin had for some time 
been important sources of information on Russia.  During the three years since the 
Bolshevik takeover in 1917, disruptions in channels of communication emanating 
from Soviet Russia served to augment the role and workload of the diplomats with 
regard to providing accounts of important events taking place in that country.  Among 
these stations, Viborg and Riga stood out in particular for their voluminous reports 
dating from 1920s.  With the shift of the power base to the Kremlin and radical 
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centralization pursued by Lenin, the processes in the Bolshevik capital began to 
acquire special significance for Western observers.  Now that the Bolsheviks were in 
firm control of Russia, the once rebellious provinces lost their share of attention to the 
center.  And the offices closest to the capital, began to serve as major hubs of 
knowledge about Soviet affairs. 
Among experts of Russia, there were some expectations that once the 
Bolsheviks defeated their opponents on the battlefield, the former would have to 
reckon with the horrid situation for which its ideological policies were at least 
partially responsible.   But given the extreme militarization of the Bolshevik regime, 
the immediate fulfillment of such expectations was out of reach.  The end of the 
Soviet-Polish War heralded the start of a new era which saw an end to major combat 
operations by Soviet forces, and the government’s fear of peril diminished.  
Nevertheless, in terms of actions designed to remedy the almost impossible living 
conditions in Bolshevik Russia, very little was apparent.  Dismissing the rosy 
predictions about supposedly new developments in Russia, John Campbell White, 
Charge d’Affaires of the U.S. embassy in Poland wrote that although “recent reports 
indicate decided change in Bolshevik homeland,” he had received “no evidence that 
the Bolshevik government is showing any great capacity for constructive work or 
civilized existence than in the past.208  In fact, an overwhelming number of 
despatches depicting actual conditions in the country were glum.  A German prisoner 
of war returning from Russia reported of extreme hardship and widespread 
malnutrition with his personal experience at a repatriation camp which interestingly 
                                                 





housed 1500 Germans sympathetic to the Bolshevik cause.  Daily ration, wrote the 
prisoner, consisted of substitute coffee and 150 grams of bread which was later 
increased to 300 grams.  The prisoners were fed small amounts of “soup consisting of 
frost-bitten carrots and potato peels” three times a day.  There was very little to 
economic life outside the camp since all the shops were closed.”  Although much of 
the private enterprise was banished under Bolsheviks, basic conditions of survival, 
both for the people and the regime, dictated that the government allow a certain space 
for commodity exchange which took place certain area of the city.  However, even 
this make-shift bazaar was sometimes too much for the Bolsheviks to tolerate.  The 
German POW penned:   
“The whole buying and selling takes place on the market.  Very often it 
happens that the market is surrounded by a chain of soldiers and that all 
people that have bought or sold something are arrested and interned for 3 
months in one of the concentration camps and forced to work…. The 
streets look somewhat strange since business life does not exist anymore. 
The faces of people are bloated as a consequence of the hunger.  A fresh 
healthy face causes a sensation and all passers by stare at it.  The mortality 
is very great.  Death caused by starvation on the street is not seldom.  
Single graves do not exist anymore.  The corpses are thrown into common 
graves and if one is full, it is covered up and another one dug.”209   
 
In the Ukrainian town of Vinitsa captured from the Bolsheviks by advancing Polish 
soldiers, the native population was reported to have great sympathy for those who 
liberated them from “terrorists”.  “Even though Lenin abolished death penalty,” 
related one despatch, “on the line of front the executions were ordered.  Many persons 
                                                 





were beaten, shot and often buried alive.”210  One could certainly suspect that the 
anti-Bolshevik Poles were not always impartial when it came to the portrayal of their 
enemies.  However, not only is there consistency to the depiction of Bolshevik 
actions by their military opponents on multiple fronts, but such reports are also 
corroborated by those very far from the frontlines.  Confirming that a decree had been 
issued abolishing the death penalty, the German POW nonetheless informed that such 
rulings had little effect on the Bolshevik actions on the ground.  The commissars were 
free to hang anyone they believed to be the enemy.  “The hangmen are mostly 
Chinese,” he reported. “They receive 30 roubles for each head.  There is much 
bitterness against the Chinese among the Russian population…”211  Unfortunately, 
the problem of executions was not confined to the “Chinese hangmen” alone.  Lide 
Rotfilder, a refugee from Archangel told her American interviewer in Riga that when 
the Bolsheviks took over the city following the Allied evacuation “they immediately 
began wholesale executions” all of which were “summary and without trial.”  
According to her, the population of Archangel which once stood at 90 thousand was 
now reduced to 30 thousand people including the large Bolshevik armies that had 
arrived.212        
The arbitrariness of the Bolshevik rule did not even bypass its most committed 
sympathizers.  An American diplomat in the Estonian capital Tallinn had the chance 
to interview Jacob H. Rubin of Milwaukee, a Bolshevik proponent traveling all the 
way to Russia to participate in the construction of his dream society.  The diplomat 
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noted how Rubin was arrested several times and expressed confidence that “he had 
now been cured of whatever Bolshevik propensities he may have had.”  In this 
interview, Jacob Rubin informed the American official that “raids were made every 
night and persons shot for no greater offense than changing Nikolai roubles.”  
Convinced that the Soviet regime was “honeycombed with hypocrites,” Rubin 
reported that there were “many strikes, constant arrests and shootings and epidemics 
of typhus, news of which were suppressed.”213  Reporting about her experience in 
Bolshevik Archangel, Mrs. Rotfilder conveyed that everything was being confiscated 
from the population.  “While there is absence of meat and sugar, bread is heavily 
rationed,” she observed. “Of course, the starving population is aware that the 
commissars have practically everything they need.”214  An English Reverend, Frank 
W. North, the leader of a group of French and British refugees from Russia, speaking 
to the reporter from the Times newspaper, was more direct in his verdict on 
Bolshevism:  “Bolsheviks have destroyed the country. They have proved time and 
time again that they have no sense of honor, that they are unreliable and treacherous, 
and that they cannot keep a promise.  They do not know the meaning of truth.” His 
conclusion was simple: “Bolshevism must die.”215  
The negative image of the Soviet regime was exacerbated by the sense that the 
new Soviet elite, while proclaiming itself to be the champion of the downtrodden, 
exhibited callous disregard for the welfare of the masses.  Reports about the Soviet 
government’s special attention to the needs of the Red Army and Cheka personnel 
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served to solidify its image as a junta with little connection to the interests of most 
ordinary Russians.  At the time when average Russian citizens received 300 grams of 
bread when they were lucky, the portions of the Red Army men constituted 600 
grams a day -- twice more.216  That the Soviet army personnel received the best 
available nutrition, salary and clothing from the government was a fact in abundant 
evidence to anyone who traveled to Russia of 1920-21.  Individuals such as Reverend 
F.W. North were convinced that “the change will begin to take place when there will 
remain nothing more to steal, in order to provide food for the Red Army,” and 
therefore, the West should withhold all aid from Russia.217  Even Soviet newspapers, 
on a rare occasion, admitted that “the crimes  committed by some members who 
enjoy great privileges due to their position exceed all limits and this appears to be 
dangerous disease which is deeply rooted among Communists.”  However, such 
excesses, Commissar Bistriansky explained in Pravda, pertained only to those who 
were not politically educated and did not care for the Party.218
Diaries by Mrs. Wilfred Sheridan published in several series in the Times, and 
passed on to Washington by the American Commissioner in London Norman Davis 
were instructive in this regard.  Invited to Russia by the Bolshevik envoy to London, 
Lev Kamenev, the first cousin of Winston Churchill went to Petrograd as a bust 
sculptor for Communist leaders.  Speaking somewhat fondly of her first encounters 
with Vladimir Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders, Mrs. Sheridan related an account of 
a banquet given to the honor of departing Chinese delegates by the Soviet foreign 
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minister.  Having initially found Russia hunger-stricken and ravaged, Mrs. Sheridan 
was shocked by her experience at this dinner ceremony.  “The dishes as they 
appeared, were like things we have seen in dreams.... I ate so many excellent hors 
d’oeuvres, thinking I was never going to eat again and that nothing else was coming, 
that I had little room for anything else.”  Struck by the irony of the setting, Sheridan 
added: “Our manservant at the table must have just felt he was back in the old pre-
Revolution days and serving his master’s friends.”  Sheridan’s depiction of the 
conditions outside the banquet hall were less flattering:  “Everything is rationed in 
Petrograd – conditions are horrific.  Sukharevsky market is allowed only once a 
week, but operates all day long.  Occasionally the Govenment raids it which means 
that it is encircled and everybody is arrested, buyer and seller alike, for buying and 
selling is called specualtion and in big cases is punishable by death.” Amused 
Sheridan reported the story of Trotsky’s wife being arrested in one such raid where 
the latter ended up spending the night in jail because she was unable to get a hold of 
her husband.  Curiously, Trotsky did not seem to have noticed.  Despite the risks 
involved, it appears that of all places, Mrs. Sheridan found the market to be one of the 
very few venues in which she saw people “really human and excited.”  “My 
impression was of people who were enjoying the very fact of being able to buy and 
sell,” she wrote.   Later when she asked Litvinov’s reaction to such markets, the 
Soviet minister coolly responded: “Some day we will suppress it, when we have 
sufficient things to distribute to the people.”219
                                                 





Despite their attachment to an ideology which rejected market as a remnant of 
the old order, in reality, the Bolsheviks had begun to yield to market forces as early as 
1918.  They did so not out of realization of their past mistakes or errors of the 
ideology, but due to circumstances which necessitated some measure of compromise.  
According to Julie Hessler, who traced the social history of Soviet trade from 1917 
until 1953, “policy makers came to recognize that the eradication strategy had its 
limits.”220  Again, in Hessler’s view, by no means, this recognition meant capitulation 
in the face of necessity, but a strategic maneuvering which ultimately tried to 
reconstruct the market on a socialist basis.  In her book, Julie Hessler pointed out the 
difficulties faced by the Bolshevik leadership in identifying the boundaries of private 
enterprise and the feasibility of economic freedoms.  According to her, this dilemma 
prevailed for several decades – thus allowing certain space for market interaction 
without explicitly endorsing it or guaranteeing its participants any measure of real 
security.  Hessler referred to Moscow based diarist Got’e’s observation as an accurate 
description of the uncertain Bolshevik attitudes: “Bolsheviks did not want to trade, 
represented after 1918 by the open air-markets, but neither did they want a 
Sukharevka to spring up in every corner and crossing.”  Hessler also agreed with 
historian Marguerite Harrison when the latter observed that, “the policy of the 
government with regard to the regulation of private trade  was so vacillating that no 
one knew exactly what was legal and what was not.”221  
Such vacillation may have left a breathing room for exceptionally skillful and 
lucky individuals, but the society at large suffered under severe economic conditions.  
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As many starving Russians saw it, the Bolshevik compromises had not gone far 
enough.  According to historian Paul Avrich, this period was perhaps even more 
dangerous for the Soviet leadership, since “the traditional centers of Bolshevik 
support, were in a depleted and weakened condition and themselves gripped by 
profound unrest.”222  Armed rebellions and peasant uprisings erupted all over the 
territories of Soviet Russia only to be brutally suppressed by overwhelming number 
of Cheka and Red Army troops.  Meanwhile, workers in major city factories went on 
strike demanding food.  A despatch dating to March 4, 1921 issued in the American 
Consulate in Viborg was typical in its description of one day’s events in Petrograd.  
On February 24, Trubochny factory workmen in Vasilostrov stopped work, and with 
their wives and children marched to Laferm tobacco factory.  They raised placards 
denouncing communism and called for free trade.  Then the troops loyal to 
government, consisting of the Chinese men, were brought in, and the rally was 
dispersed with bloodshed.  Communist authorities responded by patrolling streets and 
putting up propaganda posters.  Even under such repressive circumstances the 
remnants of leftist political opposition came to life.  “The Menshevik and SR 
organizations in Petrograd, though decimated by arrests and hounded by the police, 
managed to distribute a number of proclamations among the working class 
population,” demanding “liberation of all arrested socialists and nonparty 
workingmen, abolition of martial law, freedom of speech, press and assembly for all 
those who labor.”223
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Meanwhile accross Petrograd, in the Kotlin Island, situated in the Gulf of 
Finland, discontent with the Bolshevik regime had reached its peak.  Unlike other 
parts of Bolshevik Russia, the island was garrisoned by a reculcitrant regiment of 
sailors at the Kronstadt naval base whose defiance of authority long predated the 
Revolution.  According to Avrich, “under the influence of the extreme Left, which 
throughout the year held ideological sway over Kotlin Island’s tempestuous 
population, Kronstadt set itself up as a revolutionary commune on the model of Paris 
Commune of 1871.”224  The denunciations of the Soviet regime were spearheaded by 
sailors who until several months ago were “the torchbearers of revolutionary 
militancy.”225  They had contributed 40,000 armed men to the Civil War fighting 
against the Whites, and were the ones who dispersed the Constituent Assmebly on the 
fateful day of January 15, 1918.  But fed up with catastrophic conditions on the 
ground and the increasing encroachments on their liberty, they revolted.  On February 
28, 1921, on board the battleship Petropavlovsk stationed at the Kronstadt naval base 
the sailor crews passed a resolution challenging nearly every aspect of the Soviet rule.  
Among the demands laid before the Bolshevik govenment were the immediate new 
elections to the Soviet; freedom of speech and of the press for workers and peasants, 
for the Anarchists, and the Left Socialist parties; the right of assembly and freedom 
for trade union and peasant organizations, the liberation of all political prisoners of 
the Socialist parties, and the granting of the peasants of freedom of action on their 
own soil.226  Although a rebellion from the discontented masses against the Soviet 
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authority was not a novel phenomenon, coming from the sailors who had been the 
core supporters of the Soviet power, the event was a rude awakening for the Kremlin.  
The very people who once fired the opening salvo of the Bolshevik Revolution from 
the cruiser Aurora had now joined the long list of Bolshevik enemies.  Nor would 
they be treated any differently.   
The events in Kronstadt, while conforming to the usual script by which the 
Soviet authority repressed dissent, was not without consequences in terms of the lost 
support for the Soviet cause among far leftists who watched the actions of the Lenin 
government in horror.  A particularly valuable eyewtiness to the events, in that 
regard, was Alexander Berkman, “one of the busiest, bravest and best members of the 
international anarchist movement for more than half a century.”227  Born to a middle-
class Jewish family in Lithuania, young Alexander had emigrated to the United States 
in his teens.  His serious involvement in the anarchist movement and openly 
professed devotion to the Bolshevik cause ultimately resulted in his deportation from 
the United States, after which he came to the Soviet Union, to participate in the 
fruition of his dreams.  He was among the very first to be deported for their 
subversive activities in America.  However, like many of his fellow deportees, 
including well-known American anarchist Emma Goldman and writer Bertrand 
Russell, Berkman soon came to regret his allegiance to the Bolsheviks.  His 
disillusionment is best reflected in the Bolshevik Myth, a diary which he published in 
the United States seven years later, in 1925.  Identified as “one of the most valuable 
sources of primary material on the early development of the system of repression 
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which was established by the Communist regime under Lenin and Trotsky long 
before it was extended and intensified under Stalin,”228 Berkman identified his 
experience in Kronstadt as the breaking point in his attachment to the Soviet regime.  
His denunciation of the Soviet actions in Kronstadt also served to detach a sizeable 
portion of the international anarchist movement from the Bolshevik-led Third 
International. 
Perhaps due to its geographical proximity, nearly all despatches addressing 
the Kronsdatd uprising came from the American consulate in Viborg, and perhaps for 
the same reason, there is abundance of information about the dynamics of the 
rebellion.  Initial reports about the uprising date to March 1, 1921, when the courier 
of the legation reported mass disorders in Petrograd.  “There is such and increase of 
famine that the people are atacking the shops and endeavoring forcibly to take the 
necessities of life, which the government authorities find it impossible to issue in a 
systematic and satisfactory way.”229  False alarms regarding the imminent collapse of 
the Soviet regime had become so frequent that few people seemed to notice the 
gravity of the situation.  By March 2, reports began streaming about the mass revolts 
spreading to the areas surrounding the Kronstadt naval base.  According to the latest 
information, the workers had attacked the Derjabinsky prison and liberated the 
prisoners there.  However, during the course of attack, nearly 200 workers had been 
killed.  It was also reported that Petrograd was declared in a state of siege, prompting 
the arrival of heavy machine gunners into the city from Karelian Isthmus, who 
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according to the despatcher “are generally used to put down uprisings.”230  In the city 
itself, Soviet authorities launched an arrest campaign targeting anyone suspected of 
sympathizing with the rebels in Kronstadt.  Almost overnight, 450 workers were 
arrested.  Heavy curfews were imposed.231  In a decree published in daily Krasnaya 
Zvezda (Red Star), the Soviet authorities forbade all types of associations in open or 
closed quarters.  Violators of these rules would be subject to “most extreme 
punishments prescribed in a state of war.”232  
While Moscow and Petrograd remained under the Bolshevik control, in 
Kronstadt, the Soviet power in effect ceased to exist.  A general assembly was called 
on March 1 attended by 16 thousand people to elect the Kronstadt Provisional 
Revolutionary Committee.  The next day, the sailors moved to take control of the key 
installations without meeting much resistance.  Under the slogan “All the Power to 
the Soviets, and Not to the Political Parties”, the Kronstadt rebels made it clear that 
the present Bolshevik leaders usurped power and betrayed the original ideals of the 
socialist revolution.  In a copy of Kronstadt Izvestiia obtained by American diplomats 
in Viborg, a rebel author noted that “three years domination by Communists have 
been worse than 300 years under the yoke of the Tsar.”233  In the minds of Kronstadt 
rebels, the working class had revolted against the Communists and “the third 
revolution had come.”  To be sure, contrary to the claims of the Soviet authorities 
linking Kronsdatd rebels to forces ranging from White Guards to the French 
intelligence, the sailors saw themselves as a part of the revolutionary heritage.  
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Perhaps it was this element that made them all the more dangerous in the eyes of 
Lenin and his surroundings.  Paul Avrich maintains that “the sailors did not appeal for 
the overthrow of the Soviet government; nor did they advocate a restoration of the 
Constitutent Assembly..., but the resolution’s open declaration  -- that the “present 
soviets do not express the will of the workers and peasants” – represented a clear 
challenge to the Bolshevik monopoly of power.”234  In this struggle the sailors were 
led by an elected committee senior clerk of Petropavlovsk Stepan Petrichenko and 
former tsarist general A.N. Kozlovsky who commanded the armed rebels. 
In the immedaite term, the Soviet government’s greatest priority was to ensure 
that they would not lose the seat of power.  The fall of either Petrograd or Moscow 
would have likely spelled an end of the Bolshevik regime.  The assessments of the 
General Staff of nearby Finland, obtained by American observers, confirmed this line 
of thought.  The Finnish believed that the Bolsheviks would not allow the forces in 
Kronstadt to link up with Petrograd.  “If rebellious workmen and other elements 
succeed in uniting with Kronstadt, their success is likely,” concluded the Finns.235  
Therefore, Petrograd and Moscow, had to be protected at all costs.  After all, this 
strategy had proved highly effective during the Civil War in which the control of the 
center allowed Bolsheviks to crush their opponents one after another.  The Bolsheviks 
became strongly determined to ensure that the rebels in Kronsdatd remained isolated 
and were unable to gain foothold outside the tiny Kotlin Island, both militarily and 
ideologically.  To that effect, by March 3, the Red Army surrounded the area 
disallowing anyone from leaving toward inner parts of Soviet Russia.    
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Aside from the well-tested method of mass arrests and executions, the 
Bolshevik authorities found that change in tone and several concessions to the general 
populace could contribute to lessening the zeal against the regime.  “Recent posters 
and decrees torn by our couriers from walls of Petrgorad about March first show that 
communists are on the defensive,” reported the American Consul in Viborg, Harold 
Quarton, on March 5, 1921.  According to the informants in Petrograd, public appeals 
began with the consoling phrase “dear comrades”, and some contained statements on 
behalf of the Petrgorad Soviet begging “more intelligent workers to explain the 
situation to the more ignorant.” “The use of words “dear” and “begs” is unusual by 
Soviet authority and point out the necessity of present time,” Quarton added.236  The 
March 6 issue of the Krasnaya Zvezda published the text of the speech delivered by 
Vladimir Lenin in which the Bolshevik leader called upon workers not to be 
discouraged  because they have to suffer hardships.  Lenin compared the state of 
Russian workers to those in Vienna who, he said, “even had to suffer from hunger.”  
He admitted before the crowd that “it was a mistake not to collect and store food and 
fuel for these dark days.”237
Sudden shift in tone was not confined to verbal gestures alone.  Faced with 
imminent collapse, the Soviet government distributed one pound of meat and one and 
a quarter pound butter to the workmen, which according to the despatch, “made quite 
a hole in Petrograd’s dwindling food supply.”238 A new proclamation signed by 
Zinoviev and Kalinin contained seven measures which included importation of coal 
from abroad, provision for non-party representation in the Soviet, allowing city 
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vegetable gardens to be maintained by local inhabitants, dismissal of country workers 
from Petrograd factories on acount of short rations, and the replacement of wanton 
requisition with a definite quota system for the peasants.”  In a brazen stroke of irony, 
the Bolshevik government concluded the proclamation warning that “hunger will only 
increase by revolution.”239
Despite unabated suppressions in Petrograd and Moscow, the increasing sense 
of the Soviet impotence gave way to an air of anarchy in the streets.  The 
government’s inability to immediately supress the revolt in Kronstdadt emanated 
from the acute crisis that gripped the already exhausted society at all levels.  The 
crisis also affected the very structures of the Bolshevik government.  In a despatch 
issued from Viborg on March 5, it was told that 35 thousand troops of the regular 
army had refused to obey the orders of their superiors.  “In Petrograd,” the despatch 
read, “a new Jewish organization has sprung up trying to prevent pogroms. Jews 
believe they must protect themselves for at least two weeks before any strong 
government can be established.”240  This had also to do with the strong anti-Jewish 
sentiments expressed by the rebels who mostly blamed Trotsky and Zinoviev -- both 
ethnic Jews -- for the calamities facing the country.  Many American observers, 
according to another despatch issued from Riga, believed that “unrest and uprisings 
would continue until the present government falls and anarchy prevails.”241   
Consul of Fourth Class in Viborg, Ralph Wilner wrote an analytical report in 
which he attributed many of the ills befalling the Russian people to the form of Soviet 
government – something that, in his view, was a “cross between autocracy and 
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anarchy.”  Wilner, who had spent three years in Bolshevik Russia since its inception 
in 1917 until 1920, went on: “There is a marked evidence of autocracy in the policies 
and actions of the handful Bolshevik leaders on one hand, and on the other, Russia is 
without laws such as we understand them, and the ever changing Bolshevik decrees 
become obsolete almost as soon as they are issued.... Having attracted some 
thousands hooligans and some weakminded Russian adherents, the adventurers are 
ruling over Russia by the bayonet – the only support of the Soviet government today. 
Although there is a portrait of Karl Marx on every street crossing, and his dogmas of 
brotherhood and equality are being preached throughout the land, these virtues are 
never practiced by the dictators. The handful usurpers of power are excellent agitators 
and propagandists, and having for material to work with the dark, unpatriotic and 
indifferent Russian masses, have turned them to their own good use and profit, and 
have thus been able to retain the power.... The Bolshevik leaders admit that they 
cannot explain what keeps them in power when the civic population, the soldier, yet 
the workman himself is against them.”  According to Wilner, if there was a genuine 
vote, the Bolsheviks would be be quickly ousted, “but right here is the Bolsheviks’ 
little secret in that they have never allowed popular voting.”242  
In the early days of March, the Soviet secret police Cheka redoubled its efforts 
to maintain a semblance of order in areas nearby the rebellious island.  However, 
without extinguishing the fire of Kronstadt, the control over the situation was 
gradually slipping away from the Boslheviks’ hands.243  With all remaining rations 
and material incentive allocated to the punitive battalions at the disposal of the 
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government, Leon Trotsky sent a final warning to the rebels of Kronstadt: “I order all 
those who have raised a hand against the Socialist Fatherland, immediately to lay 
down their weapons… Only those who surrender unconditionally will be able to 
count on the clemency of the Soviet Republic.”244  Trotsky’s warning fell on deaf 
ears.  Confident that they can hold out against Bolshevik attacks, and in any case left 
with a choice between certain and possible deaths, the Kronstadt rebels would not 
submit.  In fact, they were busy exposing the Soviet authorities by pasting up the 
copies of Petrograd newspapers in the town square “to show falsehood and deceptions 
practiced by Bolsheviks.”245  
On March 7, the Red Army began the bombardment of Kronstadt.  A long-
time anarchist and Bolshevik sympathizer, Alexander Berkman, who happened to be 
in the Petrgorad at the time wrote:  “Distant rumbling reaches my ears as I cross the 
Nevsky. It sounds again, stronger and nearer, as if rolling toward me. All at once I 
realize the artillery is being fired. It is 6 p.m. Kronstadt has been attacked!”246  For 
nearly ten days, Kronstadt held out against impossible odds.  However, when it came, 
the fall of the city was anti-climactic.  As thousands of troops began storming the 
naval base from all directions, Kronstadt’s defense collapsed, and the defenders 
began to run away in panic.  In an interview with American diplomat Edmond 
Stratton in Viborg, the Chief of Kronstadt’s General Staff, Boris Arkaninov, vividly 
recalled the night of March 16 when the final assault began:   
“When we saw the Chinese and Bashkirs coming at us, we knew we had 
the sympathy of the red army with us.... Fifty thousand men dressed in 
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white crawled across the ice toward Kronstadt.  We had only six thousand 
men.  Our icebreaker Yermak was stuck in Petrgorad.  Otherwise, we’d 
have cut the ice circle around us, and they could not have done anything. 
They rushed us. The bitterest fight lasted from 4 am until 11 am. But the 
city was breached and the staff had no choice but to leave.... To stay meant 
death by the Chinese who never take prisoners.”247  
 
American diplomats in Viborg woke up the next day to find out that the Bolsheviks 
had successfully put down yet another revolt.  The Bolshevik victory was evident 
from the number of refugees which began to pour into Finland.  According to a 
despatch on March 18, 4000 refugees arrived in Finland, among them the 
representatives of the provisional revolutionary government.248  “No complete 
explanation is given as to why Kronstadt fell so fast,” wrote Quarton that same day, 
“Even the best informed people and newspapers in Finland were greatly astonished at 
sudden fall of Kronstdadt.” Although the rebels were outnumbered nearly six times, 
some observers suspected that treachery had played a large role in determining the 
outcome of the Bolshevik attack.  According to Quarton, “General Kozlovsky, who 
headed the artillery brigade of the rebels, and his staff of 30 people arrived in 
Findland so early” – when in fact “other towers were still shooting in defense.”249  
Despite the means which allowed for closer observation of the events in Kronstadt, it 
is apparent, however, that Kronstadt rebels were not only isolated from Russia, but 
also from the outside world.  Their powers had been exaggerated by Western 
observers who believed a mere spark was sufficient to turn Russia into a sea of fire 
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for the Bolsheviks.  And it could have been, as Avrich pointed out, had the rebels 
launched an immediate offensive on the mainland thus rallying the discontented Red 
Army soldiers and masses to their standard.  Instead, the rebels chose to dig in and 
fight a defensive war against a regime that had just finished defeating far stronger 
opponents in the Civil War.  If anything, the failure in Kronstadt may have further 
solidified the popular image of the Bolshevik leadership as invincible.        
The measures taken by the Bolshevik government against its vanquished 
opponents in Kronstadt followed the familiar pattern: exodus of native inhabitants, 
followed by mass executions and arrests on charges of treason and counter-revolution 
of those who stayed behind.  Before the Bolsheviks entered the base, nearly eight 
thousand inhabitants fled for Finland.  Immediate care to the refugees was given by 
the American Red Cross which faciliated large shipments of food and clothes from 
Viborg to the border town of Terijoke.250  “Who knew that these revolutionists would 
find refuge in Finland from the hands of their own fellow Bolsheviks, hunted by 
Chinese hoards of Trotsky,” noted American observer in the makeshift refugee camp 
Edmond Stratton, struck by irony of the panorama before him.251  Those who chose 
to stay behind were even less fortunate.  “All males of Kronstadt are subject to 
suspicion and arrest,” reported American observers:  “The city is under thorough 
Bolshevik control. The Soviet troops act like Mongols against their own people.”252  
An eyewitness to the assault on Kronstatd, Alexander Berkman penned, “Thousands 
of sailors and workers lie dead in its [Kronstadt’s] streets. Summary execution of 
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prisoners and hostages continues.”253  “Although many were promised reprieves if 
they surrendered,” reported another eywitness, “some were put in handcuffs and 
marched through streets to impress workmen of futility of revolt.”254  
With thousands more under police custody, the Soviet government initiated 
the construction of the first concentration camps to receive the rebels of Kronstadt – 
later to become notorious by its acronyms -- GULAG.  Nearly seventeen years later, 
Leon Trotsky, exiled and soon to be assassinated by his Bolshevik comrades had the 
following to say about the short-lived saga:   
“The truth of the matter is that I personally did not participate in the least 
in the suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion, nor in the repressions 
following the suppression… But I am ready to recognize that civil war is 
no school of humanism. Idealists and pacifists always accused the 
revolution of "excesses". But the main point is that "excesses" flow from 
the very nature of the revolution which in itself is but an "excess" of 
history.”255
 
Quelling the rebellion in Kronstadt was a major victory for the Bolshevik government 
over a restless society which it had sought to pacify ever since taking power.  To 
understand its significance, one must consider that this rebellion marked the last 
serious effort among indigenous citizens to topple the Communist government -- until 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1980’s.  Nevertheless, the underlying cause 
which lent itself to the uprising remained.  The American observers in Viborg 
attributed the reasons for the revolt to severe shortages in basic necessities.  “Food 
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situation will worsen in late Spring,” they predicted, “because productive grain norm 
which is 10 million poods for Petrograd was 5 million in March and will be come 3.5 
million in April.”256  Despite Soviet claims which labeled Kronstatd rebels as tsarist 
sympathizers, consul Quarton believed that the uprising was mostly due to economic 
and social conditions and would likely be repeated in other parts of Soviet Russia. 
Four days after the end of Kronstadt uprising, on March 21, 1921, the 
Communist Party gathered for its Tenth Congress in which a decree was issued "On 
the Replacement of Foodstuff and Natural Resource Assessment by a Natural Tax."  
Incomprehensibly titled, the tenet of the bill was to fix the specified amount of any 
surplus agricultural product to be taken by the government, and allow peasants to 
keep the remaining surplus for use as capital or to trade for industrial goods.  In 
conjunction with additional decrees that came to be known as the New Economic 
Policy (NEP), this measure replaced the principles of War Communism upon which 
the Soviet authorities had hetherto based their policies.  No longer would the 
Bolshevik commissar, at least on paper, have the freedom to take away as much of 
the peasant’s property as he wished.  With a small element of free trade -- or 
capitalism, as some opponents of the measure argued – injected into the otherwise 
barren economic landscape of Russia, suddenly the peasants were given an actual 
incentive to plow their fields and raise cattle.  A mere ability to take the product of 
one’s labor to the market without facing deadly retribution by the government was 
seen as a blessing by many peasants.  But the relief did not come overnight.  After all, 
having retained full control over substantial segments of the economy such as 
industry and banking, the Communist regime did not change in essence.  As far as the 
                                                 




Soviet authorities were concerned, the NEP was a necessary evil in combatting the 
disastrous realities of Russia which persistently threatened the government’s 
durability.  To demonstrate their unswerving commitment to Communist ideals, in 
one typical instance, the Soviet authorities turned 471 bourgeious families out of their 
residencies in Moscow, confiscating the majority of their belongings.257  
Dissatisfaction among impoverished peasants remained particularly strong.  
For one, given the equally disastrous state of the city, peasants had few counterparts 
with whom they could trade, and even less commodity by which to carry out such 
trade.  American diplomat John Hurley described conditions in rural Russia stating 
that “peasants show little enthusaism over the new system of “free exchange of 
goods” since they see no prospect of obtaining what they require from the towns.”258  
According to reports flooding the American legation in Viborg, uprisings in 
Archangel, Vyatki and other places in the South were in progress.259  Attempts to 
shift blame to the ineptitude of local authorities did not fly.  In the correspondence 
between Soviet officials intercepted by the American mission in Berlin, a commissar 
named Sinyavski reported about the “tough situation” affecting central and southern 
parts of Russia:  “In 1918 we fought for railroad lines, communication posts, [but] 
now it’s the opposite.  The struggle is going on in villages at great distance from 
railroads.  The discontent caused by requisitions has called forth a popular sentiment 
that is hostile to all government officials and their measures.”  According to 
Sinyavsky, Bolshevik officials were being regularly murdered and the general 
disobediance had reached the level at which even military intervention did not appear 
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to bear fruits.  Pointing out the increasing popularitiy of a general named Antonov 
heading over six thousand-member militia, Sinyavsky advised “immediate 
reinforcement of troops in Voronezh, Saratov, Tambov and Pensa.260
The Bolshevik attempts to alleviate popular discontent on the political front 
were negligible.  In an effort to placate the politically active strata of the urban 
society, they organized a conference to which they invited workers representing what 
Bolsheviks classified as the major elements of the spectrum.  According to April 15, 
1921 issue of Pravda, the primary “media organ” of the Soviet government, among 
the attendants were 764 non-party, 144 communists, 3 mensheviks, 1 anarchist and 35 
miscellaneous.  If true, this would be the first instance in a very long time when 
Communists recognized political space for any faction other than themselves.  
Furthermore, the conferences seem to have taken place in a contentious atmosphere 
allowing some workers to challenge the officals in the government.  “Bolsheviks 
seem surprised that workmen dare to complain,” penned Consul Quarton; “They 
apprently think they [workmen] ought to go on half starving and freezing .”261  A 
despatch dating to April 27 mentioned “recent elections to the Moscow Soviet” in 
which 1137 out of 1399 elected representatives were Communists.  According to 
Quarton, in reality this was not a great Communist victory, since “the whole thing 
was rigged like it was last year.”262  
More revealing were the contradiction-filled statements made by Louise 
Bryant, the wife of a well-known Bolshevik sympathizer John Reed whose love for 
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the Bolshevik cause upon death in 1920 had earned him a spot in the Kremlin 
cemetery reserved for revolutionary dignitaries.  On the way back to the United States 
due to her illness, Bryant met with the American representatives in Riga for an 
interview.  During the conversation, Bryant expressed confidence that “the present 
movement to the right will continue and Russia will get better.”  After praising the 
character of Bolshevik leaders whose company she enjoyed frequently, she added that 
there was “absolutely no anti-American feeling in Russia.”  Citing the prospect of 
total anarchy in the case of Bolshevik government’s fall, Bryant believed that the 
United States should “open up trade relations with Russia.”  Downplaying the 
negative impressions of Bolshevik policies in the sphere of religion, Bryant stated 
that “the head of the church seemed quite content with existing conditions and said 
that the church had needed shaking up,” even though the Russian clergy grew much 
incensed at the motto placed on the facades of chruches, which reads, “Religion is the 
opium of the people.”   Only at the end did she submit that “the food and health 
conditions were bad,” and that “a tremendous number of people had died.”263   
Melville A. Chater of the Near East Relief, traveling to the Georgian city of 
Batum, recently taken under the Bolshevik control, reported a similar experience.  His 
first impression of the city was that “the streets were deserted.”  According to Chater, 
“the population lived on a pound of sour black bread a day with tea to wash it down.”  
In a place where average monthly salary was 25,000 roubles, Chater was shocked to 
discover that half a duck cost 18,000 roubles.  “One can see why the Georgians didn’t 
do much shopping,” he observed.   Although there existed a committee of local 
                                                 





Georgians, in Chater’s opinion, the actual government consisted of the Cheka which 
had complete control over the situation.264  In yet another report published in Riga’s 
daily Segodnya on June 23, 1921, the author relayed the story of a person who “had 
recently been allowed  into Russia because of his Bolshevik sympathies, for the 
purposes of distributing food to scientists and literary men.” The unnamed traveller 
reported being stopped in the street by “perfect strangers who looked him up and 
down and asked him questions, just as if he had dropped from another planet where 
men lived like human beings. He saw Kotljarevski, a member of the Academy, who 
came like a beggar with faltering footsteps, to receive his modest share of the supplies 
– without a short, clad in rags.  Bloch was sick with scurvy.  Benoise, the painter, was 
dreaming of ‘a piece of chocolate’. But these are all men of talent, men of science of 
whom Gorky and others are ‘taking care’. But what will be the fate of common 
mortals?” inquired the author.265  On certain occasions, one did not even have to 
cross the border to witness the devasatation wrought by Communists upon Russia.  
The photos taken by the U.S. Army Major George Anneman on a visit to the Russo-
Finnish border arranged by the American Consulate in Viborg showed “the ruins on 
the Russian side of border at Rajajoki.”  These photos constituted a striking contrast 
to the picture of the Communist envoy Maxim Litvinov’s car which, in the words of 
the photographer, “resembled those by the Russian dignitaries during the Tsar’s 
regime.”266
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As bad as the conditions were in Soviet Russia, they were about to get much 
worse.  The initation of the New Economic Policy, contrary to the expectations, did 
not result in immediate relief.  Given the abject state of Russia’s industry, agriculture, 
and overall, the entire economic infrastructure, nothing short of a miracle could have 
averted starvation that was about to hit the Soviet countryside.  And in Lenin’s 
Russia, miracles did not happen.  In July of 1921 a severe famine struck the central 
Volga region.  While the living conditions were not much better in other parts of 
Soviet Russia, especially Ukraine, starvation in Volga was particularly acute.  The 
desire by the Communist leadership to conceal the realities in the region was 
impossible, if not counter-productive, insofar as the number of affected people 
measured not in thousands but millions.  As the magnitude of starvation became more 
evident, the Soviet government acknowledged the famine in June 26 issue of Pravda.  
The Soviets’ admission of the food crisis was corroborated by a few sympathizers 
who traveled to that country.  Upon his return from Russia, a Swedish Communist 
named Frederick Strom gave an interview to Svenska Dagbladet newspaper in which 
he stated: “The total crop failure in the entire Volga district is a fact which cannot be 
argued against and one awaits with great foreboding the results of same.  In the rest of 
Russia, the crop is only half of the normal  and in the Ukraine over half of the normal 
production...”267 Despite Mr. Strom’s strange confidence in the Soviet authorities 
ability to “succeed in neutralizaing this crop failure,” it never came.  In fact, by the 
time the news of the crop failure had broken out, thousands of people had already 
perished to hunger.  Finally, a few weeks later, Russian writer Maxim Gorky came 
                                                 





out with a desperate plea for help addressed to the Americans and Europeans.  “I ask 
all honest  European and American people for prompt aid to the Russian people. Give 
bread and medicine.”268
 
It did not take long before the Americans, the only nation capable of such assistance 
at the time, sprung into action.  Beginning in August, the American Relief 
Administration (ARA) headed by a business tycoon Herbert Hoover, launched an 
unprecedented campaign of relief which in the end saved more than ten million 
Russians from death by starvation.  In his impressive volume detailing the experience 
of Volga famine and the incredible story of the American aid effort, historian 
Bertrand Patenaude has traced the three crucial years during which the impossible 
was made possible.  According to Patenaude, the Volga famine “was no simple act of 
nature.”  Violent requisitions during the Civil War, fatally flawed economic theory of 
War Communism, and Bolshevik callousness were primary reasons that exacerbated 
the drought of 1921 to the level of mass starvation.  But the more striking aspect of 
the Big Show in Bololand was the story of 250 Americans, charged by a man who had 
nothing but visceral antipathy for Bolshevism, essentially trying to save the people 
from their own government, and their ultimate success in this endeavor. 
Not many people could imagine how a handful Americans would manage the 
consequences of a disaster that covered a territory half the size of the United States.  
In a confidential interview with the State Depatment officials, Russian scientists 
Nikolai Vavilov and Arthur Jaczenski who were visiting the United States at the 
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invitation of the American Agricultural Society, predicted a failure for such efforts.  
First, they claimed, “ARA won’t be able to get down to famine areas, because of 
breakdown in transportation.”  Furthermore, “the Russians cooperating with the 
Committee [ARA] will be very irresponsible, due to the utter demoralization of the 
people. Consequently, an immense staff of Americans will be needed in Russia to 
administer relief.” In fact, the very purpose of allowing Vavilov and Jaszenski to 
travel to the United States stemmed from the desperation that engulfed the Kremlin, 
which otherwise did not let individuals leave the country at their wish.  The scientists 
told that it took them fifteen applications to obtain an exit visa, before the Cheka 
finally approved their travel plans.  Just in case, however, their families were “placed 
under ‘house arrest’ to prevent them from making any public utterances abroad 
against Soviet regime and to insure their prompt return to Russia within four 
months.”269  Judging from the interview with other native visitors from Russia, it is 
apparent that such hostage-holding was a standard practice by the Soviet government 
which often correctly presumed that those allowed to go abroad would not return 
otherwise.270  Visiting in Riga, Victor E. Gartz, who is described as a well-educated 
intellectual, “could not delay his departure by a single day since his mother, wife and 
children were hostages there.”  Struck by the contrast with life in Riga, Gartz told his 
interviewers that most days he was unable to receive even his allotted portion of half 
a pound of bread: “For two years, I have not received meat, eggs, milk, butter or any 
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fats.  I havn’t received any clothing or shoes.... We have nothing,”271  Gartz’s 
statements were corroborated by professors Vavilov and  Jaczenski who informed the 
Americans that “the population of Russia had been reduced by many millions as 
many having perished through the terror as by starvation” and that there were “no 
industrial or educated classes left on Soviet territory with the exception of a small 
group in Petrograd.”272
Judging from the signals that continued streaming from Soviet Russia, its was 
not just Volga that needed relief but the entire country.  By the time the first 
American aid workers began to arrive in Russia in September, 1921, the conditions 
had grown worse.  As John Ellingston, an ARA supervisor later observed in Moscow, 
“The ARA Russian operation was in the strictest sense of the word a campaign, and 
like the English at Gallipoli the Administration had to begin firing the moment it 
landed.”273  The presence of American relief workers in Russia provided the U.S. 
government with a vital outlet of information about the country that was otherwise 
closed to outside observation.  For the first time since the American ambassador fled 
Petrograd in February of 1918, the government regained access to observers of 
American nationality within the Russian territory.  Since in accordance with the 
agreement between the ARA and the Soviet government the relief workers enjoyed 
complete independence and freedom in their operations so long as they were confined 
to the realms of famine relief, it was believed that the American employees would not 
be as susceptible to pressure as those who operated in Russia without a mandate.  
Indeed, next to official representation which entailed diplomatic immunity and other 
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forms of protection, this was an optimum alternative by which the American could 
establish an outpost of information in Soviet Russia.  Given Herbert Hoover’s 
credentials as an ardent anti-Bolshevik and strong ties to the Republican 
administration, the reliability of his employess was not in question. 
Headed by a veteran relief worker named Philip Carroll, the ARA mission 
entered Russia from Riga in early September.  Before going into Russia, Carroll and 
his staff had received preliminary briefing in the Latvian capital which at the time, 
according to Patenaude, was “a primary source of sensastionalistic stories about the 
horrors of Bolshevism in Red Russia.”274  Once in Russia, the Americans instantly 
recognized that they were in a realm the reality of which the descriptions could not 
possibly capture.  To be sure, on their first few days in Russia they did not encounter 
anyone dying from starvation before their eyes.  But that was about to change soon.  
However, even before that, a walk through the streets of Moscow drove a senior ARA 
officer Will Shafroth to conclude that “Moscow was the most depressing city in the 
world.”275  The downtrodden looks of its people and dilapidated quarters of the city 
left a strong impression  on the Americans who thought they were visiting a part of 
Europe.  Even the “sensationalist stories” from Riga had not prepared ARA staff 
members for the experience they were about to undergo in Russia.  Assessing the 
social structure visible to a foreign eye, Shafroth wrote: “There is no middle class left, 
there are no bourgeois left.  There are only commissars and the people.”276
The first despatch from Riga pertaining to the ARA mission in Russia dates to 
September 12, when Brown gave a brief report about the first impressions in Russia 
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and the work done thus far: “Cargoes of food stuff have already arrived for the ARA. 
The Americans have already begun feeding the children. They intend to open 100 
dining rooms capable of feeding 100 kids at a time. According to Brown, each meal 
would consists of rice pudding made with milk, white roll, cocoa and vermicelli 
pudding.”277  By Russian standards, this was a royal diet, not just the kind of diet to 
save little children.  As Patenaude demonstrated in his book, in many cases, adults 
envied the kids who received nourishment far better than they could imagine.  Two 
months later, “a trustworthy source” from Petrograd conveyed about the displeasure 
of the local population with the newly opened American dining rooms because 
mothers were not admitted to these restaurants and therefore 3-4 years old children 
have to get their food themselves.278  Both in terms of logistics and organization, the 
first several months were undoubtedly the harshest.  Often, the circumstances forced 
Americans to make decisions they would not have fathomed back at home. In a 
conversation with the visiting commanding officer of the USS Childs in Novosossisk 
the distrcit manager of ARA, John Foy recalled stories “impossible to describe.”  To 
the great astonishment of the officer, Foy confirmed the rumor that “they had to pick 
and choose even among children as to the ones that would be saved and the ones that 
would be allowed to die,” since, “there was not enough food for all.279     
The impact of the famine upon the already exhausted population cannot be 
overstated.  Many anti-Bolsheviks in the West calculated that the worse the situation 
became in the country, the better would be the chances for the dissolution of the 
Communist government.  But that was not the case.  Individuals such as Herbert 
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Hoover, too, considered the famine a strong indication of the criminal nature of the 
Bolshevik regime and utter bankruptcy of its ideas.  Hoover’s reaction to the 
calamity, nevertheless, was quite the opposite. “Whatever their ideology, they must 
be fed,” the great American humanitarian famously declared.  In describing the 
American reaction to the Russian famine, Norman E. Saul writes that “the United 
States really had no choice but to offer aid after the Soviet appeal to the West.”280 and 
refers to a close Hoover associate Philip Norton to note that “an economic agenda 
underlay much of American policy toward Russia.”281  True, in sending massive 
American aid to Russia, Hoover sought to practically demonstrate the superiority of 
the American capitalist system over Bolshevism.  In his own words, Herbert Hoover 
viewed the ARA relief efforts  as “an opportunity to point out to the Russian people 
themselves that their economic system is hopeless.”282  However, to altogether 
attribute perhaps the greatest famine relief operation in the history of mankind to 
inevitability or ulterior motives would be unfair to the man who on his own initiative 
ultimately saved ten million Russian lives.  As far as Hoover was concerned, 
defeating the Bolshevik regime was synonymous with saving Russian lives.  He saw 
no contradiction between the two.  He was convinced that “charitable aid will only be 
a drop in the bucket”283 and will fail to change the tragic realities of Russia predicated 
upon the Bolshevik economic philosophy.  Even as such, there is no indication that 
Hoover saw a direct linkage between the famine and an immediate revolt against the 
government.  Perhaps it was because Hoover understood certain things about a 
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famine.  American emissary in Poland Hugh Gibson, in his lengthy analysis of the 
situation in Russia, once observed that a famine would not produce a revolution.  
“People who have never lacked food cannot understand this basic reality.”284  
More chilling elaboration of Gibson’s point is illustrated through the 
eyewtiness account of a certain Kas Volianski about the Volga refugees, intercepted 
by Americans legation in Riga.  “Three years of constant undernourishment, pillage, 
progressive disintegration and civil war have made out of this population a mass of 
wretched egoists, who can calmly look on when others are dying of hunger. The 
heartlessness of the population can be observed in all regions that are little more 
amply provided with foodstuffs.”  The scene in which Voliansky described 
retransportation of refugees back to Volga where “the Americans have prepared for 
bread, meat, and all those things that even non starved population is not dreaming of, 
much less these starved wretches” would sound familiar to anyone knowledgeable of 
Holocaust: “The droves of starving people crowded into the cold and filthy cars 
without a grumble, just like some cattle.  They were to be taken back to the region 
that they had only left before.  In their face one could read, well, to tell the truth, there 
was nothing to be read in them, they were like masks without expression, only with 
the stamp of dull suffering upon them.  They were no longer the faces of human 
beings…. The suffering, the hunger, and three years of training to live only for the 
present moment, had deprived these people of the ability to react on anything else 
than their own momentary animal instincts.”  It would have been a mistake to expect 
such people to organize behind some sort of ideal against regular, well-fed forces of 
the Soviet government.   Even for Voliansky who admittedly had seen hunger, 
                                                 




undernourishment, and debility in the German punitive camps, the experience was 
surreal.  “In every person there [German camps] – no matter how enfeebled 
physically, lived a free soul, in their eyes one could see all sorts of emotions, except 
submissiveness.  But here [in famine refugee camps] there was nothing but vacant 
wandering glances, sluggish movements, absence of volition, or in other words, 
absolute hopelessness, apathy and inertia.”285
While there was little doubt in the minds of both the starving masses and 
foreign observers that the Soviet government was largely responsible for the famine, 
some also blamed the Russian people for having allowed the situation to reach such 
level of desperation.  “The present famine situation in the Volga districts is the direct 
result of the Bolshevik policy of appropriating grain, leaving only enough to last until 
next harvest.  Then the drought came and hence the famine,” wrote Fred Keyes, an 
American recently released from Soviet Russia.  But much of the blame, according to 
him, lay with the peasants a great number of whom were ignorant. In Keyes’ mind, 
this was not a problem confined to the callousness of the Bolshevik regime alone, but 
had deeper roots in Russian traditions which were doggedly conservative and immune 
to positive change.   “The Russian mujiks are lazy and dishonest. They sit around, 
smoke and drink and watch their women do all the work. Their house consists of one 
room and they sleep on the pech [stove]. They don’t want to change their old ways. 
Even the richest man who had four houses etc, slept on the floor with this family.”  
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Keyes added that 75 percent of the peasants were sick of Bolshevism and when 
asked, responded saying: “Give us back the old regime.”286   
Keyes was not alone in his ideas about the peculiar nature of the Russian 
society which allowed for realities difficult for a Western mind to grasp. “Surprise is 
often expressed by people who have never been to Russia, and know nothing of the 
Slav temperament” wrote in his violuminous memoir Edward Harris, now a Consul 
General to Singapore,  “that five percent of the population  should dominate the 
ninety-five percent, and this probably represents a true estimate of the ratio between 
the number of Bolsheviks and those who are opposed to them. This is one of the most 
difficult questions to answer... to convey with conviction to others a true picture 
which will visualize and explain  the cause and continuation of Bolshevik power is 
something which is almost impossible.”  What further infuriated Harris was the 
lingering popularity of Bolshevik ideals throughout the world and the fact that 
“people in other countries who have far surpassed Russia in culture, should turn to the 
most ignorant race of all for advice and guidance in seeking a solution for the great 
social problems which confront the world.”287
The entrance of the ARA in the Russian scene was not an altogether pleasant 
phenomenon for the Soviet authorities.  The fact that an organization led by a 
renowned anti-Bolshevik and a capitalist magnate was feeding millions of Russians 
signified the utter impotence, or perhaps even bankruptcy of the Communist ideals.  
But in the minds of Bolshevik leaders, the humiliation came with a silver lining.  The 
logistics of the famine relief efforts required close interaction between ARA staff 
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members and Soviet officials.  The Soviet administrators were responsible for a 
whole range of tasks which included transportation of food, appropriation of space for 
dining rooms, organization of lists of individuals to be included in meal plans and 
numerous other vital functions.  Implicit in this interaction was de facto recognition 
of the Soviet authority.  Soviet historians Nikolai V. Sivachev and Nikolai N. 
Yakovlev, touching on ARA famine relief in a book published in 1979, noted that 
despite occasional spars with the Soviet officials,  “on the whole, the Americans 
realized they were dealing with an established authority.”  The authors also added that 
by April of 1922, James Goodrich, a former governor of Indiana informed Herbert 
Hoover from Russia that ‘at this moment there is no hope of a counterrevolution or of 
any sudden change in the government.’”288  
The permission given to ARA to operate inside the USSR with unprecedented 
autonomy was a matter of expedience for the government which saw greater risk in 
millions of its citizens perishing in a famine than in allowing capitalists to salvage the 
situation.  But it was also indicative of the trends within Soviet leadership to reach 
modus vivendi with the non-Communist world.  Historian of Soviet foreign policy, 
Jon Jacobson, argues that “geopolitical estimates and even diplomatic considerations 
influenced what manner of revolution the Soviet leadership promoted in Europe and 
Asia.”289  By the end of the Civil War, it had become apparent that no Communist 
revolution would be taking place in Europe.  As the only Communist state on the 
world stage, it was essential for the Soviet government to modify the contours of its 
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international behavior and in this instance, lessen the degree of revolutionary 
militancy in relation to the West.  Jacobson draws attention to the two prominent 
figures in Soviet foreign policy establishment, Georgii Chicherin and Maxim 
Litvinov, who, despite disagreements among themselves on important issues, were 
the products of Western education.  While “Chicherin was raised in an aristocratic 
and pietistic family in which he and his sister were required by their parents to say 
grace in English at each meal,” Maxim Litvinov spent ten years of his life in England 
before returning to Russia at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution.290  In Jacobson’s 
view, Chicherin’s stronger attachment to promoting worldwide revolution by sowing 
conflict among capitalist states than Litvinov who favored more constructive 
engagement did not immediately result in one viewpoint’s victory over another.  
Under the guidance of the Party’s upper echelons, hence, “in the years after 1922, 
Chicherin and Litvinov negotiated post-revolutionary Russia's entrance into world 
politics without in turn recognizing the legitimacy of the capitalist world system or 
agreeing to pay any of the debts of previous Russian regimes.”291  The engagement 
with ARA was, in a sense, part of this strategy. 
   A subtle shift in attitude about the durability of the Soviet government was 
also beginning to take hold within the American foreign policy establishment.  
According to diplomat Loy Henderson, who specialized in Russia at the time, most 
State Department experts with background in Rusian affairs were enamored by the 
“grandeur of the Russian empire,” and had trouble accepting the disappearance of a 
mighty country that was once an ally in the Great War.  “It was only natural that 
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members of the State Department whose interests had been centered on Russia should 
have been influenced, to an extent at least, by their experiences and associations in 
that country,” remarked Henderson, “that they should have tended to look at Eastern 
Europe from the point of view of St. Petersburg or Moscow, and they should have 
little sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations or comparatively small ethnic groups 
who seemed to prefer devoting their energies to the setting up of their own 
governments to the atempting to restore this imagination-capturing empire on a more 
democratic basis.”292  For several years following the collapse of the tsarist regime, 
the Americans had continued to adhere to the principle of the territorial integrity 
which they felt was fair application in regard to one of Europe’s mightiest nations.  In 
the note which came to define America’s relations with Soviet Russia for well over a 
decade, the U.S. Secretary of State Brainbridge Colby justified his country’s refusal 
to recognize former Russian colonies by stating that until the question of Bolshevik 
governance was resolved, “no final decision ahould or can be made without consent 
of Russia” on matters of vital importance, “especially those concerning its 
sovereignty ove the territory of the former Russian Empire.”293  Under the 
circumstances dictating revision of outmoded attitudes and strong insistence of the 
U.S. commisioner in Baltic states, Evan E. Young, however, the years of 1921 and 
1922, saw an important adjustment in the American actions on the northwestern 
borders of Russia.  In 1922, after nearly five years of silence on the matter, the United 
States moved to recognize the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.  Even in 
the memorandum of recognition of the Baltic State, the American officials felt the 
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need the add a clause stating that “the United States has consistently maintained that 
the disturbed conditions of Russian affairs may not be made occasion for the 
alienations of Russian territory, and this principle is not deemed to be impinged by 
the recognition at this time of the Governments of Estonia, Lativa, and Lithuania 
which have been set up and maintained by an indigenous population.”294   
For the United States, much of the interaction with the small breakway states 
of the Russia Empire was considered in the context of the relations with Soviet 
Russia.  Shortly after the establishment of American legations in the independent 
Baltic State, the United States designated the legation in Riga as a center of 
information-gathering about the Soviet state.  In addition to the embassy which 
carried out its usual diplomatic functions intended for U.S.-Latvian relations, a 
substantial office was established which came to be known as the Russian Section.  
Numerous experts and diplomats dealing with Russia were assigned to the section 
with aim of consolidating the information-gathering efforts.    “The purpose of the 
Department in assigning to Riga Consul H.B. Quarton and Vice Consul E.L. Packer 
and other additional personnel,” wrote Secretary Charles Hughes to the American 
Commisioner in Riga, “is to make our office the Department’s principal source of 
information relating to conditions and the progress of events in Soviet Russia.”295  To 
be sure, even before March of 1922, when the Russian Section became organized, 
Riga had already been serving as one of the primary sources of information on the 
Soviet Union since the last American envoys withdrew from mainland Russia in 
1918.  As the briefing of ARA officials in Riga indicates, the Latvian city had already 
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earned the reputation “as the West’s primary ‘listening post’ into that forbidden 
land.”296   But not just a listetning post -- according to Natalie Grant, Riga, especially, 
was at the time “an oupost of Western civilization” in this beleagured part of the 
world.297  In terms of its cultural heritage, political idenity and economic ideals, 
republican Latvia (and also Lithuania and Estonia) had much more in common with 
the West than its eastern neighbor which had forcibly coveted the land and its people 
for the past several centuries.  The eventual natural partnership between the Baltic 
states and America was obvious to many in Washington, especially given the need to 
monitor the activities of the Bolshevik menace to the east.   
Centered in Riga, the new information-gathering effort was designed to secure 
the proffessionalism and efficiency of the service.  For nearly four years, America’s 
information about Russia was being received from various representations in foreign 
nations bordering Russia – which created the impression that Washington lacked a 
consistent and long-term policy toward that country.  In a memorandum written in 
March 1921, Arthur Bullard, the chief of the Russian Division at the State 
Department in 1919-1921, had requested the Secretary of State to remedy the 
situation.  “At present,” he wrote, “the Russian division is receiving reports on 
Russian conditions from many points along Russian border, but with the exception of 
Consul Quarton at Viborg, Finland, these reports are prepared, incidentally, by 
officers of the Department, consular, and diplomatic, who are overburdened with their 
principal work.”  Beside lacking the proper insight, Bullard added, such 
representatives could “only occasionally spare time to prepare a report on Russia.”  
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Judging by the superb qualities of Harold Quarton, he suggested opening a listening 
post in Finland.  While adamantly opposed to the recognition of the Soviets, Arthur 
Bullard advocated to plan for the day when the Soviet government would be no 
longer.   “We must train Russia observers,” Bullard wrote, who would constitute the 
frontal forces in the government’s “concerted effort to understand Russia.”  This 
trained observer “should be made to feel that he was being prepared for the moment 
when it will be possible to re-establish relations with Russia.”  For Bullard, in 1921, 
America’s seemingly indifferent stand in regard to Russia was a mistake and he 
believed that as a major power, the United States simply could not afford to ignore 
the happenings in that country.298  By then, slowly, yet consistently, the United States 
government had proceeded to fulfill Bullard’s recommendations. 
According to Katherine A.S. Siegel, during this period the State Department 
closely followed developments in Russia.  “Dewitt Clinton Poole, who headed the 
Division of Russian Affairs at State, recorded that in 1922, ‘the Department received 
an average of three and one half despatches and one cablegram per day relating to 
thje Russian situation,’ much of it originating in Riga, Latvia.299   While the the State 
Department “was particularly interested in the progress of Soviet international trade,” 
the appointment of Charles Evans Hughes as the State Secretary by President Warren 
G. Harding ensured the continuation of the anti-recognition policy.  A Republican 
nominee during the presidential elections in 1916, Hughes had lost to Woodrow 
Wilson by a narrow margin.  His strong political credentials and well-developed 
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outlook into world affairs “made him one of the ‘most distinguished’ State 
Department chiefs.”  Given his anti-Bolshevik views, coupled with the presence of 
another powerful statesman Herbert Hoover in the cabinet, little change was expected 
in the political relations between Washington and Moscow.  Furthermore, under 
Hughes’ leadership, the influence of the State Department in the decision-making 
process, as well as its capabilities to monitor the political developments in Soviet 
Russia grew.    
In 1922, the Division of Russian Affairs was folded into the Division of 
Eastern European Affairs which assumed responsibilities for dealing with other new 
states in what once used to be Russian Empire, yet continued to focus primarily on 
the Soviet regime.  Evan E. Young, the commissioner in the Baltic states, was invited 
to serve as the chief of the division.  Once in Washington, Young tapped his close 
aquaintances from Latvia to work for him, among whom Robert F. Kelley and Loy 
Henderson would later become the most prominent and influential in the State 
Department.  A junior consul, just back from his post in Ireland, Henderson recalled 
bumping into Young during his visit to the State Department.  The chief of the small 
division located on the third floor of the building asked him if he “would be willing to 
take a desk in his office,” since Young needed a “junior officer who had some 
acquaintaince with Eastern Europe.”300  Henderson accepted the offer and soon met 
with a handful experts among whom 31-years-old assistant chief of the political 
division of the department, Robert Kelley, left particular impression on him. “It was 
unusual for an officer so junior to be appointed to such a responsible position. I found 
that an exception had been made partly because Young, under whom Kelley had 
                                                 




worked in Riga, had insisted that the latter be his first assistant, and partly bceause 
during the year that Kelley had served in the division he had displayed both marked 
ability and stamine.”301  Led by former Riga appointees, the Division of Eastern 
European affairs elevated the status of the U.S. legation in Latvia by improving the 
mission’s observational capacities with regard to Soviet Russia.  
According to Loy Henderson, who would later become a chief secretary of the 
legation, the Russian Section “was staffed with officers who had served in Russia, 
most of whom could speak and read Russian.”  Outside the Soviet Union, the section 
possessed the largest respository of Soviet books, pamphlets, newspapers and other 
periodicals.  By mid-1920’s the legation subscribed to more than 50 newspapers and 
magazines which usually arrived in Riga within 36 hours of their publication.  While 
the Russian Section heavily relied on offical Soviet publications, there were also the 
diplomats of friendly countries, newspaper reporters, businessmen and technicians, 
who in the words of Henderson, came to Riga “for a breath of fresh air,” and “had no 
hesitation in discussing privately with members of the legation their experiences in 
the Soviet Union and in giving their views on the developments and trends in that 
country.” “Since in those days, the United States had no intelligence service other 
than that of armed forces, the legation also arranged to obtain information from the 
secret sservices of several friendly countries.”  In fact, the quality of the information 
obtained by the Riga Legation often surpassd those of the countries which maintained 
embassies inside the USSR due to “the limited space allotted to them by the Soviet 
                                                 




government for living, and working quarters, the lack of other facilities, and the 
manner in which they were spied upon and quarantined.”302  
The opening of the Russian Section in Riga took place on the heels of the 
ARA mission which took off in the fall of 1921.  The sudden presence of Americans 
unaccountable to and fully independent of Soviet authorities increased the access to 
information about even the most intimate aspects of Russia’s internal affairs.  
However, as Natalie Grant noted in her seminal article “The Russian Section, A 
Window on the Soviet Union,” “The ARA reports were not always comprehensive 
and few ARA officers had a sufficiently fluent knowledge of Russian to communicate 
directly with the people and were thus forced to depend on local interpreters.”303  
Nearly all major figures associated with ARA were essentially relief workers and 
very little experience or even interest in policy-making.  The information they 
furnished was of significant value in terms of providing an accurate picture of the 
living conditions in Soviet Russia.  But they could not always be counted on to 
provide reliable information about the political processes which were often more 
complicated than the visibly drab realities of Russia.  After all, Communism was a 
novel phenomenon, and, without considerable prior experience, very few Westerners 
understood the philosophy and the general ways in which the Soviet government 
functioned.     
For such purposes, Washington relied on the newly assembled team consisting 
of individuals who could be identified as veterans of Russian, and in particular, Sovet 
politics.  The newly appointed chief of the Russian Section David B. Macgowan, who 
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did not arrive in his post until November of 1922, had most recently completed his 
duties as one of the last American diplomats in the Russian territory.  Having last 
served as a U.S. Consul in the yet non-Bolshevik city of Vladivostok, Macgowan 
possessed a treasure of experience in the Russian landscape.  The Tennessee native 
started out his career as a journalist reporting from Petrograd for three years.  In 1915, 
Macgowan was hired by the State Department to serve as a vice-consul in Moscow.  
As such, Macgowan was one of the handful Americans who actually witnessed the 
Bolshevik Revolution on the ground.  Unlike many of his colleagues who departed 
Russia shortly after the evacuation from Petrograd, he remained in the far eastern 
corner of Russia and continued providing despatches on conditions in non-Bolshevik 
areas of the country.  During his tenure as a consul in Vladivostok, Macgowan had 
performed admirably steering American interests in the region through the difficult 
period of intervention, the Japanese invasion and Bolshevik encroachments.  Another 
prominent member of the Riga team, Earl Packer also served in Russia during the 
tumultuous period of the revolution.  Having served as a clerk at the American 
mission in Petrograd from 1916 until January of 1918, Packer was then promoted to 
the post of an assistant military attaché in the U.S. embassy in Russia.  As the 
American mission in Russia wrapped up its activities toward the end of the Civil War, 
he returned to Washington to take a foreign service exam, and became a drafting 
officer as the assistant chief at the Division of Russian Affairs.  In 1922, when the 
Russian Section was instituted, the superiors decided to send Packer to Riga in the 




The Russian Section, as Natalie Grant put it, “occupied a position seldom 
encountered in the American Foreign Service,” insofar as “the government with 
which it was concerned was out of reach”, and “no direct contact could be maintained 
with the officials of this government.”304  The primary duties of its officers included 
preparing reports based on the Soviet press, interviews with the knowledgeable 
parties and various other activities that helped to enhance knowledge of the events in 
Russia.  Particular emphasis was placed on summarizing the reports coming from the 
state-owned newspapers that dealt with internal Soviet politics.  In the instructions 
sent to the founders of the Section, the State Department requested them to “regularly 
obtain newspapers …, have them read and translations prepared of such portions as 
you believe will be of special value  and interest to the Department.”  Washington 
seemed to be most interested in “translations of what may be considered basic 
documents, i.e. decrees and official announcements of the Soviet authorities, 
statements by leaders such as Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Rakovsky, etc., and editorials 
by Steklov and Radek.”305  It was expected that the members of the Riga staff, 
seasoned in the revolutionary politics of Russia, would be well suited to follow the 
not-so-dull dynamics of the Kremlin, especially considering the frequency of reports 
about Vladimir Lenin’s deteriorating health.  In addition to politics, the Russian 
Section was also charged with informing Washington about the economic, judicial 
and religious aspects of the Soviet life.  It was up to the diplomats in Riga to 
determine what information was worthy of attention, and under the circumstances, 
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this often meant compiling a wide range of subjects which in totality helped to 
convey some sense of the overall realities of Russia. 
In the meanwhile, the realities of Russia appeared to be shifting in a less 
gloomy direction.  Amid the deadly famine in the Volga, the measures adopted in the 
aftermath of the Kronstadt uprising had begun to produce some results in the barren 
economic landscape of the Communist state.  According to a confidential 
memorandum sent to the American representation in Finland, despite acute fuel 
shortages and near-total breakdown in transportation, the embryonic revival of private 
enterprise had at least alleviated the situation for a certain strata of people in the 
central cities.  “The new economic policy has already begun to restore some of the 
former conditions of life at Petrograd and Moscow,” stated the report.  “The remnants 
of the Intelligentsia are beginning to be seen again in the streets though seldom in the 
cafes and restaurants.  The number of business advertisements appearing in Russian 
newspapers are also an indication of the new conditions.”  The repairs carried out at 
the Semenovsky race course by the government appeared to be designed to lure in the 
emerging class of people with financial means.  The situation in Moscow comprised a 
stark contrast with the countryside where the famine and typhus epidemic continued 
to rage.  Among those who had fled to Moscow to escape death and disease in other 
regions, at least one hundred humans died every day from typhus and malnutrition.306  
According to historian of Moscow, Timothy J. Colton,  “from its 1920 low of 1 
million, Moscow gained  a half-million residents by 1923,” and by 1926, the two-
third of Muscovites had been born somewhere else.  Much of this growth – 85 percent 
                                                 




from 1921-1926 – “stemmed not from fertility but from in-migration, which was 
lubricated by the annulment of most administrative restrictions on mobility.”307  
Another reliable source in Petrgorad reported increase in foodstuffs at the 
local markets.  “People having plenty of money can get everything,” the informer 
stated, but the prices were prohibitively expensive.  “A salary of 1 million rubles is is 
insufficient for people to live on,” informed the source, and therefore “most of the 
people were enaged in extra work” which the Soviet authorities ubquitously labeled 
as  “speculation.”  The new creed became well-spread among the inhabitants: “He 
who does not speculate cannot eat” instead of the Bolshevik one: “Who does not 
work must not eat.”308  This type of optimism was partially corroborated by some 
officials of ARA in Russia.  According to Cyril Quinn, the second executive assistant 
to the ARA chief of operations, the moral of the people in Russia had improved.  
Most Russians felt that the worst had gone by.  There was a marked change in the 
outward appearance of the cities; the improvements induced by private trade were 
evident everywhere. Quinn attributed much of the improvement to the government’s 
new tax plan which limited the collection of taxes to once a year.  “In theory, the 
economic situation is hopless without outside help,” Quinn noted, “but in Russia one 
gets the sense that things will somehow work out.”  At the very least, he was certain 
that the Soviet government was not going to fall.309   
Many outside observers interpreted the Soviet measures toward market as a 
necessary retreat from an otherwise suicidal policy course.  Identified as the State 
Capitalism by the observers in Riga, however, the contours of the NEP were still 
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unclear.  The head of New York Chamber of Commerce Irving T. Bush who traveled 
to Soviet Russia in June of 1922 noted that the situation was getting somewhat better, 
though nowhere near normal.  His assessment of the condition of the peasants 
concluded that their indusry was slowly reviving; however, the Bolsheviks were not 
being particularly helpful in facilitating the necessary conditions for economic 
growth.  Having met with Lenin, Trotsky, Chicherin and other Soviet leaders, Bush 
remained opposed to the recongition of the Soviet regime.310  An American citizen 
traveling to Odessa around the same time observed that “the broad streets were clean 
and the pavements were in good order” A few people strolling about the streets 
looked well-dressed and well-fed, if not exaclty prosperous.   The American noticed 
no traffic in the city, except an occasional government automobile that whizzed by.  
“Shops looked well from outside, given the items on the window.  But once you enter 
it, the shelves are bare, it turns out everything in the store is placed on the windows to 
see,” he told the American interlocutor in Istanbul, “ but he sellers assured me they 
can get whatever I want, if I gave them enough time.”  The visitor then went to the 
ARA headquarters in the locality here he met with the American officials in charge of 
relief operations.  After a stroll in Cadillac through the deserted streets of Odessa, he 
was taken by Hodgson to see the dining rooms.  “There were hundreds of children 
lined up in a courtyard going in to get their ration of bread and cocoa.  They all 
looked healthy and well-fed.”  As he watched the Russian kids receiving 
nourishment, Hodgson told him that “when the ARA had first come into Odessa there 
were hundreds and thousands of children literally dying of starvation, many of them 
                                                 





so weak that they were unable to to go to the feeding stations.” But coupled with 
ARA’s efforts, good crops had improved the situation.311   
Eager to capitalize on the meager effects of the NEP and easing of famine, the 
Soviet hosted several high profile American representatives whose mission was 
designed to gauge the improvements in the state of the Soviet economy.  Among such 
visitors were the U.S. Senators Edwin F. Ladd of North Dakota and William H. King 
of Utah.  Accompanied with their own interpreters, the senators traveled through the 
Urals, Crimea and Armenia.  Speaking to the American envoy in Stockholm Robert 
Bliss on the way back from Russia in Stockholm, Senator Ladd brimmed with 
excitement about the results of his visit.  Claming that he had not experienced 
government interference with the program of the visit, Edwin Ladd  spoke of the 
expansion of religious freedom and freedom of trade.  Senator Ladd judged religious 
freedom by the number of people who attended the church when he visited them, but 
“doubted that many had religious feelings, since children grew up in a revolutionary 
era.”  Noting the material improvement, Senator Ladd observed that Russia had 
“touched the bottom and was slowly mounting the upward grads.”  However, he also 
admitted that much of his trip was confined to the private car and hotel room rather 
than meeting with average Russians.312  His associate Senator King was not as 
impressed.  While not discounting possibilities for some trade between the two 
countries, senator from Utah referred to his Communist hosts as “international 
scoundrels.”  Once back in Washington, Senator King told Robert F. Kelley that he 
“avoided the comissars the whole time he was there, while his colleagues flattered 
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officals and were flattered in return.”  The Utah senator came out against “any type of 
recognition.”313   
Despite minor signs of improvement in limited areas of the country owing to 
the partial retreat from the ideals of War Communism, living conditions for the 
overwhelming majority of the citizens remained dreadful.  According to Russian 
professor who came to Tallinn along with his wife, “foreigners arriving in Russian 
towns only saw the main streets and the conditions of life led by officials, and got no 
idea of the real situation.”  Many of the people, they said, were on the verge of 
starvation.  “The general attitude of the poorer classes is that of waiting for something 
to end their misery,” the man told the American representative in Estonia.  It has 
taken two years for the couple to obtain permission for this visit and four months to 
get the necessary passports and documents.  In the end, they were forced to leave 
behind their 17 and 18 years-old daughters as a collateral to ensure that they would 
return to the Soviet Union.314     
The Russian peasants continued to suffer under harsh circumstances due to the 
past Soviet practices, ongoing heavy taxation and government control.  A professor 
from the Siberian university informed ARA representatives the livestock in the region 
was drastically reduced since the previus year the government had demanded 
livestock as a form of tax payment.  According to him even though they were the 
growers of food, the situation seemed to be better in the cities than in the countryisde.  
As for the high Soviet officials, “all kinds of talks, conferences and schemes” led to 
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nothing since “they were all evading the main issues.”315  In a report passed on to the 
American representative in Denmark by Baron Meyendorf, a member of the old 
aristocracy, the Russian peasant was described as someone utterly opposed to 
centralized rule saying that “every kind of government is disastrous for the mujik,” 
and reminisced about the rule of the Tsar.    The Soviet taxation system repelled many 
even though most peasants avoided talking politics. While the red army and the 
peasants got along well there was palpable reentment toward the GPU, which the 
report described as ‘gendarmerie’.  The Soviet gendarmeries, unlike those in other 
Western countries were more potent, as they possessed “the power of life and death 
over all persons who are offensive to the Government.”  The report identified Jews as 
one of the few stratas able to take advantage of the small economic freedoms granted 
by the Soviet regime, and were on good terms with the peasantry who relied on their 
services:  
“There are few Jews in northern Russia.  These all occupy themselves 
with trade. Some of them are tailors, and many act as boot-leggers and 
money-changers. In the above mentioned distrcts, the farmers are on good 
terms with the Jews and make use of their service in all cases of necessity. 
Some observers report that only the Jews are able to trade at all and to 
furnish peasantry with the necessities of life such as salt, metals and 
glass.”316  
 
On his way back from Russia in December of 1923, F.A. McKenzie of Chicago Daily 
News met with the U.S. Consul in Harbin whom he informed of the sharp contrast 
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between the outward signs of improvement in the cities and the conditions in the 
regions.  In Siberia, the situation was no better than during the worst periods of the 
Civil War.  As he arrived in the villages, “it became evident that conditions in Siberia 
are much worse than they were in 1920.”   The peasants’ livestock was severely 
depleted and they complained bitterly.317  The Latvian Minister in Moscow also 
obsered that the peasant support for the Soviet government was almost nil, and the 
grain production was quite low.  Given the circumstances the minister believed that 
the Soviet government had no choice but to continue pushing NEP in full force.  Still, 
however, the Soviet government’s refusal to abandon its enmity toward private 
enterprise threatened long-term provisions for better life and business.  According to 
McKenzie of Chicago Daily News the Soviets showed inclination to invite American 
businessmen into the country, but “the tendency of the Bolo authorities was to take 
over any enterprise that promised development on a large scale.”  Validating 
McKenzie’s apprehension about Bolshevik practices, Mr. Robbins of White Star Line 
stated that his company in Moscow was facing operational difficulties due to strict 
government intereference. “Under present conditions it is impossible to operate a 
business,” Robbins complained.318
Naturalized American citizen, A.A. Wishnevsky spoke with the staff member 
of the U.S. Consulate in Riga in June of 1923 after resigning from the charimanship 
of a soap-producing factory in Kazan, “due to intolerable conditons under which he 
ws compelled to work.”  He said that the local Communist party cell was constantly 
interfering with the work of the factory and slowing down the pace.  His assistant was 
                                                 





a former janitor who lacked basic understanding of business or industry, but his 
Communist Party membership had entitled him to the supervisory position.  
Wishnevsky complained about parallel authority where most of his decisions, even 
though confined strictly to economic realm, would have to be approved by the Party 
officer who knew next to nothing about the functioning of the factory.  The 
suffocating political control over ordinary workers did not stop at the confines of the 
factory.  “Whenever Communist authorities want to stage a demonstration,” said 
Wishnevsky, “they simply give orders to the union officials to assemble their men at 
particular place and time. If someone doesn’t show up, they take away his union card, 
and after that he cannot obtain employment.”  Once, on May 1, they ordered 
Wishnevsky to show at the annual labor day demononstrations.  Instead, he went 
hunting.  An immediate trial for Wishnevsky followed uin which he was roundly 
denounced by his colleagues and was severely reprimanded.  But due to his American 
citizenship and the fact that he was not a Communist Party member, Wishnevsky was 
left alone.  In a similar report compiled from Vladivostok where the Soviet authorities 
were said to have spent 30,000 dollars on the May day festivities.319   “When one 
considers the misery and suffering existing among practically all classes of Russians 
in the city and province such an expenditure can only be characterized as criminal 
waste,” noted A.W. Kliefitch of the Division of Eastern European Affairs on the side 
of the despatch.  To the great revulsion of the American, a photo from the parade 
                                                 




taken from a local newspaper copy showed the Bible and the crown chained by Soviet 
soliders.320   
Symbols of old Russia were not the only only ones to be shackled by the 
Soviet authorities.  Ever paranoid of the presence of many enemies both within and 
abroad the country, the Soviet prisons were full of dissenting citizens, including even 
the foreigners who failed to remove in time the presumption of guilt toward 
themselves.   A former member of the Latvian embassy who served a prison term in 
the Soviet Union under the espionage charges reported numerous Western persons 
jailed on similar suspicions.321  Among the imprisoned foreigners Poles and Baltic 
nationans who had come to do business in Russia comprised the majority.  In one 
frighteningly hillarious instance, according to Riga’s daily Segodnya, an American 
Communist who was sent by Communist Party of USA to attend a gathering by 
Communist International underwent an unforgettable experience at the hands of 
Soviet security forces.  En route to Moscow, he made acquaintance with two fellow 
travelers who spoke English.  When the American asked for directions to the 
Communist International, the men prankfully pointed him to Lubianka, the 
headquarters of the State Political Administration, the GPU.  The unsuspecting 
American walked into the building and was promptly arrested.  After several weeks 
of incessant pleading by the American, the authorities agreed to review his case.  
Following the investigations, he was released.  As the Soviet police removed 
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handcuffs from him, the examining magistrate mollified the hapless prisoner: “Don’t 
worry – that is the way we deal with all foreigners whom we think suspicious.”322   
1923 was the year during which largely thanks to efforts by the American 
Relief Administration, the terrible famine afflicting much of Soviet Russia abated.  It 
was perhaps an irony of fate that Herbert Hoover, in trying to demonstrate the non-
viability of Bolshevism, had given the Soviet regime a new lease on life, thus actually 
helping it to preserve its otherwise ruined legitimacy in the eyes of the people.  
Certainly, the measures by the Soviet government, designed to lift stifling 
government control over the economy also played a role.  There appeared to be 
realization that without some compromise on the question of trade, the Soviet 
government would implode under the weight of severe economic problems.  
According to German Foreign Secretary Richard von Kuhlman, toward the end of his 
life, Soviet founder Vladimir Lenin confided in his doctor and von Kuhlmann’s 
personal friend named Bumke about his concerns for the future of the Communist 
ideology.  As von Kuhlmann related the story to the American consul in Berlin, 
“Lenin had told him [Bumke] that he had become entirely convinced that 
Communism was a failure as a practical system and that the Bolshevists must 
necessarily adapt their system to meet realities. He added, however, that he regretted 
nothing that he had done in doing away with the old order of things in Russia.”323  
There are other signs that, as a highly intelligent person, Lenin did acknowledge the 
drastic consequences of his ideology for the welfare of the people.  Nonetheless, as a 
revolutionary man for whom the noble end justified the means, the Soviet leader’s 
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compunction did not reach the point at which he would revisit his ideological 
principles, let alone, take an action that would soften the deadly grip of his Party over 
the country. 
Though an ever-inspiring leader of the Soviet phenomenon, by the end of 
1922, Vladimir Lenin had gradually begun to withdraw from public life due to 
deteriorating health.  In fact, he had never fully recovered from the assasination 
attempt that left a few bullets lodged in his body.  In the last few months of his life, 
Lenin’s debilitating condition touched off a power struggle within the ruling 
Politburo.  Lenin’s collective method of leadership gave the struggle a particularly 
ferocious character as various politicans grouped and regrouped around various 
leading Communists.  Yet the same collective leadership also made it possible so that 
when on January 21, 1924, the father of the Bolshevik Revolution drew his last 





Chapter 4: Era of Soviet Normalcy 
Vladimir Lenin’s death in January of 1924, contrary to some expectations, did not 
mark the beginning of a new era in the Soviet Union.  Some time before his death, 
Lenin had been incapacitated by serious illness which curtailed his physical ability to 
govern the country.  Given Joseph Stalin’s rising stature in the Party and his strong-
arm tactics toward Lenin’s immediate surrounding, even the revolutionary leader’s 
political capacity to effect change was often limited.324  The definitive departure of 
the founder of the Soviet state predictably gave way to furious battles for succession 
in power.  Nonetheless, with persistent attacks on private property, quashing of 
political dissent and refusal to renounce revolutionary claims abroad, the Soviet 
regime retained its essential features.  As the American diplomatic despatches from 
the region illustrate, even at the height of the New Economic Policy which tolerated 
minor degree of freedom in commodity exchange, those capable of feeding 
themselves – or Nepmen, as the Soviet lingo pejoratively labeled them – risked 
arbitrary arrest, exile or execution. 
While the reports from the representations in China, Turkey, Finland and 
Germany significantly contributed to Washington’s knowledge about the Soviet 
affairs, much of the information-gathering task was formally bestowed upon the 
Russian Section created within the U.S. Legation in the capital of Latvia and still in 
its embryonic stages.  Writing from Riga, Ambassador Frederick W.B. Coleman 
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enumerated three main sources of their information: the Soviet press, “the 
observations of substantial, in some cases responsible men that had lived in the Soviet 
Union a more or less prolonged period and had given studious attention” to the 
happenings in the USSR, and a special class of observers (agents) whose reports had 
been scanned at the Riga legation for a number of years.  “It’s not believed that all of 
these sources is the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,” stated Coleman, but 
examined in relation to one another, they provided a fairly accurate picture of Soviet 
realities: “Taken by and large, these sources report substantially the same state of 
things. These facts, filtering through the minds of the Legation staff, and of others 
similarly situated yield substantially similar conclusions. These conclusions are 
inevitable; they may be described as objective, not subjective.”  And the objective 
conclusion about the Soviet Union consisted of several main points which the 
observers in Riga conveyed to their superiors in Washington.  Their analysis 
contended that the Soviet power was too entrenched to be overthrown; that with all 
the talk about tolerance for free trade, “Communist principles had been modified, not 
eradicated”, and that the NEP had not halted the downward slide in economy which 
would likely lead to yet another catastrophe unless a radical alteration of course took 
place on the part of the Soviet leadership.325  In the absence of serious political 
developments such as civil strife or rebellion, the focus of the despatches hence 
shifted to analyzing domestic economic conditions.  As the more easily observable 
phenomenon, in the era of NEP, everyday conditions – byt as the Russians – called it  
became an important tool in gauging the success or failure of the Soviet government.   
                                                 




Large segments of the Bolshevik establishment never warmed up to the idea 
of private property and free trade.  In 1921, when Lenin initially resorted to the NEP 
he had done so grudgingly and many around him saw the step as a necessary retreat 
for the sake of a greater ideal – retaining power.  “We felt as though  the Revolution 
had been betrayed, and it was time to quit the Party…. If money was reappearing, 
wouldn’t rich people reappear, too? Weren’t we on the slippery slope that led back to 
capitalism?” wondered aloud a young Bolshevik Alexander Barmine.326   In a 
reassuring response to those who resisted against the “retreat” Pravda editorial 
announced the necessity “to realize that under current conditions, the strengthening 
and development of the revolution [were] only possible this way.”327  But Lenin 
never lost sight of the possible implications of allowing the bourgeoisie to creep back 
into Soviet landscape.  “Free trade, even its at first not linked to the White Guards as 
Kronstadt was, nevertheless leads inevitably to White Guardism, the triumph of 
capital and its full restoration,” he asserted at the Tenth Party Congress in March of 
1921.328
Among historians of the Soviet Union, NEP once remained at the center of a 
debate on whether there existed a possibility for an alternative course of development 
for the socialist state.  American historian Stephen Cohen has vociferously defended 
the viability of alternative course by emphasizing the ideas of Nikolai Bukharin and 
other Soviet leaders who advocated a more lenient approach toward private 
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enterprise.329  More recently, Evgeni Gimpelson, a Russian historian, has suggested 
that during the NEP, the Soviet system did indeed move toward liberalization and 
away from terror.  However, in Gimpelson’s view, the democratic alternative did not 
come to fruition, because it was blocked by “a ruling party beholden to ideological 
dogmas on ‘building socialism’ and ‘dictatorship of the proletariat.’”330  For this, 
rather than the conscious policy by Lenin, he blames the evolution of the Soviet 
administrative apparatus which formulated its modus operandi during volatile times 
of the Civil War where extreme centralization and dictatorialization effectively served 
the survival of the Soviet regime.  A younger historian P.V. Panov goes even further 
by dismissing the democratizing influence of the NEP as hype unsupported by 
evidence.  He shows that Lenin took special care to ensure that the NEP would not 
affect “the bases of the existing political establishment” by instituting policies that 
crippled any chances for the genuine market economy to develop.331  The result was 
that “factually during the years of NEP the monopolization [of the national economy] 
did not weaken, but expanded.”332  Moreover, according to Julie Hessler, “the NEP 
laid the foundation for the future development of the socialist economy by combining 
a massive state presence with market mechanism and institutions.”333  While the 
Soviet authorities occasionally yielded in the struggle against private entrepreneurs, 
Hessler points out that “punishments, purges, mobilization of Communists, and 
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political and occupational training became the standard techniques for counteracting 
the antisocialist tendencies inherent in commercial activity.”334  As Timothy J. Colton 
put it, “the official response vacillated between repression and grudging indulgence, 
with repression winning out in 1923-1924 and liberality getting a second wind after 
that.”  In this regard, Colton believes, “the boisterous Sukharevski market was a 
barometer: closed in 1920 and reopened in April, 1922, its was closed a second time 
at the end of 1924, and opened again  in 1925, only to be shut for good in 1930, and 
its stalls burned.”335
As the despatches indicate, hostility of the Soviet regime toward the NEP and 
its beneficiaries was evident throughout, and its severity did not fully abate during the 
period, but which, given the intensity of the ones that either preceded and succeeded 
it, could be called the Soviet-style normalcy.  In comparison with the era of War 
Communism, indeed, some visitors saw improvement in the overall conditions, and 
their interpretation of the actions of the Soviet government occasionally differed from 
those of the majority.  “I was impressed with the recovery of Moscow betwen 1921-
23,” wrote an ex-parliamentarian from Ontario, Canada, Colonel H.J. Mackis.  
According to him, more than 2,000 stores, “carrying splendid stocks”, were operating 
in the city, and they were not controlled by the state, as formerly.  “This communistic 
doctrine is quickly passing, and the political administration is under the control of 
sincere, hard workers – men who do not hesitate to eliminate any communistic 
doctrines when it is not applicable to the present-day needs of Russia..., but they will 
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not allow the country to be exploited for big profit by the traders and others.”336 
Mackis’ sentiments were corroborated by an agent of the Russian Section in the 
Soviet Union, referred as IS2, who reported of slow progress.  According to IS2, the 
living conditions had improved since 1923, and the rates of pay had gone up to the 
pre-war levels.337  The commercial attaché of the United States in Constantinople, 
Mark L. Bristol, delivered a letter written by a Columbia University-educated Turkish 
journalist, intercepted from the Turkish diplomatic pouch leaving Moscow, which 
sounded positive notes about the direction of the Soviet economy.  “Indeed, the thing 
that strike foreigners coming to Russia is the lack of communism,” journalist penned.  
“Communism was tried and failed.”  According to the unnamed Turkish journalist, 
the great masses of people remained destitute and practically hungry, while the new 
grown up bourgeois spent money and lived “as though every day was the last day of 
the world.”  Pointing out the material luxuries offered to those who could afford it, 
the journalist declared: “There is no difference between life in Moscow and in any 
other big city of Europe, except as far as poverty is concerned.”338   
Even seasoned observers such as Walter Lyman Brown, the European director 
of the American Relief Administration, had become convinced that “the application 
of Communist principle to the economic life has proved a complete failure.”  In a 
conversation with the chairman of the Department of Near Eastern Affairs, Brown 
conveyed his impression about “the general trend to the right and toward 
conservatism” in the Soviet Union.  However, he noted, “the progress in this direction 
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is not steady and the movement is frequently halted and checked.”  Having worked 
with Herbert Hoover in pre-revolutionary Russia, Brown even related the statement 
he had heard from the emissary of the British embassy who expressed certainty that 
“in 20 years Russia would become a strongly capitalistic country.”  Despite these 
tendencies, he nevertheless advised against recognition of the Soviet Union, until the 
Communist International was thrown overboard and the Soviet regime formally 
abandoned the course of fomenting revolution abroad.339   
Indeed, certain measures not taken by the Soviet government in regard to 
tradesmen contributed to relative improvement in economic conditions.  For one, by 
1925, the great majority of the Soviet population had ceased to starve.  For the first 
time since the Bolshevik takeover, there was a glimpse of economic activity in the 
streets of Moscow and Leningrad, spurred by the government’s hesitation to stamp 
out free commodity exchange among the citizens.  Timothy J. Colton, observes that 
“even with the spate of closures, Moscow consumers could take their pick of 4, 977 
private shops and 606 cooperatives in May 1924, and of 5,600 market stalls, 24,000 
self-employed buggy drivers and unaccounted street hawkers.”340  According to 
Colton, once a broken city, Moscow was rapidly reurbanizing under the even 
marginally liberalized economic circumstances.  The Latvian Minister to Moscow, 
Charles Ozols, reporting to his American counterparts in Riga, spoke of “noticeable 
evidences of the revival of private trade.”  Ozols noted that the banks were lending 
money, to a limited extent, even to private enterprises.  However, Ozols added that 
“the so-called New NEP is not the result of any new law or decree but merely a 
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lessening of the repressive measures directed against the application of the ‘old’ 
NEP.”   Many peasants continued to think that their conditions were no any better.  In 
Ozols’ view, the only difference was that there was now a greater degree of freedom 
of speech than formerly and that therefore, the people were more open in their 
criticism of conditions.  “Up to two years ago,” Ozols conveyed, “the average 
individual was very guarded, virtually to the point of silence, in his complaints and 
the peasants were passive in the face of repressions.”341  Given the intense power 
struggle that was brewing in the corridors of the Kremlin, there was widespread 
sentiment that the Cheka had somewhat loosened its grip over the society.  “The 
theories are breaking down everywhere,” wrote four conservative delegates of the 
British parliament visiting Soviet Russia, “and Communists have to allow more 
freedom.”  In their view, “thus economic conditions in Russia are no doubt 
considerably improving – not owing to, but despite, the system of government.”342  
According to the diplomatic despatches, however, for significant portions of 
the population, including the urban Nepmen who evidently benefited from the 
government’s lax attitude toward free trade, life was still full of unexpected miseries.  
The despatch sent from the American legation in Riga to Washington in February of 
1924 addressed the latest order given by the head of Cheka (now renamed GPU - 
State Political Directorate in 1922), Felix Dzerzhinsky, regarding the expulsion of 
“the scum of the NEP” from Moscow.  According the decree, 300 thousand people 
would be removed from their houses so that “quarters to be made available for 
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workmen and Party or State employees.”343  “Fight against private trade is being 
conducted as viciously as ever,” read another despatch,  “and [there is] no decrease in 
number of so called economic arrests.”344  While passing through Riga on his way 
home, the secretary of the Swedish embassy in Moscow, Mr. Lund, in his 
conversation with the American observers, spoke of “decided swing to the left” and 
the suppression of the NEP.  According to him, “the GPU exercised a general control 
over economic matters.”345   
The Soviet newspapers, the copies of which were obtained by the American 
diplomats in Riga, were filled with attacks against kulaks who were said to be 
attempting to undermine the Soviet system.346  Having vanquished the tsarist 
aristocracy, in the NEP, the Soviet authorities found a new source of the public 
enemy – a scapegoat on whom all the ills of the society could be blamed.  
Demonization of the kulaks as murderers and counter-revolutionaries thus became a 
common feature in the Soviet public discourse.   
“At a time when Russia can be saved only by a vigorous and courageous constructive 
policy,” wrote G.C. Dixon of Melbourne Herald Tribune in a report entitled Truth 
about Russia, “the Soviet leaders are becoming more and more fanatical in their 
adherence to theories and barren formulae...”  Narrating his experience from the 
border entrance point in Sino-Russian border through Moscow, the Austrialian 
journalist was struck by the zeal with which the government had crushed the vitality 
of the Russian society.  “Everywhere in Chita I saw signs of poverty and decay. All 
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the larger shops have been nationalized; that is, confiscated by the Soviets, and 
businesses were obviously at standstill. In all of Chita there were two smoking 
chimneys.”  As for his impressions about the Soviet capital, Dixon penned: “The 
cleanliness and orderliness of the streets, poverty revealing itself in poor clothes, 
dingy buildings and swarms of beggars and a general atmosphere, hard to define but 
depressingly real, of suspicion, suspense and gloom – these were the first things 
which impressed me on my arrival in Moscow.”  The journalist was particularly 
struck the overwhelming police presence throughout Russia -- something he held 
responsible for much of the average Russian’s plight. “The Russian’s every step and 
every turn are directed by cast-iron regulations designed to reduce him to the level of 
an automatic and unquetioning machine.... Some people would resent this dragooning 
, but the long-suffering Russian walks just where he is told to walk, complies with all 
the inumerable reulgations governing every activity and phase of life and passively, if 
not contendedly accepts the status of a mechanical unit.”  Shocked by his 
observations, Dixon turned his criticism toward those in the West who rather saw 
rebirth of human freedom in the Soviet experiment.  “Exactly how the delusion has 
spread that commism implies liberty and equality, I do not know, but a delusion it 
certainly is,” he wrote.  “The communist does not believe in equality, denies certain 
categories of people even such elementary rights as the franchise and emphatically 
maintains that the majority must be terrorized into accepting the views and principles 
of the minority.”347   
                                                 





As late as 1925, passengers who arrived at Tallinn from Petrograd reported 
hunger riots in their native city.  While the Soviet Press did not confirm the outbreak 
of disturbances, an Izvestia report on March 15, stated that rye bread and flour 
shortage had been liquidated thanks to “the energetic measures  of the domestic trade 
authorities.”  According to the report, “fifteen car loads of rye and flour arrived, 
hence shortening the bread lines…”  It appeared that the Soviet authorities were 
especially keen on maintaining order in the two largest cities of the union – the 
traditional seat of power in Russia.  They appear to have made it a priority to “see to 
it that the populations of larger cities, particularly Moscow and Petrograd shall be 
fed.”348     
America’s choice of Riga as a listening post to Russia had a great deal to do 
with the fact that authorities in Latvia, ever-mindful of the ominous presence of an 
eastern neighbor, facilitated a public discourse which took active interest in the 
developments inside the Soviet Union.  American representatives frequently referred 
to the Latvian sources of information which included not only the emissaries of that 
country in Russia or experts who spoke the language, but also the newspapers which 
often carried detailed reports about Soviet conditions.  Rigasche Rundschau, the local 
newspaper in Riga, regularly reporting on the developments inside the Soviet Union 
based on émigré sources, referred to a report in Belgium based Odessa Izvestia about 
disturbances in Kharkov between the local workers and the red troops.  According to 
the report, hundreds of citizens attempted to plunder the wheat trains bound for export 
when the Soviet troops opened fire upon the crowd killing many.  Among the dead 
                                                 




were also the soldiers of the Red Army and “some commissars.”349  In another 
Soviet-related item in Rigasche Rundschau, an appeal was made by starving Russian 
intellectuals.  According to the statement, by Soviet admission alone, 343,000 
professionals have been driven away from their positions “for the sole reason that 
they could not provide a proletarian birth.”  Adding that millions have already 
perished the statement concluded: “Something must be done, and the world’s 
conscience must be roused, before it is too late.350  
Naturally, Riga’s role as an information center – or a center of disinformation 
as Moscow perceived it – riled the Soviet regime.  Likening the Rigans to latrine-
cleaners who spread excrement all over the newspaper pages, G. Rylkin of Izvestia, 
denounced  Riga as “the principal birthplace of all these rumors.”  In a sharply 
worded and sarcastic diatribe characteristic of Soviet editorials, the Izvestia author 
declared:  
“Riga means exasperated propaganda against the Soviet regime!.. Riga is  
the witness of unsurpassable human stupidity, dullness, blackmail and 
fraud! Riga means a pleasant pastime for the bourgeoisie!  Riga is the 
daily bread of the white guard scribblers of the international swindlers and 
forgers!”351   
 
But despatches depicting harsh Soviet realities did not just come from the Latvian 
capital.  Situated near the Soviet-Chinese border, the town of Harbin was a major 
source of information to Washington about Soviet practices outside the main cities of 
Moscow and Petrograd.  David Wolff, historical expert on this center point of the 
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Russian colonization effort in Chinese Manchuria, has written extensively on the 
importance of Harbin as Russia’s gate to East Asia.  While the city at least formally 
remained under the Chinese administration, Harbin owed its origins to the influx of 
ethnic Russians and Jews under whom “an unprepossessing fishing village with a 
population under 100 metamorphosed into an urban conglomerate with more than 
100,000 inhabitants.”352  Beginning from 1890’s, under the guidance of the reformist 
finance minister of the Tsar, Sergei Witte, numerous Russian workers, engineers and 
entrepreneurs arrived in the area for the construction of Chinese Eastern Railway.  
This railroad precinct also attracted a large number of Jews who, according to Wolff, 
realized that Harbin was “far enough away to escape persecution and institutionalized 
prejudice and yet remain in a Russian cultural environment.”353  Harbin evolved as a 
cosmopolitan Russian center without many restrictions of the tsarist regime.  “Outside 
the empire,” Wolff writes, “a free discussion of unorthodox approaches could be 
pursued unimpeded by the taboos of autocracy.”354  As such, “after 1917, émigré 
Harbin became the only Russian city outside the Soviet Union”355 where free political 
discourse with regard to Russia’s future continued, often with the participation of 
those who had just fled the Bolshevik dominion. 
Given the stricter border control in the Western boundaries of the country, 
many Russians and foreign travelers chose the Siberian frontier as an exit point from 
the Soviet Union.  As such, the American Consulate in Harbin gathered wealth of 
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information from those who had just experienced life on the other side of the border.  
The picture painted by individuals who spoke to the American consul George Hanson 
substantiated those in Riga.  According to G.M. Avdakia , a naturalized American 
who had just returned from the Soviet Union, “reign of terror existed in Russia.”  She 
spoke of everyone being afraid of running afoul of the governemnt’s secret police and 
the Soviet authorities’ efforts to close private shops.  Having spent some time in 
Moscow, Avdakia reported about high prices.  In his judgment, many people were not 
well-dressed because they feared arrest if they looked prosperous.356  Another 
Russian merchant named A.V. Hayeff called rosy reports in the Soviet press about the 
development “mere windowdressing.”  One could not do any business with the Soviet 
government “as the latter [was] determined to monopolize all trade and permit[ed] 
private individuals to engage in business only to a limitied extent.” According to him, 
the Soviet government actively spied not only upon unsuspecting foreigners but also 
Russians and even on members of the Communist Party.”357   
Consul George Hanson’s interview with M.C. Morris Jr. And Miss W.A. 
Carver of Society of Friends Mission resonated with much of what Avdakia and 
Hayeff reported on their experience in Soviet Russia.  According to the couple who 
conducted missionary aid work in Samara, the conditions in hospitals and schools 
were horrific.  “The doctors,” they claimed “have no supplies,” and “the teachers 
have not been paid in months.”358  Shortly afterwards, assistant editor of Peking and 
Tsiensin Times, William V. Pepnell, on his way back to China, stopped in Harbin to 
                                                 
356 George C. Hanson, U.S. Consul in Harbin, China, to Hughes, September 22, 1924, RG 59, File 
#861.00/10521. 
357 Hanson to Hughes, April 29, 1924, RG 59, File #861.00/10350. 




report on his visit to old Petrograd, now renamed Leningrad in honor of the founder 
of the Soviet state, which he described as ‘dilapidated’.  In the hotel where he stayed 
there was no running water or towel, and the place was completely empty.   In the 
Soviet-run city he saw the intersection of  between “the luxury of the old and the 
shoddiness and poverty of the new.” Recountring his experience on the streets of 
Leningrad, he wrote: “Beggars are encountered everywhere, and sidle up to you and 
sigh out their distress in a sibilant, suppressed whisper which gives one the creeps.... 
The proletariat has brought all down to its own level.  The gay faces, bright uniforms, 
and Parisian modes have gone.” When Pepnell’s tour guide showed him the spot 
where Emperor Paul had been killed, according to the American, “it was not the 
excesses of the Imperial tyrants whose violent lives and violent ends make Russian 
history unique in the last 100 years that troubled the imagination”, but “the ‘Terror’ 
during the Revolution.”359   
Similar to Riga, Harbin also contained a large segment of Russian diaspora 
dispossessed by the Soviet regime.  After their defeat in the Civil War, most White 
officers and sympathizers had crossed the border into China to escape Soviet 
retribution.  In the haven provided by the Chinese authorities the emigres continued 
anti-Soviet activities by publishing fressh accounts of misery and destitution in the 
Bololand.  In a conservative Russian weekly, called Russkiy Golos (Russian Voice), a 
Russian person who recently escpaed the Soviet Union named A. Petrischev, still 
compared the food conditions in Soviet Russia to those of 1919.360  In another article 
describing the Sovet methods of collecting taxes, Russki Golos (Russian Voice) wrote 
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about the unfortunate farmer who owned one lean cow and a horse.  The Soviet 
authorities levied so high a tax that farmer “had to slaughter his cow in order to pay 
his tax, since he didn’t want to lose his horse.”  Adressing the unreasonable attitude 
of the Soviet government toward private property, the author of the report described 
taxes as being “very high” and “not in proportion to incomes”, which in turn 
contributed to the destruction of the economy.361  In an article titled An Expensive 
Lesson, a former Bolshevik sympathizer Tikhonenko, depicted as a former opponent 
of the Whites, spoke of abominable quality of life where one has to live under 
constant danger of arrest of execution.  Upon entering Soviet Russia in March of 
1923, the Soviet border guards searched him and took away 2000 roubles.  As they 
prepared to shoot him for being a speculator, his family pled and his life was spared.  
“Let the communists who robbed me be damned, and I am cured of my pro-bolshevik 
disease,” he said.  As for those who harbored certain sympathies for the Communist 
regime, his advice was: “Well, you go yourself and see how things are getting on 
there, and you’ll know what the communism is!”362   
Recent historical research by Russian historians lend support to the reports 
that in mid 1920’s, the Soviet economy began slowing down as the government 
intensified the efforts to dictate the direction of the national economy.  Already, 
beginning by 1925, the supposed high point of the Soviet economic liberalization, 
Gosplan (the State Planning Agency) was given orders to put together an action plan 
for the development of the national economy.  According to economic historian Y. P. 
Bokarev, this measure signaled the beginning of an epoch of large-scale economic 
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changes.  “Private enterprise was squeezed.  The number of patent distributions 
decreased.  Rentals contracts were reviewed.  The taxes on entrepreneurs 
increased.”363  The Soviet government consistently sought to aggrandize its role in 
the economy, often accomplishing this at the expense of private entrepreneurs.  The 
state enterprises were given special preferences with regard to loans and credits, 
whereas those operating on the private venue were shut off from the resources.  
Rather, the more successful were penalized by taxes that put enormous strain on their 
financial solvency and drove them to bankruptcy.   
As hostile as the conditions for private enterprise remained in the Soviet 
Union, 1920’s saw the burgeoning of foreign, especially American businesses in that 
country.  Although the United States government steadfastly refused to recognize the 
Soviet regime, by 1924, the endurance of the Soviet regime and its welcoming 
overtures toward several major foreign industries, brought about a new era in non-
governmental Soviet-American interaction.  The opening of AMTORG – a Soviet 
bureau of trade charged with soliciting American industrialists – in New York, 
coupled with the lobbying efforts by companies that sought to acquire profitable 
concessions on an uncompetitive economic venue led to the removal of certain 
restrictions on doing business with the Russians.364  Among the major benefactors of 
this shift were tycoons such as Armand Hammer and Henry Ford who enjoyed 
monopolies in pencil and auto-manufacturing respectively.  But such enterprises 
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comprised a small minority in the community of those who attempted to enter into 
business engagement with the Soviets.    
Businessmen Fred Brenner and Jess Fishlowitz of New York who came to 
Russia for trading fur left utterly disappointed, and in conversation with the American 
consul in Harbin expressed strongest approval for the American policy of non-
recognition.  Complaining of the impossible conditions placed by the concessions 
bureau, the fur traders spoke of poor quality materials which they were forced to buy 
along with actual items they wanted.  It seemed to them, in Soviet mindset “nobody 
was entitled to more than 5-7% profit share since they were capitalistic.”  According 
to Brenner and Fishlowitz, it was not just the Americans, but also the British and 
Germans who faced problems in Russia, even though the latter had recognized the 
Soviet Union.365  Another fur trader from Seattle, Samuel Wittenberg, who is 
described by his American diplomatic interlocutor as an “intelligent, fair minded and 
logical person,” reported losing $200,000 while his other partners at Hudson Bay 
Company and Olaf Swensen lost several times that amount.  As the causes of failure, 
he pointed out the taxation system and business control of the Soviet authorities and 
the incessant calls for “voluntary” contributions to Soviet causes: “Every month 
merchants are gathered to the main city hall to contribute something to city cause. 
Soviet officials give fiery speeches about a certain cause, and then they take an open 
vote by standing. Naturally, not to arouse suspicion, everyone gets up.”  One time the 
authorities requested group which included the American to contribute to the cause of 
communists jailed in America.  Wittenberg objected saying that this would constitute 
an act of treason against his own country.  His statement was met with heckling and 
                                                 




public denunciations.  Dismissing the NEP as a poorly guised hoax before his 
American interlocutor, Wittenberg asserted that the Soviet government simply tricked 
businessmen.  In the words of William Langdon who interviewed him, “Wittenberg 
described the “new economic policy” and concession to private enterprise of the 
Soviet government as merely “setting the bait better.”  Not for a moment, in his 
opinion, did the Soviet citizens benefit much from the repressive economic policies of 
the Soviet authorities.  Describing the economic state of the people as “abject 
poverty”, Wittenberg likened Soviet taxation policies to actual confiscation of 
property.  “The economic life of the townspeople is thus at a very low ebb, involving 
little more than transactions necessary to keep body and soul together,” he told the 
American envoy.366  
Although some businessmen received different treatment than the one 
accorded to the fur traders coming to Siberia, their conclusions did not diverge.  M.D. 
Currie and J.L. Curtis of the International Banking Corporation reported to have been 
“warmly greeted” in Vladivostok by Soviet officials.  However, the Soviet kindness 
did not prevent the bankers from observing the deserted state of the town which was 
“practically dead from a business standpoint.”  The American visitors noticed “a little 
German-Russian store” which contained “very small stocks and business there was 
dull.”  They seem to have been genuinely impressed by the excellent condition of the 
Egersheld port where there were several steamers including the American Shipping 
Board Vessel.  “Russians were employed as stevedores on the wharves, but Chinese 
laborers did the actual stowing of cargo in the vessels,” observed Currie. “It is 
                                                 





conceded that the Chinese were better workers than the Russians, and that Chinese 
labor was being used because foreign shippers of export cargo demanded  that the 
Chinese be employed.”  According to the American bankers, the worker strikes in 
Vladivostok were quickly suppressed by the “workers’ state”, because they were 
considered counter-revolutionary.  “They were being given the choice of working or 
being shot,” the businessman explained and then concluded:  “My informants told 
that at present it would be impossible to live or to do business at Vladivostok.”367     
To their amazement, Currie and Curtis were later presented an article in 
Krasnaya Znamya (Red Flag) entitled “Amerika and Egersheld” which provided 
additional taste of Soviet experience.  “Visitors come from abroad and carefully 
inspect every corner of our state construction in order to convince themselves that we 
are able to not only destroy, but also to build anew,” the article began.  Having almost 
completely mischaracterized the impressions of the American guests, the newspaper 
went on to attribute the following quote to Currie: “My stay in Vladivostok has 
shown me the stupendous improvement of the port and of the city.  The city has 
grown larger and more prosperous.  The port has improved and has increased its 
work. Generally, Vladivostok makes an impression of a business town.”  “Having 
personally inspected and ascertained the capacities of Vladivostok port,” the article 
concluded, “Mr. Currie said that he would now be able to frustrate the wrong 
understanding which prevails in American capitalist circles.”368  
A businessman named V.F. Taylor returned from Russia in July of 1927 – the 
supposed high point of the NEP, convinced that “it was wicked and unpatriotic for 
                                                 





Americans to extend any credit whatsoever to the Russians.”  “The Cultural Relations 
Bureau (USSR Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries or VOKS, as 
known to many by its Russian abbreviation) make all the arrangements for you to 
visit various placed, such as schools, factories, prisons, etc.  and sees the stage is 
properly set before your arrival,” he wrote.  “They show only their very best and 
expect you to believe the rest are like those you’ve seen.”  Taylor’s observation were 
not just limited to the business atmosphere alone, but profoundly engaged in various 
aspects of the Soviet regime.  Unlike many of his compatriots who were often 
ignorant of the Soviet Union’s multi-national character, Taylor saw the USSR as an 
empire. “The Bolsheviks went into the region of the Caucasus,” he wrote, “and by 
sheer force of arms captured that country and forced it to become a part of Russia and 
keep it a part of Russia by the same method.”  While he noted some improvements in 
the spheres of art, music, the fight against illiteracy, in Taylor’s judgment, “with all 
their improvements, nowhere did the welfare conditions approach those in 
Capitalistic America.”  Moreover, the American businessman did not believe that 
without the very aid of the capitalist countries such as England and France, 
Communism could survive long, especially given its vehement assaults on private 
property.369   
Even those businesses which managed to set up an enterprise within Russia 
the sentiments regarding Soviet Russia were gloomy.  Having spent a year in Russia 
as one of the representatives of the American Aluminum Company, Ivan Just plainly 
told his American interlocutor in the U.S. legation in Finland it was impossible to do 
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business with the Russians under the Soviet government.  “In their attempts to 
organize the company for active work,”, the American diplomat reported to 
Washington based on his recollections, “they found nothing but legal difficulties, red 
tape, petty annoyance of various kinds and much business irregularity.”  Ivan Just 
spoke of a particularly great source of annoyance which was the Soviet political 
representative in the Workman’s Union who created obstacles to the working 
environment by engaging in constant propaganda.  The businessman also gave an 
account the extreme measures taken by the authorities in order “to keep up the Soviet 
regime.”  Moreover, according to Just, the Soviet government was engaged in 
“heartless crusade against the intelligentsia”, and that the members of the group were 
persistently discriminated against.  It seemed to him that the Communist leaders were 
bent on  “stamping out the educated class and with it apparently all culture and 
decency.”370     
The complaints regarding harsh economic environment in Russia did not 
come just from the Americans.  In a letter addressed to the American consul in 
Harbin, George Hanson, the commissioner of Chinese maritime customs at Taheiho, 
Manchuria, R.F.C. Hedgeland, an Englishman, described the difficult business 
atmosphere in Russia.  “Blagovestchensk, just the opposite town on the border used 
to be known for its previous prosperity,” he reported to Hanson.   “The ships loading 
and unloading at its quays, warehouses  full of merchandise, busy shops, comfortable 
hotels,” were etched in his memory. But “since Bolsheviks took over, the blight has 
fallen upon the town… A walk or drive through the streets brings one right up against 
                                                 




all outward signs which visualize national poverty and individual suffering. The city 
is dead...”  According to Hedgeland, the efforts to revive trade between China and 
Russia were futile because “private enterprise in Russia has been killed and the 
middleman eliminated.”   “You very likely know that prior to 1917 some 80 million 
poods of cargo were carried by Russian vessels trading on the Amur,” he reminded 
Hanson. But “the estimates for 1923 is 17 million poods and that for 1924 10 million 
only,” which, to the Englishman, constituted “an ugly demonstration of the complete 
inefficiency of the State Socialism.”371  
An official of Dresdner Bank, Herr Morus, spoke with the American consul in 
Germany providing impressions from his visit to the Soviet Union that were 
“decidedly unfavorable from every point of view – political, social, cultural and 
economic.”  According to him, the whole political organization of the country rested 
on “the hopes and fears of several hundred thousands active member of the 
Communist Party” which made generous use of the Red Army and Cheka to retain 
power.  Under dismal economic conditions “hundreds of thousands people with no 
regular means of livelihood lead a hand-to mouth existence by peddling, begging and 
stealing.”  “Sexual immorality is the rule rather than exception,” he told Schurman. 
“Living conditions are intolerable. Families inhabit rooms rather than houses”  In his 
view, the Russian government relied on the money coming from abroad.  Yet even in 
that regard, the Soviets were failing since concessions were having “terrible 
experience” .  “Practically none of them have worked,” he stated, “or are working 
satisfactorily. Capital investment in Russia has fallen to the low point consistent with 
the fact that no new capital is being created.” Morus went as far as suggesting “an 
                                                 




economic boycott of Russia” which he thought “would bring the Soviet regime to its 
knees in six months.”372   
A few American businessmen did not share the assessment of their 
disappointed colleagues.  Upon his visit to Russia in March of 1925, the president of 
the Newburger Cotton Company in Memphis, Tennessee, Joseph Newburger wrote a 
letter to the United States President Calvin Coolidge stating that “the situation in 
Russia is misunderstood” and that “the present government is on the verge of 
change.”  By the latter, he did not mean a change of the regime, but that the Soviet 
government was inclined to adopt business-friendly posture.  “A great many things 
have been said about Russia that are not true,” stated Newburger and went on to 
compare Soviet Russia to the tsarist period (which he had never experienced).   
According to him, “the present Government inherited a great many of the old 
conditions existing before the war.”  His conclusion was that “a big business could be 
done upon  a very safe basis if recognition of some character could be inaugurated.”  
“The oil, the coal, the iron and aluminum that lies fallow in the bosom of Russia,” he 
exhorted the American President “could be developed to the benefit of the whole 
world.”373   
Ivy Lee, a publicity agent representing Bethlehem Steel Company, Penn 
Railway, Standard Oil Company, visited Russia in May of 1927, and expressed 
lukewarm attitude toward dealings with the Soviet Union.  In a letter addressed to the 
chief of the Eastern European Division at the State Department, Robert F. Kelley, 
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while agreeing that non-recognition had been the right course so far, Lee suggested 
some informal contact to be established with Moscow.  He noted with paradox that 
Russian attitudes toward the American government and businesses were markedly 
friendlier than those exhibited toward the representatives of the countries that had 
already recognized the Soviet regime, particularly Great Britain and Italy.  Like 
certain other businessmen who briefly traveled to Russia and met with various high 
Soviet officials, Lee saw a great potential in America’s interaction with Russia, if 
cultivated accordingly.  However, in a handwritten commentary, etched at the edge of 
the report on Ivy Lee’s views, Kelley chastised the American businessman for failing  
“to comprehend that it will be possible to establish a real basis for negotiations with 
the present regime in Russia only after certain fundamental changes have been 
affected in the international aims and practices of the Bolshevik regime and that until 
these changes have been consummated, a sound basis for intercourse cannot be 
arrived at by any amount of ‘admonishing, reasoning, arguing.’”  In Kelley’s view, 
such contacts would serve to validate the Bolshevik belief that their principles could 
actually constitute a viable basis for international discourse.374   
The views of William Danforth of the Ralston Purina Company about the 
Russian realities were more critical, though his conclusions resembled those of Ivy 
Lee.  In an interview to a newspaper, Danforth spoke of negative rumors that hounded 
them in Riga about the Soviet Union and its dreaded Cheka.  His apprehensions were 
partially validated by the difficulties that surrounded his travel to the USSR and the 
signs at the Petrograd railroad station upon entrance which read “Death to 
Capitalism!”  However these fears were soon alleviated by the warm reception given 
                                                 




to Danforth and his staff by Madame Olga Kameneva –  the head of the USSR 
Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries or VOKS, as known to many 
by its Russian abbreviation.  The wife of Communist leader Lev Kamenev and sister 
of Leon Trotsky, Kameneva struck her guests as “nice, pleasant and helpful.”  Yet, 
Danforth did not hold back in his criticism of living conditions in Moscow which he 
described as summation of “sickness, disease, degradation and immorality.”  In his 
view, “the peasant did not seemed to be attached to Communism, and refused to “give 
up his crops without ample compensation”  The workman, on the other hand, was 
represented by the Communist Party, “the ruler of Russia with more power and less 
opposition than any Czar ever had.” Describing heartbreaking scenes of beggary in 
the streets. Danforth noted how he “would like to have talked to some of them… 
without some Communist listening to what we said.”  Strangely, however, the 
American businessman’s conclusions ended on a positive note.  “The net result of the 
Revolution has been good!” exclaimed Danforth.    “Certainly I hold no brief for the 
Red Terror, the policy of force, insidious propaganda, state ownership and her 
avowed atheism. But the fact remains that they have broken the shackles of Czarism.” 
As if trying to reassure himself, Danforth went on: “Today ninety percent of these 
people are better off than they were ten years ago, so I repeat that so far the net result 
has been good.”  Like numerous other Soviet sympathizers who rationalized the 
discrepancy between their observations and conclusion, Danforth warned against 
judging Russia by Western standards.375   
It could well be that Danforth’s dissonant conclusion was based on his 
traveling to Russia as a part of the so-called Eddy mission.  The head of the Asian 
                                                 




Department of the YMCA, identifying himself as a Christian socialist, Sherwood 
Eddy organized a trip to the Soviet Union in Summer of 1926 which included 
prominent members of the American society.  Having returned from Soviet Russia 
full of praises three years before, the labor activist needed very little coaching from 
his Soviet hosts.  “Nowhere have 
we been accorded greater kindness, courtesy and freedom of movement, or met more 
frank, fearless and honest men than in Soviet Russia,” Eddy had written in his book 
dedicated to the progress of the worldwide labor movement, The New World of 
Labor.376   The purpose of the second mission was almost clear from the start – 
advocacy for quick recognition of the USSR by the United States.  A devout 
Christian, when his faith collided with militant atheism of the regime which claimed 
to champion the rights of the downtrodden, Sherwood Eddy was generous with his 
understanding.  In a Pravda issue obtained the U.S. legation in Riga, a report ran 
about the religious debate in Moscow with Sherwood Eddy’s participation.  In the 
debate, Eddy was countered by a Bolshevik who tried to convince his ‘misguided’ 
opponent about the dangers of religion.  The Pravda report presented Eddy as 
someone genuinely committed to his faith and someone who recognized a strong role 
in the society for religion and God.  However, because he could not harmonize his 
political convictions with Karl Marx’s essential teachings about religion which held 
that religion was opium for masses, Sherwood Eddy was described as a “bad 
Communist.”  “The commandment Love each other is the foulest of commandments,” 
retorted Eddy’s Soviet opponent, “as long as there are enemies, they ought to be 
hated.”  In conclusion, according to the newspaper, “Sherwood Eddy declared that 
                                                 




such a freedom of speech as he had been granted in our [Soviet] country, there was 
not yet in America.”377   
Long suspected of harboring pro-Soviet sentiments, the intentions of 
Sherwood’s mission were reflected in the statements of other members of the group 
such as U.S. District Attorney from St. Paul, Minnesota, Frederick Winston who 
spoke of his realization that the Soviet government was “the enduring government of 
all Russians,” and called upon the President to recognize the Soviet government.  In 
his private letter to the head of the U.S. legation in Riga, Frederick W.B. Coleman, 
Winston wrote that his mission was given the liberty to choose its own interpreters 
and there was “absolutely no restriction” on their movement.  “Life in Moscow is 
harsh and austere,” he admitted.  Based on his observations, the people on the street 
were dressed poorly and exhibited “serious and sober” disposition.  But they also 
seemed to be friendly toward the Americans.  Despite all that poverty and destitution 
around him, Winston concluded that he had “never come into contact with a 
government that was so concerned with the welfare of the masses.”  “Clearly, Russia 
is not ready for democracy,” he wrote, but “it seems to me that they are making a 
great experiment – testing out new concepts, political, economic, social and religious 
and I believe, in the long run the world would benefit from it.”378  During his stay in 
Russia, Professor Solomon Kagan went further stating that much of the American 
press was filled with fables about the USSR.  Despite disinformation, he announced 
that recently “the attitude of the American public opinion changed and that the best 
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proof of this change was the fact that out 99 Senators 20 were in favor of 
rapprochement with Soviet Russia.”379   
However, not every member of the Eddy mission proved so malleable.  In his 
conversation with Robert F. Kelley, Chester Rowell expressed sympathy with 
America’s policy of non-recognition.  Later, Kelley would report to the State 
Secretary about the conversation recalling that Rowell “referred with evident 
amusement to a prison shown to the so-called Eddy committee; he stated that 
condition were so idealistic in the prison as to make the whole thing ridiculous.”380  
Others, such as William Rosenwald, son of Sears, Roebuck & Co. Chairman Julius 
Rosenwald, were more vociferous.  In an interview to the Time magazine, Rosenwald 
told the journalists: "Sherwood Eddy's mission to Russia of which I was a member 
was full of bunk!"  “True we saw a lots of things … operating.  But it was a 
personally conducted tour under Soviet management.  It was almost impossible for 
the mission to get into the real hearts of the people,” he informed.  Rosenwald stated 
that upon the departure of the mission he stayed behind and became acquainted with 
the true modus operandi of the Soviet regime.  His conclusion was that the 
Bolsheviks operated on the basis of terrorism and that this terror was  “implanted 
deep in the people.”381   
To be sure, the Soviet propaganda machine did its part to nourish such 
mindset among Westerners, especially the far-away Americans.  Under the rubric of 
promoting good will between the two nations, the Soviet regime was particularly 
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keen on wooing individuals whom it correctly presumed to have some sway over the 
sentiments and attitudes of the American public.  In The Pilgrimage to Russia, which 
traces Moscow’s reception of foreigners for the purpose of enhancing Soviet image 
abroad, author Sylvia Margulies identifies such individuals as “opinion leaders.”  The 
Soviet Union, Margulies argues, “tried to adapt to its foreign propaganda system  the 
principles of direct personal agitation used among its own population, by inviting 
and/or encouraging both individuals and groups to become personal witnesses to a 
positive image of the country and then to return home  and act as opinion leaders… 
By playing host to many different types of people, the Soviet Union hoped to utilize 
opinion leaders throughout the structures of the Western society.”382  To carry out 
this gigantic task, the Soviet government had instituted the Society for Cultural 
Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) which organized hundreds of individual 
and group voyages to the USSR – ordinarily involving leftist intellectuals of the 
West.  Beginning from mid 1920-s the number and frequency of these trips rapidly 
increased, whereby, according to historians Liudmila Stern, the trip to the USSR 
acquired an air of sanctity.  “For the unconverted, it was a quest for truth, ‘a matter of 
intellectual integrity.”383  Historian Rachel Mazuy, in her aptly entitled book 
Believing Rather than Seeing? has recounted the stories of French writers and 
intellectuals who made pilgrimage to the socialist paradise – a pilgrimage which was 
rapidly becoming a chief requirement for one’s induction into the esoteric circle of 
the intelligentsia, not just radicals.  As such, trips by influential writers such as Henri 
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Barbusse or André Malraux carried little significance in terms of discovering the truth 
about the Soviet Union.384  In many cases, this was merely a ceremony in which the 
Soviet leadership was only too willing to oblige.  It was not necessary that the 
Westerners involved in this project at the other end of the deal be Communists.  
Surprisingly, nor did VOKS require from its own employees and tour guides 
membership in the Communist Party.  According to historian Michael David-Fox, 
“many VOKS guides were not communists: they were highly educated, frequently 
opinionated figures employed because of their strong knowledge of foreign languages 
and many of them were Jewish.385  The essential idea was to foster the reputation of 
the Soviet Union as any other “normal” country to be visited by tourists while at the 
same time retaining an image of a unique bastion of socialism building a distinct 
society.  Liudmila Stern quotes German writer Johannes Becher to sum up the 
purpose of the endeavor: “These writers have to be governed in such a way that they 
don’t feel  that there may be directives from Moscow … they have to be influenced in 
such a way that they say what we want to hear.”386
In mid 1920’s, there was a rapid increase in the number of foreign visitors 
whom came to the Soviet Union.  Having undergone a chaotic revolution, bloody 
civil war and a famine of 1921-23, Russia’s image as a pit of misery and deprivation 
was gradually being replaced by a new appearance thanks to serious efforts by Soviet 
authorities.  In 1925, only 483 foreigners were received by VOKS, but this jumped to 
1,200 in 1926; by 1929 and 1930 this number would increase to approximately 1,500 
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per year.387  Altogether, during the two decades following the end of the Civil War, 
Russian historian A.V. Golubev estimates that 100 thousand foreigners – on average 
5 thousand per year – visited the USSR, most of them carefully vetted in accordance 
with their ideological proclivities.388  In Golubev’s view, these decades in fact 
constitute the “golden age” in the Soviet efforts to woo foreigners.  “The techniques 
of hospitality,” as Golubev calls it, gained full strength in mid 1930’s” after the 
foundations of Soviet cultural diplomacy were carefully laid out throughout 1920’s.  
The term “cultural diplomacy” here entails “a massive complex of ideas, methods, 
institutions which comprised a propaganda mechanism previously unseen in 
history.”389
At the same time, Golubev is also keen to point out that attitudes and beliefs 
in the West also played a significant role in the adulation of the Soviet regime, 
especially among those disaffected by the shortcomings of American socio-economic 
system.390  Hence, it was not just the Soviet side which brought golden age into 
fruition; there were many willing individuals on this side of the Atlantic who had 
begun sowing seeds of doubt about their countrymen’s views of the Bolshevik 
regime.  A librarian from California, Harriett Eddy was actively involved in 
organizing trips to the Soviet Union under the aegis of the American Society for 
Cultural Relations beginning from mid-1920’s.  The Society, founded in 1926, 
brought together an array of American intellectual and prominent public figures who 
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claimed to be interested in the Soviet Union and nurturing cultural interaction 
between the two countries.  In reality, many individuals associated with the 
organization at least implicitly sympathized with the Soviet experiment as an 
optimum alternative to American capitalism.  As such, they extensively collaborated 
with Kameneva’s VOKS in its propaganda work designed to create false impressions 
of Soviet realities among foreign travelers.  As was the case with Sherwood Eddy’s  
mission, the trips organized by the group, too, eventually fell into disfavor in the 
United States when it was revealed that the members of the delegation were required 
to submit to a collective report on their impression of the Soviet Union which was 
ubiquitously positive.  At one point, the president of the Northwestern University 
“canceled his place in the delegation before the departure charging that he was 
expected to write a report favorable to the Soviets upon his return.”391  Several others 
followed the suit.   
Often these staged trips to the Soviet Union were accompanied by the 
explanation that most tourists’ “aim was primarily enjoy themselves and satisfy their 
curiosity.”392  If so, however, they seem to have accomplished more than just 
satisfying the curiosity that pertains to visiting a foreign country.  When the American 
Labor Delegation passed through Poland on the way back from Russia, the U.S. 
consul in Poland reported an incident where only James Maurer and Albert Coyle of 
the American Trade Union Delegation were authorized to speak as leaders of the 
expedition to the journalists.  According the despatch prepared by the consul in 
Warsaw, “the party was favorably impressed by what it saw in Russia.”  On the 
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streets, visitors reported, there was ‘pep and joy.’  The improvement there was 
drastic, and the masses were given opportunity for pleasure and relaxation.  All 
workers enjoyed free theater tickets daily, the use of libraries and museums and 
numerous other opportunities for relaxation which were not found in other countries.  
Maurer praised everything the group saw in Soviet Russia from hospitals to basic 
living conditions.  The most astounding was the labor delegation leader’s account of a 
Soviet prison. “The prisons are not as good as they might wish,” he stated.  “The 
reason for this is that the Soviet do not believe in prisons and will not waste money 
on them now because the need for prisons is bound to pass, therefore the expense for 
improvement would be a loss.”  Equally amazing was the fact that the American 
academicians, professing to be the conscience of truth and liberty before the almighty 
powers of the state, quickly succumbed to the mere “rules of the trip” according to 
which only the leaders of the delegation had the authority to describe their experience 
in Soviet Russia.  John Brophy excused himself for not speaking to the Associated 
Press “freely because of loyalty to the expedition.”  So did Professors Chase, Douglas 
and Fitzpatrick.  Instead, their leaders glowingly spoke of the reception given to the 
group by Chicherin and Stalin.393  
While such visits usually accomplished their intended purpose by winning 
over “opinion leaders,” there were also cases when staged did not entirely go 
according to the plan.  In an interview with the American consul in Finland, Francis 
Dwyer of San Francisco reported about his trip as a member of 35 member delegation 
organized by Jerome Davis of Columbia University, also an associate of the 
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American Society for Cultural Relations during July-August of 1927.  Unlike most 
members of the groups, Dwyer was filled with skepticism, especially when during 
their trip to a prison in Moscow, “a prisoner came up and handed a member of the 
group a bouquet of flowers from the prison garden and requested that it be given to 
Sacco and Vanzetti and that a telegram he sent demanding their release.”  Soon 
afterwards Kameneva assured him that in the near future such jails would be phased 
out.  Dwyer, however, told his American interlocutor that “he believed this incident 
was prompted by an official command.”  He also narrated with utter disbelief the 
story of their trip to a rest home in Leningrad where “a very respectable meal was 
served, and an official apologized for poor fare, saying he had not received notice of 
the group’s intended visit until it was too late to prepare anything more than the menu 
the inmates customarily received.”  Given the harsh living conditions in the rest of the 
country, the Soviet display of luxury struck Dwyer as disingenuous.  “Life in Russia 
is devoid of any pleasure,” he concluded in his interview.  “The common necessities 
such as coffee and butter can only be obtained at prohibitive prices or by fraud.”394   
Accounts such as those given by Francis Dwyer are scarce in the record of 
diplomatic despatches.  Among those who spoke candidly or at all to the American 
diplomatic representatives interested in information from the Soviet Union, there 
were very few Americans who traveled to the Soviet Union as a part of the group 
organized by American Society for Cultural Relations or VOKS.  As such, the 
diplomatic despatches do not reflect the widespread phenomenon of the “fellow 
travelers” – a term initially coined by Leon Trotsky in reference to the Westerners 
who were not wholly committed to Communism but, though hesitantly, were willing 
                                                 




to tag along this great experiment, and ultimately, played a significant role in 
reshaping the American views of the Soviet Union.395  Generally, individuals 
who praised the Soviet Union fell into three main categories: a) 
those with vested interests to portray everything through rose-
colored glasses, i.e. communist sympathizers, leftist intellectuals, 
and businessmen; b) uninformed and misguided individuals who were 
led by VOKS -- the kind of people who believed Mrs. Kameneva when 
she explained that dilapidated conditions in prison were due to the 
fact that prisons were soon to be phased out of practice; a) a few 
such as economist John Maynard Keynes who had some positive things 
to say about the Soviet Union but they were almost always projected 
to the future instead of present realities.  Such people rarely spoke a 
low-level American diplomatic officer charged with the task of interviewing visitors 
from Russia.  They spoke to the press, lectured on public venues, and wrote lofty 
memoirs about their experiences in the USSR.  
“The cream of the interwar cultural and intellectual elite, as well as thousands 
more rank and file experts, progressives, public figures  and many others classified by 
their Soviet hosts as members of the intelligentsia, made a reverential pilgrimage to 
Soviet Russia,” wrote David-Fox, and came back with the reports that were full of 
praise and adulation for the Communist experiment.396  Among the foremost 
representatives of this movement were Bernard Shaw, Andre Gidé, and Americans 
John Dewey, Upton Sinclair and Theodore Dreiser.  “A Bolshevik as far as I can tell 
is nothing but a socialist who wants to do something about it,” asserted Bernard Shaw 
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in 1919, long before he even stepped foot on the Soviet soil, “To the best of my 
knowledge I am a Bolshevik myself.”397  Having attended the November festivities 
dedicated to the tenth year anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1927, 
American writer Dreiser came out of Russia with lots of positive sentiments toward 
the deeds of Stalin’s Kremlin.  “As for the Communist system – as I saw it in Russia 
in 1927 and’28 – I am for it – hide and proof… I saw its factories, its mines, its 
stores, its Kommissars, with at least ten of whom I discussed the entire problem.”398  
According to David-Fox, while Dreiser “pulled his punches and muted his criticism” 
of the Soviets, he was also “severely conflicted and in transition in regard to his 
views.”399  At times he confronted and argued with his Soviet hosts on various 
aspects of his observation, at points even defending capitalism.  Indeed having come 
closest to see his communitarian ideals fulfilled, in fact, Theodore Dreiser was one of 
the more modest among those who worshipped at the altar of Soviet Communism.  “I 
have been over into the future, and it works,” declared Lincoln Steffens, a well-
known American journalist from San Francisco.400  “The spectacle of Russia has 
deeply moved me,” echoed writer Waldo Frank, “Every modern man must be moved 
by Russia as a man would be if he were faced with his own future.”401  
The fellow travelers’ rosy accounts of the Soviet conditions infuriated the 
official observers of the Soviet Union in the American legation in Riga.  In contrast to 
those who had been dined and wined by the Soviet authorities, the Riga staff was in 
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constant correspondence with American businessmen and others who often left Soviet 
Russia with horror stories.  “There is no mystery whatever about the Soviet Union,” 
wrote Ambassador Frederick Coleman in regard to the debates over the “truth” about 
the Soviet Union of 1920s,  “and when communists state that representatives of 
foreign powers are misinformed, they speak from interested motives.”  “They demand 
exclusive currency for Soviet government communiqués and the roseate statements 
foisted upon carefully selected visitors who are feted, coached, personally conducted 
to show places and loaded down with selected publications… It is the purpose of this 
theatrical art to create an illusion, and the illusion may be so complete that common 
sense is forgotten… It’s not that any foreign government is sufficiently informed 
about the Soviet Union; the Soviet government itself is insufficiently informed.”402  
Likewise, denouncing a recent report as “irrelevant” prepared by the British Labor 
Delegation to Soviet Russia and authored by A.A. Purcell of the Furnishing Trade 
Union, an editorial article in the British Times criticized the “wholly sympathetic”  
account of the six-week trip of the so-called “Investigation Commission” to 
Leningrad, Moscow, Baku, Tiflis, Kharkov and Rostov.  Having found little 
objectionable about the state of Soviet affairs, yet without much evidence to support 
their optimism, the authors of the report had found the Soviet Union to be “a strong 
and stable state”   The Times editorial blasted the Soviet sympathizers for their 
unwillingness to come to grips with the facts on the ground: “They constantly qualify 
predictions of a joyful future by putting them in the conditional,” the editorial referred 
to the British labor delegates. “They do not foretell that the result will in question will 
follow, but confine themselves to the speculation that it “should” follow. The caution  
                                                 




is almost the only sign in the report that the delegates or their ‘advisory’ colleagues 
have the slightest apprehension of the difference between assertion and proof.”403   
Some Americans’ positive impression of the USSR was not just the product of 
the Soviet propaganda machine.  The idea of building a new society made such an 
appeal to many Westerners, especially the more idealistic intellectuals, that in the 
Soviet Union they strongly desired to see the image of an alternative development 
with greater social justice and none of the problems that plagued capitalist universe.  
“Why were intelligent individuals seized by the religious fervor of neophytes, 
refusing to tolerate any evidence which suggested that their picture of the Soviet 
Union might not be accurate,” asks Liudmila Stern.  “How could they have blindly 
supported what is known to be a lie , a myth?”404  For some idealists, almost none of 
the Soviet shortcomings could dissuade them from hoping for the Soviet success.  For 
them, the Soviet Union represented an ideological asylum into which one could 
escape from all the injustices, imaginary or real, of the Western world.  According to 
Neal Wood, who detailed the ideological motivations between British intellectuals 
and communism, “for many intellectuals Soviet Russia was the one hope of the 
future.”405  It would be naïve to presume that Western intellectuals knew little or 
nothing about the realities of the USSR. That Russia was a catastrophe-stricken land 
under early Bolshevik rule had been no secret to anyone remotely familiar with the 
stories coming out of revolutionary Russia.  Rather, they were willing to sacrifice for 
what they regarded as the grand experiment in the cause of social justice.  As Wood 
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states, “in the perspective of history the significance of the vast economic programme 
of Soviet communism would take precedence over the somewhat questionable actions 
of the OGPU and the bureaucracy.”406  While most ordinary citizens of the Soviet 
Union incurred this sacrifice through death by exhaustion in labor camps, for the 
intellectuals, the sacrifices entailed compromising one’s basic instincts about right 
and wrong at an individual level.  The latter often identified the existing socio-
economic disparities in the West as a potent justification for this act.  As historian 
Paul Hollander observed about one of the root causes behind such phenomena in his 
ground-breaking volume about the Western intellectuals who were drawn to 
totalitarian regimes of the 20-th century, “the grass seems greener on the other side, in 
societies which legitimate themselves by high ideals and appeal to (and promise) 
community, brotherhood, wholeness, social justice, equality and selflessness; they 
offer some shared form of self-transcendence.”407    
The backwardness of the Soviet landscape, if not its crushing repressiveness, 
was obvious to anyone from the moment he crossed the border.  But that did not 
necessarily translate into denunciation of he Soviet regime; on the contrary, in a 
strange way, it helped to reinforce some visitors’ sympathetic beliefs about the Soviet 
Union.  In his letter to Dewitt C. Poole, now working as an American consul in 
Germany, billionaire heir John Rothschild  wrote about the severe contrast between 
Russia and the West.  He believed that materially Russian living standards fell below 
those of any Western European country, let alone America.  People, he wrote, were 
dressed poorly, and one could not see ““single decent shop-window” in the whole city 
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of Moscow.  Yet in a strange way, Russia made him “think of America.”  “I felt the 
spirit of democracy.  However, absolute the government may be, it seems that Russia 
now belongs to the man in the street.”408      
The contrast between the content of John Rothschild’s observations about life 
in the Soviet Union and his conclusions were not untypical.  In fact, there were 
several reports from Russia in which the author, while deriding the horrendous 
relaities on the ground, reached at a distinctly positive opinion about the overall 
direction of the Soviet course.  Nor did this stance necessarily relate to the observers’ 
pro-Communist inclinations.  On the contrary, in many cases, the observers 
rationalized hardships in the Soviet Union by the shortcomings of the Russian 
character.  They simply refused to judge Russia by what they called, their own high 
Western standards.  It can be stated that this sort of implicit ethnocentrism was 
present in many accounts that stressed positive developments in the USSR, Soviet 
sympathizers and neutral individuals alike.  The correspondent for Frankfurter 
Zeitung, Edgar Mesching, attending the commemorative celebrations of the Petrograd 
Academy of Sciences, wrote that the present system of Soviet governance actually 
worked to the advantage of the Russian peasant: “The Russian is naturally lazy. 
Before the war, peasants were somewhat pampered in the way of loans and advances 
of money; whereas the Bolsheviks have done nothing for them.  As a result, they’ve 
been compelled to work harder.”409  So, according to Mesching, while the living 
standards were extremely low and there was notable “level of discontent” against the 
Soviet government, the regime was in no way threatened.  “The droshky, or horse cab 
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is most popular conveyance in Russia,” casually penned William Danforth about his 
impressions in the streets of Moscow, “and the horse is usually much smarter looking 
than the driver.”  The peasants, he noted, did not seem attached to Communism, and 
displayed a “thick mind” when it came to giving up “his crops without ample 
compensation.”410  
Occasionally, a visitor, while eager to burnish an image of irrational Russian, 
demonstrated remarkable lack of insight of his own.  In a conversation with James 
Wilkinson, the American consul in Finland, a former American diplomat Henry 
Dickinson Lindsley, while opposing the recognition of Russia, repeated the official 
Soviet line that the situation in the country had drastically improved since the October 
Revolution.  “But he recognized that not having been in Russia before the 
Revolution,” wrote Wilkinson to his superiors, “he had no real basis for comparison.”  
“The Russians are free,” Lindsley told his interlocutor. “They have liberties which it 
is hard for a person accustomed to European and American restrictions to 
understand.”  As an example he cited his own experience on the street when a 
drunkard Gypsy, approached by the police, yelled back at the officers about Russia 
being a free country, after which the police left without doing anything.  As far as 
Lindsley saw things, in Russia, there were only two unpardonable sins: spying and 
counter-revolution.  “Punishment for such crimes were quicker and harsher than in 
the West,” he noted.411  
James Wilkinson’s other interviewee, William A.H. Gantt, an American 
doctor studying the works of renowned biologist Ivan V. Pavlov, offered a more 
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unique explanation of the Russian flaws.  “The great writers,” he told Wilkinson, 
“have attempted to account for the Russian temperament by studying the Russian 
mind and have thought they succeeded.  But they have failed.  Russian temperament 
is explained by the Russian stomach where not enough food is put to keep the 
Russian mind and the Russian body going… The listlessness, the fatalism, the lack of 
backbone of the Russian are attributable to the fact that for generation after 
generation he has starved his body.  He eats black bread and drinks weak tea, and 
then sits around and wonders why he does not feel like doing anything.”  Having 
spent three years in Russia, Doctor Gantt reached his conclusion based on medical 
examinations of many Russians.  Undressed Russian person’s physical state, he 
described, resembled that of “starved animal”:  “His body is sickly looking.  There is 
no pink about his skin which is loose and moldy.  His movements are slow and his 
feeble reflexes accurately indicate the character of that of which they are rebounds.”  
Such individuals, Gantt said, were physically incapable of staging rebellion against 
repressive government.  In contrast, according to the American doctor, the soldiers of 
the Red Army were well-fed and displayed physically distinct healthy characteristics.  
“These troops look like men,” he told Wilkinson.412   
Among Westerners who gave the Soviet experiment the benefit of the doubt 
there were some truly brilliant figures.  The American diplomats sent clippings from 
the issue of Manchester Guardian newspaper in which Arthur Ransome, narrated 
economist Maynard Keynes’ thoughts about Soviet Russia after the latter visited the 
native country of his wife in 1925.  In Mr. Keynes Looks at Russia, Keynes was said 
to abhor many Soviet political practices with all its intolerance and rigidness.  Keynes 
                                                 




did not bow to the imposition of Marxist ideals on economy either: “How can I accept 
a doctrine which sets up as its Bible, above and beyond criticism, an obsolete 
economic textbook  which I now to be not only scientifically erroneous but without 
interests or application for the modern world,” Keynes was quoted saying.  
Nevertheless Keynes was willing to cut sufficient slack for the Soviet authorities 
who, in his judgment, had “set up a system very low by our living standards, but 
evolved out of starvation and death, and much comfortable compared to that of the 
past.”  While pointing out the two moods that enveloped foreign visitor to Russia – 
oppression and elation – Keynes chose to emphasize the promise of the latter, born 
out of the fervent desire to build a new kind of society. He felt that his “eyes were 
turned towards, and no longer away from the possibilities of things: that out of the 
cruelty and stupidity of Old Russia nothing could ever emerge, but that beneath the 
cruelty and stupidity of New Russia some speck of the Ideal may lie hid.”413     
While sympathetic attitude toward the Soviet Union was mostly characteristic 
of the short-term visitors – mostly intellectuals and well-known figures who had been 
invited to the Soviet Union for propaganda purposes -- there were others, particularly 
among foreign correspondents working in Soviet Union, who sometimes came to at 
least ponder about the feasibility of the Soviet alternative.  Among the most 
prominent of these journalists were Walter Duranty of the New York Times and Paul 
Scheffer of Berliner Tageblatt who regularly updated American diplomatic 
representatives about the developments in the Soviet Union.  Their reports drew 
significant attention not only because they lived in the USSR for a prolonged period 
of time and had access to high Soviet officials, but their reach to wider masses 
                                                 




through weekly reports from otherwise isolated Soviet Russia gave them great 
influence in shaping the public opinion.  In later years, after Paul Scheffer was 
expelled from the Soviet Union for his insubordination, no other newspaper 
correspondent played such a decisive role in influencing politics than Walter Duranty 
whose ties with Joseph Stalin’s government and reporting from the Soviet Union 
remain a source of contentious debate.  “Duranty was regarded as  the dean of the 
Moscow press corps,” wrote James Crowl in Angels in Stalin’s Paradise, “because of 
his years of service, and for many Americans he was the most authoritative observer 
in Moscow.”  While George Bernard Shaw called him the king of reporters, his 
colleague Jimmy Abbe declared flatly: “his writings under a Moscow dateline have 
done more than anything else to influence American opinion in  favor of the Soviet 
Union.”414   
In a letter written in 1927 to the American Ambassador in Germany, Jacob 
Gould Schurman, Duranty described himself as an Englishman with political views of 
“left-labor.”415  This admission, emanating from someone who at one point referred 
to Bolshevism as “a compound of force, terror and espionage, utterly ruthless in 
conception and execution” should have sounded strange.416  Prior to his arrival to the 
Soviet Union, Duranty was known as perhaps the most vociferous opponent of the 
Soviet regime in the press corps.  His reporting from the Soviet–Polish War helped to 
produce an image of the Soviets as a monstrous power bent on extinguishing the light 
of liberty all around.  But much had changed since a young upstart who once worked 
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at the Paris bureau of the New York Times set his foot on the Soviet soil in 1921.  
“Luck broke my way,” is how Duranty described the most important phase of his 
career when the famine of 1921-23 provided an opportunity for him to visit the Soviet 
Union as a part of foreign journalist delegation.  Soon, having earned the confidence 
of the Soviet officials who handled the foreign reporters, the Englishman convinced 
his superiors in New York to stay in Moscow and became a regular reporter on the 
Soviet Union.   
A careful and reflective observer, Duranty’s reporting during the NEP era is 
not even disputed by his critics.  “During this period, Duranty’s lucid and simplified 
explanation of economic problems was exemplary, and some of his best work in the 
Soviet Union was economic reporting,” writes S.J. Taylor in a book criticizing 
Pulitzer-Prize winning journalist’s misconduct during the famine of the latter 
period.417  Not in vain described as one of the most brilliant journalists of his era, 
from early on, Walter Duranty adopted a rule for himself: “to believe nothing that I 
hear, little of what I read, and not all of what I see.” Duranty, unlike others who 
believed that the NEP spelled the end of Communism, likened the Soviet policy of 
limited liberalization to “the old Roman Saturnalia, when for three days each year 
slaves and underlings might usurp with impunity the pleasures and privileges of their 
masters.”418  By the mid-1920’s, “Duranty believed that Socialism was here to stay” 
and that “ultimately Stalin would lead the way.”419  In his conversation with 
American Ambassador in Germany Jacob Schurman in September of 1926, Duranty 
reported about the prices remaining very high and the fact that Russia was isolated 
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and unable to produce anything.420  “All this tends to produce a vicious cycle,” he 
told Schurman, “Without large grain exports, goods cannot be reduced in price; 
without reduction in the prices of goods, large exports of grain are impossible.”  The 
only solution, Duranty believed, lay in obtaining credit from the United States.  He 
then revealed that in a private conversation with him the Soviet foreign minister 
Maxim Litvinov had made it clear that “Russia was ready to meet all conditions laid 
down by the U.S. if she could do so without ‘losing face’.  Aside from his 
surprisingly warm ties with the high Soviet officials, Duranty’s prolonged stay in 
Moscow, seem to have instilled in him a degree of antipathy toward the opponents of 
the Soviet regime.  In a later letter to Schurman, Duranty openly mocked the Russian 
émigré dissidents as the kind “arguing over beer bottles in the backroom of a Swiss 
pub.”  “But when you’re supposed to be running one-sixth of the total surface of the 
globe,” he added, “it’s only common sense to stay on the job a bit more closely.”421  
Adhering to journalistic standards, Walter Duranty, of course, was too careful in his 
remarks to even sound sympathetic toward any side, especially the Soviet one.  But as 
the time went on, there was a deafening lack of criticism directed toward Stalin’s 
visibly calamitous rule.  
His critics have frequently pointed out Duranty’s not so hidden contempt for 
the average Russians as a decisive factor in his disregard for their agony.  According 
to James Crowl, one of Walter Duranty’s early impressions of the Russian people was 
shaped by an execution scene in which he observed three Russians quietly puff on 
cigarettes and then lower their heads to take bullet from the pistol of an executioner 
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whom together they could have easily overpowered and escaped.  In Crowl’s view, 
this incident marked “an impression of fatalism and indifference to death which 
remained with him and helps to explain how in later years he could view with such 
callousness the fate of suffering Russians.422   In his reporting, Duranty was also said 
to have been heavily influenced by a German journalist Paul Scheffer.  In a 
conversation with Schurman, Henry Wales of Chicago Tribune, complained about the 
negative aspects of this influence and remarked that both reporters “looked at 
development too minutely and overanalitically, losing sight of broad political and 
economic trends.”423  But reporters such as Duranty and Scheffer attributed their 
statements precisely to these complex trends which, in their minds, required a long-
term thinking.  “In Russia,” declared Paul Scheffer, “government is being conducted 
on an idea and for the sake of an idea. Russia is the one country in the world in the 
eyes of whose rulers to-day is nothing, tomorrow everything. This is the source of the 
weakness and the strength which distinguishes this State from all other States.”424  As 
a reporter for a major German newspaper, Scheffer’s depictions and ideas regarding 
the Soviet state were no small matter.  And when Paul Scheffers of the world 
hesitated issuing a definitive statement about the developments in the Soviet Union 
and wondered aloud about the feasibility of the Soviet experiment, it is 
understandable why others might have felt driven toward conclusions that did not jibe 
with the observations on the ground.     
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It is also important to note that the foreign correspondents’ ability to report 
truthful information was sharply restricted by the Soviet regime which used the 
issuance of visas as a leverage against journalists whose livelihoods and careers 
depended on their assignment in Russia.  “For the Western reporters,” Taylor writes, 
“there was ominous threat of losing their visas, which were granted to foreigners for a 
maximum period of six months at a time…  In most cases, loss of the visa meant loss 
of the job.”425  Most journalists quickly learned to play by the rules.  Others, 
however, eventually ran out of patience and the will to cooperate, and were quickly 
expelled from the Soviet Union.  This is exactly what happened to Duranty’s comrade 
Paul Scheffer in 1929 when he was refused a re-entry visa and ended up being 
reassigned to Washington. 
Beginning from 1921, Paul Scheffer later wrote in his memoir, the Press 
Department of the Foreign Commissariat charged with censorship over correspondent 
despatches stepped up its activities.  Under the directorship of Theodore Rothstein, 
the Press Department would use various methods to hamper the foreign 
correspondents’ ability to report about the realities in the Soviet Union.  “A favorite 
one was to shake the reporter’s confidence in the accuracy of his information. 
Another was to delay official approval of a despatch till the reporter, pressed for time, 
would finally accept the wording proposed to him… Sometimes, to be sure, the red 
ink would be bluntly drawn through an unpleasant fact.”426  However, the most 
draconian yet effective option by which the Soviet leadership interfered with the 
foreign correspondents’ freedom was by isolating them from the society at large.  
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According to Scheffer, after the diplomatic incident with England, “the GPU made 
thousands of arrests all over the Soviet Union, and the arrests especially affected 
people who had contacts, direct or indirect, with the English mission,” after which 
most Russians became convinced “that any contact whatsoever with foreigners was 
dangerous.”  “In this direct isolation of foreign correspondents,” Scheffer wrote in 
1932, “and in fact, of all foreigners, in Moscow is now complete.”427   Under such 
circumstances, it is difficult to gauge the psychological impact of isolation on one’s 
views about Soviet realities and subsequently.  After all, how could a reporter find out 
the truth without ever engaging in discourse with the people about whose country he 
was reporting? 
The foreign correspondents were not the only ones affected by the ban on 
interaction between the Soviet citizenry and foreigners.  The foreign diplomats 
became equally isolated in that regard.  Swedish diplomat Lund once complained to 
his American interlocutor that Soviet security services had infiltrated many foreign 
missions including his own.  According to him, the Soviet citizens who called at such 
missions were immediately arrested.428  In December of 1927, the Latvian Consul-
General in Leningrad reported about ordinary Russians being banned from visiting 
foreign missions.  According to the Consul, from the moment Soviet citizens entered 
into any sort of contact with a member of a foreign legation, they became subject to 
persecution.  “As a result,” the Latvian diplomat reported, “the Missions have been 
obliged completely to abandon invitations to Russians to their entertainments.”429  
While the Soviet government still encouraged foreign visitors to travel to Russia, it 
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moved to severely curtail genuine interaction between Western and Soviet citizens.  
With the borders long closed since the October Revolution, most Soviet citizens’ 
experience of abroad came from the few foreigners who were present in their country.  
In the eyes of the Soviet authorities, such interactions posed double danger.  For one, 
Bolshevik authorities always viewed information control as an essential tool in their 
fight to retain power, and as such, for instance, one of the first acts of the Bolshevik 
government had been the liquidation of all non-Bolshevik press.  Yet equally 
important was to prevent circumstances which could negatively contribute to the 
Soviet image abroad.  The American legation in Riga frequently relied on the reports 
supplied by the Latvian and other Western embassies in Moscow. By banning 
interaction between foreign nationals and its citizens, the Soviet authorities 
accomplished a great deal in preventing the Western nations from acquiring  objective 
information about the Soviet realities.   
The most effective weapon by which the Soviet accomplished this deed, as 
usual, was the omnipotent security agency – with a slightly modified title in 1923, 
OGPU.  Its innocuous abbreviations which stood for the “Unified State Political 
Directorate” belied the true nature of an institution that struck terror into the hearts of 
millions across the Soviet Union.  Having inherited the cruel practices of its 
predecessor, the agency was still commonly referred as Cheka.  The significance of 
the role played by this institution which secured the Bolshevik victory against 
overwhelming odds and helped to preserve a regime bent on starving its citizens is 
difficult to overestimate.  Cheka’s dreadful presence did not escape the sight of even 




of Chicago Tribune, was so impressed by the power of this organization that he 
devoted an entire article explaining how “the terror has been branded on the souls of 
the Russian people.”  While Cheka had ceased in mass murdering the opponents of 
the Soviet regime, it maintained its reign of terror, wrote Seldes:  “Freedom does not 
exist in Russia on the account of Chekah [sic].   There is no democracy… Freedom, 
liberty, justice as we know it, democracy all the fundamental human rights for which 
the world has been fighting since time began, have been abolished in Russia in order 
that the communist experiment might be made.  They have been kept abolished by 
Chekah.”  According to Seldes, the Soviet authorities frequently invoked the articles 
57 and 62 of the criminal code, which stood for counter-revolution, to get rid of the 
perceived dissenters.  But it was not just the punitive aspects alone that drew Seldes’ 
attention, but the incredible power of control which the Cheka possessed over the 
Soviet society.  “The Cheka rule is absolute,” he wrote. “No one is beyond suspicion 
with the possible exception of Lenin himself, and it is frequently boasted in Moscow 
that if Lenin asked the arrest of Trotsky it would follow without hesitation.”  
According to Seldes, Cheka controlled villages, elections, factories, political 
opposition, and watched over the Red Army.  Among the subjects to draw intense 
scrutiny were the foreign travelers who documents and correspondence was 
consistently monitored.  At the time Seldes wrote about Cheka, he estimated the 
victims of the Soviet security agency to stand between 50,000 to 500,000 “with 
decided favor to the latter figure.”  By 1924, he wrote, wanton executions, mass 
murders, wholesale searches were perhaps a thing of the past in Cheka history, being 




fashion.  “But the most important thing about Cheka today,” American journalist 
maintained, “is that by its never ceasing persecution it has smothered all liberty of 
expression, it has cowed the souls of the people, it has continued a reign of terror, 
which makes Bolshevism supreme and will not let any change or democratic 
movement come in to Soviet Russia.”430   
A significant number of despatches sent to Washington featured some sort of 
reference to the OGPU as a force behind the enforcement of draconian and perhaps 
even quixotic policies of the Soviet state.  While describing the construction of new 
building and the disappearance of hunger with the coming of NEP, Arthur Ruhl, the 
correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune, was clear about the absolute 
dictatorship exercised by the Communist Party and the terrible persecution against 
free speech and members of the bourgeoisie.  “People are being exiled to Siberia and 
removed out of their homes,” he told the members of the Russian Section in Riga.431  
Captain E.E. Yarrow and Reverend Emmet Woollen who had recently came to 
Istanbul from Caucasus, spoke to the American diplomats there of the frequent 
tribunals and extensive authority of the Cheka.    Even though the charges of counter-
revolution were punishable by death, according to Yarrow and Woollen, “extreme 
measures were rare”, and they only remembered two fellows in Armenia executed for 
“interfering severely with the Soviet commercial organization.”  However, in the 
despatch relaying the content of the conversation, the U.S. attaché Bristol noted that 
these Americans retained ties to that part of the world, and “neither therefore is 
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unlikely to say anything which would embarrass the business or the friends he has left 
in Russia.”432    
Otherwise, most individuals with no dependence on the good graces of the 
Soviet authorities, such as the conservative delegates of the British parliament visiting 
Soviet Russia, after spending few days there, concluded that the country was “an 
autocracy, pure and simple.”  Having observed the situation on the ground, the 
delegates stated that they had every reason to believe wholesale arrests, 
imprisonments, deportations, even shootings for purely political offenses without any 
attempt at trial were still going on.  They characterized “the atmosphere as so 
engendered to make life intolerable for those who have to live elsewhere.”433  These 
accounts were handily corroborated by those who personally experienced the 
repression by the OGPU.  “Imprisonment is resorted to upon slightest provocation,” 
wrote fur tradesman Samuel Wittenberg.  While getting their documents checked on a 
ship bound for Vladivostok, Wittenberg described how one young Russian grumbled 
aloud about unending meanness of the authorities,   “He was overheard, knocked 
down by the police and carried off to prison, the authorities not even troubling to take 
his effects from the ship into their custody – pending his release,” he wrote.434  Some 
stories touching on constant police presence in USSR were on a less somber, perhaps 
even humorous note.  Melbourne Herald Evening correspondent, C.G. Dixon was 
traveling on a train to Moscow from Siberia, when he noticed “a big man in uniform 
striding up and down the corridor.”  “Sudenly he turned sideways, flung open the 
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door and sprang in,” described Dixon: “What he expected to find I do not know, but 
whatever it was, he was disappointed.”435  
As repressive as the Soviet security apparatus remained, it exhibited relative 
laxity in its conduct during the period between 1924 and 1927.  The most plausible 
explanation for this was the power struggle which ensued Lenin’s death in January of 
1924.  As various Bolshevik leaders grouped and regrouped against one another in an 
attempt to take the stewardship of the Communist Party, the uncertain political 
control over the OGPU interfered with the latter’s functions as the foremost punitive 
agency of a police state.  Writing about the unusual revival political courage among 
ordinary citizens at the height of the NEP, Aleksandr Petrishchev commented in 
émigré newspaper Russki Golos:   
“GPU is in a strange status. They are supposed to arrest anyone talking 
bad about government official.  But since Lenin’s death, government 
officials are cirticizing each other.... Today a spy has to obey Zinoviev, 
but maybe tomorrow he will have to obey Trotsky.  If he satisfies one of 
them, the other might break his neck.... Everybody realizes that in spite of 
the fact that Lubianka is Lubianka, but still, its hands are not so long as to 
reach everything.”436  
 
The power struggle between Joseph Stalin and Leon Trotsky was the subject of great 
many despatches prepared by the Russian Section of the U.S. legation in Riga.  
Unlike other representations, the Riga bureau’s explicitly stated function was to 
monitor the political and economic developments inside the USSR.  As such, the 
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American delegates regularly received and forwarded translated reports from the 
Soviet Press which they felt reflected the direction of the political winds.  Editorials 
in Pravda and Izvestia were the best indicators.  For instance, the November 19, 
1924, Pravda ran a feilleuton  mocking Trotsky’s newly published book, The Lessons 
of October.  Having chosen to forward this article to his superiors in Washington, 
Charge d’Affaires in Riga John Wiley considered it to be an important sign of 
Trotsky’s weakened position in the ruling apparatus.437  In the following years, the 
despatches were replete with various accounts of the conflict between Trotsky and the 
Georgian secretary-general of the Party.  They addressed Trotsky’s fall from grace, 
his expulsion from the Politburo and finally, his unsuccessul alliance with Zinoviev 
and Kamenev in an effort to wrest power from Stalin.  As such, these despatches 
comprise the most intitial documents that pertained to the foundation of an inquiry 
named “Kremlinology” – the study of the inner-party struggle among Communist 
leaders. 
Those who carefully followed the debates ascribed various interpretations to 
the power struggle in Moscow.438  Some saw the conflict as ideologically driven, 
especially due to Trotsky’s unabashedly leftist policies regarding the economic 
reforms.  Others viewed it as a settling of scores between power-hungry individuals 
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who had inherited the vast country with the promise of a gigantic experiment yet 
owed little accountability to the peoples that inhabited the land.  Whatever the 
variables involved, by the end of 1927, it had become clear that Stalin had emerged 
victorious over his rivals in the the so-called Left Opposition.  Stalin’s success drove 
many outside observers to presume that the Soviet leader would now be free to pursue 
the liberalization of attitude toward the kulaks and continue the course of the NEP.  
After all, Trotsky and his cohort were heavily responsible for much of the hardships, 
violence, and famines that had characterized the initial years of the Soviet 
experiment.  The idea of doing more of the same, which Trtosky, against all reason, 
fervently advocated, appealed to very few.  But it could not be overlooked that the 
NEP had always been a bastard child of the Soviet experiement, and grudgingly 
tolerated until an opprtune time arrived for its abandonment.  If the Revolution -- 
carried out upon the ideal of establishing the dictatorship of he proletariat --  was to 
ever succeed, the NEP had to go.  In that sense, the ideological commitment of the 
Soviet leaders to building Communism  --  however they interpreted the idea --- could 
not be underestimated.  “Despite the fact that he smashed the “Opposition for 
personal as well as “ideological” reasons,” William Duranty wrote in a letter to Jacob 
Schurman, “Stalin stands pretty strongly for pure Communism”  More importantly, 
Duranty further elaborated, Stalin was “very well organized and of course quite 
ruthless.”439   
In a conversation with the American Consul Leland Harrison in Stockholm, 
the returning Swedish Minister in the USSR conveyed that he was “greatly 
disappointed in the hope which he had so confidently held that Stalin would go to the 
                                                 




right after the elimination of Trotsky and his followers.  Perhaps the wish had 
influenced his judgment. [But] his guess had been far off the mark. It had been 
another instance of the unexpected happening in Russia.”  With the full-scale assault 
on the NEP now gathering steam,  the deteriorating conditions in Soviet Union 
heralded the beginning of yet another unpredictable era.  “The pressure upon private 
traders and capitalists is steadily becoming stronger,” told an “intelligent lady of 
German descent” to her American interlocutors in Riga: “Butter and eggs are hardly 
to be had. Shortage of bread-stuff universally expected.... There is grave fear of the 
return to food cards and other features of military communism.”  According to her 
with the adoption of a “new economic policy” (as opposed to the New Economic 
Policy), the harvest of agricultural crops would yield disappointing results.  “All 
private traders felt themselves to be menaced daily by the penalties imposed on 
violations of decrees and orders restricting and regulating economic operations, in 
fact admit daily infractions of such decrees and regulations” reported the two 
businessmen just arriving from Soviet Russia to Latvia. “Great apathy and depression 
prevail… Nobody expects anything good.  Economic difficulties are becoming 
constantly more acute and practically everybody is absorbed  by the petty cares of 
daily life and the maximal frictions of social contacts.”440  “It was also true,” the 
returning Swedish diplomat from Russia had told the American minister in 
Stockholm Leland Harrison that Russians seemed to possess surprising powers of 
endurance and of recuperation: “They appeared to be able to exist on little or nothing. 
But Soviet economic policy was so fundamentally fallacious and was proving so 
disastrous, the policy of squeezing out the private traders and the kulaks, spreading 
                                                 




antagonism and discontent among the peasants, their uneconomic methods of 
production and the losses of their industries with the inevitable breakdown in their 
finances and their currency could only lead to a final failure.”441  Exactly what 
amount of hardship and suffering this “final failure” would entail, few could imagine. 
                                                 




Chapter 5: Revolution Resumed 
In the Fifteenth Party Congress held in December of 1927, the emerging leader of the 
Communist establishment, Joseph Stalin, outlined a five-year plan for the Soviet 
economy.  The primary goal of this plan, the Soviet leader announced, would be “the 
transformation of small and scattered peasant plots into large consolidated farms 
based on the joint cultivation of land using new superior techniques.”442  At the time, 
very few could have foretold the enormous consequences of this seemingly mundane 
objective.  Five years later, with millions of peasants dead from starvation and 
repression at the hands of the state apparatus, the Soviet countryside lay completely 
transformed.  Nearly one thousand years-old institution of peasantry in the territories 
controlled by the Soviet government succumbed to a campaign of violence and 
destruction unparalleled in history.  Historian Adam Ulam described it the best when 
he wrote: “Within a few years they [the peasants] were forced to change their entire 
manner of life, forsake their immemorial customs and rights. It was not a civil war. It 
was, as a Soviet poet justly called it, a war against the nation waged by Stalin at the 
head of the Communist Party of the USSR, and from this war he emerged 
victorious.”443  While various historians emphasize various motives behind the efforts 
to subordinate peasants by the Soviet government, there is a consensus that these 
measures resulted in great losses in human lives.  The diplomatic despatches dating to 
this period also reflect a wealth of information about the extreme hardships caused by 
Stalin’s collectivization.  However, there is a strong sense of continuity in the actions 
                                                 
442 Adam B. Ulam, Stalin: The Man and His Era (New York: The Viking Press, 1973), 291. 




of the Soviet government, which in the eyes of the Western observers, never truly 
warmed up to the notion of private property.  Most observers convey how the 
conditions became significantly worse during these years; but there is hardly a 
genuine surprise at the actions of the Soviet authorities.  Based on these despatches, it 
is rather difficult to sense a marked departure in the governance style of the Soviets, 
heading into collectivization. 
One could not accurately assess the dynamics of information-gathering by 
American diplomats without acknowledging the role of the men at the U.S. State 
Department who had great influence over the Republican administration’s attitude 
toward the Soviets.  Later known as “Mr. Eastern Europe” within the State 
Department, Robert F. Kelley was one such man.  In 1924, during the Congressional 
hearings on the question of Soviet recognition, then a junior officer, Kelley 
successfully stood his ground against the powerful proponents of the recognition, 
namely, Senator William Borah.  When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
chairman pounced on Kelley questioning the State Department’s opposition to 
recognition, Kelley carefully laid out the facts, at one point explaining to the Senator 
the difference between severance of diplomatic ties and withdrawal of recognition 
within the frames of the international law. According to Loy Henderson, “the 
evidence submitted and interpreted by Kelley before the Senate was so overwhelming 
that not only Senator Borah but many of the Americans sympathetic to the Soviet 
experiment and who had been criticizing our policies toward Soviet Russia found it 




government and the Communist International.”444  Impressed by his erudition and 
commitment to work, in 1926, Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg insisted that 
Kelley be promoted to the division chiefship.445  Kelley would continue to serve in 
that post for the next eleven years.  
As a chief of the division, Kelley was intent on reforming the information-
gathering operations about Soviet Russia so that it “should be based upon facts and 
study, not emotions.”446  His essential focus was on economic indicators which 
Kelley felt would be most reflective of the performance of the Soviet regime.  For this 
purpose, Robert F. Kelley organized a professional Russian language program where 
the discerning observers of the future began to undergo training.  Among these young 
apprentices were the renowned American diplomats and Russian-area experts such as 
George F. Kennan and Charles E. Bohlen, to whom at the time Kelley referred as ‘my 
boys’.   “One of the difficulties in the Foreign Service in those days was,” Bohlen 
would later explain, “that an officer would spend two, or three, or even four years in 
one country and then be transferred to another without really having much 
opportunity to acquire a serious knowledge of certain countries’ customs, institutions 
and history.”  Recalling his decision to choose precisely the Soviet Union as his field 
of expertise, Bohlen conveyed that he saw “the growing importance of the Soviet 
Union and realized that the United States would need experts to deal with the 
Communist state.”447  One with a more immediate connection to the information-
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gathering operations in Riga was George F. Kennan.  Long before he came to rise to 
the post of a U.S. ambassador in the Soviet Union and a premier architect of 
American foreign policy course toward that country, Kennan worked as a junior 
diplomat preparing “basis of reference material and statistical data which would serve  
to counterbalance with reasonable adequacy the efforts of the Soviet authorities to 
distort or suppress even the most elementary data on the progress of the Soviet 
economy.”448   
Despite his consistently negative attitude toward the Soviet regime and its 
philosophy, Robert F. Kelley’s vision for the American observation post in Riga was 
to turn it into a reliable center of information. The Russian Section in Riga, as Kelley 
saw it, never did or was meant to engage in anti-Soviet propaganda.  “The Russian 
Section of the American legation in Riga,” Kennan wrote, “was a small research unit 
where, since there was no American representation in Russia itself, we received the 
major Soviet periodical  and other publications, studied them, and reported as best we 
could to the United States government.”449  Dismissing the Soviet efforts to portray 
the Section as a “sinister espionage center,”  Kennan explained that, “the United 
States government had not yet advanced to that level of sophistication. We had no 
secret agents, and wanted none. Experience had convinced us that far more could be 
learned by careful scholarly analyses of information legitimately available concerning 
any nation that by the fanciest arrangements of clandestine intelligence.”450  
Kennan’s statement may explain why the bulk of the reports prepared by the Russian 
Section involved summaries and analyses of various reports, articles and editorials 
                                                 
448 George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 48-49.  
449 Ibid., 47. 




taken from the Soviet press. However, human contact and the efforts to obtain 
information from eyewitnesses were of equal importance. 
Among those who helped to shape America’s early perceptions of the Soviet 
Union was, of course, Loy W. Henderson.  Born to the family of a Methodist minister 
in northwestern part of Arkansas in 1892, Henderson’s path to the career in foreign 
service began accidentally owing to the United States’ entrance into the First World 
War.  Eager to serve his country, Henderson abandoned plans to attend law school in 
favor of representing the American interests in volatile Europe, particularly the 
German-Russian frontier.  Thus unlike Kennan or Bohlen, Henderson’s experience 
with the Bolsheviks nearly dated to the times of the October Revolution.  While 
Henderson did not assume his duties at the U.S. legation in Riga until September of 
1927, Henderson had been an eyewitness to the deadly turbulence that shook Russia 
and its immediate neighbors in the aftermath of the Great War in the capacity of an 
American Red Cross worker.  As a close affiliate of Evan Young and Robert Kelley 
at the State Department, Henderson also believed that “the rulers in Moscow, 
although perhaps differing at times regarding the methods to be employed, were 
united in their determination to continue to promote chaos and revolution in the non-
communist world.”451  Similar to his colleagues, Henderson’s conclusions were based 
on a long record of facts regarding the actions and policies of the Soviet government.  
Having spent considerable amount of time in the State Department archives 
familiarizing himself with the Russian history and Soviet government, he arrived in 
Riga with significant background knowledge on Soviet affairs.  Although, financially, 
the U.S. legations abroad fared better than most other foreign representations, 
                                                 




Henderson was keen on improving the quality of work at this important outpost.  He 
“emphasized, in particular, the need of the Russian section for competent, well-
educated translators and also for personnel capable of editing translation and 
checking for accuracy.”452  As he immersed himself in the functions of the Russian 
Section, Henderson found a satisfying challenge in trying “to expose for the benefit of 
the State Department the exaggerated nature of Soviet claims of 
accomplishments.”453  
The period from mid-1920s onward was marked by increasing isolation of the 
Soviet society and restrictions on the foreign observers’ ability to obtain information 
not only about but also within the USSR.  While several American companies still 
remained inside the Soviet Union, and hundreds of American engineers and industrial 
experts continued to make contributions to the gigantic industrializing drive, the 
Soviet secret police systematically prevented attempts of interaction between the 
Westerners and the indigenous people.  One of the more important sources of 
information about the Soviet internal affairs were the embassies of the friendly 
European countries in the USSR, whose representatives regularly briefed American 
diplomats in their respective national capitals.  But given the lack of interaction with 
Soviet citizenry, even their sources were severely limited.  Speaking to the American 
envoy John B. Stetson, Jr. in Warsaw, the Polish Foreign Minister Count Edward 
Raszynsky emphasized the difficulties faced by  “an outsider to form individual 
contacts with Russians [in order] to gain knowledge.”  “Restrictions are such that 
foreign diplomats can contact no one except the Soviet officials,” the minister told his 
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American interlocutor, “native people are afraid to come anywhere near a 
foreigner.”454  Separately, the head of the Latvian legation in Moscow, P.Z. Olins 
reported that their main sources of information about Soviet realities consisted of 
“Lettish colonists, foreign newspaper correspondents, diplomats from other foreign 
countries and the Soviet press.”  Of these, the most trustworthy was the information 
supplied by the Latvian natives who, in desperate attempts to escape the Soviet 
Union, came into contact with the embassy staff.  As for the latter categories, 
according to the Latvian diplomat, “foreign journalists in Soviet Russia , including 
American journalists, were not able, even through diplomatic or secret channels, to 
furnish their newspapers with plain, unvarnished accounts of conditions in the Soviet 
Union, since the publication of the real facts by any paper no matter from what source 
it purported to come, would make its Moscow correspondent persona non grata to the 
Soviets.”  Because “foreign newspaper correspondents in Russia received large 
salaries and enjoyed a social position which they do not have elsewhere  since in view 
of the limited society in Moscow they were treated virtually as members of the 
diplomatic corps” – a position which very few among them dared to jeopardize.  
Writing to his superiors at the State Department, the American diplomat corroborated 
Olins’ views by referring to two unnamed American journalists who, while passing 
through Riga some time ago, “admitted that they did not feel free to depict the worst 
phases of Soviet life.”  As for the Soviet press which both the Americans and Latvian 
diplomats in Moscow continued to monitor, the latter deemed it “of very little value” 
                                                 





in that the Soviet statistics were “extremely unreliable and were only written to prove 
a thesis.”455   
Writing for Vosische Zeitung, Wilm Stein aptly observed that “Soviet Russia 
was a country in which everything is kept secret – and where nothing could be kept 
secret.”456  In that regard, the information from Soviet publications helped distill at 
the very least the government attitude and intentions.  Yet once in a while there 
actually was information which could be useful for a discerning individual.  As 
falsified as the numbers usually were, one could detect worrisome trends within the 
economy even from the Soviet publications.  According to the report published Soviet 
magazine Ekonomicheskaia Zhizn’ (Economic Life), obtained by American diplomats 
in Riga, grain procurements for the year 1928-29 amounted to 9,549,000 tons as 
compared to 10,115,000 for the year 1927-28.457  To a degree, one could identify a 
certain pattern to the information supplied by the Soviet authorities that would lead 
one to the explanation of the Soviet economic realities.  Citing the Commissar of 
Foreign and Domestic Trade Sh. M. Dvolaitsky, Ekonomicheskaia Zhizn’ noted a 
“drastic decline of private trade and that the number of private trade enterprises which 
have ceased operation” standing at 102,000 throughout the entire Union.  The 
commissar reported that in Moscow the number of private enterprises declined in the 
period June of 1926 to November of 1927, from 11,000 to 6,600 or by 40.5 percent.  
Dvolaitsky informed that the liquidation of the 4,500 private shops was only partially 
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compensated by 343 new cooperative shops opened during that period.”458  This 
much the Soviet government disclosed about the measures taken against private 
enterprise in the towns and villages.  The rest – the saga of tragic proportions – was 
told by hundreds of foreign and indigenous persons who had the chance to record 
their stories in the diplomatic despatches. 
Successive blows delivered by the Soviet authorities against private trade 
predictably resulted in the decrease of economic output at all levels.  According to 
Russian historian Elena Osokina, by the second half of 1920s, forced industrialization 
had already caused economic imbalance insofar as the prices for industrial 
commodities superceded those for the agricultural goods.  In Osokina’s view, “the 
price imbalance was one of the primary reasons behind the peasants’ refusal to give 
bread to the state.”459  Already before the end of 1928, Russian émigré newspapers in 
nearby countries were filled with reports about unrest in Siberia and other parts of 
Russia due to “unwise economic policy of Soviets which had caused suffering among 
peasants.”460  In his conversation with American diplomats in Riga, the Estonian 
representative conveyed that previously “peasants used to farm up to 200 hectares, 
but Soviet taxation system was such that now they farmed only 5-6 hectares.”  
According to him, the Soviet authorities were ignorant about the situation of the 
peasants and did not seem “to have formulated a clear policy.”461  In a conversation 
with the American minister in Warsaw, the Polish consul in Tiflis S. Mostovsky 
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confirmed the account given by his Estonian counterpart.  Citing the extremely poor 
crop situation, the Polish diplomat characterized the grain crisis of 1928 as a 
manifestation of the conflict between the Soviet authorities and the peasantry.  “The 
peasants are reducing sowing and produce only as much as they need for themselves, 
but refuse to produce anything for the market,” he informed.462  Faced with the Soviet 
government’s increased “control and repression,” the peasants’ resentment toward the 
Communist regime had grown beyond.   
Soviet authorities were deeply alarmed by the crop failure of 1928.  Rather 
than moving to address the grievances of the peasantry which objected to high 
taxation and draconian regulations, however, the dictatorship of the proletariat 
interpreted the peasant unwillingness to abide as a direct challenge to its 
revolutionary authority and a structural problem in need of a permanent resolution.  
The Communist establishment, then headed by Joseph Stalin, followed a traditional 
Soviet pattern of response to what appeared to be an organized form of dissent.  
According to Osokina, the Soviet leadership “not only modified the plans for the 
Five-Year Plan, but adopted it in its optimal version”463 -- which essentially meant 
that the Kremlin was willing to fight its way through the solution, even if it meant 
confronting the significant portion of the population.  The consequences of this 
response were not simply wholesale arrests and executions of the undesirable 
elements, but a reformulation of the policy whereby individual farming and rural 
market economy would be altogether liquidated.  In that sense the drive to 
collectivize the Soviet village was not just a response to the recalcitrant peasant, but a 
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calculated step in the overall tendency to do away with every manifestation of 
economic power outside state control.  The peasant response to the Soviet regulations 
may or may not have accelerated this trend.  The fact is, under a regime supposedly 
constituted by the proletarians for the proletarians, the so-called peasant question 
always persisted.  As far as his surroundings were concerned, Stalin’s decision to at 
last solve this question was not a radical departure from the course of a revolutionary 
government which had openly avowed to abolish private property and build 
communism.  
Initial indications of the worsening situation came from Western journalists 
based in Soviet Russia.  Having learned to carefully maneuver through words when it 
came to depicting Soviet realities, even the habitually “easygoing” correspondents 
sounded the alarm.  In a memo of the conversation with Paul Scheffer prepared by 
J.C. White of the American embassy in Germany, it was made clear that the Soviet 
Union was facing a serious economic crisis.  Scheffer informed that the peasants were 
being taxed beyond endurance, impoverished and pushed into collective farms.  
“Evinced with utmost pessimism”  which the recent show trials impressed on him, 
Scheffer displayed “profound emotion at the Soviet brutality.”  “Only with the help of 
America could Russia survive the inevitable crisis,” Scheffer told Ambassador White.  
The German reporter yet added that he hoped the American help would not be 
forthcoming.464  A week later, in a conversation with the American Consul in Berlin 
D.C. Poole, Scheffer reiterated his strong opposition to the American recognition of 
                                                 





the Soviet Union and expressed hope that the diplomat would take note of his 
suggestions.465   
Edward L. Deuss, the Moscow correspondent for the International and 
Universal News Service of America furnished similar information to his interlocutors 
in Riga on the way back to the United States.  He stated that the living conditions 
were becoming more and more difficult every day and one could hardly obtain food 
in the Soviet Union any longer.  “One has to stand in queues for everything if they 
have it;” Deuss enumerated “bread, eggs, butter, milk.”  He also noted that the 
foreigners refused to allow their children to intermingle with the Russian children due 
to the extreme unsanitary conditions in which the latter lived.  On the question of 
interaction with America, Deuss explained, the Soviets did not really want to trade 
but establish a self-sustaining industry.  He pointed out the single auto producing 
factory AMO which needed American technological and corporate expertise, but 
added that “not much will come from the Soviet concession policy.”  On the contrary, 
Deuss believed that the American recognition would undermine the existing trade 
since “the Soviets would then cease to court the United States, except to get credits, 
and then there would be falling of American trade just as it occurred when other 
countries recognized the Soviets.”   
Edward Deuss shared his journalistic experience in the USSR along with five 
other regular Western reporters: Walter Duranty of The New York Times, William 
Reswick  of Associated Press, Eugene Lyons of the United Press, W. Henry 
Chamberlain of Christian Science Monitor and Negley Fanson of Chicago Daily 
News.  According to Deuss, by then, the Soviet had kicked out journalists named 
                                                 




Donald Day and Novinsky on the account of “sensational stories.”  “They [Soviet 
authorities] have no problem,” Deuss conveyed, “as long as they [Western 
correspondents] don’t write “sensational stories.”  Describing the strict censorship in 
the Soviet lands, Deuss informed that all foreign correspondents’ cables were being 
censored and had to be approved by the Press Division of the Commissariat of 
Foreign affairs and then sent to OGPU for final approval.  In numerous occasions, the 
Soviet authorities forced the Western correspondents to make alterations to the text of 
their report.  The information supplied by Deuss, in his American interview’s 
judgment formed a “striking contrast with the opinion recently expressed to the 
Legation by Walter Duranty.  It was quite clear that Mr. Duranty had lost the proper 
perspective in viewing events in Soviet Russia .”466   
In many ways, Duranty’s indiscretions were becoming more difficult to 
conceal especially since much of the information coming out of Soviet Russia did not 
appear to fit into the apologetic mold created by the Englishman in Moscow.  In his 
statements given to the American diplomats outside the USSR, Walter Duranty did 
not share his colleagues’ pessimism about the situation.  While he conceded that 
Stalin was a “prisoner of his own principles, narrow minded and lacking in mental 
elasticity,” Duranty blamed the campaign against the peasantry on the grain failures  
which “made it necessary for him [Stalin] to rely on fanatics.”467  Earlier in 1929, 
Duranty stated that the Soviet government had ceased exporting grain and had taken a 
more liberal attitude toward private dealers – an assertion which he withdrew several 
months later in his conversation with Schurman in Berlin.  “His optimism with regard 
                                                 
466 Coleman to Kellogg, January 10, 1929, RG 59 File #861.00/11326. 




to things Russian have become somewhat tempered as a result of contact with the 
outside world,” wrote Schurman.  During yet another trip through Germany, “in a 
private conversation with a member of the staff he spoke on the food situation in 
Soviet Russia with pessimism.”  According to Duranty, practically all food-stuffs 
were now being rationed.  In his judgment, the hardship was not as much due to 
shortage as to the Soviet efforts to keep down speculation.  “A good crop,” he told his 
interlocutors “would help”, before adding that Russia possibly faced “the worst 
winter since 1922.”468   
Some of the journalists, who, unlike Duranty, did not depend on the good 
graces of the Communists, were more forthright.  As a reporter for the British Daily 
Telegraph and renowned military correspondent during the World War I, sent to the 
Soviet Union on a temporary assignment, Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett ran a series of 
articles in January of 1929 one of which was plainly titled - Doctrinaire Refusal to 
Yield to Economic Forces!  The reporter was struck by the climate of repression and 
fear that pervaded the Soviet society.  Describing the harsh conditions of the peasants 
and the persecution of the private traders in the hands of an oppressive elite, 
Ashmead-Bartlett concluded that  the Spartan life, imposed by the Soviet regime on 
its citizenry was bad for governance.  “These fanatical theories are preventing the 
expansion and revival of Russia’s trade at the present time,” he wrote.  The journalist 
was also struck by the extreme suppression of political dissent inside the USSR and 
the omnipresence of the OGPU which, according to him, “had a power of life and 
death over citizens.”  “Whenever you are introduced to a new acquaintance,” 
Ashmead-Bartlett wrote, “someone is sure to whisper in your ear: ‘Be careful, he is 
                                                 




well-known to be an agent of the OGPU.’”469  It is no coincidence that most outside 
observers often compared the tumultuous years of Stalin’s collectivization to the 
period of War Communism during which the Bolshevik party under Lenin wantonly 
requisitioned grain, confiscated individual properties and stifled all manifestations of 
market.  Having left Russia after 18 years of residence, the Belgian businessman 
named Charles Lambert told John Stetson in Warsaw:  
“General conditions have become much worse during the last year. The 
conditions are very similar to that of military communism of the years 
1919-1922. There is an acute shortage of food and fuel.  Prices are 
extremely high in the market.” 
   
While Lambert described the situation as essentially a conflict between the peasantry 
and the Soviet regime, he characterized the urban attitudes toward the government 
also as negative.  “The village hates the city, identifying it with the Government, but 
the city itself is dissatisfied with the Soviet regime and criticizes it far more openly 
than ever before,” stated Lambert.470  In Helsingfors, Consul James R. Wilkinson 
reported the same alarming news about Soviet Russia.  Dr. W.A. Horsley Gantt, 
returning from Russia, told him about “acute famine in many parts of the country.”  
According to the doctor, “such common articles as fruit, coffee, tea, eggs, cured ham, 
butter, table delicacies etc. if at all available, were entirely beyond the reach on the 
account of their dearness of the ordinary person.”  Foreigners and locals alike, Gantt 
said, were forced to follow complicated procedures and secret ways to obtain basic 
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commodities.  “The quality of the bread is very bad.  It is dark, moist and not of a 
good taste,” he wrote. “White bread is no longer seen anywhere.”471     
From former capital of Russia itself, the Polish consul J. Webb Benton wrote: 
“On the whole, general conditions in Leningrad are beginning to resemble very much 
those of 1922-23.”472  Speaking to Frederick Coleman in Riga, the chief of the 
Eastern Division of Foreign Ministry of Latvia, too, reported acute shortages 
throughout the Soviet Union of all prime necessities, especially of foodstuffs and 
articles of clothing.  In order to protect workers and partymen, Mr. Students 
informed, “private commerce in towns had been almost completely annihilated and 
the retail trade had become concentrated in cooperative shops.” which were often 
empty due to shortages and breakdown in the system.   According to him, all 
commodities, were being rationed.  “As a general rule, the disenfranchised population 
in the cities has to depend for it supplies chiefly on the underground trade which 
continues to exist in spite of all persecution,” he said, “The prices charged there 
exceed many times the fixed prices in cooperatives.473   
Its inability to secure sufficient food supplies on the one hand and its determination to 
control essentially all means of production on the other led the Soviet government to 
resort to rationing.  While food rationing is a practice which has also been utilized in 
capitalist powers such as the United States or Great Britain in wartime, the Soviets, 
under exceptionally peaceful conditions, took the practice to a whole different level.  
According to Elena Osokina, the first acts of bread rationing began in the cities of 
Ukraine – the breadbasket of the Soviet Union.  “By the beginning of 1929 the 
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rationing system was introduced to all cities of the USSR. Moscow’s turn came last, 
in March of 1929.”474  At first, the rationing applied to the main staple of the Soviet 
diet – bread – which remained the only major source of calories sufficient enough to 
sustain humans.  Soon thereafter the rationing spread to other products including 
sugar, meat, butter and tea.  It is difficult to believe that by introducing rationing the 
Soviet government genuinely sought to alleviate the suffering its policies had brought 
upon the people.  At the time when stores lacked fish in Murmansk, a port city lying 
next to a vast ocean, Soviet minister Anastas Mikoyan boasted about the export 
shipment of fish to Hamburg.475  Worse, this was a government that continued to sell 
grain abroad at the time millions of its citizens starved.476  It is more likely that by 
rationing products, the Kremlin sought to achieve three main objectives: channel 
scarce food to high-priority citizens whom it considered essential to its 
industrialization drive – mostly workers in vital industrial complexes, penalize or 
liquidate recalcitrant portions of the society, and at the same time put up an 
appearance of a government that was troubled by the effect of severe shortages on the 
people.  
 According to both eyewitnesses on the ground and recent evidence from the 
Soviet archives, aside from hypocrisy and falsehoods, the most common method by 
which the Soviet retained control was terror.  Russian historian N.A. Ivnitski dates the 
intensification of punitive measures to January of 1930, when “dekulakization and 
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repressions became the primary means of collectivization and turned into main 
methods by which the authorities increased the tempo of the campaign.”477  The 
archival documents, utilized by Ivnitski, reveal direct orders from the Kremlin 
identifying the scope and nature the mission of the thousands of OGPU troops 
dispatched to agricultural regions.  For instance, an order # 776 issued by the OGPU 
chief Henrich Yagoda to the local chiefs of the OGPU and the Red Army, requested 
that they provide the exact numbers for personnel and weaponry needed for the 
operations.478  The targets of the mission were outlined in two categories: the first 
category of the enemies included “counter-revolutionary agents” to be liquidated; the 
second category consisted of  kulaks and their families who were to be exiled to 
northern, unpopulated regions of the USSR, with confiscation of their properties.479  
According to the official numbers of the OGPU, between January 1 and April 15, 
1930, alone, the total number of the arrested individuals constituted 140, 724.480  
More often, these arrests were carried out in accordance with the arbitrary quotas set 
by the government.  For instance in Central Asia, the quota was set at 1300 kulaks, 
whereas in South Caucasus, that number was 1200.481  By Stalin’s order on February 
7, the OGPU was instructed to send operational reports (svodki – a Russian term for 
reports from the front) on its campaign in the villages.482  Indeed, a war it was. 
 Initially, Stalin’s collectivization drive produced mass exodus of people from 
the Soviet Union.  Those with the slightest opportunities to escape, did so.  Most 
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people in this category had some sort of ethnic or family ties to the outside world.  In 
an emotional letter uncharacteristic of a diplomat, senior American envoy in Riga 
Frederick Coleman thus described the conditions of the German colonists, arriving 
from Soviet Russia after a long fight to escape:  
“When the members of the first convoy arrived in Riga hardened railway 
men, policemen, and reporters mingled their tears with those of the 
emigrants…The sudden appearance of these people on the threshold of 
Western Europe, after a sojourn of more than a hundred years in the 
comparatively little known regions of the land of the Muscovites, has 
brought the people with whom they have come into contact to the 
realization that a tragedy is taking place in the Russian villages on a scale 
unprecedented in history…It is beginning to be understood that behind the 
screen of smug speeches delivered by Soviet leaders, there is a story of 
persecution and suffering which recalls some of the darkest pages of 
medieval history.”483  
The American diplomats in Finland were reporting similar stories of migration by the 
Swedish colonists from Soviet Russia.484   
Among the refugees, there were also those who escaped their historical 
homelands which now belonged under the Soviet jurisdiction.  From Tehran, the U.S. 
Vice Consul Henry S. Villard reported about the mass migration of Azeri Turks in the 
Caucasus into the Azerbaijan province of Iran south of the Araxes river owing to 
scarcity of food.  “Most of the refugees are attempting to cross the Araxes river into 
the Persian provinces of Azerbaijan, and in the last few weeks 1500 such persons are 
said to have gained Persian territory near the border town Hassan kala,” he wrote.  
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“Soviet patrols, however, are endeavoring to prevent such escape and it is a common 
rumor that all fleeing refugees are shot on sight.”  According to Villard, the refugees 
formed a chain trying to cross the river in order not to drown.  In the meanwhile, 
according to him, Soviet authorities had sent 400,000 troops to the border region in 
order to quell the acute unrest there.485   
As far the Soviet government was concerned, the peasantry deserved its fate, 
for it had committed an unpardonable sin of blackmailing the authorities by 
withholding grain.  The response from Stalin to Ukrainian poet M.A. Sholokhov who 
beseeched the Soviet leader to alleviate the suffering of starving peasants, is telling in 
this regard:  “You see only one side of the story.  The other side is that the peasant 
sabotage almost left the workers and the Red Army with no bread.  The fact that 
sabotage was quiet and seemingly harmless does not change the fact that those grain-
producers had been waging  a “quiet war” against the Soviet government.”486  The 
authorities identified the kulak -- term for a wealthy peasant -- as the implacable 
enemy of the collectivization, hence chief target of the OGPU’s wrath.   While the 
punitive security forces constituted the primary tool of dealing with the peasantry, the 
Soviets also applied the principle of “divide and rule” to the countryside.  According 
to Ronald Hingley, who studied the history of Russian secret police, by dividing 
peasants into arbitrary categories in supposed correspondence to their wealth, the 
authorities sought to turn citizens against one another thus easing the burden of the 
OGPU.  As such, the term kulak was employed to create an illusion of opposing 
classes within the peasants.  The tactic of collectivization was, accordingly, to incite 
                                                 
485 Henry S. Villard, U.S. Vice-Consul in Tehran, Iran, to Stimson, April 25, 1930, RG 59, File 
#861.00/11430. 




the poor and middle peasants against the kulaks.”487 But who was a kulak?  
According to the Soviet government, kulak was a malicious class, an obsolete social 
strata which resisted the change for progress in order to maintain its superior socio-
economic status in the society.  As professor Malbone W. Graham told the American 
diplomats in France about his understanding of the term, “anyone employing the 
labor of another was a kulak; anyone who possessed more than 2 horses or 2 cows 
was a kulak; anyone maintaining any appreciable domestic industry was a kulak.”488  
In reality, however, as Hingley later explains, the definition of kulak varied 
depending on the government’s perception of him.  “Any peasant, whatever his 
economic situation, could conveniently be labeled as a kulak if he was unwise enough 
to express opposition to authority. Thus the liquidation of the kulaks as a class, as 
decreed by Stalin on December 27, 1929, became a formula for persecuting the 
peasantry at large.”489  Concurring with Hingley, historian Robert Conquest wrote in 
his seminal work on collectivization, Harvest of Sorrow, that “the use of the term 
kulak had been a distortion of the truth right from the beginning of the regime” 
insofar as “many kulaks even on the definitions of the late 20’s had already been 
ruined” and “others were hardly rich or exploitative.”490  Conquest found the 
description of a Communist activist, sent to crush those resisting the confiscation of 
their land, to be the more realistic definition of the kulak:   
“He has a sick wife, five children, not a crumb of bread in the house.  And 
that’s what we call a kulak!  The kids are in rags and tatters.  They all look 
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like ghosts.  I saw the pot in the oven – a few potatoes in water.  That was 
their supper tonight.”491  
 
The Soviet policies in the villages naturally produced strong resentment among 
peasants toward the authorities.  Beginning from late 1929, this deep level of rancor 
frequently led to peasant uprisings throughout the regions.  Polish consul in 
Leningrad reported about an unrest in the city and the riots in Novgorod and Pskov 
regions which were put down by the armed forces.  Rumors swirled that General 
Mikhail Tukhachevsky, conqueror of Denikin, had objected to the use the regular Red 
Army formations against the populace – a move that had made him a target of 
charges of Bonapartism and disloyalty.492  While the government retained and 
enhanced its capacity to inflict severe pain on the opponents of its policies, in the 
words of one observer, “the effect of terror was very different from what it was 
formerly, as the population had become accustomed to the GPU methods, which 
therefore, no longer produced the same moral effect.”493  In the regions most affected 
by collectivization the resistance was substantial and violent.  Austrian newspaper 
Neues Wienner Tageblatt reported peasants uprisings throughout Russia, 
Transcaucasus, Ukraine and Siberia.  According to the report, peasants were stealing 
and buying weapons from soldiers.  In the regions of Moscow, Saratov, Orlov, Riazan 
and Ukraine, a number of Soviet officials had been killed in retaliation to the peasant 
persecution.494  In Paul Scheffer’s view, the resentment was so deep among 
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Ukrainians against Soviet authorities that had Poland invaded USSR, “the Ukrainian 
peasants would help them defeat the Red Army.”495 (Scheffer’s prophecy was partly 
fulfilled when ten year later, Ukrainian peasants greeted the invading German troops 
with traditional ingredients of hospitality -- bread and salt).   
The Polish consul in Minsk reported a litany of disturbances in Belarus.  In 
Vitebsk, a band had been formed by M. Puchalsky who operated in districts of 
Kbylinca and Kruin and they “persecuted local communists and members of the 
Young Communist League.”  When the OGPU tried to arrest eight members of the 
group, the population interfered and created difficulties for the secret police in 
carrying out the arrests.  In the regions of Minsk, Wieliczka, Loshia and Orzscathe 
the locals murdered collective farm chairmen, secretaries of the rural kolkhozes, and 
Soviet press agents.  In the Belorussian capital Minsk, during a quarrel between a 
Communist official and workmen, the crowd joined the latter and attacked the police 
detachment endeavoring to establish order.496   
In the provinces where there was not ethnic attachment to the Russians, the 
resistance was stronger and nationalistic in character.  “Moslem inhabitants of the 
Caucasus region appear to be among leaders of the new uprisings owing principally 
to scarcity of food and alleged religious persecution. The unrest is also said to be 
especially marked among members of the so-called wealthier peasant class, who are 
reported to be destroying their produce and livestock rather than subject them to 
communal distribution,” consul Villard reported based on rumors he heard in 
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Tabriz.497  The rebellions in the Caucasus were also reflected in the notes by other 
diplomats in the southern region.  According to the Polish consul in Tiflis, groups of 
insurgents throughout the North and South Caucasus fought back against Soviet 
armed detachments.  In previous two months alone, the consul reported, 30 drivers 
from Tiflis had been killed in the fighting while transporting the Soviet troops.  “The 
insurgents operate chiefly in Northern Caucasus, in the localities of Chechen and 
Dagestan, in Azerbaijan, in the districts of Zagatala, Ganja and Guba and in Southern 
Armenia,” the consul wrote.  He added with interest that “in Armenia, the Turks, 
Kurds and Armenians are fighting under the banner of insurgents  and under the 
command of former officers of the Tsarist Army, Russians and Armenians.”498  
Despatches from the American mission in Romania also reported of a “serious 
uprising” in the Caucasus.  According to the note, the peasants insurgents had taken 
the control of the Baku-Batum railway and the oil pipeline.  There were rumors of 
Poland sending material aid to the anti-Soviet insurgents in the South.  However, 
without an uprising in Ukraine, the diplomat noted, “the Caucasus revolt would not 
amount to anything.”499  Historian Ivnitski also confirms that in southern areas of the 
USSR, especially in North Caucasus and Azerbaijan, the OGPU and Red Army 
formations sustained hundreds of casualties in the battles against insurgents.500   
Due to heavy control over information and the isolation of the regions of 
conflict, people in the cities had little knowledge of the clashes in the countryside.  
This lack of information also pertained to foreigners who resided in the major urban 
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centers of the country. John Snate of Helsingfors, a substitute musician in Moscow, 
conveyed that he, had heard rumors about uprisings and that the government was 
using force to put them down.  But having been isolated to the city he could not 
definitively confirm clashes.  Judging by his own environment, Snate was not too 
optimistic about the perspective of these uprisings:   
“The general impression among well-educated people is that conditions 
are likely still to become worse owing to the Russian character. The 
Russians are too passive. Most of the educated people are sure that the 
present regime will continue. The Russian people prefer not to take any 
action. I don’t think there will be any internal revolution. The people are 
too apathetic, exhausted and cowed into submission.”501   
 
Snate’s interpretation of the Russian realities echoed Dr. Gnatt’s description which 
spoke of continuous “low murmurs of dissatisfaction.”  “But this is about all,” he 
said. “The population is so cowed that it remains under control and just accepts the 
situation.”502
Many foreigners appeared in awe of the ability of the Soviet authorities to 
hold down the discontented citizenry.  Having spent a notable period in the Soviet 
Union, the University of Pennsylvania scholar William White spoke with Jacob 
Schurman on his way out about the hardships that lay ahead for the resisting 
peasantry.  “In two and half years that Mr. White was in Russia the strongest 
impression he received,” wrote Schurman “was the power of the Soviet state over the 
individual. While civilized countries had the power to arrest, fine, imprison, and even 
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execute the individual, the power of the Soviet included the food, lodging, work and 
paternal rights over the children of the individual… In the rural district the 
recalcitrant peasants could be blacklisted and sold out.  Any one aiding him thereafter 
was subject to the same penalty.”503  Even those with more sympathetic disposition 
toward the Soviet Union, such as Maurice Hindus, representing the World’s Works 
and the Asia Magazine of New York admitted that in Russia “everything is for the 
State,” and “nothing for the individuals.”  Unlike most observers who would’ve 
compared Russia to Pharaoh’s Egypt, in that respect, Hindus found Russia 
comparable with the ancient Sparta.  “The faces of the army soldiers, youth were all 
strained, hard and cruel.”  Everyone, according to him, was learning how to shoot, 
except the bourgeoisie.504     
If there was one class of people that showed little discontent toward Soviet 
form of rule – it was the members of the army and OGPU, who according to almost 
every observer, were well-fed and maintained by the authorities.  During the 
tumultuous years of the collectivization, the loyalty of the secret police, if not the 
army, played a key role in salvaging a regime that essentially fought against its own 
citizenry.  It was no coincidence that amid starvation and conflict, the Soviet 
government managed to erect a new building for the GPU in the Lubyanka square 
which displayed a fascinating design of secret entrances and other latest ingenuities of 
architecture.505  The Communist Party may have been wrong in its socio-economic 
calculations, but in establishing a state of the art secret service agency, it had found, 
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so to say, a silver bullet to much of its problems.  “No man, no problem,” Joseph 
Stalin is said to have once uttered.  If so, then the OGPU was a crucial element of this 
dictum, or to be precise, its enforcer. 
Since its inception in October of 1917, the vast punitive apparatus built by the 
Soviet government had already killed, imprisoned and exiled great number of people 
who in one way or another were perceived to be an obstacle to building communism.  
On June 4, 1918, the commander of the Red Army, Leon Trotsky “called for a group 
of unruly Czech war prisoners to be pacified, disarmed and placed in a kontslager: a 
concentration camp.”506  A chain of islands in the White Sea, known as Solovetski, 
were soon designated for this purpose.  In the words of Anne Applebaum, 
“Solovetski, the first Soviet camp to be planned and built with any expectation of 
permanence, developed on a genuine archipelago, spreading outward island by island, 
taking over the old churches and buildings of an ancient monastic community as it 
grew.”507  As the first prison placed under the command of the OGPU, Solovetski 
also constituted the first camp of the notorious Gulag.  According to Iurii Brodskii, 
the historian of Solovetski, since 16-th century the place had served as a small 
monastic prison for the Tsar’s personal enemies, yet for the most part it had been 
known as a quiet refuge for solitary monks.508  On October 13, 1923, the chairman of 
Sovnarkom, Aleksei Rykov issued an order designating the islands as the “northern 
camps of special significance”: Severnye Lagery Osobogo Naznacheniya, or SLON as 
it became commonly known.  Unlike the tsarist period when the prisoners in the 
monasteries numbered in tens, the Solovetski camps contained thousands, almost 
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exponentially increasing by each passing year.  In the eyes of the Soviet government, 
surrounded by water, this was a natural prison, where opponents of the regime would 
be isolated.  
According to both Applebaum and Brodskii, the evolution of Solovetski from 
a regular prison into a massive concentration camp was predicated upon the 
increasing economic value of the enterprise.  Well into 1925, the camps had operated 
in an environment where inmates, useless burdens that they had become to the 
system, were left at the mercy of sometimes sadistic wardens.  But as the number of 
inmates rapidly changed, so did the thinking of the administration.  By late 1920’s, 
thanks to the initiative of a charismatic inmate and former nepman named Naftaly 
Frenkel, Solovetski acquired a brutally commercial character where prisoners were 
categorized based not upon their political affiliation, but by their level productivity.  
The introduction of the “you eat as you work system” had the benefit of sustaining 
physically fit prisoners whose only wish was a full stomach.  But this system also 
meant that the weak would simply be left to die.  As Applebaum put it, “in practice 
the system sorted out prisoners very rapidly into those who would survive, and those 
who would not. Fed relatively well, the strong prisoners grew stronger. Deprived of 
food, the weak prisoners grew weaker and eventually became ill or died.”509
The increase in the economic functions of the SLON impressed the Soviet 
leadership to such extent that “Stalin even suggested giving medals to good 
workers.”510 “Like a management consultant taking over a failing company Frenkel 
‘rationalized’ other aspects of camp life as well, slowly discarding everything that did 
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not contribute to the camps’ economic productivity. All pretense of reeducation was 
rapidly dropped… The Solovetski museum and theater continued to exist but solely in 
order to impress visiting bigwigs.”511  This emphasis on work was also reflective in 
the slogans that began popping up around the camps.  According to Iurii Chirkov, a 
former inmate, at the entrance of the island’s Kremlin a huge poster read: Cherez 
Trud k Osvobozhdeniu! (Through Work to Freedom).512  For those unfamiliar with 
the history of concentration camps in the USSR, this slogan is ordinarily associated 
with the gates of the Nazi concentration camps where the phrase “Arbeit macht frei!” 
became etched onto memories.  
Stalin’s collectivization vastly increased the number of those who would 
experience the Soviet justice system firsthand.  According to the historian of Gulag, 
Oleg Khlevniuk, “as a result of mass punitive actions and the transfer of inmates 
sentenced to three or more years to the jurisdiction of the OGPU, the network of 
corrective camps grew much farther than originally planned in 1929. The number of 
prisoners in Solovetski camp grew from 19, 876 to 57, 325 between 1 April, 1929 and 
1 April, 1930.”513  Even if the Soviet statistics were to be believed, the Moscow 
Statistical Review, obtained by the American legation in Riga, informed that from 
1923 to 1929, in the RSFSR’s overall prison population, excluding the autonomous 
republics, increased 180 percent from 65,849 to 118,888.514  What made matters 
worse was that the Soviet prison system was not just about punishment, it was an 
elaborate mechanism which utilized humans as a source of labor for various projects 
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which the Soviet leaders had deemed necessary to pursue in the cause of 
industrialization.  This, in turn, meant that arresting an individual was one basic way 
to aggrandize the labor force in a country so desperate to “catch up” with the West.  
In March of 1928, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and Soviet of 
People’s Commissars instructed the RSFSR Commissariat of Justice “to discontinue 
infliction of punishment in the form of imprisonment on short terms” and transfer 
everyone serving less than a year under a compulsory system of labor.  In a manner 
reflective of Soviet understanding of governance and judicial system, Nikolai M. 
Ianson, the Commissar of Justice warned the judges to take these measures seriously, 
otherwise “they would be made to learn by personal experience what compulsory 
labor means.”515    
In their zeal to assert power and ensure stability, the Soviet authorities waged 
war against enemies, real and imaginary alike.  In a despatch sent by the Polish 
consulate in Kiev, the diplomat reported the emergence of new classes of enemies as 
the kulaks vanished from the scene.  Among the new legion of prisoners were now 
soldiers, large percentage of teachers and cooperative employees.  Decrying the 
overcrowded prison conditions and the food rations which were limited to 200 grams 
of bread daily, consul noted that “most are subject to punishment by administrative 
decrees without even a chance of defense before the court.”  “Political prisoners are 
kept with the criminal ones,” he added.  According to the diplomat, “death sentences 
were being executed every night in Kiev and other places.”516    
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The reports regarding the inhumane prison conditions and the heavy reliance 
on convict labor in Soviet Union were often corroborated by former prisoners 
themselves who managed to escape.  In “Slavery of Convicts in the USSR” published 
in Estonian daily Vaba Maa, a Tartu merchant named Pärli extensively detailed his 
eight years of experience in the Soviet labor camp.  Originally having been arrested 
on charges of espionage when he went to the Soviet Union as a member of the 
commission to “settle the question relating to peace,” Pärli had been sentenced to ten 
years in prison.   According to Pärli, the convicts’ food ration hovered between 300-
600 grams, whereas the working prisoners received 200 grams of slated beef or trout 
and 26 grams of sugar.  “These rations of food are not adequate for the people who 
are doing heavy work,” he wrote, “The strength of these convicts diminish daily 
under this diet and at last many of them collapse while at work.”  The prisoners 
worked all seven days of the week felling trees and building railways under extremely 
large quotas.  “The slightest act of contradiction and disobedience is punished by 
execution and in cases where the guards tire of beating the malcontents until they die, 
they command the victims comrades to do so,” he wrote.  Some prisoners, in order to 
avoid work, inflicted wounds on themselves by cutting open their abdomens, veins or 
cutting off fingers.  In such cases they were forced to go back to work after minimal 
care.  Describing the wretched conditions of the prisoners, Pärli stated that everyone 
was covered with bugs and lice. “Large numbers of bugs and lice make nightly 
attacks upon these crocodile skinned person,” he wrote, “thus depriving them of their 
only solace and recreation – sleep.”  Many prisoners’ limbs or entire bodies froze, as 




cold.  Describing the average attire of the prisoner, Pärli wrote:  “In these rags  there 
are often large holes through which body parts of the uncovered human body is 
visible.  The whole picture is ridiculous and nauseating.”517    
In his next report, Pärli outlined four categories of prisons in the USSR: 
prisons, reformatories, concentration camps and agricultural colonies.  The principal 
concentration camps were located in the northern part of the Soviet Union: Solovetski 
island in the White Sea, Wichersky Concentration Camp in Perm, Ust Sossolski in 
Vologda.  Staffed by kulaks, “tens of thousands of people,” he wrote, “work here 
until death.”  According to the imprisoned Estonian merchant, the Soviet authorities 
attached particular importance to the concentration camps, where “the convicts are 
practically being turned into slaves.”  He wrote: “The main reasons for the 
establishment of concentration camps for prisoners is economic… Each log and  
plank of wood that is brought out of the concentration camps is the product of 
atrocious torture and suffering of the slave convicts… Hordes of raggy, hungry and ill 
human wretches fell trees for fuel and timber.  They work without ceasing until they 
fall to the ground, dead.”518   
A story told by an Ukrainian refugee who escaped the Solovetski Island prison 
camp after a 29 day journey over 1120 kilometers, upheld much of Pärli’s account.  
In his personal account published in Estonian newspaper Paehvalet, the Ukrainian 
narrated his harrowing experience since being arrested by GPU on charges of being a 
member of the Ukrainian nationalist anti-Soviet organization and sentenced to 10 
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years of imprisonment.  He considered himself extremely fortunate, since only few 
succeeded in running away.   Most were caught and shot.  According to him, the GPU 
guards “tortured escapees before other prisoners to make an example of them.”   In 
this regard the administration of the camps was creative and “continuously invented 
new trick for torture.”  The chief of the camp Saon, Voskov, the Ukrainian recalled, 
was a sadist “who didn’t just look on as his subordinates tortured people but shot 
prisoners himself, often for no reason, because he didn’t like their face.”  Those who 
received packages began to be shot, so prisoners refused to accept packages 
thereafter.  Most prisoners died of torture, others didn’t survive due to lack of food 
and hard labor.  As the situation became more desperate prisoners frequently staged 
bloody uprising occasionally forcing the dismissal of camp chief.  Despite draconian 
measures against those who tried to escape, however, people ran anyway, because 
many realized that life in the camp was a slow death.  Recalling the origins of the 
Solovetski labor camp, the author wrote that it was first opened by Felix Dzerzhinsky 
in 1923, “the famous terrorist and the father of Cheka,” and “the first prisoners were 
sailors from Kronstadt.”519   
An escaped Russian prisoner from Solovetski, in an interview with the 
American consul in Finland, James Wilkinson provided similar information.  
Dobrushin, as Wilkinson referred to the Russian, was the son of a well-to-do peasant, 
whose properties were confiscated and was thrown into prison in 1925.  In his 
estimate, the convict population of the district stood at 145,000 – the highest so far 
given by an eyewitness.  According to the escapee, the prison conditions were severe 
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in terms of lack of food and clothes.  Prisoners came from all over Russia.  Some 
intellectuals, he said, were still left around, “with members of these classes having, 
for the most part, long since perished.”   Amid unsympathetic and brutal doctors, 
many prisoners succumbed to scurvy and pneumonia which prevailed in the camps.  
As for the discipline, even a minor infraction was countered with summary execution 
by GPU.  “When a death sentence is passed, the prisoners are invariably forced to dig 
their own grave,” Voloshin told his American interlocutor.  The guards frequently 
resorted to torture with exposure to cold being the common form of coercion.  Many 
prisoners simply starved or froze to death.520      
An American named Herbert A. Brandt, who once worked for the ARA and 
returned to Riga after five years of imprisonment in Russia, gave resembling accounts 
regarding the use of cold as a routine measure of punishment.  According to him, the 
charges of forced labor led the Soviet authorities to experiment with certain changes 
in the operation of certain prison camps.  In the Komi camps, guarding and 
supervision over the prisoners was relinquished from the OGPU into the hands of 
selected prisoners.  These men, Brandt related, were taken from among the criminal 
prisoners rather than the kulak element.  “They were efficient guards, even more strict 
than the majority of the OGPU men since if dismissed they would return to manual 
labor,” he said:  “The criminal guards were hard boiled. And they tortured the 
prisoners by making them stand in the cold in their underwear.  Some of them froze 
to death while undergoing this punishment.”  According to Brandt, criminals 
constituted merely one fourth of the prison population, with political dissidents, 
                                                 




economic counter-revolutionaries and kulaks comprising the remainder of the 
body.521   
  In Red SLON in the White Sea, Maiia Babicheva traces the origins of the 
memoir literature written by those who either escaped or served out their prison term 
in Solovetski to the year 1926, when S.A. Malsagov published the English translation 
of his book An Island Hell in London.522  Written in a highly emotional tone, this 
book nevertheless provided valuable information on the Soviet concentration camps.  
Malsagov’s feat was soon followed by his fellow escapee, Iurii Bessonov, whose 
memoirs, published in French and English, analyzed the culture of the concentration 
camps in the broader context of Soviet political system.  What emerges from the 
various accounts about experience in SLON is that “each tale has its own unique 
qualities, each camp held different sorts of horrors for people of different 
characters.”523  As Applebaum stresses, while Soviet concentration camps shared 
many features with Nazi camps, the former were not death camps where a certain 
group of people, chosen based upon ethnicity, were placed with an explicit and 
predictable objective to be terminated.  As numerous memoirs attest, though difficult, 
it was possible for individuals to serve out their term and ultimately survive the 
experience.   
 One particularly impressive case is that of Iurii Chirkov, a prominent Soviet 
academician, whose time at the Solovetski comprised the basis of intellectual growth.  
At the age fifteen, Chirkov was arrested and sent to Solovetski where he spent his 
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formative years surrounded by highly educated figures of the revolutionary period.  In 
his memoir Chirkov recounts his love affair with books and his work at the Solovetski 
library under the guidance of imprisoned intellectuals some of whom had been 
personal acquaintances with Lenin before the Bolshevik takeover.524  
“Paradoxically,” notes historian Brodskii, “the first inmates of the SLON were 
activists of the political parties which had allied with Bolsheviks in the struggle for 
power.”525  These people were voracious readers and books were the most prized 
possession of those who left home for jail.  In the foreign section of the local library, 
Chirkov recalled, there were books in 26 languages, left and brought by those who 
had faced the frequent misfortune of being arrested as “counter-revolutionary”.  
Populated by the cream of the society, the Solovetski camps had a theatre, symphonic 
orchestra, poetry club and even a Gypsy ensemble led by the former artists of the 
Bolshoi theatre.  If as the first commander of the camps, A.P. Nogtev, boasted with 
Solovetski having authority of its own - separate from the Soviets, then this prison-
country had to have all of its attributes, including its own cultural element.526          
  According to Babicheva, the memoir-publication with regard to SLON 
underwent various stages, the last of which involved the writings of the Soviet 
citizens who could openly share experiences following the collapse of the USSR in 
1991.  Among the most descriptive accounts of the Solovetski is that of the renowned 
Russia scholar Dmitri Likhachev who shortly before his death produced a memoir 
dealing with his personal experience in the Soviet prison camps.  In Reflections on the 
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Russian Soul, Likhachev’s story of pain and suffering differs from those of countless 
others only in details.  Arrested in 1928 for associating with a harmless group of 
religious thinkers, Likhachev recalled his journey from the local NKVD jail cell to 
the Solovetski prison camp where death and disease reigned supreme.  Likhachev was 
particularly struck by a group of teenagers – vshivki -- who had no clothes, no food 
rations and no legal status within the camp.  “Everyone knew of their existence, but 
he authorities had simply crossed them off, giving them no soup, bread or porridge. 
They lived on charity. Or rather lived until they died. And then they were carried out 
dead, put in coffins and taken to the cemetery.”527  Adults did not fare any better.  
According to Likhachev, executions were common.  The writer remembered one 
October day in which the authorities executed 300-400 individuals at once.  In one 
instance of the procedure, “a tall, one-legged professor of ballistics named Pokrovsky 
started to hit the escort with his wooden leg. He was knocked to the ground and shot 
right there in the gateway. The rest went on without a word…”528  Likhachev was 
deeply affected by Soviet writer Maxim Gorky’s visit to the camp where he became 
acquainted with the conditions and by a very rare accident, spoke with a boy who 
revealed to him the actual account of the happenings.  When he emerged from the 
barracks, Gorky had tears in his eyes.  But the actual results of this trip were the 
physical liquidation of the “boy”, increased repression at the camps, and a clean bill 
of health for Soviet prison practices by the writer himself.   
 In See No Evil, Dariusz Tolczyk examined the implications of Gorky’s visit to 
Solovetski and places this trip in the context of a propaganda campaign that not only 
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sought to mislead the foreigners about Soviet realities, but the Soviet citizens 
themselves.  The people were being trained to see and interpret realities in a way that 
served the cause of Communism.  The use of literature, Tolczyk showed, was directed 
to negate the reality filled with extreme hardship and in its stead, feed people with 
illusions about a march toward radiant future.  “Soviet reality in its ‘constant 
progress’ should have been near the stage when ‘all class antagonisms are abolished’ 
and ‘solidarity’, ‘love’, and ‘friendship’ form[ed] the basis of society.  These [Soviet] 
writers made it look as though it did”529
The new Bolshevik literary ethics not only accepted, but enthusiastically applauded 
the suppression of present freedoms as a worthy sacrifice for the sake of imaginary 
freedom in the future.  “In the process of fulfilling this grand historic destiny, 
[Bolsheviks] were ready not only to accept, but also to cause ‘necessary’ casualties 
among ‘little men’, the Chernyshevskian creatures, who yet failed to acknowledge the 
analogy between their own goals and history’s.”530  
Although the rapid increase in prison population made the revelation of the 
facts about Soviet Union all but inevitable, the Communist government still cared a 
great deal about the information entering the outside world about its prison practices, 
and subsequently, it put up a genuine effort to curb or at least undermine the 
emerging perceptions abroad. In fact, according to Likhachev, Gorky’s mission, too, 
sought to counter the public opinion in the West and help resume the sales of lumber 
to the USA and Great Britain which had banned its import due to the reports that the 
                                                 
529 Dariusz Tolczyk, See No Evil: Literary Cover-Ups and Discoveries of the Soviet Camp Experience, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 179. 




Soviet lumber was being produced by slave labor.531  In that sense, the Soviet 
government exhibited great degree of sensitivity when it came to foreign criticism of 
its human rights record.  On September 13, 1930, the chairman of Sovnarkom, Alexei 
Rykov, issued an order calling “to remove prisoners from all loading of foreign 
ships.”532  Shortly after France joined the list of countries imposing ban on Soviet 
lumber products, the Kremlin propaganda master Karl Radek launched a press 
campaign to publicize human rights violations in capitalist countries.  According to 
Oleg Khlevniuk, correspondence between Joseph Stalin and Viacheslav Molotov 
indicates that Soviet leader was personally involved in this campaign and urged his 
subordinates to respond vigorously to the charges of slave labor.  Despite loud 
denials, however, “the participation of prisoners in lumbering for export remained a 
significant part of the Gulag economy.”533     
Another powerful aspect of the Soviet efforts to deceive the outside world was 
carried out by luring in a certain stratum of Western intellectuals whose gullibility 
and idealism made them perfect foot-soldiers in the Soviet propaganda battle.  On his 
way back from Soviet Russia, in an interview with the American consul in Vienna, 
Dr. G. A. Graham of Longbeach, California conveyed his impression about Russia, 
which he, at first admitted, was a dilapidated country.  As for its prisons, Dr. Graham 
had the following to say:  
“Inside the prison, prisoners were reading newspapers, smoking and 
walking about as they wished. They had no other guards except those 
which they elected among themselves. They get 74 rubles a month.  They 
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have their own cinema and newspaper.  The food is better than for other 
peoples and the kitchens are clean…  For murder they get 8 years of 
prison.  At the end of 5 months their record is examined and they get a 
leave of 8-10 days to go home. In short, Dr. Graham concluded, “they are 
satisfied in the prison; they have their work, get their pay and have their 
liberty just as if they were outside of it.”534     
 
The American diplomatic observers were sufficiently astute to recognize propaganda 
and disinformation when they saw it.  Particularly, the staff in Riga, did not take 
occasionally discordant accounts such as the one furnished by Dr. Graham seriously 
and dismissed them outright.  For genuine information, they often relied on 
eyewitnesses, or at the very least, critical individuals for whom Russia was more than 
just a once in a lifetime travel destination.  And these sources almost ubiquitously 
displayed consistency and contained details that could not be provided by naïve 
tourists or fearful reporters.  The depiction of the conditions in Solovetski Island, 
prepared by a Riga section staff member based on a “highly confidential source” 
corresponded  with the other accounts provided by escapee and retuning prisoners.  
This source, corroborating the account by Pärli, identified Fyodor Eichmanns as the 
head of the Solovetski Prison Camps, appointed to the position thanks to his services 
as a commander of the Bolshevik regiments in Siberia during the Civil War.  
According to the report, the prisoners were barely clad and slowly starving, while 
scurvy and typhus killed thousands each year.  Minor infraction were punished with 
severe measures which frequently involved standing in cold during winter and with 
mosquitoes during summer.  The mortality rate particularly increased during winter 
                                                 





with 5-7 bodies taken to mortuary every day.  Because of icy ground the bodies were 
not buried but placed “simply under piles of snow from which the wind blows over 
them; there protrude here and there limbs of the dead people.”   In the spring when 
snow melted the bodies were then buried.  “Prisoners are not allowed to go home 
until the work is finished.  Self-cutters are denied medical help and are driven to work 
with bleeding fingers.  Daily work lasts 16 hours.”  The reporter then told the story of 
a chemist named Lendurd Eskuson who maintained interest in chemical reactions, 
simple liquid acids, experimenting and showing them to other prisoners.  The officials 
soon became weary of scientist Eskuson.  On a routine day, he was sent to work for 
timber cutting – when he excused himself for the reason of illness, the guards named 
Zhilko and Moskalenko beat him to death.535
Among the prisoner population which contained “cripples, blinds and 
mentally unsound people”, there was a particularly high number of religious clerks 
who were ordinarily respected by their prison mates. Russian Orthodox, Greek 
Catholic and Roman Catholic priests who populated the prison camps, were also the 
most functional representatives of the ‘community’.  The same report described 
Orthodox bishop of Riazan Gleb as a street cleaner, Bishop Gennadius storekeeper, 
and Bishop Hilarion as working in fisherman’s artel.  The presence of the religious 
clerics in the concentration camps were profusely corroborated by the reports from 
religious organizations worldwide which frequently claimed of the disappearance of 
their affiliate pastors and priests in the hands of the GPU.  Both in despatches from 
the American envoys abroad and letters to the American president reflected a growing 
concern among the Western faithful for the fate of their Christian brethren the land of 
                                                 




Communism.  Bringing attention to the deportation of Lutheran Bishop Malmgren to 
the Solovetski camps, the National Lutheran Council wrote to president Herbert 
Hoover stating that he was a “godly man of learning and consecration, who we know 
has been scrupulously careful about mixing into politics…”536  But it would be 
erroneous to presume that mass arrests of bishops, pastors, priests, rabbis and mullahs 
had to do with the religious figures’ involvement in politics. 
The drive toward collectivization was accompanied by severe repression 
against religion in its own right.  The essence of Stalin’s Five-Year Plan was a 
concerted assault against the peasant tradition.  A strong part of that tradition was also 
the religiosity of the peasant.  If the old muzhik were to be destroyed, so would the 
church in which he worshipped.  The Soviet ideological conviction in the social 
regimentation of man and confidence in their ability to create man anew was a 
significant part of this drive.537  Even though, since its inception the Communist 
regime harbored particularly hostile attitude toward the “opium of the masses,” as 
Karl Marx once labeled religion, anti-religious activities of the Soviet government 
acquired a particularly vicious character with the ascent of collectivization.  By late 
1920s, the diplomatic despatches were awash with news from Soviet Russia regarding 
the Communists’ renewed and vigorous assaults against all forms of religious 
expression in public venues.  The Fourteenth Congress of the Soviets of the RSFSR 
decreed on May 18, 1929 amended the Constitution to declare atheism the official 
creed to the RSFSR, thus depriving “the religious bodies of the freedom of religious 
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propaganda and give anti-religious propaganda the sanction of the state.”  To this end, 
the Soviets inaugurated the Union of Militant Atheists charged with confiscation of 
church bells and secularization of church premises.  On August 27, 1929, the Union 
of People’s Commissars issued a resolution on the uninterrupted workweek, “which it 
was expressly stressed in the press, was expected to render difficult the observance of 
Sunday, Saturday and Friday by the Christians, Jews and the Mohammedans 
respectively.”  According to the despatchers, Soviet newspaper Pravda announced the 
measure to be a severe blow to “religious obscurantism.”538   
The despatches from Riga frequently referred to the wealth of editorials and 
reports from leading Soviet newspapers to inform Washington about the scope of the 
anti-religion campaign.  The anti-religious hysteria whipped up in the Soviet press 
contained features very similar to the kinds of attacks that targeted the Soviet 
regime’s other actual and perceived enemies in the past:  It was always about toilers 
and laborers insistently demanding that the Soviet government come to their aid and 
fend off the enemies of the revolution.  The December 26, 1929, issue of Izvestia 
carried precisely one such report in which the laborers “insistently demand the 
closing of churches, synagogues and mosques, and the confiscation of church bells.”  
As to why laborers should be so keen on the confiscation of church bells remains 
unclear.  What was clear, however, was that the Soviet authorities were genuinely 
committed to the destruction of a social phenomenon which even the most 
megalomaniacal tyrants in the mankind’s history did not dare to attempt.  The organ 
of the Communist youth Komsomol featured an editorial entitled “Religion as a 
                                                 





Factor Retarding the Execution of the Five-Year Plan” in which the target was not 
just the religion but anyone who did not enthusiastically share the official position of 
the Party on this matter: “We assert that religion is a factor retarding the progress of 
the five-year plan.  He who tries to deny this is sliding down into the bog of 
conciliation, he is practically an opportunist, retarding  and frustrating the work of the 
Party and of the labor classes.”  Quoting Lenin about the need for “more energetic 
struggle against religion,” the authors of the editorial appeared particularly resentful 
of the citizens’ continued attachment to celebrating the Christmas holiday.  For this 
occasion, the Association of the Militant Godless approved several anti-Christmas 
slogans which read: “Christ’s Peace camouflages the counter-revolution of the 
kulaks!” 
“The followers of priests and sectarians are the agents of the kulak and nepmen!” 
“We are building a new world without priests, and without belief in God, on the basis 
of collective, genuinely Communistic labor!”539
The newspaper that drew particular attention of the American observers was 
Bezbozhnik (Godless) which regularly monitored the achievements of the Communist 
regime in the fight against religion.  What made Bezbozhnik stand out were both its 
informative quality and penchant for the absurd.  Where else could the reader find out 
about the opening of a club for national minorities in the former synagogue upon the 
demand of the “toiling Jews”?  Report after report from Bezbozhnik conveyed the 
closures of churches, synagogues and mosques, as the houses of worship became 
turned into communist clubs, entertainment centers, electrical power stations, 
locksmiths, cottonseed warehouses or granaries.  The American legation in Riga  





based its report on “a good source” stating that by early 1930’s, 364 Orthodox  
churches, 38 monasteries, 59 synagogues, 38 mosques, 43 protestant meeting houses 
had been shut down.540  The Soviets were not committed to physical destruction of 
religion alone, but to its total liquidation in the minds that were supposedly in the 
process of being cleansed from the baggage of the past.  Thus anti-religious 
propaganda displayed itself through the cinematic art.  Not long after the Soviet 
movie-makers had learned how to use the video-camera they were busy churning out 
movies that attacked all religion. By 1931, The Georgian State Motion Picture 
Industry released “The God of War,”  the Uzbekkino had produced “From Under the 
Arches of the Mosque,” and Goskino authored “The Cross and the Mauser.”541    
In his study of the Soviet League of Atheist Militants which sponsored the 
publication of Bezbozhnik, historian Daniel Peris focuses on various weaknesses and 
flaws of the organization which, in his judgment, ultimately failed to achieve its 
stated objectives.  “Make no mistake: many millions who might have believed in God 
under a continuation of the Old Regime lost their faith in this period; other found 
faith in Stalin or Socialism, or in nothing at all,” he allows.  “The League, however, 
played no substantial role in these developments.”542  It is quite possible that the 
foreign observers’ frequent and  unavoidable reliance on the written word could have 
obfuscated their ability to fully grasp the effectiveness of the organization or its 
newspaper vis-a vis the populace.  Yet the same could be said about almost any 
Soviet bureaucracy.  The dysfunctions of the state institutions often reflected the 
dysfunctions the quixotic Leninist ideology at work and the Soviet society at large.  It 
                                                 
540 Ibid. 
541 Coleman to Stimson, January 8, 1930, RG 59, File #861.404/343.  




is significant that in Peris’ own judgment “the regime’s anti-religious stance was not 
a mere formality. With only temporary respites, the Soviet regime attacked religion 
ruthlessly in the cities and later with even greater intensity in the countryside.”543
To be sure, those who did not play along paid the price.  As the Soviet 
authorities began running out of the old nemesis of the regime such as tsarist 
sympathizers, minority nationalists and bourgeois elements, the religious leaders 
comprised a significant category in the Soviet penal system that imprisoned tens of 
thousands of political prisoners (the Soviet government actually did not flinch from 
labeling them as such  -- politzakliuchenniye) .  At times, as it was in the case of 
Catholic Archbishop of Latvian nationality Slosken,  “Bishops representing foreign 
nations were released from prison in exchange for captured Communist spies.”  
Initially arrested in Mogilev and then shipped to Solovetski, Slosken made living by 
catching fish before numerous letters and pressure from abroad resulted in his 
release.544  But most, like the Lutheran pastor Albert Koch, did not fare as well.  
Sentenced to death by the Soviet court for counter-revolutionary activities, Koch’s 
family of four children, mother and wife had been shipped to a labor camp in White 
Sea.545  Speaking of persecution against Lutherans “unparalleled anywhere in the 
world”, FWB Coleman noted the story of the Lettish Lutheran Congregation whose 
pastor and membership faced severe forms of harassment from the Soviet authorities.  
Both priests being considered as “social useless, even noxious,” the pastor was not 
allowed to obtain housing in the city, nearby the church in which he served.  Pastor 
Zalit was forced to reside in the suburbs from where with great difficulties he 
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commuted to the church while the membership of the parish had dwindled down to 60  
individuals under the threat of imprisonment, dismissal from work or at the very least, 
becoming a social outcast.546   
The Soviet campaign against religion may have echoed the trials faced by 
Christians under the early Roman empire.  But the head of the Patriarchal Orthodox 
Church in Russia, or whatever was left of it, in an interview to Izvestia “virtually 
denied all claims of persecution  stating that the religious people were better off now 
than before the Revolution.”  As for the deportation of pastors and priests into 
concentration camps, Metropolitan Sergius ascribed this to the individual motives and 
cases which, according to one example which cited, involved not paying rent on time.    
“Millions of active members of our church, who are toilers, enjoy all rights, including 
suffrage, conferred upon them by the Constitution.  Those church members support us 
materially and we are not in need of any aid, least of all interference from abroad,” 
the Russian religious leader stated .547  The despatch sent out of Riga also addressed 
the response written by Russian Orthodox representatives abroad who denounced 
Metropolitan Sergius’ “lies and libel against the Church, which was plainly evident to 
himself and to all believers.”  The point by point refutation of the patriarch’s claims 
were laid out in the Paris based Poslednie Novosti.548   
Certain outside observers ascribed the relatively quiet destruction of 
Christianity in Russia to the innate nature of the Russian person who was never 
religious in the true sense.  As early as the revolutionary period, the American 
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Ambassador David Francis observed in astonishment how the droshki drivers who 
had previously halted whenever passing by a church and piously drawing a cross, 
easily abandoned the practice once the Bolsheviks took charge.549  Also, 
interestingly, many of the reports addressing the persecution and struggle of the 
Christians in Soviet Russia concerned with the representatives of the Catholic and 
Protestant clergy, not the Orthodox who comprised the overwhelming portion of the 
population.  Although the Orthodox church suffered the brunt of the Kremlin’s 
concerted assault against religion, some Western observers brought the Russian 
Orthodox population’s commitment to the Church into question.  “The peasants never 
harbored much love for the Tsar whom they referred as batyushka (father) or the 
Church which erroneously came to define Russian peasant,” argued Maurice Hindus: 
“He is a pagan through and through.  His attendance at church is in answer to an 
emotional appeal.  He knows nothing about the service, about religion, or the 
teachings of Christ.”  In Hindus’ opinion, the Russian Church long ago ceased to be a 
vital force for it had sunk to such a condition of bigotry and illiteracy that it had “no 
real hold upon the hearts of the people except through emotionalism.”550  If that was 
the case, then the statements by the head of the Russian Patriarchal Church Sergius 
went some ways to substantiate the argument.   
In the case of the Muslim population of the Soviet Union, which numbered in 
tens of millions, the campaign against religion often came upon stiffer resistance.  
Whereas in the atomized urban Russian cities, the sense of community was too fragile 
to hold up against pressure from the state, in rural Muslim villages and towns, the 
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destruction of mosques frequently led to riots and violent retributions.  In heavily 
Muslim populated Central Asia and Caucasus, the Soviet efforts to defang the 
community of the faithful ran into great difficulties.  Reporting from Tabriz about the 
disturbances in the Soviet Caucasus, the American envoy Henry Villard attributed the 
uprising among the Muslim inhabitants of the Caucasus to religious persecution, 
alongside “scarcity of food.”551  The Polish Consul General in Tiflis wrote of strong 
Turkish influence among the Muslim population of Georgian Soviet Socialist 
Republic.  He described an incident in the Ajar village of Chulo where two 
Communist brothers entered a mosque and raped a worshipping woman there.   In 
response the village inhabitants murdered the brothers and their mother and seized the 
control of the village.  When Soviet authorities sent troops to quell the uprising, the 
people encountered with gunfire forcing the Reds to retreat to Batum.  Later in 
conference of the local Communist Party, the Georgian communists would emphasize 
the importance of caution in dealing with the “fanatical people.”552   
If the intention was the liquidate religious practice in public venue, the 
Communist leaders somewhat succeeded.  But erasing faith from the hearts and 
memories of the Soviet citizenry required more profound effort – the upbringing of a 
new generation of Communists unbound by the traditions of their forefathers and 
godless, as the title of the well-known newspaper professed.  Returning from an 
extensive visit to numerous Soviet cities,  R. K. Bonnett of Washburn-Wilson Seed 
Company of Idaho reported about serious efforts by the Communist leadership to fill 
the young minds with propaganda and thus inducing xenophobia and deep hatred of 
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capitalism.  Bonnett recalled a startling encounter with a Russian boy who asked him 
about American boy scouts and then added: “Kick American boy scouts in the belly 
for me.”553  In a “Letter from Moscow” published in Tallinnische Zeitung, the author 
was among many foreign observers who noted that the youth has had been “brought 
up completely in the spirit of Communism; it does not know what is taking place 
beyond the borders of the Soviet Union.”554
In August of 1932, the recently appointed American minister in Latvia, Robert 
Skinner, conducted a survey among the members of the Russian Section requesting 
them to submit analytical response to the question “Are Russian happier now than 
before?”  The answers were strikingly similar to each other in that almost every staff 
member emphasized the growing significance of the Communist youth and their 
potential to reshape Russia, though not necessarily in a positive way.  Basing his own 
memorandum to Washington on the survey, Skinner noted: “All observers seem to be 
satisfied  that the new generation born or matured since the revolution, which knows 
nothing and apparently cares nothing about the situation prior to the revolution, a 
generation unable to visit the outside world rejoices in the belief that Russia is a 
highly favored country destined to lead the world.”   A young staffer of the section, 
George Kennan, recognized the power of the youth yet dismissed its capacity to leave 
a lasting legacy in the history of Russia and the world.  “The romance of economic 
development has been known to inspire young people in other countries than Russia,” 
Kennan wrote.  But according to him, that enthusiasm would eventually wane and 
fade away insofar as it lacked a “permanent foundation” and “any particular promise 
                                                 
553 John L. Bouchal, U.S. Consul in Helsingfors, Finland, to Stimson, July 25, 1933, RG 59, File 
#861.5017/164. 




for the future.”  “Totally untrained to think for himself, unaccustomed to fighting his 
own mental battles and facing his own problems, guided neither by tradition, 
example, ideals, nor the personal responsibility which acts as a steadying influence in 
other countries,” Kennan conveyed, “the young Russian will probably be as helpless 
and miserable as a babe in the woods.”555
When it came to predicting Russia’s future or grasping its present, some of 
Kennan’s colleagues displayed less certainty.  Despite mountains of information 
about the Soviet Union at their disposal which led Skinner to express doubt “whether 
any other government was in possession of a more complete, and on a whole reliable 
documentation on the subject,” even the hardened veterans of the Russian affairs had 
difficulty assessing the basic question of happiness in the USSR.  Once having 
functioned as a leading diplomat in the American occupied Archangel, Felix Cole 
was puzzled by the contrast between extreme statements regarding the conditions in 
Russia and the people’s state of happiness.  “I read the reports by American visitors 
avidly.  They are both extreme… they either say what they went in thinking, or his 
statements are controlled by whether or not he wants to go back in again at an early or 
later date.”  Cole believed that the peasants in Russia were better off from the end of 
the War Communism until the beginning of the Five Year Plan.  In his judgment, it 
was wrong for foreign observers to assume that the ability of the Soviet regime to 
retain power stemmed from the people’s support for it.  As for the all the talk about 
cultural revival under Communists, Cole did not consider “the existing 
reglamentation of all intellectual life in the Soviet Union to be conducive to the 
development of art, literature and music.”  Cole’s fellow analyst William Gwynn 
                                                 




seemed to concur: “Whether Russians are happy I don’t know.  But I do know that I 
should not be happy under their rule of life.  And I do know that most travelers, if not 
all, when they leave Russia do so with a distinct sense of relief.”  Yet another analyst, 
Loy Henderson, pointing to the insufficient level of personal contact with the Russian 
populace, held his verdict observing that the Soviet experiment demanded “years of 
accomplishment before it could be judged.”556
Indeed the Soviet government’s contextualization of the deadly campaign 
against the peasantry within the frames of a struggle to build a new, better, more 
industrialized society, at least in the minds of some observers, mitigated the shocking 
reality of the measures taken by the Soviet government and in some ways, could have 
prevented the issuance of a definitive verdict on the ‘promises of Communism’.  Like 
Henderson, many, while seeing and even recognizing the transpiring catastrophe, 
abstained from a conclusive judgment as if awaiting a particular date when the 
historical truth would be revealed in one cathartic instance.   Louis Fisher, the 
Moscow correspondent of the left-liberal Nation magazine, in a conversation with the 
American diplomats in Riga, chided them for inability to get as good information as 
the Germans and spoke positively of the Soviet experiment.557  According to him, the 
population increase was the big factor behind the industrial and agrarian policies of 
the Soviet state which in turn intensified its agricultural reforms in order to meet the 
demands of the growing population.  Around the time millions of Soviet citizens 
starved, Fisher wrote that “a walk through Moscow streets would convince even the 
skeptic that living conditions have improved and that store stocks have been 
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replenished.”558  Like Duranty, Fisher played an important role in shaping American 
public perception about the Soviet Union and did so to the benefit of the Communist 
regime.  As a Moscow correspondent for a magazine with substantial readership 
among the intellectual elite, Louis Fisher wrote reports that almost ubiquitously 
placed the Soviet practices in a positive light.  While his actions were often similar to 
those of Duranty, however his motives contained some measure of idealism regarding 
the just future which the Soviets claimed to be building.  Born to a family of Jewish 
emigrants from Russia, Fisher experienced harsh childhood and like many of his 
peers disappointed by the calamitous effects of the First World War on the Western 
society, found ideological refuge in Marxism.   It would take many years before Louis 
Fisher would come out with mea culpa and denounce the Soviet regime.559  However, 
during collectivization, Fisher willingly contributed to the Soviet machinery of 
deception by denying the deadly realities around him. 
As for Walter Duranty of the New York Times, his reports were upbeat as 
usual.  “Things here are exciting,” he jovially wrote to the Jacob Schurman in 
Germany, “Stalin switched the whole works two or three days after I arrived and 
startled everyone – especially the younger tovarisches.… Anyways, things have 
loosened up in consequence and it looks as if the Spring sowing might go all right.  I 
at least remain optimistic…”560  Duranty’s optimism, if ever genuine, was misplaced.  
The sowing of 1930 did not “go all right.”  Nor did the sowings of 1931 and 1932 
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when at the latter year the famine in the Soviet countryside reached its peak.  In fact, 
already by 1930, nearly every traveler to the Soviet Union who had no vested 
financial or other interests in dealings with the Soviet government reported the 
worsening of the conditions.  M.M. Klemmer of Standard Electric Company, based 
on his observations in Moscow and Leningrad, spoke of serious shortages of food and 
the use of ration cards for nearly every basic necessity:  “The reason for this”, he 
explained, “is in the policy of socialization by the Government, ruining the peasants’ 
farms and confiscating of what they call  “the excess” of the grain in the country… 
The population is kept in a condition of half-hunger, receiving, the working people 
only on an average about 400-600 grams of bread and 100 grams of meat per day.”561    
Edward Deuss of the International News Service, in a call to the American 
diplomat in Berlin, described the situation as “extremely bad – the worst that he has 
witnessed since his transfer to Russia in 1926.”  Regardless of what the Soviets said, 
Deuss went on,  “the production was at a low point and that finished goods had 
almost completely disappeared.”  In Deuss’ view, the Five-Year Plan was a disastrous 
failure.  According to him, “the number of people jailed in the last three years [was] 
fantastic, and that most people confessed to just about any charge in order to escape 
exile to Siberia.562  Even the usually soft-spoken Samuel Harper of the University of 
Chicago recalled his last trip to the Soviet Union in summer of 1930 as “the most 
exhausting and expensive trip I’ve had in fourteen times that I’ve visited Russia 
during the last 25 years.”  While he thought that the conditions were not yet as bad as 
those during the Civil War, he acknowledged that many around him were “starting to 
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talk about it.”  Unless the Soviet government took urgent measures to stop the wheat 
export, he warned, the whole Bolshevik edifice would implode over the starving 
populace.  In one of the strongest statements he had yet made toward the address of 
the Soviet leadership, Harper concluded: “The next months may show more clearly 
whether the leader may not have put too heavy a strain on the country, in their 
stubborn, revolutionary zeal having passed the hour of midnight.”563   
The Soviet authorities’ zealous campaign of grain requisition and 
collectivization intensified the famine in the agricultural regions of the country.  
However, if the focal point of the Soviet industrialization were the factories and the 
main beneficiaries were meant to be the workers, to some foreign observers, even 
there the Soviet authorities appeared to be grossly mishandling the affairs of the 
industrial infrastructure.  In comparison to the situation in the Soviet countryside – 
from which by early 1930 the Soviet government essentially banned foreign visitors, 
the state of Soviet industry has been  more thoroughly documented by the Americans 
who lived and worked in Russia.  Thanks to the Soviet government’s eager campaign 
to duplicate the American level of productivity (a campaign known as 
Amerikanizatsiya), numerous American nationals worked in Soviet factories.  They 
were the ones who came to the USSR under the aegis of the New York based Soviet 
American Trade Organization - Amtorg - whose primary task was to attract American 
industrial experts into the Soviet industry.   Though with varying degree of contempt 
for the Soviet misrule and Communism in general, these Americans’ observations 
were very similar, and also, provide valuable insight into the Soviet way of life and 
work during the First Five Year Plan.     
                                                 




Shortly after signing a contract with Amtorg in December of 1930 to help 
Soviet with engineering work, F. Moritz Mueller of the Upson Company arrived in 
Moscow in May of 1931.   He was almost immediately appalled.  “Their standards of 
life and actions were so different from ours that I felt as though I had landed on 
another planet where the laws of human behavior with which I was familiar did not 
apply. I must discard mine, and learn an entirely new set…. I soon learned to distrust 
everybody.”  Mueller ascribed  the deep mistrust in the Russian society to the Soviet 
government’s tyrannical style of governance.  “I attribute this trait,” Mueller wrote, 
“to the close personal supervision of their lives by the government, through GPU.  
They’re constantly terrified by fear of arrest and imprisonment or death, on the charge 
of implication in counter-revolutionary activities.”  By its very nature, the Soviet 
government always stifled individual initiative and promoted submissive workers 
whereby “the cream of brains was skimmed off and thrown away.”  Nor it is that 
Mueller harbored particularly kind feelings for the ordinary Russians.  “One of the 
elementary rules in pure and applied science is to experiment with only on variable at 
a time.  The Russians, least competent by character and in experience to create 
anything new politically, industrially, or socially, are carrying on the most advanced 
experiments, in all three field at once.”  According to the American engineer , the 
Russian mind was “immature combined with Oriental mystery and shrewdness.”  He 
quoted “one Russian cosmopolitan” who once observed: The Russians are children, 
but they are damned clever children.”  At the end of his report, Mueller outlined five 
possibilities none of which bore a promise for the Russians’ future.  The only positive 




away from the USSR, since at least the Georgians were “intellectually superior to the 
average Russians and were thus represented in high position in the Soviet 
government.”564   
Another Amtorg contractor, Ed L. Addleton of the Gisholt Machine 
Company, working for the Traktorstroy wrote back to his superiors: “The conditions I 
saw in Russia are so heartbreaking that I would gladly forget them if it were possible, 
for even in the worst days of the war conditions were better than they are in sections 
of Russia that I saw.”  Conveying his depression and the extreme lack of food, 
Addleton wrote that he had lost ten pounds since his arrival in Russia a few weeks 
ago.  Like F. Moritz Mueller, Addleton was certain that none of the Soviet projects 
including the one in which he was involved would succeed.  “The moral is extremely 
low… It cannot go on like this,” he wrote.565  Another engineer Octave Liner 
expressed deep regrets for coming to Russia called it a big mistake.  As far as he was 
concerned, the Soviet system of governance was evil and the American should have 
no truck with it.  R. B. Hosken of the Sullivan Machinery Company described the 
atmosphere at his workplace as one of terror.  Especially following the Shakhty trials 
in which the Soviet leadership executed a number of engineers under the charges of 
espionage, Hosken’s coworkers, the very people with whom he had to cooperate in 
order to do his job, avoided contacts with him, because he was a foreigner.  “They 
were obviously frightened with exposure to contact with foreigners such as ourselves. 
They never talked with us without witnesses being present and they were afraid to 
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make definitive statements on even the most trivial subjects.”    After work, the 
foreigners felt as lepers in the Middle Ages for nobody dared to approach or converse 
with them.566   
There was a consensus among American experts working in Russia that 
whatever the Soviet government was trying to accomplish, it was obstructing its own 
path by self-defeating measures.  The situation in Russia, from an industrial point of 
view is hopeless, stated C.F. Smith and R.S. Grieves who worked as industrial 
advisers for the Stalingrad Tractor Company.  Citing the shortage of raw materials, 
the Americans told their interlocutor in Riga that the factory function at a 25 % level 
capacity.  In the opinion of the American engineers the root cause of the problem was 
the government’s destructive interference and counter-productive policies.  They told 
of a contemporary joke where in response to criticism from the GPU about the factory 
work, workers responded saying that if factories possessed as many engineers as the 
GPU, they would get the job done.  Fred R. Hess of Berwyn Illinois, who was 
employed in Kazakhstan building flour mills similarly appraised the desperate 
financial situation of the Soviet government.  Hess used familiar terms to explain the 
Soviet realities to his American interlocutors: “Take any American firm and clear out 
of its offices all responsible educated, efficient, common-sense persons, and put in 
their places men who in the U.S. dig sewers; take your efficient persons, put 
detectives on their heels, give them an extreme inferiority and fear complex, put them 
as subordinates under the ‘wop’ directors, and you have a true picture of the Russian 





factory and industrial administration.  The psychology is purely oriental. All sorts of 
tricks and chicanery are necessary in this scheme of things.”567   
Not all Americans employed at Soviet factories were fully candid about their 
experiences in the Communist country, and even gave some indication for the reasons 
of their inability to tell the whole story. Charles Harry of Oglebay Norton Company 
in Cleveland spoke of his work at the mines in Krivoi Rog, south of Moscow.  While 
mentioning the full employment  and excellent food in his location, Harry also noted 
that there wasn’t much on which he could spend his 125 rubles.  He added that the 
crops had been terrible in the countryside and that the “political control in Soviet 
Russia was very effective.”   Harry’s company’s office was located near a police 
court.  Every day he saw individuals being sentenced and sent somewhere as the 
families were being broken.  He tried to get his Russian colleagues tell him what 
happened to which they would usually respond:  Bad business!  According to the 
American diplomat in Finland, shortly after speaking to him, Charles Harry returned 
to Russia, “but prior to his return he said if he were not returning to Russia he would 
feel freer to give a vivid description of conditions  concerning everything including 
the plight of the Ukrainian farmers.”568   
Others were either misled or simply lied.  Frederick Bishop of the Universal 
Wendy returned from his five month stay in Soviet Russia with a glowing report 
about the “remarkable” achievements of the Communist government.  Excitedly 
speaking of his conversations with various high Soviet officials, Bishop expressed 
confidence in Moscow’s agricultural policies and even went further blaming the 
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United States for needlessly complicating things.  As for the Soviet people, in 
Bishop’s judgment, “the beneficial effects to a country of the development of the 
heavy industries was not readily apparent to the masses.”  Anyone “with the ability to 
make and who have made extensive penetrating and unbiased studies within that 
country,” Bishop believed, would recognize this reality.  Based on his conversation 
with Kalinin, Bishop assured his American audience that the living standards in 
Russia were increasing day by day and the people had more valiuta (foreign 
currency).  Indicative of his close contacts with top Soviet officials, the American 
engineer even employed Joseph Stalin’s favored sentence starters: “It is a well-known 
fact that Russia practices self-criticism to a great extent than any other country in the 
world.  The Russian papers give full publicity to all national shortcomings and 
failures with a view toward remedying situation.”  Bishop felt that “the present form 
of government is undoubtedly the best Russia has ever had though it would not fit 
into a country such as ours.”  He yet added that “the efficacy of national planning was 
now recognized by all.”569   
In a Soviet published newspaper, Abraham Geier, a Chicago tool and die 
maker who came alongside 25 Americans to work at the electric factory in the Soviet 
capital, Elektrozavod in 1931, was reported to have compared his impressions of he 
Soviet life with that under the tsarist regime.  Having been jailed in old Russia for 
nearly three years, Geier found everything about Soviet Russia wonderful.  “No more 
gendarmes, no more fear of officers or secret police.  It is a free world!” he 
exclaimed.  Instead he proceeded talking about the effects of the Great Depression in 
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his native of Chicago and how the unemployed Americans envied the Geier group for 
heading to their Soviet promiseland where everyone was guaranteed work.  On their 
way to Russia the Geier group passed through the Baltics where they were told about 
the starvation in Russia.  Having just arrived at the railway station, Geier denounced 
these reports by stating: “Everybody seems warmly dressed – and there’s plenty of 
food.  Stealing one’s clothes and danger of starvation?  That just describes the 
situation on the other side of the Soviet Union.”570   
For Americans who had lived in Russia for more than a week, the Soviet 
realities were entirely different.  In a special memorandum prepared for Robert Kelly 
of the State Department, an American resident of Moscow wrote about the existence 
of “virtual famine of consumer goods in Russia.”  “Nearly all American who stay in 
Russia for any length of time lose weight substantially,” the memo went on.  Despite 
the privileges afforded to them as the citizens of an economically advanced and 
superior nation such as the United States, many Americans who resided in Russia for 
longer terms experienced great hardships.571  Writing from Vladivostok, in Eleanore 
L. Pray noted the “terrible” quality of life.  “We haven’t had white bread for over a 
year and half.  The bread that was available tasted like anything except bread. 
Personally, I think we ate up the remains of everything that has been collected all 
over ex-Russia from forgotten corners – some in saw mills.”  With the exception of 
vegetables and wines, she wrote, nothing was available in stores.  “Everything 
possible is sent abroad without the slightest regard to hungry people in the country.”  
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According to her, the only kinds of food allowed for local stores were those which 
were too spoiled or unfit for export.  Still, as an American, her bread and butter was 
assured, because she had a steady source of income from outside unlike the locals 
who had nobody to count on and starved.  In the midst of all this shortage and hunger, 
Mrs. Pray noted with irony how the front pages of the Soviet newspapers carried 
stories of starvation in British India due to the heavy government taxation.  All this 
while heavy government taxation had brought farming in the Soviet Union to 
bankruptcy whereby horses were being slaughtered for use in sausages, dubiously 
named Budyenny sausages (Budyenny was the commander of the Soviet cavalry 
forces during the revolutionary period).  “What I have written is but a colorless 
picture of the actualities but unless one is here living among the people on can get no 
conception of them,” Pray concluded her letter.572   
The Americans who experienced life in other remote corners of the Soviet 
Union reported similar levels of deprivation and want. J. Henry Moore of Lancaster, 
South Carolina, wrote of his experience in Tajikistan where the living conditions 
were, in his words, deplorable.  “Unless one has seen the way people live it is hard to 
believe that conditions could be so bad.  Russians in Moscow are the same way, but 
because of the presence of foreigners things look better.”  The inhumane Soviet 
policies targeting the population had produced a deep level of mistrust toward the 
government.  “The moral sense of the present government of USSR seems nil,” 
Moore wrote.  As far as he was concerned, the Communist as it existed in Soviet 
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Russia was the “greatest evil influence” in the world and had to be confronted as 
such.573     
Another American, J. Samuel Berell of Tulsa, Oklahoma, who spent forty 
days in Turkestan concurred with J. Henry Moore’s view of Soviet Communism and 
its dangers for the West.  Those who discount the possibility of Communism’s export 
into America, Berell warned, appear certain.  “Yet less than fifteen years ago a person 
traveling in Russia, with its beautiful cities, its wonderful buildings, art galleries, 
factories, intelligentsia would have considered anyone a lunatic who predicted 
conditions as they actually are there today.”  This state controlled and regulated every 
act and tried to control and direct every thought of each individual.  Everything was 
being falsified about the outside world.  In terms of political leadership, Berell wrote, 
Joseph Stalin was “the acknowledged, actual Dictator of the country with more 
autocratic authority than has ever been held by any monarch since the days of 
Genghiz Khan.”  While the people starved, the Soviet army and security forces were 
well-fed and clothed.  The vast security apparatus of the Soviet state had a crushing 
effect on the society.  He added: “They are everywhere – see everything. The accused 
has no counsel – no trial – no witnesses in his behalf.  Unless released, his fate is 
seldom known, whether it be jail, Siberia, or the firing squad.  It is needless to add 
that people shiver at the very thought of the G.P.U.”  In Turkestan itself, Berell wrote 
the people were divided into two categories: workers and non-workers – 
identification which mattered decisively when it came to allocation of food.  The non-
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workers’ rations of food in all varieties was significantly less than that of the workers 
whose numbers in a rural areas of Central Asia were small.574   
By 1932, the conditions in the Soviet countryside had deteriorated to such 
extent that, there was a mass exodus of farmers and villagers into the city.  As bad as 
the situation was in the cities, unlike villages, there were no scenes where people 
dropped dead in the streets due to starvation.  In places such as Ukraine, North 
Caucasus and Kazakhstan, the assault against the village had made the choice of 
staying in the land of one’s ancestors a matter of life and death.  “The situation in the 
country districts is entirely different, reported anonymous author writing from 
Moscow in the Tallinn newspaper Tallinnsche Zeitung.  “A steady flow of hungry 
people is under way towards Moscow. Coming mostly from the regions of Orel, Tula, 
Riazan, they say they are former ‘kulaks’ from whom everything has been taken and 
that they have come into the city in order not to starve in the country.”575  Professor 
Bruce Hopper who was in Moscow in July of 1932, reported the following: “In 
Ukraine, there is definite famine.  Peasants come [to the cities] and sell old rags to 
buy a piece of bread.  They will likely die after the food is finished.”576    
Due to this influx by starving “kulaks”, the population of Moscow and other 
large cities were rapidly increasing, even though the cities clearly lacked any 
mechanism to cope with the situation.  In response, the Soviet government instituted 
an internal passport system which basically banned villagers from leaving.  Less than 
                                                 
574 J. Samuel Berell to Kelley, December 12, 1931, GR 59, General Records of State Dept. Office of E. 
European Affairs, USSR Section, Report of Visitors to Russia, 1931, Box 5.  
575 Carlson to Stimson, April 14, 1932, RG 59, File #861.00/493. 
576 Professor Bruce Hopper to Kelley, July 18, 1932, GR 59, General Records of State Dept. Office of 





hundred years after they had been emancipated by the order of Alexander II in 1861, 
the Russian peasants once again found themselves enserfed by the state.  Though 
somewhat novel in outlook, the Communists’ latest measure was the reenactment of 
an old policy by Tsar Ivan Grozny who in 1592 abolished the peasants’ right to move 
and placed them in bondage to the land they did not own.  Except, back then there 
was no OGPU rummaging through the peasants’ homes and confiscating the very 
seeds and the cattle by which the peasants sustained themselves.   
The Soviet ban on travel applied not only to the starving peasants attempting 
to escape, it also applied in reverse to those who wished to enter the famine zone, 
most particularly, to  foreign travelers who wanted to observe the realities on the 
ground.  The OGPU forces cordoned off the disaster zones to the outside observers.  
The only individuals with access to these areas were the Soviet government officials, 
be they party leaders, military officers or state media representatives, and most 
notably Walter Duranty, the correspondent of the New York Times.  Unlike any other 
foreign journalist in the USSR, Walter Duranty enjoyed a very special status.  He was 
the only journalist with a personal automobile in Moscow and had the longest tenure 
in the Soviet Union as a correspondent.  In comparison to many of his colleagues, he 
appeared to have the confidence of the Soviet officials.  And why not?  After all, in 
his several years of reporting from the USSR, Duranty had hardly written anything 
negative about the Soviet practices.  In most of his official conversations and 
newspaper reports, Duranty made a special effort to put a rational, if not a positive 
spin, to the actions of the Soviet government during collectivization.  To be sure, the 




region, almost everyone identified Duranty as someone with strong “pro-Soviet 
views.”  
Even his excursion to the famished Soviet countryside did not end his streak 
of optimism in public.  As Americans such as Hopper came to refer to Stalin’s USSR 
as Duranty’s Inferno, the New York Times reporter dismissed the avalanche of the 
reports about Soviet famine as a “mostly a bunk.”  Duranty used nearly every 
expression in his literary arsenal, from “shortage” to “malnutrition” or “disease” to 
avoid the use of the word ‘famine’.  During his trips to Rostov-on-Don,  Duranty 
wrote stories headlined “Soviet is Winning the Faith of Peasants, “Members Enriched 
in Soviet Commune” and “Abundance Found in North Caucasus.”577  Thus, at the 
height of the genocidal famine that ended millions of lives, thanks to the services of 
its correspondent in the USSR Walter Duranty, the largest newspaper in America 
failed to report the actual story and in fact, misled the public.  In close company, 
however, Duranty was more honest about his findings.  A year later at a dinner party 
by his colleagues at the New York Times, “Duranty described “picture of ghastly 
horror” in Ukraine , estimating that millions had died from the famine of the year 
before.  “But Walter you don’t mean that literally, his colleague exclaimed.   “Hell I 
don’t … I’m being conservative ,” he replied and as if by a way of self-consolation, 
he added his famous truism: “But they’re only Russians.”578  Yet, contrary to the 
expectations of many American observers of the Soviet Union, Walter Duranty’s star 
was just rising.  And so was that of the Communist regime in its relations with the 
United States.  
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Chapter 6: End of the First Cold War: America Recognizes 
the Soviet Union 
In 1933, the year of the American recognition of the world’s only existing 
Communist state, the situation in the Soviet Union had not changed for the better; on 
the contrary, the acute famine in Ukraine and North Caucasus continued to claim 
hundreds of thousands of lives and the concentrations camps were being replenished 
with fresh reinforcements.  What had changed, however, was the United States, hard-
hit by the effects of the Great Depression.  The collapse of the American financial 
markets in the Black October of 1929 did not only undermine public faith in President 
Herbert Hoover, known for his fierce opposition to Communism, it also undermined 
the Americans’ belief in the ideals of laissez-fair capitalism and free market.  With 
unemployment figures at record levels, by the time Franklin Delano Roosevelt swept 
into presidency, many in America had come to take interest in the statist endeavors 
carried out in the Soviet Union which appeared to guarantee employment and other 
government benefits for the citizens.  The platform which won the presidency for 
FDR was a radical departure from the economic philosophy and the general 
worldview of his Republican predecessors.  To be sure, FDR’s New Deal – which 
dramatically enlarged the role of the state enterprises in the national economy – was 
the product of an era in which capitalism was out of fashion.  Given the ascendant 
interest toward state socialism in the West, it is nevertheless remarkable how little 
influence did the actual conditions in the Soviet Union have on the new American 




face of considerable opposition from those who closely monitored the Soviet regime, 
Washington went to great lengths to accommodate Moscow and establish cordial 
relations.  While certain bitterness between the two nations persisted at various levels 
for some time, the very first year of Roosevelt’s presidency spelled the end of the first 
Cold War. 
Incidentally, in contrast to previous years, the American knowledge about 
Soviet affairs dramatically increased in the year of recognition.  This increase was 
due to two major factors: the Great Depression which forced thousands of unskilled 
American labor to go to the USSR in search of a better life, and paradoxically, the 
Soviet industrialization program which drew in highly skilled American experts.  
With regard to the former, the economic downturn had left many families desperate 
for work.  The Communist propaganda seemed to have convinced some individuals to 
replace dashed illusions for the American dream with the Soviet one.  Particularly 
vulnerable in this regard were the most recent immigrants, such as the Finnish-
Americans, whose attachment to America was not yet as deep.  The diplomatic 
despatches from Finland at this period are filled with the stories of those who came to 
the northern timberlands of the Soviet Union to lead a different life.  And a different 
life it became. 
Upon his escape from the Soviet Union in March of 1933, Finnish-American 
Eino Latvala was interviewed by the Central Detective Police in Helsingfors who 
passed on the content of the interrogation to the American legation in Finland.  In the 
interview, Latvala regretfully spoke of the good life he left behind in America in 




1914, Latvala had owned a car and enjoyed good living.  But at the “instigation of a 
local Communist,” he decided to go to Soviet Russia.  He worked at a Vilga forest 
camp as a chauffeur while his wife cooked at a local cafeteria.  But the life was very 
hard “since there was a lack of the most necessary foodstuffs such as potatoes.”  
Without his wife, who provided the family with scraps from the kitchen of the 
cafeteria, Latvala stated, they would not have survived.  While in the Soviet Union, 
his wife lost 170 pounds.  Unlike his fellow Finns who had crossed the border 
illegally into the USSR and ended up working as slaves in the Soviet labor camps, 
Latvala’s family was lucky, because they still had their American passports which 
allowed them to leave the country as “conditions became intolerable.”579
Demonstrative of the similar trend was electrician Roini Elmer Skytte who 
was a second generation immigrant born to Finnish parents.  When the Depression 
hit, his father was forced to sell the farm after which they both moved to the Soviet 
Union.  He worked at the Matrosa station as an operator of electric generator 
producing current for lighting  purposes, getting paid 180 rubles per month.  He 
informed Finnish interrogators that 400 Americans worked alongside him in Karelia.  
Five months was all it took for Skytte to decide that he could no longer stay in that 
place.  But in the course of those few months, he lost his 16-yrs old daughter to 
scarlet fever and his wife developed scurvy due to extreme undernourishment.  
Describing things in Russia as “awry”, the engineer complained about the complete 
breakdown of the machinery and infrastructure.  Echoing Eino Latvala, Skytte told 
the Finnish police about the story of about fifty Finns who had illegally crossed into 
the Soviet Union and were ordered “to do forestry work while being kept isolated.”  
                                                 




As typical for returning immigrants – disappointed and destitute – Skytte’s return 
money had been sent from America.580     
Carl Sjoman was another Finnish American, impoverished and awaiting for 
money from the United States to return, who came to the American legation in 
Helsingfors to renew his passport.  Sjoman went to Russia with his mechanic father 
after they had both lost their jobs.  Their first destination was the town of Kontuhopja 
in Karelia.  There, Sjoman worked as a carpenter, getting paid 200 rubles in paper 
mill.  The father and son lived in a barrack building with additional six persons per a 
single room.  Main staples of diet were “black bread with sour taste, occasional 
macaroni, fish and horse meat.”  At the time of his interview Sjoman’s father was still 
in Kontuhopja expecting the money to be sent by his son once the latter reached the 
United States.  Sjoman also noted that that many Americans, though “happy in 
Russia,” were planning to leave by next spring.581   
In addition to the Finnish police, the American legation itself conducted 
numerous interviews with returning Finnish-Americans who had called on the 
consulate for passport renewal and other travel related arrangements.  One of the 
interviewees was Philip J. Endlich who had initially gone to Russia within a group of 
architects.  After the contract expired, Endlich signed another agreement with the 
Soviet government and stayed there.  During his stay in the USSR, Endlich worked in 
several places, notably at Sverdlovsk, but also had a chance to visit Moscow and 
Leningrad.   He characterized the conditions throughout Soviet Russia as having 
“steadily grown worse.”  “Long lines of people may be seen in all cities… Each 
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person would be waiting for the small ration of food available,” he stated.  According 
to Endlich, the inflation was a severe problem insofar as “what 2 years ago cost 5 
rubles now cost 20 rubles.”  “The conditions of the Russian people is really pitiful. 
They are starving,” he summed up.  Unlike the Communist elite and foreigners who 
possessed special privileges and their own stores, the rest of the population quietly 
endured the hardships.  Some, however, could not.   Endlich witnessed as humans 
dropped dead from starvation on the streets without anyone showing much interest.  
“The Russians are utterly apathetic to the fate of others. They can see a man dying on 
the street and no one goes to his help. What they do think about is their own 
immediate needs for bread.”582    
Not every returning American, however, had the perceptiveness or education 
of Endlich.  Most of the people, especially those crossing back into Finland, lacked 
even basic education.  “He had no schooling to speak of; he did not speak with any 
great intelligence regarding Russia and did not volunteer any information.” Thus 
characterized the American Consul John L. Bouchal his interlocutor Jacob Kauppi 
who spent about a year in the city of Petrozavodsk.  “The informant worked in the 
mines in the United States but with the depression lost his job and was not able to 
secure another. He had been unemployed for about a year before he decided to go to 
Russia in 1931.”  Like Latvala’s wife, his spouse also worked at the local cafeteria 
while Kauppi drove truck and did carpentry work.  According to him, the food at the 
cafeteria was good, but noted that this was only because they were Americans.  
“Since these foreigners were asked to come  there, they enjoyed privileges and 
obtained better food and lodging than the Russians,” he added.  However, in terms of 
                                                 




lodging, most American families lived in a single room with no running water.  
Kauppi spoke of constant “coming and going” of the Americans in northern Russia.  
In terms of providing information – meager and not wholly reliable – about the state 
of affairs in Soviet Russia the likes of Kauppi were few.  Consul Bouchal noted that 
Kauppi “answered questions put to him but professed ignorance on all matters that 
did not concern him personally.”583  Farmer Joonas Harju was yet another 
interlocutor included by Consul Bouchal in the category of unhelpful informants 
whose lack of superb judgment posed a challenge for the American diplomat in 
search of reliable information.  Joonas went to Russia in May of 1931, and settled 10 
kilometers away from Petrozavodsk.  He worked at a dairy farm alongside other 
Finns.  In Joonas’ judgment,  the running of these farms was “not as smooth as in 
other countries, because the people who own their farms elsewhere know that what 
they do they do for their own good.”    The state-appointed management was not very 
capable, thus eventually prompting him to leave.  The American consul described the 
informant as “an old man from a rural section of Finland” and “accustomed to 
extremely simply mode of life.”  “He did not appear intelligent at all,” Bouchal 
added.584  
The diplomatic despatches addressing the conditions in the Soviet Union were 
received with great interest at the State Department in Washington, and were read 
with diligence.  So much diligence that in a letter written by Robert Kelley to John 
Bouchal, the division chief chided the consul for the less than stellar quality of his 
interview summaries in comparison to those conducted by the Finnish police.  In a 
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terse note, Kelley pointed out grammatical errors and other inconsistencies which he 
thought should have been looked over before being sent to him.  Kelley also seemed 
to be greatly concerned that the Soviets seemed to have found out about the 
interviews being conducted with returning Finnish-American immigrants, and had 
taken on to coaching them prior to their departure from the USSR.  He informed 
Bouchal that those who deliberately leaked information from inside about the 
activities of the legation should be uncovered and punished for doing so.585   
Helsingfors was not Kelley’s only target for its shortcomings in reporting 
information about Soviet internal affairs.  In March of 1933, Kelley sent a string of 
letters to nearly all major capitals of the countries surrounding the Soviet state, 
instructing them to provide information.  In notices sent to Istanbul, Vienna, 
Stockholm and Berlin, Kelley emphasized the importance of conducting interviews 
with returning American visitors to Russia and submitting the content of those 
conversations.586  Even the embassies in Paris, London and Prague, Kelley instructed, 
had an obligation to obtain information “from competent American observers” who 
had been to Soviet Russia.  As passport renewal centers and stations where 
individuals obtained visas to come to the United States, the American embassies had 
the unique advantage to encounter people some of whom had just come out of Soviet 
Russia.  These interviews had to be conducted in a confidential and meticulous 
manner according to certain guidelines.  In a memorandum which Kelley coordinated 
with U.S. Undersecretary William Phillips, the East European Division came up with 
a standard list of questions that were to be asked from those who agreed to be 
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interviewed.  Specific questions ranging from progress of socialization of agriculture, 
militarization, living conditions and other aspects of Soviet society were designed to 
cover all major areas of American interest about the developments in the USSR.  It 
was not important, nor expected that interlocutors would be able to answer all the 
items in the questionnaire.  This was an attempt to allow interviewees the opportunity 
to express their views and knowledge about whichever aspects of life in the Soviet 
Union.  Also, the aim of the effort was to ease the burden on those diplomatic staff 
members posted in stations further away from Soviet borders whose lack of 
knowledge about Russia often rendered them incapable of conducting such 
interviews.    
Kelley’s efforts yielded certain results.  The American embassies’ renewed 
interest toward visitors from the Soviet Union drew in numerous businessmen 
traveling out of Russia who volunteered valuable information about their personal 
and professional  experiences in the USSR.  Many of them, like Edward J. Terry who 
had been a chief consulting engineer in Chelyabinsk tractor plant, appeared at first too 
frightened or perhaps even shocked to talk about their experience.  According to the 
American consul in Berlin, Raymond Geist, “very intelligent” and the kind of person 
who would not “exaggerate matters upon which he is reporting,” Terry described the 
situation in Russia as “the most appalling human disaster that could possibly befall 
mankind.”  “The things which he has witnessed has rendered him a violent opponent 
of the communistic system,” wrote Geist, “though it appears that he personally has 
had nothing done against him.”  In Terry’s words, the Soviet government essentially 




arrest.  Under best circumstances, the Russian workers’ diet consisted of black bread, 
cabbage soup and tea.  His Russian co-worker who had once been in the United States 
and spent 3 months in an American prison told Terry that “in comparison to his 
present situation in Russia it was an enviable experience as he had had plenty to eat 
and decent quarters.”  The American engineer himself narrated a story when he 
discovered four wagons loaded with dead bodies being transported from prison.  
Summarizing the gist of the conversation, the American diplomat wrote, Terry was 
“violently opposed to recognition” on the ground that “it would compromise the good 
name of our nation to recognize a country which has adopted universal slavery.”   
Further, he thought that the American slavery of 19-th century was a “paradise” in 
comparison to the one being practiced in the Soviet Union.587
Speaking to the staff members of the U.S. legation in Latvia, Archibald G. 
Hunter, a chief engineer in Kharkov Tractor Plant reported on his experience in the 
Soviet Union with great disappointment.  He spoke of resentment among local 
Russians toward American professionals who received higher wages and unlike the 
rest of the population, did not starve.  According to Hunter, every day 20 or 30 people 
showed up on his doorstep begging for food.  He recognized some of them as workers 
from his factory.  When mechanical engineer in Electrical Factory in Leningrad, 
Walter John Kowal showed up at the Riga legation, “he seemed frightened, uneasy, 
his attitude was one of humility and servility which [was] unusual in the average 
American.”588  He repeatedly asked for assurances that the contents of his 
conversation would not passed along to GPU and inquired “when did the last time the 
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Consulate check its premises for bugs.”  A bit later, Kowal opened up to the 
American diplomats telling them of the dreadful methods by which the Soviet 
security services tried to turn him into a spy.  As for the living conditions, in Soviet 
Russia, “his apartment of two rooms and one bath with no running water was 
considered first class.”  With butter, meat, cabbage and other basic food commodities 
having disappeared, the Soviet people hungered, Kowal told his interlocutors.589    
Similar nervousness in behavior was displayed by John Peterson, an American 
engineer working at Murmansk who came to Tallinn to renew his passport.  
Extremely reluctant to say anything to vice consul Latimer, Peterson “was in obvious 
fear of being watched; he expected people to be listening from behind closed doors.”  
It took several days before the engineer opened up to the legation staff member and 
spoke of his ordeal in Russia.  Although under the contract he was obliged to return to 
Murmansk for several more months, Peterson stated that he would not be going back, 
“because he could not stand the nervous and physical strain of living under conditions 
such as those existing in Russia.”   According to vice consul, Peterson’s “clothes were 
shabby and he looked a bit starved.”  Peterson admitted that as a seaman, he had been 
used to bad food, but nothing could prepare him for conditions in Russia.  The 
engineer said that he would stay a few more days in Estonia just to satiate his hunger 
and then began to weep.  Most Americans, he related, ”would not be able to stand the 
conditions there.”590   
Some American professionals who engaged in close partnership with the 
Soviet government were usually tightlipped about their experiences and did not easily 
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divulge information.  One such person was the distinguished Canadian engineer John 
C. Calder who had constructed numerous automobile factories for the Ford company 
both in the Untied States and the Soviet Union, including the latest in Stalingrad.  
Considered as a leading advisor to the Moscow authorities in engineering, Calder had 
been “over practically all of the territory of the Soviet regime and that he probably 
had covered more of the territory of the Soviet regime than any other American or a 
foreigner in the employ of the Government or in the employ of American and foreign 
companies in the country.”  He was, as expected, “cautious about his views.”  
However, after several encounters with American officials in Berlin, Calder revealed 
that he was “extremely pessimistic with regard to the general situation,” and in all 
times he had been in Russia, the things “had never been worse than now.”  According 
to him, even the Soviet leaders “realized the seriousness of the situation.”  He 
described conditions in Turkestan and Kazakhstan as “denuded of all animal life, 
even of birds, and that there was practically no sowing.”  “Calder stated that food 
shortage was very great and had been for months, and that literally thousands of 
people were dying from lack of adequate nourishment.”  According to the talented 
engineer, the Soviet industrial infrastructure was utterly dysfunctional insofar as the 
machinery was breaking down due to low worker moral and maintenance.  Even more 
interesting was Calder’s verdict on the question of recognition.  While avoiding a 
blunt response, “Mr. Calder seemed to be of the opinion that the situation in Russia 
was really such that he doubted  whether it would be advisable for any country to 
consider resuming trade or diplomatic relations with it at this time.” As for the United 




seem advisable in his opinion to take any action with respect to the opening of 
relations at this time.”591   
Clarence W. Poy was a distinguished engineer in canning industry who, after 
having spent more than two years in the Urals and Central Asia, saw little economical 
advantage in recognizing Soviet Russia since the destitute Russians would “only be 
able to place orders in America on the basis of credit.”  More interesting were Poy’s 
vivid reports about the appalling conditions in the provinces of the Soviet state.  “Mr. 
Poy reported for the first time among Americans returning from Russia, that mass 
starvation is taking place,” interlocutor Jacob Massel reported: “In Tashkent, a city of 
500,000 people are actually starving.”  A land once plush with grazing sheep and fruit 
orchards, Uzbekistan had turned into a wretched site where people traveled along 
railroads looking for food.   “The amount of food actually imported by the Russian 
government merely helps out a bit in Moscow,” but in the provinces which were less 
visible to foreigners, the food had become so scarce that “even communists had 
trouble in getting it.”  “The people are desperate but in their weakened condition and 
in the process of starvation  they seem to be calmly resigned to their inevitable 
death… It is most significant to note that starvation is starting in the most fruitful 
section of Russia.”  According to the engineer, whatever fruits existed in the orchards 
were gathered and instead of being given to the people, they were canned and shipped 
for export.  Moreover, huge quantities of fruits rotted due to inefficiency and lack of 
energetic manpower to harvest them.  “He confirmed the reports that that horses are 
                                                 





starving, tractors are ruined and that the workers are dying from starvation,” wrote 
Massel in the report of his conversation.592
Returning from the hub of the Soviet oil industry in Baku, American engineer 
Charles Holland observed that the situation was “probably more serious there today 
than at any previous time.”  Describing the bread situation as bad, Holland 
nevertheless noted that in terms of food supply and housing conditions, Baku fared 
better than any other Soviet city.  Having encountered restriction in some countries, 
the Soviet food, designed for export, was coming back into the local markets.   “He 
attributed this to the fact that the oil industries, being the principal source of revenue 
are fairly well taken care of and that relatively good conditions developed in and 
around these operations.”593  Similarly, a few months earlier a newspaper 
correspondent, had confided the following about his experience in Baku to the U.S. 
envoy in Tehran Charles C. Hart: “Moscow regards no section as more important than 
Transcaucasus because, perhaps, without the well-nigh inexhaustible oil fields at 
Baku the Soviet might long ago have been on its knees to the rest of the world.  Baku 
oil is the one commodity which has been readily exportable at all times, providing 
large sums of foreign currency so much needed.”  With the population of a half 
million people, in Hart’s opinion, Baku was “the most extravagantly illuminated city 
in the world.”  Still, “nowhere, as also in Batum and Baku, was there any place that 
looked inviting.  Shop windows betrayed utter lack of interests in commercial life, 
this attitude being characteristic of the people toward every sort of community 
activity.”  Hart noted that even though he saw some cattle along the way from Baku 
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to Batum, there was no meat available for consumption.  Endowed with a good sense 
of humor, Hart speculated that “all of the expert meat cutters in Russia may have been 
promoted to commissars under the Soviet regime.”  “In all of my journey throughout 
Transcaucasia,” American journalist further penned, “I did not see one well-dressed 
woman or a man with the exception of government officials and army officers who 
sport the most extravagant attire.”  Celebrating the arrival of 1933 in a dilapidated 
hotel, with “cheap food and 40% proof vodka,” Hart was told that “a funeral party 
could not have been more suppressed, more somber.”  In his conversation with the 
Iranian Consul General in Baku, the journalist attributed the mood to “unshakeable 
fear” dominating the society.  According to him, upon return to their homes, most 
people feared the arrival of Cheka and their imminent arrest.594     
The conditions in the Russian-populated provinces were substantially worse.  
After interviewing Frank de Groff who was employed at the combine producing plant 
in Saratov, Leslie Gordon Mayer, American Vice-Consul in Latvia reported: “He 
states that in Saratov, a city of 200,000, the deaths from starvation are at the rate of 
about 100 per day and that there are not coffins to bury the dead, that trenches are dug 
in the cemetery and the corpses thrown into these as fast as the workmen can 
complete the digging.  He claims to have seen piles of human bodies one upon the 
other lying in the open and awaiting burial.  As a foreigner he is, of course, given 
privileges not enjoyed by the native population in the procuring of food , but even his 
rations and those of his wife and children have been reduced.”595  Alvin Leonard 
Erickson, a former resident of Vladivostok and, consulting technical engineer for the 
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Kamchatka salmon canning industry, told similar stories to the Vice Consul in Tokyo, 
C.A Hutchinson.  “Food is even scarcer than it was six months ago at the time of 
previously reported conversations,” reported the vice consul Washington, “Deaths 
from actual starvation are frequent and the sight of men, women, and children 
collapsing on the streets of Vladivostok is said to be common.”  Based on his 
personal observations, Erickson estimated that 150 people died every day in 
Vladivostok during the typhus epidemics and malnutrition.  Overall, the conditions in 
Vladivostok, he said, were worse that at any time since the domestic disturbances in 
1918-23.596     
The native Russians’ accounts of the situation in 1933 corresponded with 
those of foreign observers. When Peter Shirokov, an American citizen of Russian 
descent showed up at the American consulate in Harbin, “he still appeared weakened 
and anemic.”  As a locomotive engineer he stayed in Siberia for about a year 
surviving on bread and potatoes.  According to him, “food shortages appeared to be 
as severe in European Russia as in Siberia.”  Shirokov reported that during his entire 
stay in Russia, he had managed to eat meat only four times, and still, as a better paid 
expert he was far better off than most members of his crew who went on duty hungry 
and “without having or being able to obtain sufficient clothing to assure their comfort 
and to safeguard their health.”  Inability to show up for work would often result in 
getting arrested by GPU.  When the engineer finally decided to leave Russia, he 
himself was interviewed by the GPU guards before obtaining an exit visa (the Soviets 
were equally rigid on letting foreigners leave the country), “Shirokov was questioned 
                                                 






closely concerning the economic conditions in the U.S. and the officials seemed 
unwilling to believe his statements to the effect that living conditions were by no 
means so bad in the United States as they were in the USSR.”597  In Vienna, the 
American officials were forwarded a letter by Countess Georgina Gyomorey Almasy 
which was originally written by the sister of her employee living in Skodlolovsk, 
Russia.  In that letter, written in German, the Russian begged her sister for help:  
“As far back as I can think, however, we have never lived as badly as now. 
How one has to hunger here! My dear friends, I beg you to send us one 
dollar. You wrote back to us that it was not possible, that conditions were 
also bad with you. However, hunger perhaps has never pinched you as it 
has us… If the beloved God  does not have mercy, we must die.”598   
 
One dollar, the sister wrote, would be sufficient for them to buy a pound of flour and 
grits, and stave off death by hunger.  Even if the sister couldn’t help, the starving 
Russian implored, perhaps she could get in touch with “other people from America” 
who would lend a helping hand.  “It is difficult to die from starvation,” the letter 
concluded.     
Further to the West, in Ukraine, the famine was killing millions.  In August of 
1933, Whiting Williams, a great educator and economic investigator, arrived in 
Warsaw, after having visited Kiev, Kharkov and the Don basin.  According to his 
American interlocutors, Williams was very much affected by what he had seen.  He 
had just been to an area  which was for the most part banned to the outside world.  In 
order to hide the massive famine from outside observers, the Kremlin had gone so far 
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as to bar foreign correspondents from leaving Moscow.  A well-trusted figure, 
Williams confirmed the reports of famine in no uncertain terms.  Williams’ 
overwhelming description of the famine at one point prompted the interviewer to note 
that it was difficult to believe that his statements were not exaggerated.  During the 
two weeks of his stay, Williams “saw laborers and peasants dying as a result of 
starvation.”  He saw “people dying in the streets,” and “cried in particular at the 
instance of a baby girl whose death from starvation he himself observed.”  The most 
striking image in Williams’ mind was the sight of peasants “falling from weakness 
occasioned by hunger, while they were working in the grain fields in the midst of 
food.”  In a grotesque contrast, “in vast areas of fields wheat was still standing 
schocks” due to lack of manpower to harvest the crops.  According to Williams, 
“Moscow had rushed in shock troops and young Communists to gather all this food,” 
since most of Ukraine’s farmers had not survived.  Having seen many villages 
depopulated, Williams had “gained the idea not hundreds or thousands but millions of 
Russians [sic] have died from starvation and the diseased occasioned by the lack of 
food.”599   
The diplomatic despatches conveying the impressions, experiences and 
opinions of many Americans who represented different layers of the society revealed 
a widespread revulsion at life under the Soviet regime which frequently translated 
into opposition to the recognition of the USSR.  To be sure, among the foremost 
opponents of such measure was the chairman of the Eastern European Division of the 
State Department, Robert Kelley, who took great interest in the reports coming out of 
                                                 





the Soviet Union and gave them substantial weight in his policy considerations vis-à-
vis the USSR.  From the very beginning, Kelley’s views about recognition were 
predicated on the principles outlined in the 1920 declaration by the U.S. State 
Secretary Bainbridge Colby who held that “there cannot be any common ground upon 
which [the United States] can stand with a Power whose conceptions of international 
relations are so entirely alien to its own, so utterly  repugnant to its moral sense.”600  
Kelley believed that the Communist government of the USSR possessed inherently 
distinct qualities from most other governments, and this distinction prevailed in all 
aspects of its conduct.  Unlike various proponents of the recognition, Kelley perhaps 
understood the correlation between what was taking place inside the USSR and the 
Soviet stance in the international arena, although he was adamant in not making it an 
issue when explaining his stance against recognition.601    As early as 1924, Kelley 
had written an article entitled “The Political Organization of the Soviet Power” in 
which he characterized the governance of USSR as beholden to the “orders from the 
leaders of the Communist Party which has neither mandate nor responsibility other 
than self-imposed to the inhabitants of the vast country.”  In his judgment, 
“consideration of this fact [was] essential to a correct understanding of the foreign 
relations of the Soviet power.”602   
When Ivy Lee of the Bethlehem Steel Company returned from the Soviet 
Union in 1927, railing against restrictive effects of the non-recognition policy, Kelley 
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came out with a strong commentary.  According to Kelley, those such as Mr. Lee who 
advocated closer relations with the Soviets failed “to comprehend that that it will be 
possible to establish a real basis for negotiations with the present regime in Russia 
only after certain fundamental changes have been affected in the international aims 
and practices of the Bolshevik regime and that until these changes have been 
consummated, a sound basis for intercourse cannot be arrived at by any amount of 
‘admonishing, reasoning, or arguing.’”  Such recognition, he insisted, would only 
legitimize the “Bolshevik belief that their principle can constitute sound basis for 
international discourse.”603     
With the passage of time, Kelley’s distaste for the Soviet regime did not 
diminish.  Officially, Kelley listed four objections to the recognition of the Soviets.  
The first problem, he argued, was the stated goal of the Soviet government to foment 
revolution abroad.  A government that proclaimed and actively sought to derail the 
political order of other sovereign nation could not be granted legitimacy.  Secondly, 
by refusing to honor the financial obligations of its predecessor, the Soviets failed “to 
observe certain generally accepted principles governing the conduct of nations 
towards each other … which the experience of mankind has demonstrated are vital to 
satisfactory development and maintenance of commerce and friendly intercourse 
between nations.”604  Thirdly, Soviet monopoly over foreign trade and its official 
policy on private property, Kelley argued, made it extremely difficult to conduct 
meaningful trade with that country.  Finally, the Soviet notions of justice were so 
radically distinct from the American values, which made future problems between the 
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countries almost inevitable.  Kelley attempted to ensure that the Soviet government 
would not be able to exercise its brand of justice on the American citizens residing in 
Soviet Russia, as it had done so with the British subjects when several English 
engineers were arrested under the charges of economic espionage.   
Robert Kelley took the Soviet statements calling for worldwide revolution at 
their face value and believed that the Communist ideology was central to the Soviet 
actions both at home and abroad.  Kelley’s conclusions were based on keen 
observation and incomparable knowledge of the Soviet affairs.  Later in the year, 
when Soviet foreign minister Maxim Litvinov arrived in Washington to negotiate 
recognition, “he remarked that ‘the division of Eastern European Affairs in the State 
Department had better records on the history of Soviet diplomacy than did the Soviet 
Foreign office itself.’”  To be sure, “Kelley not only had a better library than the 
Soviets, he also took his library more seriously.”605  His expertise in Soviet affairs 
gave Kelley a stature within the U.S. State Department that was difficult to ignore 
even after Roosevelt had decided to recognize the Soviets.  As author John Richman 
put it, Kelley’s “serious and scholarly professional demeanor contributed much to his 
ability to continually reinforce governmental hostility toward the Soviet Union.”606   
The pressure against recognition did not just come from the State Department, 
but also the representatives of friendly nations who felt obligated to inform the 
American government of the consequences of recognition.  Expressing the “liveliest 
hope” that the United States would not recognize the Soviet Union, the Director of 
the Press Section of the Latvian Foreign Office Dr. Bihlman, confided in the member 
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of the American legation in Riga that “American recognition would be the end of us, 
of Europe.”  He further predicted that if American recognition be extended, American 
trade would “suffer at once unless long credits should be granted, for Soviet trade is 
political and large order now given to the U.S. are partly intended to foster demand 
for recognition.”607  In his telephone call to U.S. State Undersecretary William R. 
Castle, the Swedish foreign minister echoed similar sentiments.  Sweden was a small 
nation compelled to recognize its giant neighbor, he stated.  But what did the United 
States stand to gain from this step?  If the increased trade was the objective, then the 
Swedish minister reported, the trade between Sweden and the USSR which 
maintained diplomatic relations was nil.  Any talk of increase in trade peddled by 
Soviet sympathizers, according to the minister, was “fantastic inasmuch as trade was 
not a question of recognition in any way but merely of credits.”608     
There were powerful groups within business as well as political circles who 
ardently pushed for recognition and believed that such a step by Washington would 
help increase their fortunes in the Soviet Union.  Among the most influential 
lobbyists for recognition were companies as such General Electric, General Motors, 
Armand Hammer and others who were powerful players in America’s entrepreneurial 
landscape.  In a typical letter addressed by the local representative of the General 
Motors Export Company in Russia, E.M. Van Voorhess, urged the need to recognize 
the unquestionable strength of the Soviet  Union “both from a political and economic 
point of view.”  “To an unprejudiced observer on he ground with opportunity to study 
the situation carefully, it is evident that in the interests of American trade the present 
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is the most propitious moment during the last fifteen years for the American 
recognition of the Soviet Union and the conclusion of some form,” Van Voorhess 
wrote.609   
More prominent advocates of the recognition were those who had directly 
benefited from their involvement with the Soviet government.  As a head of the 
Nitrogen Engineering Corporation, Frederick Pope had been given lucrative contracts 
inside the Soviet Union which earned him millions of dollars and a name recognition 
in Washington DC.  Even before FDR’s victory in 1932 elections, Pope softly 
advocated rapprochement with Moscow.  With a direct access to FDR he conveyed to 
the president from early on that Americans “ought to have an unofficial representative 
in Moscow” to at least deal with the problems of the burgeoning American expatriate 
community in the USSR.610  Pope’s advocacy for the recognition found its way to 
newspaper headlines.  In a major newspaper report shortly after the presidential 
elections, Pope rejected the criticism of the Soviet Union as a failing state where 
inhabitants starved.  In sharp contrast to most other observational reports coming out 
of the Soviet Union, Pope wrote:  
“Every time I went back there I found conditions better than before… The 
first five-year plan was a helpful stimulus to production and the second is 
intended, I believe, to increase the output of consumer goods… The 
people are quiet and hopeful, and the stability of the government appears  
to be independent of any  single personality… If there is any shortage, it 
will spread out because this year’s crops are better.”611   
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J. B. Doan, the president of the American Tool Company wrote a letter to State 
Undersecretary William Castle in which he  questioned the rationale behind the 
policy of non-recognition.  Having conducted $1 million worth of business through 
Amtorg, Doan suggested that the American policy hurt the American businessmen 
more than the Communist regime itself.  Why would the U.S. government “not 
materially aid in securing businesses securing business by those who want to do 
business and who are able to grant the terms of payment,” he inquired.  In Doan’s 
views, Russia was the greatest potential market next to Germany, and Washington 
obstinacy denied the Americans a fertile ground to conduct business.612  Albert 
Creighton of Massachusetts echoed similar sentiments in meeting with James Grafton 
Rogers.  Having enjoyed close relationship with the Amtorg’s New York office 
chairman Peter A. Bogdanov, Creighton was convinced that both America and the 
Soviet Union stood to gain a great deal by establishing diplomatic relationship with 
one another.  He expressed the belief that by continuing to cut off Russia, the United 
States would facilitate conditions under which “the Russian would build up non-
market habits,” as if the Soviets were ever inclined to pursue a different course.613   
There was also a genuine sense in certain quarters of Washington that the 
Soviet thirst for recognition was so great that it would acquiesce to just about any 
demand to achieve such an end.  Individuals such as Frederick Poole of the National 
City Bank favored recognition, because they believed this would allow the settlement 
of the accounts with the Soviet government on the obligations and debts which 
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Bolsheviks repudiated after coming to power.614  Such groups saw recognition as an 
opportunity to hold the Soviet government accountable for the debts its owed to the 
companies that conducted business in Russia prior to the Revolution.  Yet others 
seemed to hail from genuinely altruistic motives, insofar as they believed that 
America’s refusal to recognize the Soviet Union further increased the suffering of the 
Soviet citizens.  Quoting Hugh Cooper, an engineer who built water power hydro-
electric plants in Russia, Francis Kellogg suggested that the U.S. should take 
leadership in improving the conditions of 160 million people who inhabited the 
Communist state.615  Arnold Margolin, a former member of the Ukrainian delegation 
to the Paris Peace Conference, also saw a recognition as a humane approach to the 
Soviet problem. According to him, this way, “the American government could render 
most valuable services to the population of present-day Russia by advising the Soviet 
government in an informal, friendly way with regard to modification in their political 
regime.”  Even a mere promise of holding genuine elections and establishing 
Constituent Assembly would be a huge achievement in that regard.  In Margolin’s 
view,  an important condition to the recognition would be the request that the Soviets 
“undertake obligation to let Soviet nationalities decide their own independence.”616     
On the political front there were several players who had long been pushing 
for normalizing relations with the Bolshevik regime.  With the election of Democratic 
candidate to office, some of these individuals gained leverage to advance their views 
on American policy.  One such person was William Bullitt, a one time envoy of 
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Woodrow Wilson to conduct talks with Lenin’s government at the height of the Civil 
War.  Born to a wealthy family which afforded him an ability to travel and live 
almost wherever he pleased, Bullitt spent much of his time afterward, traveling the 
cities of Europe until the opportunity availed itself for him to present himself in the 
freshening political scene in Washington.  As FDR’s presidential campaign rolled 
forward, Bullitt communicated with his special contacts inside the Roosevelt team.  In 
order, to impress the future president with his foreign policy credentials and 
knowledge of world affairs, Bullitt made several high profile trips around Europe -- 
which seemed to do the trick.  Known for his distinct views on dealing with the 
Russians (in contrast to the State Department and most other Russian experts of the 
Republican administration) and eager to advance those views, Bullitt soon became a 
visible figure in the foreign policy think tank of the victorious Roosevelt team.  A 
career that almost came to an abrupt end with a failed mission in 1919 appeared to 
have been given a new lease on life, and Bullitt would do anything in his power to 
utilize this opportunity.  
Perhaps the most prominent figure in shaping a friendlier American attitude 
toward the Soviet Union on the domestic political spectrum was the Republican 
Senator William Borah.  Throughout 1920’s and early 30’s the influential senator 
from Idaho chided the White House for what he viewed as a rigid attitude toward the 
Soviet power.  Having acquired the post of Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Senator Borah questioned the motives behind non-recognition and 
viewed them as counter-productive.  Often described as a “difficult” or perhaps even 




Secretaries of State rarely dared to cross him on significant issues.617  According to 
Norman Saul, “Borah, an American working man’s symbolic progressive was by 
nature in favor of the underdogs and saw bolshevism as a big step forward over the 
old regime in Russia.”618  In Senator’s mind, America’s decision to withhold 
recognition from a powerful nation such as Russia did not serve the cause of peace 
and created unnecessary tension throughout the world.  In a speech made to the 
Senate in 1931, Senator Borah made it clear that “peace among nations” would be 
“indefinitely retarded so long as one sixth of the earth’s surface, occupied by the third 
largest population in the world, is estranged and afraid.”619  But unlike some of his 
colleagues, who believed in the realist expediency of recognizing the Soviets, Senator 
Borah genuinely believed that the Soviet government reflected the legitimate desires 
of the Russian people and was, in fact, a good government. “The people of Russia are 
far better off under the present government than they have ever been in their 
history.”620  At the height of the famine in Ukraine and other agricultural regions of 
the USSR, Senator Borah had the following to say about the conditions of the 
peasants in Soviet Russia: “There can be no doubt, Mr. President, that a new life, a 
new existence has been given to the peasant of Russia. There can be no doubt that he 
is a different human being with a different outlook. They [Soviet authorities] may 
inveigh and propagandize and falsify the facts, but the truth is, that the revolution has 
released the Russian people from the old, dead, hopeless past…”  Turning his 
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criticism against the failures of capitalism in America, Senator Borah concluded his 
speech:  “I am, I confess, disturbed about the unsolved problems of capitalism, and I 
am almost equally disturbed over the fact that the time which we ought to devote to 
solving these questions and to bringing about conditions which would help to solve 
them, is devoted to attacking some other theory and agitating against some other 
government.”621  
William Borah’s fiery speech was fueled by the hardships of the Great 
Depression which, at the time, seemed to bring the entire edifice of American 
capitalism into question, but it was also a message of defiance against the prevailing 
sentiments in the U.S. Congress.  A prominent representative of the strong anti-
Communist faction was a Republican representative from New York, Hamilton Fish 
III.  Hailing from one of the prominent political families of the American North-East, 
the anti-Sovet Congressman was the grandson of Hamilton Fish Sr, the one time U.S. 
Secretary of State and a namesake of Alexander Hamilton.  While serving as a 
chairman of the committee to host foreign dignitaries in New York City in 1917, 
Hamilton Fish had been among the first Americans to greet the representatives of the 
Provisional Government in the United States.  Unlike Senator Borah and others, 
disillusioned by the crushing effects of the Great Depression, the Republican 
Congressman never believed the idea of the Communist Revolution as a progressive 
event in the history of the Russian people.  On the contrary, he considered the 
Bolshevik takeover as a great catastrophy not only for Russia but for the entire world 
which failed to take the threat of Communist ideology seriously.  As such, 
Representative Fish not only fought against the recognition, but the very idea of 
                                                 




Communism.  In 1930, he introduced House Resolution 180 and formed a committee 
devoted to monitoring Communist activities in the United States.  For two years, until 
the election of Roosevelt, this committee was active in investigating those suspected 
of carrying out or abetting Communist propaganda inside the United States.  An 
implacable enemy of the Soviet Union, Fish termed Communism as “the most 
important, the most vital, the most far-reaching, and the most dangerous issue in the 
world.”622  In this fight, he was joined by various quarters of American civil society. 
Nationwide organizations such as the National Civic Federation (NCF) and 
the American Federation Labor (AFL) staunchly opposed recognition.  The NCF 
petition signed by more than five thousand individuals expressed belief that  
“recognition of Soviet Russia would be a repudiation of all that our national life has 
represented for a hundred and fifty years and of all the spiritual ideals for which 
modern civilization has striven for two thousand years… There must be no 
compromise between American democracy and Russian Bolshevism.”  These 
organizations’ primary demands included explicit repudiation of the idea of 
worldwide revolution by the Communist state, compensation to the American 
nationals for confiscated property and the Soviet state’s need “to prove itself fit to 
associate with other nations.”  The leader of the National Civic Foundation, Ralph 
Easeley was particularly adamant on what he perceived as the dangerous Soviet 
incursions into the American landscape of ideas.  In his judgment, America should 
have taken more active steps to curb the Communist influence, by shutting down 
newspapers such as the Daily Worker, which frequently glorified Soviet 
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“achievements” before the American public.623  Other organizations opposing 
recognition of the Soviet state included the American Coalition of Patriotic, Civic and 
Fraternal Societies, National Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution, 
National Society of the Sons of the American Revolution, National Society United 
States Daughters of 1812.   
At a local level, the Chamber of Commerce from Hamilton Fish’s native state 
of New York addressed a letter to the newly elected FDR calling him not to recognize 
the Soviet Union.  The great argument of the proponents of the recognition was that 
such a step would enable the United States to further expand trade with the Soviets.  
But the facts, the Chamber of Commerce maintained, spoke otherwise: almost every 
other nation that had recognized the Soviet Union reaped no benefit from this gesture, 
nor would the United States.  Even if expansion of trade came to fruition, the letter 
argued, American capitalists did not wish to become accomplices to the spread of 
Communism.  “This is the considered, deliberate and virtually unanimous judgment 
of a large body of businessmen as eager for orders, if properly obtainable, as any 
merchants and manufacturers can be.  They do not want them from anywhere at the 
cost of selling their birthright,” concluded the President of the Chamber James 
Brown.624   
Another prominent businessman, Warren R. Roberts, Chairman of the Board 
of the Roberts and Schaefer Company expressed to Robert Kelley his readiness “at 
any time to submit confidential information” about his fellow entrepreneurs’ 
experiences in the Soviet Union.  In the letters that followed his meeting and serious 
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discussion with Kelley about the Soviet Union, Roberts gave the names of several 
representatives of major American companies whom he directly contacted in order to 
solicit their reports about the conditions in the USSR.  Roberts, no doubt, knew 
Kelley’s attitude toward the Soviet Union and judging from the content of his 
correspondence, he shared the East European Division chief’s apprehensions about 
the Communist state.  “I am greatly interested in this matter which I consider of vital 
importance to our Government and our people.  We must not allow our national 
officials to take  action in this matter which would be prejudicial to our best interests.  
I am confident that they will act wisely in the matter if they follow advice of your 
Division based on facts which you can submit,” he wrote.625
Such expressions of belief by American businessmen are noteworthy 
especially in light of the historical arguments which hold that the capitalists were at 
the forefront of the campaign to improve relations with the Soviet Union insofar as 
they had vested financial interests in such an outcome.  The results of a survey 
conducted by the liberal American Foundation among 485 professionals also reveal a 
more complex picture.  The responses to the question concerning the recognition 
broke down in the following order with the ratio between those who supported and 
those who opposed the measure: Businessmen – 75/56, Press – 65/17, Doctors – 
33/20, Religious Leaders – 20/6, University Teachers (from the faculties of history, 
law, economics and politics) – 118/12.626  Evidently, the businessmen, who according 
to most academic narratives addressing recognition played a vanguard role, displayed 
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greater parity between proponents and opponents of recognition, than those in any 
other profession category, including the press, academicians and, perhaps most 
surprisingly, American religious leaders who could not have been unaware of the 
intense Soviet persecution of Christianity.  
Equally vociferous in their opposition to recognizing the Soviet Union were 
the  organizations and individuals representing the non-Russian peoples of the USSR.  
The United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States, an umbrella organization 
for a dozen of groups representing the Ukrainian immigrant community in the United 
States, appealed to FDR, expressing its strong and unequivocal opposition the 
recognition of the USSR.  “During the past year several millions of inhabitants of 
Soviet Ukraine, the land of our ancestors, have died from starvation,” the appeal 
noted.  “The existence of this terrible famine in Ukraine has been repeatedly proven 
by the leading European and American press… It is impossible to give the exact 
figures as to the total number of deaths from this great famine, principally because of 
the rigid censorship in Soviet Russia.”  Drawing attention to the tragic plight of their 
countrymen back in the old country, the petition affirmed  “the well authenticated 
reports of impartial American and European newspaper correspondents that during 
the past year several million inhabitants of Ukraine have died a terrible death from 
starvation and even cannibalism was discovered in several sections of the country; all 
of this in a land which is regarded as one of the most fertile in the world.”627  
Similar sentiments were echoed in the letter to FDR by the Ukrainian National 
Council in Canada.  “Crop failure is not the reason for this famine, but the brutal 
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policy of the Moscow rulers who, needing grain for export to balance their budget, 
pitilessly take everything  from the farmers, already proletarized,” wrote the 
organization of the Ukrainian immigrants.  Asking the president to launch an 
independent investigation and arrange international relief, the Council declared its 
preparedness to supply Roosevelt “with original documents and information giving 
details of the famine conditions.” For the Ukrainian expatriates in North America, the 
recognition of the USSR was nothing other than validation of the Communist 
leadership’s genocidal policies in their native lands.628
In general, the émigré communities throughout the West battled against plans 
for recognition.  They criticized the proponents of recognition as either the tools of 
the Soviet regime or naives who lacked understanding of the realities inside the 
USSR.    In an article entitled “Crusade on Roosevelt: Struggle for Recognition of the 
USSR”,   the editorial staff of the Vozrojdenie (Revival) denounced individuals such 
as Albert Einstein, a member in the league “Friends of Russia”.629  How could the 
United States prepare itself for rapprochement at the time the Soviet terror and 
persecution seemed to have reached apex.  “Since the times of Ivan the Terrible 
Russia has not seen such terror…Is it possible that the world will still be silent? Is it 
possible that governments will still continue to make trade pacts with the Bolshevist 
murderers, strengthening the Soviet government and undermining their own 
countries?” inquired the Alexandra Tolstoy, the daughter of renowned Russian writer 
Leo Tolstoy.630  In a similar tone, Russian-born Vladimir Mitkevich implored 
Washington not to recognize the Communist government: “The monster has hidden 
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itself behind newspaper lies.  It, also, has hidden from the world the true picture of 
the excruciatory torture of the Russian people on the cross.”631
The Paris-based newspaper Dni (Days) detailed an account of the Communist 
Party meeting in which Viacheslav Molotov had spoken of the need to draw lessons 
from the famine of 1921-23.  “One need not be afraid,” he said, “of the mere word 
‘famine’. The famine of 1921-23 disposed of the surplus population and thus 
consolidated the Soviet rule, while helping it to take the country well in hand and to 
acquire stability.”  “What if we really have too much population, more than technical 
agriculture can provide for?” asked another Soviet minister Kosareff attending the 
meeting.632  The February issue of Dni reported on the meeting of local émigrés 
organized by former head of the Provisional Government Alexander Kerensky.  In 
that meeting Kerensky analyzed the results of the five-year plan which he 
characterized as “the sharp recrudescence of the struggle between the Soviet 
government and the peasantry.” According to Kerensky, “rural population was being 
deliberately exterminated to consolidate Stalin’s dictatorship,” and this went hand in 
hand with Nikolai Bukharin’s statement at the Politburo session to the effect that the 
Party had now entered a renewed phase of the Civil War.  Kerensky saw parallels 
between the present behavior of the Soviet power and its actions during the war when 
the Communists agreed “to stop at nothing in exterminating the useless and 
antagonistic elements of the population.”  For the Communists, “Russia is only a base 
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and the Russian people material,” proclaimed Kerensky, and the recognition of this 
government would not in any way help the cause of the Russian people.633   
Yet others, putting aside the question of recognition, appealed to the 
American leaders for help to the Soviet Union’s starving population.  In a letter 
addressed to the American Red Cross and President Roosevelt, United National 
Russian Organization asked them to approve aid to famine stricken regions of Russia.  
Noting that 40 percent of the Soviet population was suffering from acute starvation, 
the organization expressed hope that the American government would not stand idly 
by while millions of Russians perished.  “We hardly need to add  that we are firmly 
convinced that the tragic condition now prevailing in the USSR are the immediate 
and direct result of the insane political and economic policies pursued by the Stalin 
regime,” stated the letter.634  Prominent Russian émigré Charles R. Kotcharovsky, in 
his letter to FDR, appealed to the same American spirit of generosity that once saved 
millions of Russian during the famine of 1921-23.  “Only the USA can, both from 
moral and material point of view, save Russia for a second time from a dreadful 
disaster,” Kotcharovsky wrote.  Moreover such aid, he argued, would help mollify 
popular resentment against foreign powers.635  A copy of the letter addressed to 
Herbert Hoover did not elicit response.   
Nor did the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin seem too eager to obtain foreign aid 
for his starving subjects.  From the viewpoint of the Kremlin, the peasants had proven 
themselves to be the enemies of the Soviet power and their self-destructive 
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unwillingness to contribute to the industrialization of the country was the main cause 
of their demise.  The course could not be changed.  Moreover, by 1933, Stalin’s 
position was too strong to be undermined by the death of a few million peasants in the 
isolated corners of the Soviet Union.   
The Czech representative in Moscow, Josef Girsa, in a conversation with U.S. 
diplomat in Prague, Charles Crane, observed that Stalin felt so secure in his 
leadership post that the proletarian dictatorship had in fact become Stalin’s personal 
dictatorship.  Having arisen from “the lowest class of people,” according to 
Ukrainian-born Girsa, Stalin was a man of “great energy, obstinacy and of an Asiatic 
mentality.”  “He not only hates capitalists; he is against European communists, 
considering them as halfhearted, with no back-bone and capable of all sorts of 
compromises,” noted the Czech diplomat.  In contrast to the population, he said, “the 
army is excellent, well-armed, well fed, well-dressed and well-provided with all the 
latest technical equipment.”  With the Red Army consisting of 650,000 men plus 
150,000 GPU soldiers placed under Stalin’s command, there was simply no chance of 
a coup by an organized group of opposition.  Communists have existed for 15 years, 
he went on, and they know how to maintain government.  Despite all his political 
success, however, the economic policies were headed in the wrong direction.  The 
collectivization, Girsa argued, attacked eighty five percent of the peasants.  The 
Ukrainians and Don Cossacks suffered the most as a result, he told his American 
counterpart.636    
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The documents about the internal conditions in the USSR which the State 
Department had at its disposal gave credence to expressions pertaining to the 
desperate nature of the situation in Soviet Union.  Throughout the American 
embassies and consulates in the vicinity of the Soviet Union, the information was 
pouring in about the worsening conditions in that country.  In a conversation which 
Felix Cole and John A. Lehrs held with two members of the Latvian Legation in 
Moscow, the latter reported that most foreign diplomats stationed Moscow found the 
present famine to be worse than that of 1921-22.  They estimated that seven to eight 
million humans had died due to the famine that prevailed throughout the Soviet 
Union, but was “most acute in the North Caucasus, Ukraine, Lower Volga and 
peasant populated areas.”  In the words of Felix Cole, “asked whether in his opinion 
the Soviet Government would permit the organization of a foreign famine relief, 
similar to the one organized in 1921, [his] informant replied in the negative.”637  It is 
likely that, Stalin, better than anyone, understood the implications of the foreign aid 
which would have meant that his collectivization policy was a failure.  Above all, it 
would facilitate an uncontrolled influx of foreign volunteers into the country which he 
had worked so hard to isolate from the rest of the world.  In this particular regard, 
1930’s Russia was not the Russia that was a decade ago.  
Having spent 17 months in the USSR as the Finnish Charge d’Affaires, 
Raphael Hakkarainen returned to his homeland in 1933 with views matching those of 
the Latvian diplomats.  “Economic conditions have gone from bad to worse in the 
Soviet Union,” he informed his American interlocutor in Helsingfors, “The peasants 
have refused cooperation with the Soviet authorities and the drastic regulations laid 
                                                 




down for the farmers have resulted in acute shortage of food.”  According to the 
American interviewer, Hakkarainen added that he did “not see what the U.S. could 
gain through an alteration of its long continued policy of non-recognition.”  Russia 
cannot buy American products anyway, said the Finnish diplomat.  The Soviet 
desired recognition from the U.S. in order to life up their prestige in the international.  
As for the United States, it had no need for the Soviet Union, the diplomat 
concluded.638  Moreover the negative depictions of the Soviet Union did not just 
come from the representatives of the countries regarded as mostly hostile to the 
Soviet Union.  In Athens, a Turkish diplomat who had served in Moscow during 
1920’s told his American counterpart that “the present famine is as bad as the worst 
post-war years.”  Coming from the representative of a nation which maintained strong 
relations with the Soviets, the Turk’s gloomy depiction of the Soviet conditions 
impressed the American consul.639  The former ambassador of Kemal Atatürk to 
France went even further by stating that conditions in Russia were so terrible such 
that “only a leader was needed for revolt.”640
“The majority of the population would welcome invasion by a foreign power 
in that it would probably mean a change from present conditions. The Army is only 
loyal because it is distinctly better fed and better clothed than the rest of the 
population.”  This was the opinion of an American who had just visited Russia in 
March of 1933.  In a missive sent to Robert Kelley, the director of the Naval 
Intelligence Hayne Ellis described his interview as “hot off the griddle” but also 
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wondered aloud whether his interlocutor had supplied anything particularly new.  
According to the unnamed American, the Soviet system was based purely on 
compulsion and there was no freedom of speech whatsoever.  The Soviet 
collectivization policies in Ukraine had produced great tension in the region.  Prior to 
collectivization, he stated, the peasants in lived well, but now they were left with 
nothing.  Meat in the cities was scarce, since livestock had been killed during 
collectivization.  During his stay in Soviet Union, the visitor claimed not to have seen 
“a single animal that was not sick.” All the food went to the army whereas the food 
for the general population was inedible.  According to Ellis’ interlocutor Moscow’s 
streets were filled with beggars and the prices for drugs sand other basic necessities 
were exorbitantly high.  The conditions which he described were nothing short of a 
breakdown of an economic system, if there was ever any.641
The efforts to conceal the truth about famine included consistent intimidation 
of foreign correspondents located in Moscow to whom it was made implicitly clear 
that reporting on the subject would be recognized as a hostile act against the Soviet 
government – a government that was in charge of issuing frequently required short-
term visas without which a foreign reporter could not remain at his post or even job.  
Most correspondents often waited to leave the confines of Russia or meet a fellow 
American before they would confide about the true conditions inside the USSR.   
William Allen White, the publisher of Emporia Gazette, whose tour of the Soviet 
Union was arranged by Intourist, was surprised when a fellow American journalist 
told him that the country was indeed suffering from a great famine and from a 
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widespread epidemic of typhoid.  Williams recalled the conversation: “The first 
correspondent who wrote a story about the famine was very much afraid that after the 
publication of his story in the American newspapers he would be expelled from 
Russia.  Subsequently the American correspondents in Russia entered into a 
gentleman’s agreement that all of them would write stories on the famine, so that if 
the Soviet government expels correspondents for writing famine stories, it will have 
to expel the whole corps of American correspondents.”642  If so, then the renowned 
correspondent of the New York Times William Duranty was not among them.  As one 
American journalist who after traveling to the Soviet Union confided in the U.S. 
envoy in Iran, Charles C. Hart, no man could remain long in Russia and write the 
truth for the outside world.  “Go to Russia for a few days, then read Walter Duranty’s 
despatches from Moscow to the New York Times, and one is quickly convinced of one 
of two things,” he told Hart, “Walter Duranty has embraced wholeheartedly the 
philosophy of Russian communism or is one of those persons who likes his job so 
well that he will write nothing to impair his position.”643
However, Duranty’s ambitions went beyond the objective of retaining his job.  
Throughout his tenure in Moscow as the correspondent of the New York Times, he 
had carefully cultivated close relations with top Soviet leaders, and one could even 
say, had earned their confidence, as far as such confidence could be won in a country 
such as the Soviet Union.  His rigid self-censorship on the topic of famine had earned 
significant political capital before the Soviet officials.  Walter Duranty may not have 
been well-respected among the his colleagues of diplomatic observers of Soviet 
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Russia, but he greatly mattered to those who wished to normalize relations between 
Washington and the Kremlin.  To this end, Duranty not only enjoyed the sympathies 
of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin but also the new Democratic administration and the 
left-leaning intellectual elite which eagerly favored the recognition of the socialist 
USSR.  Walter Duranty had met and discussed the Soviet affairs with Franklin 
Roosevelt when the latter was still a governor and, the reporter’s impression was that 
the future president had “a broadminded interest and profound knowledge of Soviet 
affairs.”644  It was thus no coincidence that in November of 1933, Duranty came to 
accompany Soviet foreign commissar Maxim Litvinov to the Untied States for the 
talks on recognition.   In America, the journalist was greeted with great jubilation by 
those who knew very little about the Soviet Union except through Duranty’s powerful 
pen.  Upon his return, the correspondent was given an exclusive audience with Joseph 
Stalin.  The interview with the Soviet dictator was yet another chance for Duranty to 
bask in the glory of his unrivaled reputation as a journalist, but for Stalin, it was a 
way of thanking his distant but useful ally within the unfaithful corps of Western 
newspaper reporters.  “I might say that you bet on our horse to win when others 
thought it had no chance – and I’m sure you have not lost by it,” Stalin told 
Duranty.645   
Just prior to the interview, the debate over recognition in the United States had 
reached the watershed as each side presented arguments before the president who had 
in fact made up his mind about normalizing ties with the Soviet Union.  Among 
numerous opponents of the recognition, the one with utmost importance was the State 
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Department and its pertinent divisions.  As early as February of 1933, the chief of the 
U.S. Legation in Latvia, Robert Skinner, had sent a six page report outlining the 
views of his department on the “Recognition of Russia.”  Skinner’s position was that 
the Soviets needed America far more than America needed them.  Therefore it was 
imperative upon Washington to lay down its terms for recognition which at minimum 
included payment of the debt inherited from the Provisional Government and 
cessation of all propaganda activities against the United States.  Overall, Skinner was 
cool toward the idea of unconditional recognition and saw significant obstacles that 
had to be settled before establishing diplomatic relations.646  Skinner’s stand was 
backed by his superiors at the State Department, notably Robert Kelley, whose terms 
for recognizing the Soviet regime remained essentially unchanged since he had 
become the Chief of the East European Division.  However, Kelley was not alone in 
his skepticism toward the idea of recognition.  This position was also shared by the 
Division of Far East Affairs, which in a lengthy report examining the geopolitical 
implications of recognizing USSR vis a vis China and Japan, concluded that 
considerations against recognition outweighed those for it.  The significance of the 
Far Eastern Division’s report resided in the fact that it debunked one of the most 
serious arguments in favor of recognition which held that recognizing the Soviet 
Union was an effective measure in countering the Japanese expansionism in East 
Asia.  According to the report, such a step would push further militarization of Japan 
which would feel threatened by close interaction between Washington and Moscow.  
“Instead of dealing with 2 nations [China and Japan] that don’t share Western 
political moralities, we would be dealing with three – and the third might prove to be 
                                                 




the most difficult of them all,” the report warned.  Furthermore, the Division saw no 
economic benefits from establishing ties with a Communist regime that stifled free 
commerce and was destitute as a result of its own economic policies.647   
Even the opposition from the most relevant departments of his government, 
however, did not prevent FDR from going through with his decision to recognize.  As 
a newly elected president Roosevelt saw recognition of the USSR as the first major 
foreign policy step which for whatever reason he had been convinced he had to take.  
The recognition of the Soviet Union was also indicative of the way Roosevelt, who 
relied more on his personal friends and contacts, rather than expert administrators, 
made foreign policy decisions.  Roosevelt often “bypassed his bureaucracies by 
establishing parallel organizations responsible only to the White House.”648  Among 
such parallel influences were the chairman of the Farm Credit Association Henry 
Morganthau and William Bullitt, who oversaw much of the process leading to 
recognition.  In the course of the preceding months Bullitt took steps to outmaneuver 
the opponents of recognition within the government, and the arrival of Maxim 
Litvinov in Washington toward the end of 1933 was partly due to his efforts in the 
White House. 
In May of 1933, FDR sent a letter to the world leaders inviting the 
government to “join the international arrangement to secure peace, prosperity and 
disarmament.”  Among the addressees of the letter was the Soviet President Mikhail 
Kalinin (who was nominally considered to be the head of the Soviet state).  This was 
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the first time that an American official, the President himself, had engaged in 
communication with the Soviet government.649  Two months later, Roosevelt sent 
Bullitt as his envoy to the London Economic Conference and instructed him to meet 
with the head of the Soviet delegation Maxim Litvinov.  Around the same time, 
Henry Morganthau met with the Amtorg chairman in New York Boris Skvirskii to 
pass along a message from the President who assured the Soviet representative that he 
had  “the whole Russian situation under consideration and the delay in no way is 
prejudicial.”650
 Robert Kelley understood the implications of these developments and moved 
to make the most of the recognition talks.  Despite the tensions between the two, 
Kelley managed to convince Bullitt in the importance of debts.  In addition, the issues 
of religious freedoms for the Americans residing in the USSR and the Communist 
propaganda became top items on the negotiations agenda.  After arriving in 
Washington on November 8, 1933, Maxim Litvinov spent the next eight days trying 
to fend off the demands by the unlikely team of Kelley and Bullitt who insisted that 
the Soviets comply with these terms.  Despite intense pressure, Litvinov refused to 
budge on any single item.  Maintaining that the Soviet laws and policies already 
conformed with  those conditions placed forth by the Americans, Litvinov argued that 
these negotiations should take place after the recognition.  He had not come to 
Washington to negotiate, Litvinov conveyed, but to receive the honors of recognition.  
Soviet foreign commissar went as far as turning down President Roosevelt’s request 
to join him at the latter’s Georgia retreat for a personal conversation.  A long time 
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diplomat, Litvinov could not have picked up on the irony of haggling over the 
question of recognition once the Soviet foreign minister had already been received at 
the White House.  In effect, the Americans had already recognized the Soviet Union 
before the official recognition on November 16, 1933, following the talks in which 
the Soviets ultimately accommodated the American demands in the vaguest terms 
possible. Interestingly, the terror-famine inside the USSR and other Soviet domestic 
practices, which the Americans had so meticulously monitored over the years, played 
no role whatsoever in these talks.  The State Department, known for its cautious 
attitude toward recognition, focused its apprehensions on the legalistic aspects of 
bilateral discourse and mostly limited its involvement to logistical functions.  The 
American leadership appeared certain that what the Soviet government did to its own 
people should have no effect upon the interaction between the two states.  
  On November 29, 1934, the newly appointed American Ambassador to the 
Soviet Union William Bullitt departed for the Soviet Union.  He was met at the 
border by the Soviet officials who greeted him with utmost courtesy and accompanied 
him to the Soviet capital in a private luxury car.  The Associated Press reported that 
“it was the first time in the history of the Soviet Government that any foreign 
ambassador had been met at the  frontier or shown any attention whatsoever before 
arriving in Moscow.”651  In the capital city, he was greeted with even greater fanfare 
and ushered to his lavishly decorated apartment residence.  Bullitt almost 
immediately went on to visit the grave of his hero Jack Reed where he lay flowers.  A 
few days later, Litvinov threw a sumptuous dinner party to Bullitt’s honor attended by 
supreme leadership of the Soviet regime.  In the course of dinner party which Bullitt 
                                                 




characterized as a “superb banquet with food and wines of a quality that no one in 
America would dare to serve nowadays,” the American ambassador met with Joseph 
Stalin, Sergei Molotov and other members of the Soviet brass who heaped praise after 
praise upon Bullitt the Friend.652  Over a dinner table clad with most luxurious food 
items and alcoholic beverages, Stalin said to Bullitt: “I want you to understand that if 
you want to see me at any time, day or night, you have only to let me know and I will 
see you at once.”  When asked by Stalin if there was anything he wanted in the Soviet 
Union, Bullitt requested a fifteen acre ground in the city park for the embassy 
residence.  Stalin granted Bullitt’s wish on the spot.  As Bullitt reached out to shake 
hands with Stalin, the Soviet leader took the ambassador’s head in his two hands and 
planted a large kiss on his face.  Overwhelmed by the unusually warm hospitality by 
the Soviet, Bullitt went home that night and wrote:  “The men at the head of the 
Soviet Government today are really intelligent, sophisticated, vigorous human beings 
and they cannot be persuaded to waste their time with the ordinary conventional 
diplomatists.  On the other hand, they are extremely eager to have contact with 
anyone who has first-rate intelligence and dimension as a human being.”653  As far as 
Bullitt was concerned, he was one such human being.  For the long-time sympathizer 
of the Communist regime, all of Bullitt’s beliefs about the Soviet Union and himself 
seemed to be validated in one memorable encounter in the Kremlin.  Much seemed to 
have changed since the last American ambassador, David R. Francis, frequently 
disparaged for being unsuitable for his post, left Russia from the Bolshevik besieged 
city of Archangel on a stretcher.   The first Cold War was effectively over.             
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Altogether the despatches prepared by the American diplomats successfully conveyed 
the internal conditions in Soviet Russia which, from 1917 until 1933, were 
consistently poor, frequently reaching the point of humanitarian disaster.  While the 
influence of these despatches on the official policies of Washington varied between 
successive administrations, for those involved in Soviet affairs, especially at the U.S. 
State Department, the documents constituted a primary and reliable source of 
information with regard to the situation in the USSR.  By closely monitoring the 
Soviet press and interviewing a wide variety of individuals coming out of the country, 
the American diplomats were able to compile worthy volumes of information and 
pass them to Washington.  Ultimately, based on this knowledge, influential figures 
within the foreign policy establishment developed their views of the Soviet state, 
even though not always did they succeed in convincing their superiors at the White 
House to share the similar outlook.   
 In this dissertation I have attempted to examine and understand the despatches 
from the standpoint of those at the receiving end of the information.  The despatches 
came from a number of diplomatic stations in various locations, and as such, their 
perspectives were often limited in range.  The authors of many of these despatches 
rarely witnessed the events directly, instead frequently relying upon sources which 
could not always be verified.  Especially in the aftermath of the Civil War, when the 
American diplomats were forced to evacuate Bolshevik-occupied territories, the 
observers were left with little choice but to obtain knowledge through visitors, 




Western visitors’ political allegiances, the refugees’ inevitable anti-Soviet sentiments, 
and the isolation of foreign diplomats under the watchful eye of the OGPU 
constituted genuine obstacles to acquiring an accurate sense of Soviet realities.  In 
numerous instances, providers of information did exaggerate their experiences.  
Nevertheless, the degree of subjectivity and bias in each individual report did not 
radically alter the overall picture of the Soviet internal conditions in the eyes of those 
who read these despatches in their entirety.  Moreover, the overwhelming number of 
despatches spoke of the harsh political and economic atmosphere in the Soviet Union 
with such consistency and detail, that it would be impossible, if not erroneous, to 
overlook their validity as historical evidence. 
 As these despatches reveal, for the inhabitants  of the Soviet state, the 
period between 1917 and 1933 was highly tumultuous.  Almost from the onset of the 
Bolshevik power, political persecution, famine, and general human suffering became 
a norm of life in Russia.  Judging by the sheer scale of its atrocities, there is no 
question that Communism was a significant departure even from the autocratic 
political tradition of Tsarist Russia.  According to Nicholas Werth, writing in Black 
Book of Communism, “for the whole period of 1825-1917, the number of death 
sentences passed by the tsarist courts (including court-martials) ‘relating to political 
matters’ came to only 6,321,” whereas in the course of two months alone in autumn 
of 1918, Bolsheviks executed between 10,000 and 15,000.654  An eyewitness to the 
revolutionary turmoil, Dmitri Likhachev strongly believed that “the most merciless 
period of repression” began not in 1937-38, but as early beginning from 1918, “when 
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officers, members of the bourgeoisie, professors and especially the clergy and 
members of religious orders, together with Russian, Ukrainian and White Russian 
peasants were being shot in thousands, and that was all considered natural.”655  In the 
West, some historians have long argued about the distinct nature of Communism as a 
totalitarian model which bore little resemblance to the autocracies of the past.  
Among them, Martin Malia has most vociferously demonstrated that while distinct 
from other authoritarian regimes, the Communists’ attachment to Marxist-Leninist 
vision of society with its implacable hostility toward private property, individual 
rights, and political pluralism placed the country under their rule on a path to famine, 
mass executions and the Gulag.656
While Communism remained the central target, the question of the Russian 
national character also dominated the discussion and analyses of foreign observers 
who tried to locate the social origins of  what they saw as a patently evil system of 
governance.  There was firm conviction by some, as expressed in numerous 
despatches, that the regime such as the one which existed in Russia could only exist 
in Russia.  “On entering the country of the Russians, one sees at a glance that the 
social order as arranged by them can only serve only for their use.  One must be 
Russian to live in Russia,”657 Custine had observed a century ago – an observation 
that was also characteristic by those who used it to justify the Soviet tyranny.  This is 
what the New York Times correspondent Walter Duranty believed he was doing when 
he rationalized the absence of remorse for the deaths of millions during the 
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collectivization, by uttering, “but they are only Russians.”  For Duranty’s audience in 
America, Russia remained as mysterious as it had been for the Frenchmen for whom 
Custine produced his diaries.  In their rudimentary knowledge, Russia had always 
been a place where human lives and dignity counted for little.  It should be noted that 
the relations between pre-Bolshevik Russia and America, while courteous, were never 
too friendly insofar as the American political elite associated Russia with arbitrary 
rule, oppression and ethnic pogroms.  “I am a great believer,” George Kennan 
asserted, “in the power of the soil over the human beings who live above it.”658  It is 
noteworthy that long before young George Kennan assumed his post in Riga and 
commenced writing reports about internal conditions in the Soviet Union, another 
George F. Kennan, his great uncle, had authored series of reports from his journey, 
familiarizing the general American public about the tyranny that was Tsarist Russia.   
Without doubt, the American attitude toward the Soviet regime had as much 
to do with the Americans and their belief structure as it did with the realities of 
Russia.  Eminent scholars of the history of the American foreign policy, John Lewis 
Gaddis and Robert Kagan, have characterized the role of the United States on the 
international stage as unique and unprecedented.659  They have argued that as the first 
and most powerful liberal democratic republic in the history of mankind, the 
American political philosophy sprung from deeply-seated belief which held “these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights.”  As such, the bedrock of the American 
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doctrine, regardless of even the sharpest differences between its political leaders, had 
been the implicit recognition that in the long run the American interests would be best 
served if the republican ideals espoused by the founding fathers prevailed throughout 
the world.  The roots of this thesis can be found in Thomas Paine’s earliest 
exhortation that “the cause of America is, in a great measure, the cause of all 
mankind.”  Interestingly, what made the Soviet Union (unlike old Russia) and the 
United States similar in one single regard was the universality of their aspirations, and 
this similarity was also the cause of an inevitable conflict between the two almost 
diametrically opposed ideologies.  From the moment the Bolsheviks took control of 
the Winter Palace, the United States and the newborn Soviet state had become natural 
rivals.   
At the height of the Second Cold War, a notable number of American scholars 
of Russia refused to give credence to the earlier reports, and often blamed America 
for the state of hostility with the Soviet Union.660  Armed with the refrain that Soviet 
Russia needed to be understood in its own terms and through its own logic, these 
historians rationalized, deemphasized or outright dismissed the facts about the horrors 
of Soviet Communism that dated to its revolutionary origin.661  A long time critic of 
the Soviet Union, historian Robert Conquest wrote in the aftermath of the Cold War:  
“It is, unfortunately, only too easy to show that many of the then intelligentsia in the 
United States, the United Kingdom and elsewhere were deceived into accepting and 
                                                 
660 William Appleman Williams’, American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947 (New York: Rinehart,1952) 
was a seminal book that essentially blamed the United States for initiating the Cold War against the 
USSR.  Williams became an intellectual mentor to a generation of scholars who often identified 
American imperialistic tendencies as the root cause of the problems facing the country and in some 
cases, the entire world.  
661 Frequently referred as ‘revisionists’, more prominent among such historians were Sheila 
Fitzpatrick, Jerry Hough, J. Arch Getty who downplayed the Soviet atrocities, instead guiding their 




supporting a huge fabric of lies. The Soviet Union despite its horrors, remained 
acceptable or even praiseworthy, until Khrushchev’s secret speech of February 1956, 
and even after then with some…. The truth, though not provided by the Soviet 
authorities, was available in scores of hundreds of firsthand accounts.”662
Indeed, a significant part of the failure of some intellectuals and their inability 
to identify the depravity of the Soviet system was in their unwillingness to scrutinize 
observer reports such as those reflected in the diplomatic despatches.  Reading these 
despatches which were written in the formative years of the Soviet Union, one is 
struck by the similarity of the insights provided in 1920’s and those written about the 
later period of Stalinist terror.  In that sense, the observer reports put to question the 
idea of sharp discontinuity between the reigns of Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin.  
The despatches make it evident that Stalin, while quite naturally endowed with 
specific characteristics of his own, was the product of a political system which from 
its inception attached little value to human life and had adopted a political-economic 
platform that was bound to and did lead to a great loss of human life through political 
persecution and periodic famines.  Hostility toward market, severe intolerance for 
dissent, and the rule by fear were not just deeply ingrained in the policies of the 
Soviet leadership, they constituted the raison d’etre of the regime.  Thus, 
characterizing Joseph Stalin as an aberration in the evolution of an otherwise 
reformable entity, as some historians have done, seriously underestimates the primacy 
of the Communist ideology in the functioning of the Soviet state.663  In fact, much of 
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the First Cold War encompassed the years during which Stalin did not yet enjoy 
absolute power, but the Bolshevik practices had already produced millions of victims. 
The partial opening of the archives in the former Soviet Union has brought 
much needed clarity to the debates about the Soviet past.  This development has also 
accomplished an important task in that it has validated the American diplomatic 
despatches and observer reports which overwhelmingly and negatively reflect on the 
conditions in the USSR.  Some scholars ordinarily hold foreign observer reports at a 
low esteem, and often dismiss them as amateurish or superficial analyses of otherwise 
deep socio-political and historical trends transpiring in the subject country.  But as 
historian Marshall Poe has demonstrated in his groundbreaking narrative on European 
ethnography on Russia of 15-18th centuries, when dealing with despotic and recluse 
societies, foreign observers are sometimes the only reliable source of information, 
and these sources can actually help to obtain an accurate picture of the reality.664  The 
English merchants of 16-th century Russia were not trained in the loaded notions of 
epistemology, resistance, or agency, but they recognized tyranny when they saw it.  
Likewise, a great number of observers, including the diplomats, who dealt with the 
Soviet Union between 1917 and 1933, lacked an in-depth training in philosophy, 
political science, history or Russia itself.  Their basic faculties of judgement, 
however, allowed them to experience and discern the intolerable quality of life under 
the Communist regime.  Perhaps mindful of the intellectual snobbery of his 
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colleagues in the art of humanities in contrast to the common man, George Orwell 
had penned: “To see what is in front of one’s nose needs a constant struggle.”  
Unfortunately, a considerable echelon of policy-makers and erudites lost in this 
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